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Résumé
La gouvernance de l'Internet est une thématique récente dans la politique mondiale. Néanmoins, elle est devenue
au fil des années un enjeu économique et politique important. La question a même pris une importance particulière
au cours des derniers mois en devenant un sujet d'actualité récurrent. Forte de ce constat, cette recherche retrace
l'histoire de la gouvernance de l'Internet  depuis  son émergence comme  enjeu politique dans les années 1980
jusqu'à la fin du Sommet Mondial sur la Société de l'Information (SMSI) en 2005. Plutôt que de se focaliser sur
l'une ou l'autre des institutions impliquées dans la régulation du réseau informatique mondial, cette recherche
analyse l'émergence et l'évolution historique d'un espace de luttes  rassemblant un nombre croissant d'acteurs
différents. Cette évolution est décrite à travers le prisme de la relation dialectique entre élites et non-élites et de la
lutte autour de la définition de la gouvernance de l'Internet. Cette thèse explore donc la question de comment les
relations  au  sein  des  élites  de  la  gouvernance  de  l'Internet  et  entre  ces  élites  et  les  non-élites  expliquent
l'emergence, l'évolution et la structuration d'un champ relativement autonome de la politique mondiale centré sur
la gouvernance de l'Internet.
Contre  les perspectives dominantes réaliste et  libérales, cette recherche s'ancre dans une  approche issue de la
combinaison  des  traditions  hétérodoxes  en  économie  politique  internationale  et  des  apports  de  la  sociologie
politique internationale. Celle-ci s'articule autour des concepts de champ, d'élites et d'hégémonie. Le concept de
champ, développé par Bourdieu inspire un nombre croissant d'études de la politique mondiale. Il permet à la fois
une  étude  différenciée  de  la  mondialisation  et  l'émergence  d'espaces  de  lutte  et  de  domination  au  niveau
transnational.  La  sociologie  des  élites,  elle,  permet  une  approche pragmatique  et  centrée  sur  les  acteurs  des
questions de pouvoir dans la mondialisation. Cette recherche utilise plus particulièrement le concept d'élite du
pouvoir de Wright Mills pour étudier l'unification d'élites a priori différentes autour de projets communs. Enfin,
cette étude reprend le concept néo-gramscien d'hégémonie afin d'étudier à la fois la stabilité relative du pouvoir
d'une élite garantie par la dimension consensuelle de la domination, et les germes de changement contenus dans
tout ordre international.
A travers l'étude des documents produits au cours de la période étudiée et en s'appuyant sur la création de bases de
données sur les réseaux d'acteurs, cette étude s'intéresse aux débats qui ont suivi la commercialisation du réseau au
début des années 1990 et aux négociations lors du SMSI. La première période a abouti à la création de l'Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) en 1998. Cette création est le résultat de la recherche
d'un consensus entre les discours dominants des années 1990. C'est également le fruit d'une coalition entre intérêts
au sein d'une élite du pouvoir de la gouvernance de l'Internet. Cependant, cette institutionnalisation de l'Internet
autour de l'ICANN excluait un certain nombre d'acteurs et de discours qui ont depuis tenté de renverser cet ordre.
Le SMSI a été le cadre de la remise en cause du mode de gouvernance de l'Internet  par les États exclus du
système, des universitaires et certaines ONG et organisations internationales. C'est pourquoi le SMSI constitue la
seconde  période  historique  étudiée  dans  cette  thèse.  La  confrontation  lors  du  SMSI  a  donné  lieu  à  une
reconfiguration de l'élite du pouvoir de la gouvernance de l'Internet ainsi qu'à une redéfinition des frontières du
champ. Un nouveau projet hégémonique a vu le jour autour d'éléments discursifs tels que le multipartenariat et
autour d'insitutions telles que le Forum sur la Gouvernance de l'Internet. Le succès relatif de ce projet a permis
une stabilité insitutionnelle inédite depuis la fin du SMSI et une acceptation du discours des élites par un grand
nombre d'acteurs du champ. Ce n'est que récemment que cet ordre a été remis en cause par les pouvoirs émergents
dans la gouvernance de l'Internet. 
Cette thèse cherche à contribuer au débat scientifique sur trois plans. Sur le plan théorique, elle contribue à l'essor
d'un  dialogue  entre  approches  d'économie  politique  mondiale  et  de  sociologie  politique  internationale  afin
d'étudier à la fois les dynamiques structurelles liées au processus de mondialisation et les pratiques localisées des
acteurs dans un domaine précis. Elle insiste notamment sur l'apport de les notions de champ et d'élite du pouvoir
et sur  leur compatibilité  avec les anlayses néo-gramsciennes de l'hégémonie. Sur le plan méthodologique,  ce
dialogue se traduit par une utilisation de méthodes sociologiques telles que l'anlyse de réseaux d'acteurs et de
déclarations pour compléter l'analyse qualitative de documents. Enfin, sur le plan empirique, cette recherche offre
une perspective originale sur la gouvernance de l'Internet en insistant sur sa dimension historique, en démontrant
la fragilité du concept de gouvernance multipartenaire (multistakeholder) et en se focalisant sur les rapports de
pouvoir et les liens entre gouvernance de l'Internet et mondialisation.
Abstract
Internet  governance  is  a  recent issue  in  global  politics.  However,  it  gradually  became a major  political  and
economic issue. It recently became even more important and now appears regularly in the news. Against this
background, this research outlines the history of Internet governance from its emergence as a political issue in the
1980s to the end of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2005. Rather than focusing on one or
the other institution involved in Internet governance, this research analyses the emergence and historical evolution
of a space of struggle affecting a growing number of different actors. This evolution is described through the
analysis of the dialectical relation between elites and non-elites and through the struggle around the definition of
Internet governance. The thesis explores the question of how the relations among the elites of Internet governance
and between these elites and non-elites explain the emergence, the evolution, and the structuration of a relatively
autonomous field of world politics centred around Internet governance. 
Against  dominant  realist  and  liberal  perspectives,  this  research  draws upon a  cross-fertilisation  of  heterodox
international political economy and international political sociology. This approach focuses on concepts such as
field, elites and hegemony. The concept of field, as developed by Bourdieu, is increasingly used in International
Relations to build a differentiated analysis of globalisation and to describe the emergence of transnational spaces
of struggle and domination. Elite sociology allows for a pragmatic actor-centred analysis of the issue of power in
the globalisation process. This research particularly draws on Wright Mill's concept of power elite in order to
explore the unification of different  elites  around shared projects.  Finally,  this  thesis uses the Neo-Gramscian
concept of hegemony in order to study both the consensual dimension of domination and the prospect of change
contained in any international order. 
Through the analysis of the documents produced within the analysed period, and through the creation of databases
of networks of actors, this research  focuses on the debates that followed the commercialisation of the Internet
throughout the 1990s and during the WSIS. The first time period led to the creation of the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in 1998. This creation resulted from the consensus-building between the
dominant discourses of the time. It also resulted from the coalition of interests among an emerging power elite.
However, this institutionalisation of Internet governance around the ICANN excluded a number of actors and
discourses that resisted this mode of governance. The WSIS became the institutional framework within which the
governance system was questioned by some excluded states, scholars, NGOs and intergovernmental organisations.
The confrontation between the power elite and counter-elites during the WSIS triggered a reconfiguration of the
power elite as well as a re-definition of the boundaries of the field. A new hegemonic project emerged around
discursive  elements  such  as  the  idea  of  multistakeholderism  and  institutional  elements  such  as  the  Internet
Governance Forum. The relative success of the hegemonic project allowed for a certain stability within the field
and an acceptance by most non-elites of the new order. It is only recently that this order began to be questioned by
the emerging powers of Internet governance. 
This research provides three main contributions to the scientific debate. On the theoretical level, it contributes to
the  emergence  of  a  dialogue  between  International  Political  Economy  and  International  Political  Sociology
perspectives in order to analyse both the structural trends of the globalisation process and the located practices of
actors in a given issue-area. It notably stresses the contribution of concepts such as field and power elite and their
compatibility  with  a  Neo-Gramscian  framework  to  analyse  hegemony.  On  the  methodological  level,  this
perspective relies  on the  use  of  mixed  methods,  combining  qualitative  content  analysis  with social  network
analysis of actors and statements. Finally, on the empirical level, this research provides an original perspective on
Internet  governance.  It  stresses  the historical  dimension of  current  Internet  governance  arrangements.  It  also
criticise the notion of multistakeholderism and focuses instead on the power dynamics and the relation between
Internet governance and globalisation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction. What is Internet governance? Why 
does it matter?
The recent revelations by Edward Snowden of the existence of large-scale surveillance programmes
conducted by the US National Security Agency in cooperation with most of the major Internet
companies,  as  well  as  the  reactions  to  these revelations,  shed once  more light  on the  strategic
significance of the Internet in contemporary international relations. In addition to the growing size
of the Internet-related economic activities, the fact that issues of national sovereignty are influenced
by the Internet justifies the increasing interest of international relations scholars in this issue. In this
context, it becomes crucial to explore what type of institutions might discuss issues such as the US
dominance on the Internet. The Snowden revelations also question the basic principles that drive
Internet  governance.  Who  is  going  to  discuss  whether  privacy  should  underlie future  Internet
regulations?
Of course, these issues go far beyond the scope of Internet governance studies. In order to address
the issue of US dominance on the Internet, one would need to investigate structural trends in the
global political economy that are at work at least since the end of World War II. Issues like privacy
are not limited to privacy on the Internet. The Internet is only a new telecommunication medium
where broader and older issues are translated. It would be misleading to think that an analysis of the
history of  Internet  governance might  bring  a  totally  new perspective on international  relations.
However,  the  struggle  for  the  definition of  Internet  governance determines the scope of  issues
addressed by Internet governance institutions.  Moreover, some issues are directly influenced by the
mode of governance that has been chosen for the Internet. For instance, policy-related issues have
been  marginalised  in  Internet  governance  and  decision-making  institutions  focus  on  technical
issues. As a result, issues such as privacy or the balancing of US power on the Internet are not part
of Internet regulation debates. This is why it is interesting to look specifically at the history of
Internet governance to understand why these debates are outside the scope of existing institutions
and how broader debates are translated into Internet governance issues. 
Against this background, the present thesis explores the recent history of Internet governance and
analyses  the  evolution  of  power  dynamics  in  the  field.  Internet  governance  does  not  directly
encompass all activities conducted on the Internet, even if they are to some extent influenced by it.
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More precisely, the research investigates what is to be governed on the Internet; and who has a say
in the definition of Internet governance. Beyond the struggle for definition, the actors involved in
the implementation of Internet governance are also analysed. 
Rather than focusing on one actor such as the US government or Google Inc., this study investigates
the transnational coalitions of powerful actors that have shaped the governance of the Internet since
its creation. To this end, the research relies on a cross-fertilisation between international political
economy and international  political  sociology perspectives.  It  uses  the  concept  of  transnational
elites to analyse the most influential  actors of Internet governance,  but also analyses the global
dynamics of order and change in Internet governance. The objectives of this research are twofold.
First, Internet governance is used as a case study to investigate forms of governance that are typical
of the current globalisation process. The research aims to evaluate the potential contribution of elite
sociology and the work of Bourdieu to the globalisation literature. Second, the perspective adopted
in this study allows for a critique of mainstream accounts of the history of Internet governance. It
notably provides an alternative to the multistakeholder reading of Internet governance debates. 
The research explores  how an international  political  sociology approach  may help to  overcome
some shortcomings of critical global political economy in providing a comprehensive actor-centred
perspective  on  world  politics.  Against  this  background,  the  research  aims  to  contribute  to
Bourdieusian international  relations  through the study of  a  new transnational  field:  the  field of
Internet governance. Though not without problems, the use of Wright Mills' concept of power elite
in  transnational  settings  and  its  combination  with  Bourdieusian  international  relations  looks
promising.  However,  the limitations of Wright  Mills  due to his  lack of a theory of domination
remain  important  when  translated  to  global  politics.  This  is  why  this  study  relies  on  a  neo-
Gramscian perspective when it comes to order, domination, and hegemony. The resulting theoretical
framework has evolved constantly during the empirical analysis and is summarised in its current
version in chapter 4. 
As far as the case of Internet governance is concerned, this research explores the power dynamics
that have shaped the Internet governance system over the last 20 years. Most of the literature on
Internet governance is either produced by scholars/practitioners and rooted in a problem-solving
perspective, or relying on state-centred perspective of mainstream International Relations. Contrary
to these approaches,  The present  study evidences the domination of certain groups of non-state
actors in Internet governance and their collaboration with powerful state actors in the definition and
14
institutionalisation of Internet governance.  
Internet governance is thus described as the process of production of hegemonic projects aiming at
the unification of a power elite and at its acceptance by non-elites. The study evidences the constant
instability of the system and the need for the power elite to evolve and adapt the hegemonic project
to a changing context.  The history of Internet governance is  the history of the emergence of a
transnational field, understood as a social space of struggle and domination,  notably structured by
the dialectical relationship between the power elite and counter-elites.
Before going into the details of the analysis, the following sections briefly present the definition of
what  is  meant  by  “Internet  governance”  in  this  research.  Then,  the  importance  of  Internet
governance in the global political economy and the relevance of Internet governance as a case study
of “new” forms of governance in the globalisation process is discussed. Finally, a brief outline of
the thesis summarises the content of the different chapters. 
1.1. What is Internet governance?
The  definition of  the  Internet  is  one  of  the  main  struggle  in  the  field  of  Internet  governance.
Depending on the definition of the Internet, a more or less wide range of issues pertain to Internet
governance. Different uses of the network correspond to different visions of what the Internet is.
This became all the more true with the convergence of several telecommunication media towards
the Internet. Moreover, the focus on one or the other aspect of the Internet is used by actors as a way
to promote a particular governance system, a particular set of norms, or a particular institution. 
Internet is at the same time a library, where users seek information (databases, online newspapers,
etc.),  a  multimedia  telecommunication  network  (e-mail,  telephone  over  IP,  etc.),  a  virtual
marketplace, a place to exchange information and digital products and services, etc.  More and more
social interactions take place on the Internet. For each of these uses, an independent governance
system exists, since these online activities correspond to already regulated activities. For example,
e-commerce is regulated by general commerce laws as well as specific regulations. The exchange of
information and digital products correspond to a number of norms including freedom of speech,
protection  of  intellectual  property,  as  well  as  specific  norms  such  as  anti  online  piracy  laws.
However, there is a  common set of “shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures,
and programmes  that  shape  the  evolution  and use  of  the  Internet”  (WGIG,  2005).  This  broad
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definition is itself the result of a struggle to define the boundaries of Internet governance. Thus, it is
not neutral. However, it is flexible and consensual enough to complete more exclusive and rigid
definitions. It encompasses all the issues identified by the UN-sponsored Working Group in Internet
Governance  (WGIG)  in  2004,  and  the  issues  generally  addressed  by  the  literature  on  Internet
governance. Kurbalija (2012) presents the issues related to Internet governance into five “baskets”1:
the issues related to the technical functioning of the Internet, the issues related to cyberlaw, the
issues related to e-commerce, the issues related to development, and finally the sociocultural issues. 
Infrastructure and standardisation
The first basket includes what was historically the first concern of Internet governance. The Internet
is first and foremost a computer network that requires computer languages, standards and a physical
infrastructure of cables, servers and routers to function.  The definition of Internet governance is
sometimes limited to this set of technical and infrastructure issues. This is the most specific and
autonomous aspect of Internet governance, where specialised decision-making institutions exist. 
The use of the network (web, mail, telephony, etc.) entails a number of technical issues. First, the
information circulates through a physical infrastructure of wired and wireless telecommunication
networks. These networks are mostly owned by private companies and regulated both nationally
and internationally. A number of actors are already involved in the operation, from the Internet
Service  Provider,  the  telecommunication  carrier,  the  national  telecommunication  authority,  the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and other organizations acting in the realm of the
regulation of the global telecommunication market.
The  technical  functioning  of  the  Internet  also  requires  a  number  of  standards  that  make  the
communication between all the devices possible. This includes infrastructure standards (such as
WiFi and Ethernet), and Transfer Protocol standards (TCP/IP: Transfer Control Protocol/ Internet
Protocol) that allows the division of the information into packets and their routing over the network.
Internetworking also  requires  a  unique  identifier  for each  device connected to  the  network (IP
address) and a hierarchic system of addresses (the domain Name System). Both infrastructure and
technical  standardisation  are  tackled  by  a  number  of  public,  private,  regional  and  global
organisations that are key actors in the governance of the Internet. 
1 The term basket is a reference to the three baskets identified by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe in the final act of the Helsinki conference in 1975 as the main issues to be dealt with by the organisation.
They included the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human baskets. 
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Legal issues
Secondly,  most  aspects  of  Internet  governance  touch  upon  legal  issues.  Two  elements  are
particularly  discussed  in  the  context  of  Internet  governance  debates:  the  issue  of  the  relevant
jurisdiction for online activities; and the protection of intellectual property on the Internet (for a
literature review of cyberlaw, see chapter 2). 
Since an increasing volume of social and economic activities have taken place on the Internet since
the  mid-1990s,  the  issue of  conflicting  jurisdictions for  disputes  that  relate  to  online  activities
became a crucial element of Internet governance.  For example, the issue has been raised of what
jurisdiction applies to a website of a US company that sells Nazi memorabilia in Europe, where it is
forbidden (TGI, 2000). On a similar vein, it is not always clear when a court such as the European
Court  of  Human Rights is  competent  to  judge.  The court  did not  admit  the  complaint  by two
Moroccan nationals  against  a  Danish newspaper  for  the  case  of  the  publication  of  cartoons of
Muhammad because of the lack of jurisdictional link (ECHR, 2006).
Another prominent legal issue related to Internet governance is the online protection of intellectual
private property. This issue includes the protection of trademarks. For example, the protection of
trademarks in domain names was amongst the main issues debated in the 1990s. The protection of
intellectual property also includes the protection of copyrights on the Internet. The network makes it
easy  to  share  copyrighted  content  online  in  a  digital  form.  The  issue  has  generated  a  lot  of
discussion, court cases and legislation over the last 15 years. The difficulty to enforce the existing
instruments of national and international law related to the protection of intellectual property rights
on the Internet raises the question of the need for new mechanisms or the adaptation of copyright
law to the new environment.
Economic issues
The development of e-commerce was the main motivation of the  US administration when they
promoted the commercialisation of the Internet in the 1990s. In 1998, the World Trade Organisation
adopted a  ministerial  resolution on  e-commerce2 as  well  as  a  “Work Programme on electronic
2 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ecom_e/mindec1_e.htm, last accessed 8 April 2014.
17
commerce”3. The Work programme mandate both the Council for Trade in Services and the Council
for  Trade  in  Goods  to  examine  aspects  related  to  e-commerce  understood  “as  the  production,
distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of goods and services by electronic means”4.  The size of
business-to-consumer e-commerce is estimated to be around 1 trillion dollar for 20135. Although the
size of e-commerce is smaller than expected, it still represent an important and rapidly growing
business sector. As a consequence, it requires different types of regulation, including on consumer
protection such as the OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection adopted in 2003 (Kurbalija 2012,
p. 108-109).
Taxation of e-commerce also became a key element of the debates recently. Back in the 1990s, the
White House promoted a worldwide tax-free cyber-marketplace (Clinton & Gore, 1996, see chapter
5).  This  vision  was  partially  implemented  since  tax  avoidance  is  easier  online  because  of  the
blurriness of territorial boundaries on the Internet.  For example, large US e-commerce companies
like Amazon Ltd. and Google pay very little taxes in Europe thanks to complex tax avoidance
strategies (Bowers & Wintour, 2013). In a context of economic and  public  debt crisis,  the G20
group of industrialised countries and the OECD started in April 2013 a plan to clamp down on tax
avoidance (Bowers, 2013). E-commerce companies like Amazon are directly targeted since the plan
requires that transnational firms with extensive warehouse operations in foreign countries should
pay taxes in these countries (OECD, 2013). 
Development issues
Development  issues  were  not  the  main  concern  of  Internet  governance  debates  in  the  1990s.
However, the internationalisation of the network, the adoption of the UN Millennium Development
Goals and the emergence of economies from the South changed the landscape and affected the field
of Internet governance (see chapter 6). In 2000, the G8 summit in Okinawa conceptualised the idea
of  Information  and  Communication  Technologies  for  Development  (ICT4D).  As  the  Internet
became more important in developed economies (especially in the optimistic context of the pre-
DotCom crisis), the issue of the “digital divide” became more significant. As a result, strategies to
3 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ecom_e/wkprog_e.htm, last accessed 8 April 2014.
4 Ibid. §1.3. 
5 This figure should be compared to the $22,520 trillion trade in goods and commercial services estimated by the
WTO and the UNCTAD for 2010. Interactive Media in Retail Group estimates a $1.25 trillion, close to the $1.3
trillion estimated by eMarketer while Goldman Sachs estimate is $963 billion (Fredikson, 2013). It should be noted
that these figures are far below the predictions of the same organisations for 2004-2005 before the DotCom crisis
($4.5 to 7.3 trillion were expected for 2004-2005 by Gartner and Goldman Sachs) (Fredikson, 2013). 
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bridge  the  digital  divide  have  been  implemented,  especially  by  some  intergovernmental
organisations  like  the  ITU.  Significant  progress  has  been  made  as  far  as  ICT in  general  are
concerned. Most of this progress is due to the exponential growth of mobile telephony (ITU, 2013).
In contrast, the digital divide is much wider in terms of worldwide Internet use. According to the
ITU, by the end of 2013 only 2.7 billion individuals use the Internet (about 39 per cent of the world
population).
The issue of the digital  divide overlaps with all of the issues outlined above.  For example,  the
digital divide includes issues of infrastructure. The number and quality of the submarine cables that
connect a country to the global network determine the stability of Internet access in one country and
its  bandwidth.  This  issue  is  illustrated  by  the  case  of  the  Georgian  lady  that  cut  off  most  of
Armenia's  Internet  access  for  several  hours  in  2011  while  scavenging  for  copper  cables.  She
accidentally sliced through the cable through which 90% of Armenian Internet data was transferred
(Parfitt, 2011).
Sociocultural issues
Kurablija (2012) identifies a number of issues that do not pertain completely to the aforementioned
categories. He regroups them into the “sociocultural basket”.  Such issues include Human rights,
freedom of expression, privacy, cultural diversity, multilingualism etc. The fact that these issues are
not  labelled  as  “legal”  or  “economic”  illustrates  the  fact  that  they are  considered  second-class
citizens in the field of Internet governance. Sociocultural issues struggle to make their way into the
agenda of Internet governance. One exception is likely to develop in the future. The issue of privacy
(already  mentioned  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  as  a  pressing  issue  since  the  Snowden
revelations) might become an important topic of Internet governance in the coming years, because
of the pressure exercised by some powerful actors like Brazil and the European Union that have
been targeted by surveillance programmes. 
The different issues outlined in this section represent the broad definition of Internet governance
that is used in the present research. The particular aspects of each issue will not be treated in details
since  the  main  question  remains  the  definition  of  Internet  governance,  its  institutions,  and  its
dominant actors. Therefore, this study will not focus on any initiative, issue-area, or institution. It
will analyse the evolution of the boundaries of the whole field and the evolving structuration of the
field. The objective is not to analyse a given topic of Internet governance but rather to use Internet
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governance as a case study of the autonomisation of transnational fields and transnational elites.  
1.2. Transnational elites and Internet governance
The analysis of the large scope of issues and actors potentially included in the study of Internet
governance  requires  the  definition  of  boundaries  and  typologies  in  order  to  make  sense  of  a
complex world. The present study relies on sociological concepts such as elites and fields to analyse
the role of powerful actors in a specific issue-area. However, the focus on actors and on the specific
realm of Internet governance does not mean that reflections on order and change in international
relations are abandoned. The thesis tries to combine the analysis of specific actors in a given field
with the study of global and structural dynamics.
1.2.1. Approach and methods
While the theoretical framework and methodology are described in greater details in chapter 3, the
general idea of the thesis is to analyse power dynamics in the globalisation process through the case
of Internet governance. To this end, the study uses a number of methods such as qualitative content
analysis and social network analysis, in a historical perspective in order to analyse the power of
transnational elite, its unification around hegemonic projects, the dialectical relationship between
elites and counter-elite and the evolution of a transnational  field embedded in a global field of
power.
The study combines an international political sociology approach with a critical  global political
economy perspective. This means that the thesis investigates power in the globalisation process and
the global structures that shape the actions of agents from a neo-Gramscian perspective. Historical
structures and the production of hegemony are at the heart of the analysis. However, in contrast to
neo-Gramscian  accounts  of  Internet  governance,  the  study  takes  the  particularities  of  Internet
governance and the power of agents seriously.  Rather  than focusing on the structural power of
capital  and disciplinary neoliberalism (Gill  and Law,  1989,  Gill,  1995),  the thesis  analyses  the
specific translation of structural dynamics in a limited and relatively autonomous social space and
their embodiment by specific actors. This is why the thesis introduces two concepts from political
sociology to the study of globalisation. First, it borrows the concept of field from Bourdieu. The
concept  has  already  been  introduced  to  IR  by  the  growing  international  political  sociology
literature. The concept of field – and especially transnational field – allows for a localisation of
agents'  practices  within  a  social  space  of  struggle  and  domination.  It  helps  to  avoid  the
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national/international dichotomy that undermines the ability of IR to study globalisation. Second,
the thesis explores the heuristic value of the concept of transnational elites to provide an actor-
centred and dynamic perspective on power dynamics entailed by the globalisation process. The
concept of transnational elites stresses the fact that dominant actors are not reproduced within the
transnational field but rather come from other national and transnational fields with their specific
forms  of  capital,  world-views  and  habitus.  Against  this  background,  the  thesis  analyses  the
unification of different specialised elites around a shared project to form a transnational power elite
within  a  transnational  field.  A power  elite  exists  when  specialised  elites  become  ideologically
coherent and institutionally interchangeable (Wright Mills, 2000 [1956]). This power is understood
as a dialectic relationship with counter-elites and non-elites.
In order to study the power of transnational elites in the field Internet governance, the thesis relies
on a number of complementary methods.  First, the topography of the field – its boundaries and
space of relative positions – is explored through social network analysis.  As a result,  two main
databases  of  Internet  governance  actors  have  been  constructed.  They  include  a  total  of  900
individuals and 350 organisations in two key moments of the history of Internet governance: during
the  creation  of  the  ICANN, and during  the  WSIS (see  Annex 2  and 4).  Given the  ahistorical
character  of  social  network  analysis,  it  is  combined  with  a  more  historical  perspective  on  the
genealogy  of  the  field  (Bourdieu,  2012) and  its  relations  to  historical  structures (Cox,  1981).
analysis results in the identification of a chronology of Internet governance. Internet governance
emerged as an international relations issue in the context of the privatisation and liberalisation of
telecommunications and of globalisation of the economy (see chapter 4). The emergence of Internet
governance as a political issue triggered the first political crisis and the first institutionalisation of
the field around the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in the second
half  of the 1990s (see chapter 5). The evolution of the global political  economy soon after the
creation of the ICANN affected Internet  governance and threatened the stability of the ICANN
order  (see chapter  6).  As a  result,  non-dominant  actors  raised the  issue  of  Internet  governance
during World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS, 2002-2005). The debates of the WSIS on
Internet  governance are  analysed in  chapter  7 and 8.  They brought  about  some changes to  the
ICANN order and corresponded to a new context in the global political economy. Since the WSIS,
the field of Internet governance has shown a relative stability. However, the potential for change is
analysed in the concluding chapter (chapter 9). 
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The  different  stages  of  the  history  of  Internet  governance  are  characterised  by  a  certain
configuration of the relationship between elites and counter-elites. This relationship is explored both
at the interrelational level through social network analysis and prosopographical elements, and at
the discursive level through critical discourse analysis. The networks present not only the evolving
boundaries of the field but they also represent the positions of actors and institutions within the
field. As a result, they are useful to identify elite and non-elite actors (see section 3.2). Moreover,
they  can be  used  to  analyse  the  institutional  interchangeability  of  the  elite  and to  criticise  the
multistakeholder narrative.  This data is combined with some prosopographical elements and some
qualitative interviews in order to investigate elite circulation over time and to specify qualitatively
the different type of elites within the field.
Critical  discourse analysis  identifies statements and re-construct  discourses  out  of the  available
documents produced in the two historical moments. These documents include policy documents,
reports,  drafts,  mailing  lists,  congressional  hearings,  newspaper  articles,  and  other  documents.
Statements were identified in these documents and then classified into categories to finally produce
a typology of discourses on Internet governance (see Annex 3). In the case of the World Summit on
the  Information  Society,  the  position  of  the  different  discourses  within  the  field,  and  the
relationships between discourses are analysed thanks to social network analysis of actors' statements
(see section 3.2 for more details and Annex 4 for the data). 
Finally, these mixed methods are combined in order to explore the hegemonic character of elite rule
and the potential for change in each order. The use of “mixed methods” in order to analyse the field
of Internet governance is justified by the quantity of data available and the ambition to produce a
qualitative actor-centred analysis.  It  allows for  a  structural  view of  the field  and the relational
position of actors, as well as a detailed analysis of actors' strategies. 
1.2.2. 10 claims about Internet governance as a case-study of 
contemporary dynamics in international relations
As we have seen, the thesis is an attempt to analyse power in the globalisation process through the
case of Internet governance. It argues that the critical global political economy literature can be
fruitfully combined with insights from an international political sociology perspective in order to
analyse the translation of global structural dynamics into diversified fields of social interaction and
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the power of transnational elites as a key category of actors in the globalisation process. Translation
is here understood both as “a movement from one space to another, and an expression of a particular
concern  in  another  modality”  (Rose  and Miller,  1992,  p.  181).  It  is  used to  stress  the  relative
autonomy of the dynamics within a field as well as their embedding in the structural process of
globalisation. This theoretical inquiry allows for an original perspective on the history of Internet
governance that evidences the unification of transnational elites around a shared project, and the
process of hegemony production to ensure the reproduction of this project. This contribution can be
itemised  into ten  claims  that  are  explored  and  articulated  throughout the  book.  These  claims,
although different in their nature, converge to explain why the study of Internet governance is useful
to understand the globalisation process and what can be learnt from this case-study about power in
world  politics.  The  following points  follow a  logic  order;  first,  the  thesis  acknowledges  some
commonly-accepted postulates. Second, it relies on more specific ontological and epistemological
postulates from the critical literature in international political economy and international political
sociology.  Third,  it  formulates original hypotheses and an original research program. Finally,  it
draws some conclusions from the empirical analysis of Internet governance. 
I. As a point of departure, the study rests on the commonly-accepted postulate that communications
are  a  key  element  of  globalisation  processes  and  the  Internet  is  the  central  medium  of
communication of the current globalisation process. If globalisation can be vaguely defined as a
process of space-time compression (Harvey, 1989), communications and transportation are two key
elements  of  a  globalisation  process  that  allow  the  integration  of  markets,  the  inter-  or
transnationalisation  of  finance  and  production,  and  the  diffusion  of  culture.  In  his  analysis  of
globalisation,  Scholte stresses the importance  of communications both for the late-19th century
wave of  globalisation with the advent of the telegraph; and for the current  globalisation process
marked by the development of  Information and Communication Technologies such as  satellites,
mobile telephony, and the Internet (Scholte, 2005). 
II. Internet  governance  is  chosen  as  a  case-study  not  only  because  it  is  at  the  heart  of  the
development of new modes of communication that enable the globalisation process. At the same
time, the  thesis explores the hypothesis that the form Internet governance has adopted since the
1990s is a consequence of the globalisation process. Internet governance is typical of “new” modes
of governance as generated by the globalisation process. The argument has often been made in the
global political economy literature. As a governance system mainly designed in the 1990s, Internet
governance epitomises the trend towards neoliberal forms of transnational and private governance
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(Graz  &  Noelke,  2008,  esp.  Part  III).  In  order  to  confirm  this  hypothesis,  the  context  of  the
institutionalisation of Internet governance is explored in chapter 4 and the ideological elements that
underpinned the creation of the ICANN are explored in chapter 5. Moreover, the in-depth analysis
of  the  role  of  different  types  of  actors  in  the  early  institutionalisation  of  Internet  governance
investigates the importance of non-states actors. 
III. The shift  towards transnational  and private governance was a structural trend in the 1990s.
However, in order to avoid the tendency of critical studies to over-emphasise the structural elements
and the macro-level, the thesis relies on a Bourdieusian international political sociology perspective.
In this view, world politics is divided in relatively autonomous fields (national and transnational)
with their  own stakes,  actors  and logics.  Although Internet  governance is  deeply  embedded in
global  dynamics,  the  translation  of  these  dynamics  in  Internet  governance  differs  from  its
translation  in  other  issue-areas.  This  postulate  of  Bourdieusian  IPS  is  useful  to  provide  a
differentiated analysis of world politics. While the concept of field has been used to study a number
of transnational social spaces like the European Union or the field of security (for an overview, see
chapter 3), the thesis is an original attempt to use the concept of field to study Internet governance. 
IV. Once world politics  is viewed as divided between distinct  fields,  and given the fact  that a
Bourdieusian conception of field entails the existence of dominant agents within the field, it can be
argued that  the history of Internet governance is the history of the emergence of a transnational
field, with its own elites. Bourdieusian sociology rejects the economicist conception of capital and
advocates for the analysis of different forms of capital. The power of dominant actors within a field
relies on distinct resources that need to be empirically analysed. The following empirical research
evidences the fact that  Internet governance  has become gradually autonomous from other related
fields,  such as  international telecommunications regulation and computer networking science.  It
also shows that specialised elites have emerged in the field, relying not only on financial capital, but
also on social, political and scientific capitals. As a result, domination in Internet governance is not
viewed as  the  domination  of  a  transnational  capitalist  class  but  rather  as  the  domination  of
specialised elites that are specific to the field of Internet governance. 
V. In addition to the field of Internet, the study devotes particular attention to the dominant actors
within  the  field.  These  actors  come from different  countries,  they  are  affiliated  with  different
institutions and rely on different resources to exercise power. Rather than separating these groups in
national or institutional categories, the research studies them as transnational elites and proposes an
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original  definition: Transnational  elites  are  powerful  groups  of  actors  that  interact  within  a
transnational field beyond national borders. While some literature exist on transnational elites, it s
argued here that a more systematic study of these groups could be an important contribution to
globalisation studies.
VI. These  transnational  elites,  like  national  elites  can  be  competing for  power.  This  is  the
description of pluralist democracy. However, as demonstrated by Charles Wright Mills for the US
society in the 1950s, these elites are not always competing. They sometimes unite to form a single,
ideologically  coherent,  power  elite,  where  individuals  circulate  from one position  of  power  to
another.  The research formulates the hypothesis that this phenomenon is  likely to be found at the
transnational level as well. Transnational  elites might unite around a shared project  to form a
transnational power elite. In this case, their domination is not exercised over a national polity, nor
over the global political economy as a whole, but rather over a transnational field. This is why the
thesis  explores  empirically  the  possibility  that  different  specialised  elite  unite  around a  shared
project to exercise domination within a transnational field.
VII. Informed by neo-Gramscian global political economy, the thesis does not take the power of
elites for granted. Even though the power elite is united, its domination over a field is only possible
if  some kind of  consent  exist  among  non-elites.  Thus,  the  research  analyses  the  production of
hegemony in the field of Internet governance as a dynamic process involving counter-elites and
non-elites. The power of transnational elites can be either contested or for the most part accepted.
Thus, the study of the power elite must be coupled with an analysis of the relationship of the power
elite with non-elite groups in order to avoid the shortcomings of some elite sociology. As a result,
the thesis applies a dialectical method to the study of elite in order  to investigate the  process of
hegemony production, and the potential for change contained in any given order. 
VIII. The process of hegemony production is  concomitant with the process of definition of the
boundaries of the field.  The analysis of world politics in terms of fields is not a reification of the
boundaries between different issue-areas. It is rather  an evolutionary analysis of the struggles to
define the boundaries of a given field that goes hand in hand with the struggle for domination
within the field. Internet governance is an emerging field whose boundaries are still very porous and
unstable.  The very definition of Internet governance has evolved and is likely to change in the
coming years, thereby including and excluding issues and actors. 
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IX. The thesis also evidences the fact that Internet governance has gone through several crises that
led to the reconfiguration of the borders of the field as well as its elite. The commercialisation of the
Internet in the early 1990s generated a crisis that led to the creation of the ICANN in 1998. The
changing context created the conditions favourable to the questioning of the order by non-dominant
actors during the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in the early 2000s. The present
study on the unification of a transnational power elite evidences the unstable character of elite
power. It is more a history of crisis and change than a history of order and reproduction. However,
the way in which the different crisis have been settled tend to  create an increasingly  hegemonic
system of institutions and discourses.
X.  The  WSIS  crisis  of  the  early  2000s  led to  the  creation  of  a  renewed hegemonic  discourse
articulated around the notion of multistakeholderism and a hegemonic governance system with non-
binding  institutions created  as  a  way to  produce  consent. However,  the  World  Summit  on  the
Information Society has created a fragile system that is currently in crisis. While outside of the
scope  of  this  study,  the  dissensions  evidenced  during  the  World  Conference  on  International
Telecommunications in 2012, the Snowden revelations in 2013, and the forthcoming debates on
Internet  governance  are  elements  of  a  new  crisis  of  hegemony.  Consistently  with  the  critical
tradition, the thesis argues that the current crisis can only be understood in relation to the history of
Internet governance. This is why the present research on the emergence of Internet governance as
an international  relations issue is  relevant  for  the understanding of  the current  debates and the
analysis of possible futures for Internet governance (see chapter 9).  
1.3. Outline of the thesis
One of the main objective of the thesis is to avoid the separation of the theoretical reflection from
the empirical analysis of Internet governance. This is why the literature review and the description
of  the  theoretical  framework  (chapter  2  and  3)  combine  elements  of  the  study  of  Internet
governance in  particular,  with  elements  of  an  international  political  sociology perspective.  The
following  chapters  analyse the  history  of  Internet  governance  while  trying  to  continue  the
theoretical reflection of transnational elites, order and change in the global political economy. 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the extant literature. It starts from the specific question of Internet
governance and broadens the perspective in order to relate the specific issue of the regulation of the
global  computer  network  to  the  broad  issues  discussed  by  international  relations  scholars.  It
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specifically insists on the embedding of Internet governance in the global political economy and
explores  the  potential  contribution  of  critical  International  Political  Economy  in  the  study  of
Internet governance. However, it criticises the tendency of critical IPE to over-generalisation and its
focus  on  structure  and  advocates  for  an  actor-based  critical  perspective  informed  by  recent
developments in International Political Sociology.
Chapter 3  describes the International Political Sociology approach used in the study. It insists on
three elements that are key to the approach. First, it explains how the political sociology of elites
can bring actors back to critical  perspective.  Second, it  explains a  possible articulation of elite
sociology to neo-Gramscian IPE as a way to keep non-elites in mind in the study of domination.
Finally, it draws upon the increasingly rich literature on the use of Bourdieu's concepts in the study
of IR to locate elites and hegemony within a transnational field. 
Chapter 4  goes back to the genealogy of the field of Internet governance.  It  recalls its original
autonomisation from related fields. This analysis of the emergence of a relatively autonomous field
is key to explain why structural trends like the shift to neoliberal policies were translated differently
in the  field  of  Internet  governance  compared to  fields  like  the  international  telecommunication
regulation.  
Chapter 5 analyses the first key crisis in the history of Internet governance. The crisis was generated
by the commercialisation of the network in the beginning of the 1990s and was temporarily settled
by the creation of the ICANN. The chapter explains how different elites united around the ICANN
project. It explores the ideological cohesion around the early developments of multistakeholderism
and self-regulation and describes the interchangeability of elites.
Chapter 6 focuses on the transition between the crisis of the 1990s (1992-1998) and the crisis of the
World Summit on the Information Society (2002-2005). While these two moments are generally
seen as keystones in the history of Internet governance, the period of transition is rarely analysed.
This chapter is also an attempt to use Bourdieu as a theoretician of change. In contrast to the focus
on reproduction that is often associated with Bourdieu, this chapter represent a case-study of an
analysis of change with Bourdieu's tools. 
Chapter 7 analyses the profound crisis that was evidenced during the first phase of the WSIS (2002-
2003). This crisis existed at the ideological level as well as at the level of actors. Although this crisis
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has been largely overcome during the second phase of the WSIS, the opposition revealed during the
crisis continue to structure the field of Internet governance. The analysis of the WSIS 1 crisis is
crucial for the understanding of current developments in the field of Internet governance.
Chapter 8 studies the production of hegemony in a field marked by a deep crisis between the two
phases of the WSIS (2004-2005). The power elite of Internet governance was able to settle the crisis
and  to  build  consent  through its  reconfiguration  and  the  creation  of  new institutions  and new
discourses. The settlement of the crisis described in this chapter is the current mode of governance
of the Internet. It benefited from a quasi-hegemonic status during several years but can be now
considered once again in crisis.
Finally, chapter 9 draws some  empirical conclusions from the analysis of the history of Internet
governance. It argues for an analysis of Internet governance in terms of elites rather than in terms of
stakeholders. It recalls the complexity of the process of elite unification and the instability of any
given order.  It also draws some  theoretical conclusions  on the complementarity of international
political economy and international political sociology approaches and insists on the heuristic value
of concepts such as transnational fields and transnational elites in globalisation studies. Finally, it
explores the contradictions of the governance model created during the WSIS and introduces the
current crisis in order to explore possible futures for Internet governance.  
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Chapter 2. The study of Internet governance and International 
Relations
As we have seen in the introduction, the purpose of this research is to provide new insights both on
the theoretical level through the introduction of an international political sociology perspective to
problématiques usually addressed by critical global political economists, and at an empirical level
on the study of the institutionalisation of Internet governance in the last 25 years. While the original
objective  was  first  and  foremost  theoretical,  this  chapter  focuses  on  the  existing  literature  on
Internet  governance  and  locates  the  contribution  of  the  research  within  this  emerging
interdisciplinary field. It argues that the literature on Internet governance lacks a critical approach
that  takes  into  account  the  specificities  of  the  field.  The  following  chapter  will  describe  this
approach  and  its  operationalisation  for  the  study  of  Internet  governance.  The  structure  of  the
argument in these two chapters reflects a research process that has constantly oscillated between an
empirical  study  of  Internet  governance  and  a  theoretical  investigation  about elitism  in  world
politics. 
Internet governance has attracted an increasing scholarly interest since the late 1990s from various
disciplines. It needs to be differentiated from the study of Internet usage and the study of the content
that can be found on-line. As DeNardis puts it:
“Internet  governance  scholars  […]  examine  what  is  at  stake  in  the  design,
administration,  and  manipulation  of  the  Internet's  actual  protocological  and
material architecture. This architecture is not external to politics and culture but,
rather,  deeply embeds the values and policy decisions that ultimately structure
how we access information, how innovation will proceed, and how we exercise
individual freedom online.” (DeNardis, 2013)
Thus, Internet governance raises a number of crucial issues for political science and international
relations. These questions have sometimes been limited by the theoretical perspective chosen by
Internet governance scholars. The following sections argue that Internet governance studies suffer
from an isolation from theoretical debates that are taking place in social sciences and that an IR
perspective on Internet governance defines a crucial object of world politics, highlighting important
issues of power and domination. It is further argued that traditional IR approaches are ill-equipped
to  fully  analyse  Internet  governance.  Critical  global  political  economy  could  inform  Internet
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governance  debates  since  Internet  governance  illustrate  the  processes  at  work  in  the  current
globalisation process. However, the chapter concludes that global political economy remains often
too structural and undifferentiated in its description of globalisation. That is why the present study
completes  the  structural  analysis  of  globalisation  with  insights  from  a more  agent-based
international political sociology perspective. 
2.1. Internet governance studies: from inter-disciplinarity to un-
disciplinarity
The history of the emergence of Internet governance as an object of scholarly research is strongly
related to the genesis of the field of Internet governance and its institutionalisation in the late 1990s.
As a result, most of Internet governance studies are rooted in a “problem-solving” perspective (Cox,
1981). Against this background, legal studies of Internet governance have played a crucial role and
occupy a privileged space in the literature on Internet governance. A great variety of disciplines also
study the issue, ranging form communication studies to political science and economy. Hence, the
interdisciplinary  scholarly  debate  on  Internet  governance  is  structured  along  specific  questions
rather than theoretical stances or disciplinary boundaries. 
2.1.1. A historiographical overview of the emergence of Internet 
governance studies
The first scholarly publications on Internet governance were attempts by law scholars to define the
legal norms applicable to the “cyberspace”, following the adage “ubis societas, ubis jus”. Arguably,
the first book on Internet governance was published in 1995 (Katsh, 1995).  Thus, there is almost
twenty years of scholarly literature on Internet governance,  primarily authored by law scholars.
Early publications on Internet governance raised the issue of Intellectual Property in a digital age,
and the consequences of Intellectual Property on the allocation of Internet domains (Dueker, 1996).
However, the analysis of Intellectual Property law applicable on the Internet soon raised the issue of
borders  and  national  sovereignty  (Johnson  & Post,  1996);  and  subsequently  of  how to  govern
cyberspace (Lessig, 1999; Liu, 1998; Post, 1997). The main question of Internet governance studies
had emerged and began to structure a scholarly debate.  Most of this debate took place among US
law scholars, but some scholars in communication studies and political science become involved
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around the creation of the ICANN (Mathiason and Kuhlman, 1998); legal scholars in Europe also
took part in the debate (Kur, 1996).
Simultaneously,  the Internet  economy  was  booming  and  the  stakes  were  becoming  higher.
Universities  in  the  United  States created  centres  in  law schools to  institutionalise  the  study of
cyberlaw.  Among the first centres was the Center for Law and Technology, created in 1995 at
Berkeley  law  school  and  specialising  in  Intellectual  Property.  The  Center  grew  to  encompass
broader  cyberlaw issues  over  the  years.  In  1997, Jack Balkin founded the Information  Society
Project at Yale law school with the broader project of being “an intellectual center addressing the
implications of the Internet and new information technologies for law and society, guided by the
values of democracy, development, and civil liberties”6. In 1998, the Berkman Center for Internet &
Society  was  created  at  Harvard  Law School,  notably  by  Jonathan Zittrain,  as  one  of  the  first
research centre to focus exclusively on Internet-related legal issues. The Berkman Center evolved
with the academic field and became an inter-faculty and interdisciplinary initiative in 2008. In 2000,
the  Stanford  law school  also  created  a  specialised  centre:  the  Center  for  Internet  and Society,
founded by Lawrence Lessig. The pioneers were followed by a great number of cyberlaw centres in
US universities. In the early 2000s, the trend spread outside the United States. However, most of the
new research centres had an interdisciplinary focus and were not attached to law schools. Some of
the most famous examples include the Oxford Internet Institute created in 2001, the Centro de
Tecnologia e Sociedade of the Fundação Getulio Vargas' law school (2003), the Canadian Internet
Policy  and  Public  Interest  Clinic  of  the  University  of  Ottawa (2003);  the  Internet  Governance
Project academic network based at the School of Information Studies at the university of Syracuse;
and more recently the Alexander von Humboldt  Institut  für  Internet  und Gesellschaft  in Berlin
(2012). 
The centres and departments, as well as the scholars affiliated with them, played an important role
in  Internet  governance  since  the  creation  of  the  Internet  Corporation  for  Assigned Names  and
Numbers (ICANN). Legal scholars were involved in  alternative projects of  institutionalisation of
Internet governance at the end of the 1990s and  questioned the legitimacy of the ICANN.  They
formed a counter-elite at the turn of the millennium (see chapter 6). As we can see from the list of
institutions,  it  is  also  around  the  turn  of  the  millennium that  centres specialising in  Internet
governance became more interdisciplinary. The creation of the Oxford Internet Institute in 2001
involved for example a historian and a political economist. 
6 See the description of the Centre at http://www.yaleisp.org/about/history, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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The history of the Internet had indeed became an object of scholarly research since the origins of
the  network  were  debated  and  had  consequences  on  its  management.  Was  the  United  States
historically bound to control the network? Was the origin of the network civilian or military? Some
studies were published in the late 1990s but mainly offered a US-centred view of the history of the
Internet  (Abbate,  1999;  Hafner,  1998).  The history of  the network continues  to  draw  scholarly
attention and earlier accounts are still debated (e.g. Townes, 2012). 
Political economists also started to study Internet governance with the rise of the Dot.com economy
in the late 1990s.  While most of economic  studies were limited to the analysis  of  e-commerce
without engaging in the institutional and political consequences of the organisation of the market,
some studies offered a new perspective on Internet governance based on economic theories. The
most famous example is Milton Mueller's “Ruling the Root” (2002), that relies on a perspective of
institutional economics. The creation of the governance system is, in this view, a consequence of the
marketisation and allocation  of  limited  resources.  In  this  case,  Internet  domains  were  a  scarce
resource that needed market mechanisms to be distributed. 
Finally, political scientists and International Relations scholars also entered the debate on Internet
governance. The following section (2.2.) on the IR perspective on Internet governance will look into
this literature with greater detail. While some authors were not participating directly to the specific
debate on Internet governance but rather to more general IR and political science debates, some
exceptions existed from the end of the 1990s (Mathiason and Kuhlman, 1998; Paré, 2003; Simon,
1998).
Before the World Summit on the Information Society  (WSIS),  the scholarly debate on Internet
governance had became interdisciplinary and had spread geographically to include some European
scholars.  Internet governance became gradually one of the most debated issue during the World
Summit on the Information Society (see chapter 7). Since the Summit was a large event organised
by the United Nations and attended by a great variety of non-state actors, it raised consciousness at
a worldwide scale on the importance of Internet governance.  The effect on scholarly publications
was  similar.  The  number  of  publications  on  Internet  governance  increased,  giving  birth  to  a
somewhat disaggregated field of study. 
Following the WSIS, a Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet) was created to:
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“support the establishment of a global network of scholars specializing in Internet
governance  issues;  promote  the  development of  Internet  governance  as  a
recognized,  interdisciplinary  field  of  study;  advance  theoretical  and  applied
research  on  Internet  governance,  broadly  defined,  and;  facilitate  informed
dialogue  on  policy  issues  and  related  matters  between  scholars  and  Internet
governance stakeholders”. 
GigaNet was created in conjunction with the first meeting of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF)
and still holds its annual symposium as a coupled event with the IGF meeting. Today, the network
has 180 members distributed globally7. Once  again, the evolution of the scholarly debate and its
institutionalisation echoes the evolution of the field of Internet governance. Through the IGF, as
well as through other forums, scholars play an active role in the governance of the network. This is
why the  literature  on  Internet  governance  cannot  be  read  in  abstraction  from the  genesis  and
evolution of the field. As we will see in the development of the research, scholars have been part of
a counter-elite after the creation of the ICANN (chapter 6) and some of them became part of the
civil society fraction of the power elite after the WSIS (chapter 8). 
From the generic questions of norms, borders and sovereignty in cyberspace, the study of Internet
governance has encompassed a wide variety of issues, from the standardisation to the relationship
between Information and Communication Technologies and development (ICT4D). Some of the
core of the research remains concerned with the global institutions of Internet governance, and
emanates from individuals involved in the politics of Internet governance, while other specialised
researches focus on aspects only loosely related to the general structuration of Internet governance
and  remains  in  more  academic  circles.  The  following  sections  try  to  outline  the  main  issues
addressed  by  Internet  governance  studies  and  advocate  for  a  development  of  a  critical  IR
perspective on Internet governance spanning the scope of more specialised issues by questioning
order and change in Internet governance. 
2.1.2. An Internet governance framework
The history of Internet  governance as a  scholarly field shows the  interdisciplinary character  of
Internet governance studies. Few authors have tried to make sense of these disciplinary divisions to
7 See http://giga-net.org/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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offer a general overview of Internet governance studies. The efforts by DeNardis (2013, 2014) to
map the emerging field of Internet governance studies remain important exceptions. DeNardis is an
associate professor at American University on Washington D.C and a fellow of the Yale Information
Society project. With a background in engineering and science and technology studies, she analyses
the Internet architecture and governance from a technical as well as social science point of view.
She identifies five themes that are addressed by the literature on Internet governance (DeNardis,
2013): the control of critical Internet resources, the design of protocols,  the issue of Intellectual
Property Rights related to Internet governance, the security and management of the infrastructure of
the network, and the communications rights affected by the governance of the Internet. 
The control of critical Internet resources
Critical Internet Resources (CIR) were among the first element that attracted scholarly attention at
the end of the 1990s.  Critical Internet resources refer to logical resources that are unique to the
Internet  such as  Internet  (IP)  addresses  and the  Domain Names System (DNS).  They  are  thus
different from the physical infrastructure of the network (see below) and the virtual resources that
are not unique to the Internet such as electromagnetic spectrum management (which is shared with
other  telecommunication  networks).  The  debates  of  the  1990s  were  essentially  about  what
institution should be in charge of the management of critical Internet resources, and especially the
root zone file of the Domain Names System (Mueller, 2002). 
Most of the literature on the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) can
be classified in  this category  (Christou & Simpson,  2007;  Froomkin,  2000, 2002;  Klein,  2002;
Kleinwachter, 2002; Mueller, 1999; Paré, 2003; von Arx, 2003). Because of the central role of the
US government in  the management  of the Domain Names System, IR scholars,  and especially
realists, have studied the ICANN and the management of the DNS (see section 2.2). 
The slightly more technical  issue of  IP addresses  is  less  discussed outside  Internet  governance
circles. However, the allocation of a unique IP address to each machine connected to the network is
an essential function of Internet governance (DeNardis, 2009). It has been historically tackled by
the  Internet  Assigned Number Authority,  which  is  now part  of  the  ICANN, and five  Regional
Internet Registries (RIRs). One of the most important issue in this respect is the transition from an
older  version  of  the  protocol  –  that  limits  the  number  of  IP addresses  (and  thus  of  machines
connected to the network) to 4.3 billions – to a newer version (IPv6) virtually removing the limits to
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the number of machines connected to the network (Dell, 2010; DeNardis, 2009; Mueller, 2010a).
Despite the important literature on the ICANN and the management of domain names, it is only one
among a number of other issues. According to DeNardis (2013), the issue of domain names received
“disproportionate” attention from the media and civil society because of its visibility and because of
the debates of the 1990s. However, DeNardis fails to acknowledge that the debates over domain
names and the ICANN have been essential to the definition of the frontiers of the field of Internet
governance. This is why they are at the heart of the scholarly debate and will be the main focus of
the historical analysis of the genesis of the field of Internet governance in the 1990s in the present
study.
Internet protocol design
According to some authors, the Internet can be defined as a telecommunication network using the
TCP/IP protocol suite (Townes, 2012). Although the Internet uses a large number of other protocols,
the focus on TCP/IP to define the Internet illustrates the centrality of the designing and adoption of
protocols in the functioning of the network. Protocols are standards that allow different hardware to
be compatible and to interconnect. Other important protocols include among others Wi-Fi standards,
and Ethernet to connect locally to the network; HTTP, FTP to exchange information and files, and
VoIP to transmit voice over the Internet. Like all standards, they are not neutral and are means of
control (Galloway, 2004). Several institutions are involved in standardisation related to the Internet
and evidence power relations in the global political economy (Graz, 2002). Literature specialising in
Internet governance has also addressed the consequences of standardisation and protocol design on
the governance of the network. Some authors have studied a specific standard-setting organism, like
the  Internet  Engineering  TaskForce  (Froomkin,  2003).  The  importance  of  “open”  standards  in
Internet governance triggered a debate on what constitutes an “open” standard (DeNardis, 2011).
However, the issue of standards and protocols in Internet governance is rarely addressed in terms of
power;  and the openness  of most  of  the protocols  used on the Internet  has  been treated as an
example of healthy competition rather  than a political  and economic struggle. As the chapter 4
shows,  the  struggle  between  TCP/IP and  X.25 and  other  computer  networking standards  were
crucial in the structuration of the field of Internet governance already in the 1980s (Abbate, 1999;
Townes,  2012).  The  openness  of  protocols  was  only  one  aspect  of  the  struggle  between
telecommunication operators, computer manufacturers and computer scientists. 
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Internet-governance related Intellectual Property Rights
As we have seen form the historical overview of the emergence of Internet governance as an object
of study, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) were one of the main concerns in the debates around the
allocation of  domain  names in  the  1990s. Domain names  can  be defined in  a  purely technical
fashion as a sequence of characters designed to be easier to remember than an IP address (Postel,
1996). However, the legal view is different. The issue entailed rapidly the need to know who was
the legitimate owner of a particular domain name. Subsequently, the body in charge of allocating a
domain name to an individual or an organisation needed to be legitimate and to offer guarantees in
terms of IPR (Komaitis, 2010). The literature on trademarks and domain names, and on the Uniform
Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) set up by the ICANN and the WTO is extensive
(e.g. Geist, 2001; Sharrock, 2001).
Another  issue  related  to  IPR gained  importance  over  the  years.  While  most  of  the  underlying
protocols and standards that allow the functioning of the network are open, an increasing number of
royalty-bearing patents are involved in internetworking operations. According to some scholars, this
type of IPR is becoming “the central policy problem in intellectual property law” (Lemley, 2007
quoted in DeNardis 2013), as illustrated for example by the patent war in the telecommunication
industry. The issue affects Internet governance since an increasing number of standards emanate
from organisations that do not rely on the policy of open standards implemented by the Internet
Engineering TaskForce (IETF) or the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) (Samuelson, 2007). The
issue of IPR connects with the issue of protocol design and standardisation (DeNardis, 2011). Even
within open standards, the question of IPR is also of increasing importance. One recent example is
the attempt by companies such as Google, Microsoft and Netflix to introduce Digital Restrictions
Management technology in the newest version of the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML 5). The
objective is to protect proprietary audio and video content that is increasingly posted on the Internet
directly in HTML code rather than through proprietary software such as Flash and Silverlight media
players8. 
8 The newest version of the HTML language (HTML 5) features markups such as <audio> and <video> that allows 
the playback of audio and video content without the need for additional software. For more information on HTML5 
see http://www.w3schools.com/html/html5_intro.asp, last accessed 8 April 2014. For more information on DRM in 
HTML 5, see for example 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/02/23/microsoft_google_netflix_html5_drm_infection/, and 
http://www.defectivebydesign.org/no-drm-in-html5 for a critical view, websites last accessed  8 April 2014.
36
Internet Security and Infrastructure Management
The issue of Internet security and infrastructure management is tackled by the growing literature on
cybercrime  and  cybersecurity  (Brown  &  Marsden,  2013;  Deibert  &  Rohozinski,  2010;  Dunn
Cavelty & Mauer, 2007; Dunn Cavelty, 2013; Knake, 2010). Essential features of the Internet such
as the Domain Names System need to be secured and are subject to different threats. The routing of
packets on the network is also an important issue of cybersecurity studies (Mueller, Schmidt, &
Kuerbis, 2013) and an important entry point for surveillance and control. Cyber-attacks like the
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), hacktivism and cyberterrorism have also drawn significant
attention in the last decade (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Weimann, 2005). Cyber-warfare and the
consequences  of  the  Internet  for  international  security  is  also  widely  discussed,  as  well  as  the
growing importance of cyberstrategies (Carr, 2011; Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011). Many specialised
domains of cybersecurity are studied like the security in the cloud (Farrell, 2010), or the security of
the Internet of things (Weber, 2010);  and explore the issue of institutional arrangements that can
provide  a  political  management  of  cybersecurity.  This  literature  stands  at  a  crossroad  between
computer science, security studies and Internet governance. While most of it is anchored in a realist
understanding of security and sovereignty (see section 2.2), some authors explore the question of
the respective roles of non-state actors and states in the governance of security on the Internet
(Mueller, 2010).  In spite of the many specificities of cybersecurity studies and the breadth of the
issues under study, some of the underlying questions remain in the realm of political science and
question the role of actors and institutions in the securitisation of the network.
Internet governance-related communications rights
The management of the network has important consequences on some of the basic communication
rights of the users (Pavan, 2012). The consequences of the management of the network at a national
and at an international level on the freedom of expression of users is a key issue both in the politics
of Internet governance, and in the scholarly literature (e.g. Papacharissi, 2002). An important part of
the literature on Internet  governance focuses on the restriction to freedom of expression on the
Internet (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2008, 2010, 2011).  While most of these studies
regard the Internet as an empowering tool for the users that is undermined by the policies of some
states, others have a more critical stance on the emancipatory potential of the Internet (Morozov,
2011,  2013),  or  focus  on  the  role  of  corporations  in  restraining  freedom of  expression  on the
network (MacKinnon, 2012; Zittrain, 2008).
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Some scholars use the notion of a right to communicate, which was a political struggle led by Third
World  countries  in  the  1970s  and  reappeared  on  the  occasion  of  the  World  Summit  on  the
Information Society (Frau-Meigs, 2012; Pickard, 2007). The right to communicate differs from the
freedom of  expression  of  Internet  users,  since  it  is  based on a  Human rights  understanding of
communication, applicable to users and non-users of the Internet, with consequences on the need of
a universal access to the network.  
Another  concept  that  has  drawn some scholarly  attention  in  Internet  governance  studies  is  the
notion  of  privacy  (Bennett,  2003;  Lin,  2002;  Woo,  2006). The  issue  is  becoming  of  utmost
importance  in  the  “information  economy”,  where  users'  personal data  is  a  valuable  resource
(Langenderfer & Cook, 2004). An increasing amount of research on the consequences of “big data”
on individuals' privacy is being conducted (e.g. Lee, 2013).
Finally,  the  notion  of  “network  neutrality”  is  treated  as  a  fundamental  principle  of  Internet
governance,  and  even  as  a  right  of  Internet  users.  Network  neutrality  is  the  principle  that
intermediaries  should  treat  all  data  on  the  Internet  equally,  not  discriminating  or  charging
differentially by user or content. The relevance of the principle is discussed in the political sphere as
well  as  in  Internet  governance  literature  (Wu  & Yoo,  2007;  Wu,  2003;  Yoo,  2004,  2005)  and
triggered a debate among economists (e.g. Economides & Hermalin, 2012). 
2.1.3. The danger of un-disciplinarity: how to handle a complex 
framework?
The framework described in the previous section leaves aside most of the more generalist literature
on Internet governance. Specialised issues of Internet governance are often crucial to understand the
underlying  dynamics,  but  generalist  accounts  tackle  important  issues  that  determine  more
specialised debates. For example, the literature on the design of the protocols and standards of the
Internet  needs  to  be  read  in  the  context  of  a  privatisation  of  governance;  the  issue  of  the
management  of  critical  Internet  resources  touch  upon  the  question  of  sovereignty  in  Internet
governance. The study of specialised issues of Internet governance may allow for an analysis of
broader issues. 
The disaggregation of the debates as presented in the previous section, is  not only a matter  of
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classification and categorisation.  Scholars often specialise in one or the other debates and tend to
leave aside broader aspects of Internet governance. Moreover, most of the literature on Internet
governance relies on a problem-solving tradition (Cox, 1981). As we have seen, the historiography
of Internet governance studies is closely related to the political history of the field. Scholars are
important actors of Internet governance. This is why they privilege practical knowledge of a limited
aspect of Internet governance over a general understanding of the historical and structural dynamics
of the field. 
In a field originally dominated by computer scientists, the political debates have evidenced a certain
technological determinism that influenced the literature on Internet governance (see chapter 4). As a
consequence, technology-centred perspectives are common in Internet governance studies. In this
view, the physical  architecture as well  as the protocols and standards of the Internet  determine
policy issues. This is why many studies are limited to a particular aspect of Internet governance that
could  explain social  and political  behaviours,  rather  than the  other  way around (i.e.  How pre-
existing power relations affect the governance of the Internet?). The debate on network neutrality
has been for example framed in this way. Net neutrality was presented as a fundamental principle
inherent to the nature of the network (Wu, 2003). The object of the study thus became not the
definition and origins of the principle but the adaptation of actors to this technological law. The
scholarly  literature  then  influenced  policy-makers;  and  laws  to  protect  the  network  neutrality
flourished worldwide without  the principle  having been properly discussed beforehand.  Critical
approaches that try to investigate the social, economic and political bases of a given order are all the
more marginalised in Internet governance since the origins of political interactions are sought in the
technological  design of  the network.  Scholarly debates are  often mixed with  advocacy without
reflexivity. Favouring network neutrality comes down to advocating for political economic interests
of some actors (e.g. content producers, the United States), while criticising network neutrality leads
to the defence of other interests (e.g. telecommunication firms). Likewise, multistakeholderism is
treated  as  a  fundamental  principle  generated  by  the  decentralised  nature  of  the  network's
architecture and few studies analyse the meaning and political consequences of the principle. These
specialised  debates  avoid  the  vocabulary  of  social  sciences  where  network  neutrality  could  be
translated in  terms of  power in  the global  political  economy and multistakeholderism could be
translated into a debate around sovereignty, transnational private actors, or elitism.
The rejection of the technological determinism that undermines most of mainstream accounts of
Internet governance does not imply an adoption of an economic or social determinism  (Akrich,
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2012).  A move away from the structuralist  tendency of  critical  political  economy requires that
account be taken of the influence of the evolving character of both actors and the technology itself.
While it is necessary to acknowledge the conditions of production of a given technology such as the
Internet to understand the struggles for the definition of the regulation of this technology, it does not
imply that the technology has no agency at all. The Internet, like any other technology, has grown
autonomous from its original inventors. Technical objects are more than the pure materialisation of
social relations. They become uncontrolled and are subject to unintended uses and transformations
(Vinck, 1999; 2009).  While current uses of the Internet are affected – and even limited – by the
successive technological designs of the network, the evolution of uses changed the functionality and
purposes of the network. Historians and sociologists of science and technology insist on the role of
users  as  actors  of  innovation  through the  processes  of  displacement,  adaptation,  extension  and
diversion (Akrich 2012a). Displacement refers to the broadening of the scope of the usages of a
technology. Adaptation includes the small modifications of a technology by skilled users. Extension
refers to  the addition of some elements to  a given object  in order to  extend its functionalities.
Finally,  diversion refers to the important modification of an object that prevents any return to its
original function. The Internet has been through these different processes – except arguably the
process of  diversion – on a regular basis during the last decades. Since the Internet is generally
described  as  a  particularly  flexible  technology9,  these  processes  are  all  the  more  crucial  to
understand  the  very  nature  of  the  technology.  The  first  and  most  striking  example  is  the
generalisation of the use of the e-mail  (see Abbate, 1999 and also chapter 4). The invention of
search engines, the “web 2.0” revolution and the growing size of the Internet traffic outside the web
– notably  through  “apps”  –  are  other  example  of  the  relatively  autonomous  evolution  of  the
technology. While the first concern of the thesis is the political struggles around the definition and
institutionalisation of Internet governance, it should be noted that these struggles do not address a
fixed object, they take place around an evolving technology. This is why the issue of domain names
is typical of the 1990s, when  users were expected to type directly the URL of a given website into
their browser's address bar. A few years later, users were not typing “cars.com” to buy a car online.
They  used  search  engines.  Against  this  background,  the  importance  of  domain  names  as  a
governance issue decreased (see chapter 6). 
On a similar level, it would be misleading to isolate the political debates around the governance of
the Internet from the technological controversies that marked the evolution of the network (Callon,
9 The relatively “open” nature of the technology in terms creation of new standards and protocols or the updating of 
the existing ones is generally referred to as an enabling factor of innovation. 
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1981). It is argued here that one of the founding technological controversy is the struggle between
the TCP/IP and the X.25 networking models (see Abbate, 1999, and chapter 4). The fact that the
decentralised, computer-based TCP/IP prevailed over a more centralised network relying on less
powerful  devices  is  a  central  element  in  the  structuring  of  the  debates  of  the  1990s.  Another
important technological controversy that underly the political debates since the 1990s is the issue of
the single root.  Does the Internet require  a single centralised and authoritative root in order  to
ensure an efficient routing and a perfect match between domain names and IP addressed or does the
de-centralised nature of the network allow for the creation of several roots? (Internet Architecture
Board, 2000 – RFC 2826) These controversies precede and determine to a certain extent the scope
of technological choices available. As a result, some of the debates of Internet governance are “post-
technological” (Callon,  1981) in spite of their technical character. They do not question a certain
model and reify previous technological choices. 
Of  course,  a  large  literature  rooted  in  social  sciences  and  cautious  of  the  limitations  of  both
technological and social/economic determinisms does exist. In the study of Internet governance,
reflections on the notion and institutional forms of governance is as important as the understanding
of the functioning of the network. Multistakeholderism, as a form of organising governance has
been  studied  by  a  number  of  scholars  since  the  World  Summit  on  the  Information  Society
(Antonova, 2008; Malcolm, 2008; Mathiason, 2008; Raboy, Landry, & Shtern, 2010). Others have
focused on how power is exercised in Internet governance and the institutional logics that underpin
Internet governance (Benedek, Bauer, & Kettemann, 2008; Brousseau, Marzouki, & Méadel, 2012;
Drake & Wilson III, 2009; Flyverbom, 2011;  Rioux et al., 2013).  The role of the state in these
governance settings has also been analysed (Braman, 2009; Drezner, 2004; Goldsmith & Wu, 2006;
Rioux,  2004).  This  literature  is  coherent  with  political  science  debates  about  power  in  the
globalisation process and will be detailed in the following section.
While the generalist literature is closer to the debates of social sciences and address some of the
pressing questions about power in Internet governance, the lack of disciplinary anchorage of the
literature and the technical character of the debates sometimes leads to an undisciplined rather than
interdisciplinary debate. 
Against this background, the present study tries to locate the analysis of Internet governance in the
realm of social sciences. While interdisciplinarity is needed for a comprehensive approach to the
phenomenon of Internet governance; the technical, historical and legal knowledge of the debates is
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re-framed in a social science perspective. As the following chapter shows, the study of Internet
governance can be used as a case-study to analyse the role  of certain types of actors in global
governance and to stress the issues of power and domination. Thus, the thematic  review of the
literature outlined earlier will be completed with a theoretical classification of the literature in order
to connect with the debates of political science and international relations. Whereas the literature on
Internet  governance  draws  upon  a  wide  variety  of  scholarly  traditions,  the  use  of  the  term
governance hints towards an analysis of social relations of power.
The concept of governance, although criticised, is important to the analysis of the management of
the Internet (Sylvan 2013). Governance can describe a wide variety of structures and processes that
cannot be described as government and are more institutionally embodied than an abstract rule. The
concept can be used to study the complex sets of both formal and informal institutions and rules and
the existence of both private and public actors and institutions without ruling out a priori  any actor
or process. It is a concept that allows at the same time the study of global governance through
multilateral institutions and the transnational private governance (see table 2.1). It encompasses the
various  types  of  relationships  that  can  be  created  between  states,  markets  and  institutionalised
regulation, from auto-regulation to international regimes (Rioux, 2005). Governance is used in this
research as in most studies of Internet governance since there are no widely accepted alternative to
the use of this concept when trying to describe this particular form of organising world politics. It is
however  not  used  in  a  prescriptive  way  to  differentiate  good  semi-privatised  and  efficient
governance from the outdated model of multilateralism. The concept is a useful base for a study of a
complex transnational  political  process.  It  does not  imply a horizontal  political  process nor the
absence of domination and may be the first step of an analysis of power relations in world politics.
Formal Informal
Public International institutions and
intergovernmental regimes
transgovernmental networks and policy
communities
Private Private regimes, self-regulatory 
bodies, law
merchant, etc.
transnational policy networks, NGOs,
advocacy coalitions, transnational interest
and value groups
Table 2.1: Transnational governance structures and processes (taken form Cerny, 2010, p. 187)
Beyond specific questions of Internet governance such as intellectual property rights or network
neutrality, the design and definition of a governance system is at stake. Arguably, the search for a
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transnational governance system for the Internet echoes further attempts in other field to manage
world politics.  As a result,  the  theoretical  classification of Internet  governance studies  outlined
below is  similar  to  the  classification  of  the  diverging  theoretical  positions  in  the  globalisation
debate.      
2.2. An IR perspective on Internet governance: tentative classification of 
approaches
The  following classification of  Internet  governance  shows that  mainstream approaches  such  as
liberalism and realism make important contributions to the understanding of Internet governance.
While liberal approaches insist on the role of private actors, realist approaches shed light on power
struggles  in  Internet  governance.  However,  mainstream  approaches  fail  to  acknowledge  the
dynamics at play in the creation of transnational governance systems. A richer contribution is made
by the analysis of transnational private authority that draws upon international political economy
approaches. The particular contribution of this study, as described in the following chapter, is to be
understood as compatible and complementary to this latter category. 
2.2.1. The limits of traditional IR approaches
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  “information  revolution”  and  information  and  communication
technologies (ICTs) have not arisen the same interest  in traditional IR approaches than in other
fields such as economics. Thus, a large part of the literature listed below is not part of core IR
debates. Moreover, most of the research is focused on the ICANN and not on the creation of a
complex governance system over several decades. Two main approaches on Internet governance
can be described, namely realism and liberalism. 
Realism and Internet governance
Realist approaches are critical of the notion of globalisation and minimise the changes  that have
occurred in the last decades. They do not see globalisation and the rise of ICTs as a major change in
global politics. They emphasise the persistence of the role of the state and the influence of power
politics in international relations (Waltz, 2000). In this view, struggles around the institutionalisation
of Internet governance  do not differ from traditional power politics between states.  Furthermore,
Internet governance is used as a least-likely case to confirm their hypotheses about world politics.
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While the Internet is supposed to epitomise the erosion of borders and the emergence of non-state
actors in world politics, realist studies of Internet governance proved  the continuing centrality of
states (Drezner, 2004). The regulation of human activities on the network is still divided in national
jurisdictions  and  the  Internet  remains  territorialised  (Goldsmith  &  Wu,  2006).  International
arrangements are negotiated among states with different capacities. Given the dominant position of
the US in the international system, Internet governance,  like many other issue-areas,  is  heavily
influenced by US power. Thus, many studies on Internet governance focus on the ICANN as an
American institution that personifies American power (Cukier, 2005). Realists insist on the control
that the US government exercise over the ICANN through the different contracts that have linked
the corporation to the Department of Commerce. The US government is theoretically able to reject
any new top-level domain and to delete existing ones.  Some authors use the example of the re-
delegation of the “.iq” country-code top-level domain after the US invasion of Iraq (de La Coste,
2006)17. The military origins of the network strengthen the analysis of the Internet as a tool of US
power (Roland & Shiman, 2002).
The main influence of realist thinking in Internet governance beyond the analysis of US hegemony
is to be found in the flourishing literature on cyber-security. The International Telecommunication
Union define cyber-security as:
“the  collection  of  tools,  policies,  security  concepts,  security  safeguards,
guidelines,  risk  management  approaches,  actions,  training,  best  practices,
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and
organization and user’s assets. Organization and user’s assets include connected
computing  devices,  personnel,  infrastructure,  applications,  services,
telecommunications  systems,  and  the  totality  of  transmitted  and/or  stored
information  in  the  cyber  environment.  Cybersecurity  strives  to  ensure  the
attainment  and maintenance  of  the  security  properties  of  the  organization  and
user’s assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment. The general
security  objectives  comprise  the  following:  availability,  integrity,  which  may
include authenticity and non-repudiation, and confidentiality.”10
Cyber-security  has attracted increased scholarly attention since the terrorist attacks of September
2001.  While not always rooted in a realist theoretical framework (Deibert  & Rohozinski, 2010;
Dunn Cavelty, 2013), a large part of the literature is addressing the issue of the defence by states of
digital  infrastructures  against  threats  by  terrorists  (Weimann,  2005), “hacktivists”(Arquilla  &
10 See  ITU-T  X.1205  “Overview  of  Cybersecurity”,  available  at  http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
T/studygroups/com17/Pages/cybersecurity.aspx, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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Ronfeldt, 2001), or other states (Carr, 2011; Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011). Simultaneously to the
scholarly literature,  the  term has  been increasingly used in  think tanks (Knake,  2010), defence
ministries, and intergovernmental organisations (Gelbstein & Kamal, 2002). Against most analysis
of Internet governance focusing on private actors, cyber-security research brought the state back in
Internet  governance  studies  (Dunn  Cavelty,  Mauer,  &  Krishna-Hensel,  2007;  Dunn,  Krishna-
Hensel,  &  Mauer,  2007).  National  cyber-security  strategies,  as  well  as  intergovernmental
cooperation, can be analysed in a traditional realist framework of security studies. The fact that
digital  infrastructures  are  means  and  targets  of  attacks  does  not  radically  change  the  national
management of threats. Arguably, cyber-security studies are closer to traditional IR debates than
other Internet governance studies. Scholars are generally located in research centres dedicated to
security studies rather than in communications departments. Hence, they tend to participate to other
debates and their object of study is different from the generalist research on Internet governance.
The scholarly debate is beginning to be institutionalised, as illustrated by the recent creation of the
cyber-security  centre  at  Oxford  university.  Despite  this  gradual  emancipation  of  cyber-security
research from Internet governance studies, the contribution of these debates is important to the field.
The focus on sometimes more traditional  issues of security  and sovereignty provide interesting
insights to  the Internet  governance debate.  The restructuring of  state  power  in  cyberspace  also
questions the transformation of the state and how power is exercised in new forms of governance
(Radu, 2012).
Realist studies are important for the analysis of Internet governance on three main accounts. First,
the  Internet  is  not  a  de-territorialised  space  where  states  have  no  power  or  legitimacy.  Early
enthusiasts  of the cyberspace concept focused on the idea of a de-territorialised network where
physical space had no influence. The first years of institutionalised Internet governance illustrated
the international tensions generated by the US domination of critical Internet resources such as the
root servers, the domain name space or the IP addresses. Realist studies of Internet governance
brought the question of jurisdiction and state power back to the debates (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006). 
Second, they also insisted on the material elements of the telecommunication network.  Physical
infrastructures, such as cables or servers, and users as well as service providers are located in a
specific territory within a national jurisdiction. They are also unevenly distributed between states.
Infrastructure elements such as routers, servers, and global Internet exchange points are distributed
among states  with different  capacities  (Schemeil,  2012).  The location of the root name servers,
responsible for the first step of the translation of domain names into IP addresses, has attracted
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particular attention since these servers were originally all based in the US (Cukier, 2005). T
Third, the study of the geopolitics of the Internet have shed light on important power struggles at
the inter-state level (Godeluck, 2002; Frau-Meigs, 2012). The issue of the US hegemony in Internet
governance has been a strong concern in policy discussions. The first scholarly accounts on Internet
governance did not fully address the issue. It is only with the development of the realist IR studies
that the phenomenon began to be analysed in depth (Schemeil,  2012). Recent debates about the
possibility of a cyber-cold war between China and the US illustrate the importance of power politics
in Internet  governance (DeNardis,  2014).  Even if  the history  of  Internet  governance  cannot  be
reduced to inter-state competition, traditional international politics need to be taken into account to
understand global Internet politics.
The focus on territories and jurisdictions, on material elements and on inter-state competition are
important  contributions  of  the  realist  approach to  Internet  governance  studies.  However,  realist
Internet governance studies show some limitations. First realist studies of Internet governance tend
to  understate  one  of  the  key  characteristics  of  Internet  governance:  the  institutionalized  and
legitimized role of private actors, most of them acting on a transnational scale. This is a major
change in international telecommunications politics that needs to be fully analysed.  The ICANN is
a private non-profit corporation acting under Californian law, the World Summit on the Information
Society consecrated the notion of multistakeholderism according to which governments are one
category of stakeholders equal to others. States are important actors of Internet governance but non-
state actors acquired a greater importance than in other fields. While it is important to take states
and intergovernmentalism into account, other types of actors and other modes of governance co-
exist with them in the governance of the network (Mueller, 2010).
Second, realist studies tend to overstate the power of the US government over the Internet. For
example, the control  over the Domain name system is very limited.  Would the US government
decide to delete an important domain name, other states and companies could use copies of the
Domain name system that are backed up in several places distributed worldwide. The Internet is a
distributed network that could function without some of its US elements. As we are going to see in
this study, the US domination is to be found in the power of US-based transnational Internet firms
and  in  the  domination  of  US  engineers  over  the  standardisation  processes  rather  than  in  the
theoretical control of the US government over the network. 
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Third, the focus on inequalities between states tend to obscure the inequalities within nations-states.
While North-South digital divide and the lack of influence of some states are crucial elements of
Internet governance, the number of people participating to the definition of the rules of the game in
the field of Internet governance is limited in OECD countries as well. Divisions in terms of class,
race and gender in Internet governance need to be taken into account. The resources required to
actively participate in Internet governance forums generate exclusion on an international as well as
on a  local  scale.  Thus,  the  present  study combine the analysis  of  inter-state  exclusion and the
analysis of elitism (see chapter 3). 
Liberalism and Internet governance
The most influential IR approach in Internet governance studies is liberalism. While not always
explicitly stated, a large part of the literature relies on the assumptions of rational actors cooperating
to  solve  cross-border  issues.  This  category  also  include  soft  constructivist  accounts  of  norms
adoption in Internet governance. This literature is policy-oriented and many researchers adopting
this approach are also actively involved in the various forums of Internet governance.
Since the literature is policy-oriented, it often lacks a clear theoretical framework. However, it is
generally based on some classical IR concepts, such as the notion of regimes. The definition of
Internet governance that is used by most authors is a reformulation of Krasner's famous definition
of regimes as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1983). It
was  adopted  by  the  UN-sponsored  Working Group on  Internet  Governance  in  2005  under  the
leadership of some IR and political science scholars. However, the regime theory was developed in
the  1980s and went  through a  process of  adaptation  to  a  period and an issue-area  particularly
affected by the globalisation process. Thus, the WGIG took into account non-state actors and its
definition reads: 
“Internet  governance is  the  development  and application  by Governments,  the
private  sector  and civil  society,  in  their  respective  roles,  of  shared  principles,
norms,  rules,  decision-making  procedures,  and  programmes  that  shape  the
evolution and use of the Internet.” (WGIG, 2005)
Regime theory is  not the only influence that can be found in the liberal literature. It also draws
heavily on the transnational  relations and liberal globalisation literatures. Liberal IR started in the
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1970s to include non-state actors as a new “level” in international relations (Keohane & Nye, 1972).
While the regime theory of the 1980s focused on states for historical as well as for historiographical
reasons11, the 1990s witnessed a renewed interest for non-state actors in liberal IR. Globalisation
studies described the retreat of the state and the rise of non-state actors (e.g. Badie, 1995; Ohmae,
1999).  In  this  view,  transnational  flows  include  –  and  are  enhanced  by –  the  development  of
information  and  communication  technologies.  This  type  of  thinking,  sometimes  dubbed
“hyperglobalism”  (Anheier  &  Juergensmeyer,  2012),  also  include  the  claim  of  a  radical
transformation of society and the emergence of the information age and a network society (Castells,
2009).  This  argument  fits  particularly well  in  the  Internet  governance  debate,  where  networks,
information and communication are ubiquitous (Mueller, 2010). 
Liberal literature on governance has influenced the field so much that it is almost unanimously now
referred to as Internet governance rather than regulation of the Internet or global Internet policy.
Like in other issue-areas, there is no single authority in charge of Internet governance (Rosenau &
Czempiel, 1992). Arrangements involving multiple actors and ad hoc institutions must be created.
Liberal  governance  studies  insist  on  the  horizontal  character  and  on  the  pluralism  of  these
processes.  The  concept  of  stakeholders,  as  used  in  Internet  governance  studies,  illustrates  the
management of a global issue in a political space that is not dominated by states.  
Other concepts developed in liberal and soft constructivist IR are influential in Internet governance
studies. The concept of epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) is sometimes used to describe the role
of experts and scholars in Internet governance (Cogburn, 2005). Global civil society participation in
Internet governance is also sometimes described as the emergence and practices of transnational
advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), especially in the context of the World Summit on the
Information  Society  (Mueller,  2010).  Transgovernmental  networks  is  another  concept  that
highlights the creation of networks of actors beyond traditional state-to-state diplomacy (Slaughter,
2004). It  has  been increasingly used by  liberal scholars to  study various issue-areas.  However,
because of the focus on non-state actors in Internet governance studies, the more general term of
networked governance is more widely used (Kahler, 2009).
Against this background, Internet governance studies of the late 1990s and 2000s drew upon liberal
11 The inter-state tensions of the 1980s made transnational cooperation less important on the agenda of mainstream
researchers  and  even  early  advocates  of  a  transnational  turn  moved  back  to  more  traditional  state-centred  IR
(Keohane & Nye, 1977). The neo-neo debate generated by the publication of Waltz' influential book (Waltz, 1979)
also reinforced the state-centrism of the debates. 
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concepts  such  as  governance  and  focused  on  the  role  of  private  actors.  However,
multistakeholderism became the key concept of liberal Internet governance studies. The notion of
multistakeholderism, taken from organizational and management studies (Antonova, 2008, p. 40),
broadens the scope of regime theory to embrace the role of of a large scope of private actors in this
kind of governance models. In the 1980s, organizational studies began to look beyond shareholders
to include “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the activities
of an organization” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46).  The idea was to include the affected parties in the
management of the firm in order to democratise it. The notion of stakeholder was not widely used in
political  science and international  political economy before the end of the 1990s12.  In a similar
fashion to the management of the firm in the 1980s, the idea of multistakeholderism is to include
affected parties in the management of global issues and in the regulation of global networks such as
the  Internet.  There  is  a  strong  normative  assumption  of  political  liberalism  in  the  concept  of
multistakeholderism. In this view, any affected group or individual has a say in the governance of
the Internet, which includes every single Internet user, but also non-users since they are affected by
their  exclusion from the network.  This is why multistakeholderism is associated with global or
transnational democracy (Bexell, Tallberg and Uhlin, 2010; Kleinwächter, 2008a).
Through  the  concept  of  multistakeholderism,  liberalism  became  the  official  theory  of  Internet
governance, used by UN institutions, the ICANN, and private actors. The often tacit, references to
the principles of liberalism and pluralism that characterised a large part of the literature on Internet
governance were acknowledged and adopted in  the  Tunis  Agenda through the  inclusion of  the
definition of the WGIG quoted earlier. With the object under study defined as Internet “governance”
and the organising principle being multistakeholderism, the assumptions of liberal political science
became  deeply  embedded  in  the  field.  The  lack  of  discussion  of  these  concepts  ensured  the
domination of liberal thinking on Internet governance in the last decade13.
Liberal  perspectives  on  Internet governance  have  been  essential  in  the  structuring  and  in  the
development of the field of Internet governance studies. Their focus on actors, and especially non-
state  actors,  have helped  to  grasp the extent  of the change embodied in the ICANN and other
Internet governance institutions. They have also developed a detailed description of the processes
12 Unlike  management  studies,  database  of  political  science  scholalry articles  list  few  occurrences of  the  term
stakeholder in the 1980s and early 1990s. It is towards the end of the decade, and especially in the 2000s that the
use of the term seems to become widespread.
13 The concept of multistakeholderism is beginning to be debated in policy as well as in scholarly circles (Radu and
Chenou,  2013).  See  also  the  Internet  Society  questionnaire  on  multistakeholderism.  A report  is  available  at
http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/bp-msfinalreport-20132210-en.pdf, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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and practices  of  actors  in  Internet  governance  (Kleinwächter,  2004;  Mathiason,  2008;  Mueller,
2002). The analysis of networks of actors is also a major contribution of liberal Internet governance
studies.  Concepts  such  as  transnational  advocacy  networks  and  epistemic  communities  take
seriously the role of some particular types of actors in Internet governance. Moreover, the concept
of  governance  itself  helps  us  to  look  at  regulations  beyond  states  and  intergovernmental
organisations. The particular attention given to the specificities of the field of Internet governance
(e.g. Drake & Wilson III, 2009) offers a detailed and differentiated analysis of the history of Internet
governance that is sometimes downplayed by more structural accounts of Internet governance (see
next section).  While beyond the scope of this literature review, the importance of liberal Internet
governance studies for advocacy and institutionalisation purposes must also be acknowledged. 
However, liberal accounts of Internet governance suffer from severe drawbacks that have limited
the potential contribution of the field to the IR and political science disciplines. The main limitation
is certainly the lack of analysis of the issues of power and domination. While multistakeholderism
theoretically ensures that every type of actor act on an equal footing, the reality of the negotiations
shows  dynamics  of  power  and  domination.  Governments,  large  transnational  corporation,  civil
society organisations, and individuals are not equal actors. Multistakeholderism, like other modes of
governance,  entails  exclusion and domination.  Only  elite  actors  are  able  to  fully  participate  in
Internet governance processes, while users – and to a greater extent non-users – of the Internet are
excluded.  The  problem-solving  perspective  of  liberal  Internet  governance  studies  prevent  a
questioning of the underlying structures of social inequalities. The focus on the particularities of
Internet  governance  fails  to  acknowledge  the  embedding  of  Internet  governance  in  the  global
political economy and the penetration of the structures of domination within the field. Furthermore,
the political choices that have been made are sometimes obscured by a technological determinism
that  links  the  political  structure of  Internet  governance  with  the  very  nature of  the  technology
(Mathiason,  2008).  The  very  concept  of  stakeholder  remains  ambiguous  (Ruwet,  2010) and
multistakeholderism obscures the elitist character of Internet governance. 
To conclude, liberal Internet governance studies are useful in the unique knowledge and level of
details  that  they  provide on  Internet  governance.  However,  their  lack  of  theorisation  of  power
struggles and domination prevent their full inclusion in the scientific debates of IR and political
science. They are often used in this study as references but their findings must be constantly placed
in the context  of  the  global political  economy to be understood as part  of  global  politics.  The
following section present the missing link between Internet governance studies and global political
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economy but also underlines some limitations of structural explanations of Internet governance. The
chosen solution to the dilemma between detailed description of the field, as developed by liberal
perspectives, and a theoretically-informed account of Internet governance as a case-study of the
globalisation process will be explored in chapter 3. 
2.2.2. Critical approaches: the rise of private authority in world politics 
and the dead-end of structuralism
Unlike realist approaches that undermine the evolution of world politics and liberal approaches that
fail to analyse the evolving changing patterns of domination, critical approaches to global political
economy offer a more useful perspective on globalisation that allows for a deeper understanding of
the history of Internet governance.  This section will  focus on the concepts of globalisation and
transnationalisation as analysed by critical approaches and will outline the specific contribution of
neo-Gramscian approaches. 
Critical  approaches to global political economy have analysed the globalisation process without
leaning towards hyperglobalism14. Globalisation is in this view a political process, in which agency
plays a crucial  role.  However, critical  scholars criticise the sceptical view of the realists  (Hirst,
Thompson, & Bromley, 2009) and acknowledge the extent of the changes brought about by the
globalisation process. One important element of globalisation is the transformation of the state.
Critical  approaches  do  not  explain  globalisation  as  a  retreat  of  state  authority  but  rather  as  a
transformation of the state. According to Cerny for example, the state moved away from its role as
welfare state to become a competition state (Cerny, 1990, 1997).  Whereas the welfare state de-
commodified sectors such as health and education and regulated them outside of the market, the
competition state commodifies itself in order to become more competitive and economically more
efficient.  In  a  similar  fashion,  Jessop  describes  a  Schumpeterian  workfare  state  replacing  the
Keynesian welfare state (Jessop, 2002). The analysis of the transformation of the state in the last
decades is particularly important in order to understand the changing patterns of regulation in the
telecommunication sector in the 1980s and 1990s and the context of the emergence of Internet
governance. Chapter 4 explores into more details the privatisation of Internet governance in the
early 1990s and the reliance of market-based mechanism rather than intergovernmental regulation. 
Beyond the transformation of the state, the globalisation process entails an enhanced role for private
14 Marxist  accounts  of  globalisation  as  a  structural  phenomenon  driven  by  the  natural  expansion  of  capitalism
(Harvey, 1989) are not included in this categorisation.
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actors in the global political economy and the creation of various forms of transnational private
authority. The literature on private authority in the global political economy is large and the case-
studies are varied (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Cutler, 2003; Cutler, Haufler, & Porter, 1999; Graz
& Nölke, 2008; Hall & Biersteker, 2002; Haufler, 2001, Rioux, 2004). The main coherence between
these studies is the idea that authority that was previously exercised by public agencies and states
are increasingly delegated to the  private sector.  Far from offering a clear-cut distinction between
public and private authority, this literature informs us on the evolving relationship between state and
non-state actors and the public/private hybridisation of authority (Graz, 2006). The hybridisation of
authority entails a number of issues around  new modes of governance, such as multistakeholder
forums and raise the questions of participation and legitimacy (Graz & Nölke, 2008). The analysis
of  the  various  modes of  governance  of  the  globalisation  process echoes  the  analysis  of  actors'
practices within these forums, as studied by international political sociology approaches. 
The relation between transnational private authority and neoliberalism is also a constant element of
critical studies of global political economy. Transnational private authority is not only about the
inclusion of non-state actors in the regulation of specific sectors, it is also about imposing a model
that  relies  on market  forces  and individualises  processes,  which  is  not  without  questioning the
legitimacy of  such  models  (Graz  & Nölke,  2008). Consistent  with  neo-Gramscian  approaches,
globalisation is seen as constituted by a neoliberal historical bloc. As Gill (1995, p. 406) puts it, “the
neoliberal concept of globalisation suggests that the privatisation and transnationalisation of capital
are either inevitable or desirable from a broad social viewpoint” and that free competition and free
exchange entail economic efficiency, welfare and democracy, “and a myth of virtually unlimited
social progress”. Indeed, the evolution of telecommunication regulation in the 1980s (see chapter
4), and the institutionalisation of Internet governance in the 1990s (see chapter 5) are consistent
with such dominant ideology. 
Internet governance illustrates this phenomenon since ICANN was created as a private institution
responsible for the execution of tasks that were carried out by an intergovernmental organisation in
earlier telecommunication systems. Thus, the question of ICANN's legitimacy and its reliance on a
particular vision of market regulation was crucial in the politicisation of the Internet governance
debate. The delegation of public authority to private actors entails an analysis of who the actors that
exercise this hybrid authority are. Again, the variety of actors does not allow for a simple answer to
that  question. Specialised firms, experts, professional  groups (Dezalay,  2004; Seabrooke, 2011),
certifiers  (Graz  &  Hartmann,  2012)  or  even celebrities   (Richey  & Ponte,  2008)  can  play  an
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important role on the regulation of global markets.  Several attempts to construct a comprehensive
picture of these actors exist, through concepts such as transnational capitalist class (Sklair, 2001), or
global elite (Rothkopf, 2009).  Other authors analyse the actors of global decision-making in the
general direction taken by global capitalism in elite clubs (Gill, 1990). However, the structural and
global focus does not allow for an understanding of the specific actors and processes in each sector
where transnational private authority is exercised. The following chapter advocates for the  use of
the concept of elites as a way to comprehend the variety of actors involved in transnational private
authority, while ruling out the analysis of a single global elite or capitalist class. 
While  the  emergence  of  transnational  private  authority  is  analysed  from  different  theoretical
perspectives,  a  large  part  of  the  literature  is  influenced  by  Gramsci  and  constitutes  the  most
comprehensive critical  framework in  global  political  economy.  Neo-Gramscian perspectives  are
critical in the sense that they question the existing order, and explores how it came into being. In
this view, the historical analysis of the emergence of norms, institutions and practices is  crucial
(Cox,  1981).  Contrary  to  static  and  a-historical  accounts  of  a  given  order,  the  emergence  and
evolution  of  world  orders,  as  well  as  the  existing  prospects  for  change  are  central  to  a  neo-
Gramscian analysis of global political economy. As illustrated by chapter 4, the history that led to
the  emergence of  Internet governance  is  closely related to  the  evolution of the global  political
economy as described by neo-Gramscians (Gill, 1990)
Neo-Gramscian scholarship has been primarily concerned with a re-conceptualisation of hegemony
in IR (Rupert 1995; Bieler & Morton, 2004; Cox, 1981; Gill, 1993). Hegemony in traditional IR is
understood as a dominance of one state based on its material capacities (especially  economic  and
military).  Drawing upon Gramsci´s definition of hegemony as  consensual but “protected by the
armour of coercion” (2010 [1948-1951]), Cox claimed that hegemony might prevail within a world
order when material capacities, ideas, and institutions fitted coherently. That is, when domination is
accepted “as the natural order of things” (Cox, 1994, p. 366) through the prevalent collective image
of world order, through the existence of institutions, and through material power (Morton, 2003).
Hegemony explains the relative stability of a given historical order. Hegemony is constructed within
three spheres of activity:  the social relations of production that define the main collective actors,
forms of state  understood as state-civil society complexes, and world orders  (Cox, 1981, p. 138).
This framework allows for an analysis of hegemony and change at  different levels, through the
analysis  of  particular  configurations of  these  elements.  This  framework  is  dynamic  since  the
dialectic relations between spheres, and historical structures, are ever changing. Historical structures
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are defined as persistent social practices reproduced and transformed by human activity (Bieler &
Morton, 2001; Morton, 2003). Although critical research sometimes adopt a structuralist view of
social relations, neo-Gramscian scholarship offer the necessary tools to take agency seriously. That
is why neo-Gramscian scholars focus on historical blocs to describe a moment of relative stability
of a given order and insist on its transitory character. 
Historical  blocs  are  another  concept  taken from Gramsci  that  is  applied  to  the  global  political
economy.  Gramsci  defined  historical  blocs  as  “unity  between  nature  and  spirit  (structure  and
superstructure),  unity  of  opposites  and  of  distincts”  (Gramsci,  1999,  p.  337).  It  represents  the
historical moment of hegemony, when the interests of the dominant class have been propagated and
accepted  throughout  society.  A  historical  bloc  in  a  given  society  can  be  then  expanded
internationally and become a world order. Cox (1987) described the post-World War 2 order as Pax
Americana, characterised by the Bretton Woods system and “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie, 1982).
This  historical  bloc  corresponded  to  a  form  of  state  (the  Keynesian  welfare  state),  a  Fordist
accumulation regime and the internationalisation of both production and the state (Cox, 1987; Gill
&  Law,  1989).  This  particular  world  order  was  institutionalised  in  the  UN  system.  In  the
telecommunication sector, this particular world order resulted in the reform of the International
Telecommunication Union as well as several national reforms leaning towards the Keynesian form
of state (see chapter 4). The evolution of this order that started in the 1970s with the end of the
Bretton Woods system affected the evolution of telecommunication regulation. The Internet was
popularised and Internet governance became institutionalised in a new world order characterised by
globalisation  and  the  rise  of  transnational  capital  (Gill,  1990).  This  is  where  neo-Gramscian
approaches are in accordance with the theories about the transformation of the state and the analysis
of globalisation outlined before. 
Critical approaches informed by Gramscian concepts are better equipped to analyse the emergence
and the dynamics of semi-privatized and transnational forms governance such as the ICANN system
and other Internet governance forums. Internet governance materialized as an international political
issue within a context of a general trend towards commercialization  and privatization of various
sectors, in a context of transformation of the state.  Critical approaches describe the general context
of the rise of Information-led capitalism (Schiller,  1999) or Knowledge-Based Economy (KBE)
(Jessop, 2006). Critical approaches also analyse the effects of neoliberal globalization on Internet
governance (Lee, 2009; Simpson, 2004; Sum, 2003; von Bernstorff, 2003).
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However, critical approaches to Internet governance epitomize the danger of structuralism in critical
approaches in IR and global political economy. These analyses tend to obscure the specificities of
Internet governance, in terms of actors, ideas, and institutions. They offer a rather uniform view of
globalization and tend to focus on hegemonic actors that cover a wide scope of the global political
economy, such as the United States (von Bernstorff 2003; Sum 2003) or a transnational elite whose
influence  applies  to  every  realm  of  international  relations  (Lee  2009).  As  we  will  see  in  the
following  chapters,  neoliberalism  was  not  the  only  ideology  that  had  some  legitimacy  in  the
emerging field of Internet  governance, and the actors involved were different from other issue-
areas. The process and the actors that shape a specific policy area to make it  fit  the project of
neoliberal globalization require further attention. 
By determining  ex ante the driving force behind change, critical accounts of Internet governance
reproduce the limitations of structuralist theories and fail to fulfil the “structurationist” (Giddens,
1986)  potential  of  neo-Gramscian  approaches,  where  structures  are  constantly  reproduced  and
transformed by agency and where coherence and stability are historical and temporary phenomena.
For example, some studies of the global elite, or the transnational capitalist class (especially Sklair,
2001)  assume that a common class interest  exist  among the CEOs of large transnational  firms.
Carrol and Fennema (2002) presuppose the existence of a transnational business community and
failed to analysed the process of its formation15.  Likewise,  some critical  approaches to  Internet
governance assume that a global elite was already existing ex ante and exercised its power in the
institutionalisation  of  Internet  governance  (Lee,  2009).  Others  focused  on  the  ideology  of
neoliberalism and its diffusion in Internet governance without taking sufficiently into account the
actors of the process of “neoliberalization” (Belfrage & Ryner, 2009).
There  is  a  growing  critique  of  the  exaggeratedly  structural  focus  of  critical  approaches  that
advocates  for  the  necessity  to  take agency  and  particularities  more  seriously  (Hobson  and
Seabrooke,  2007).  One critique is aimed at the Eurocentrism of critical  approaches that allegedly
neglect the dynamics of other regions and local translations global phenomena (Hobson, 2007). For
some authors,  critical  IPE is  more focused on the overall  global structures to  the detriment  of
sectoral  or  local  ones  (Phillips,  2005).  As  a  consequence,  non-Western,  local  and  sectoral
particularities are sometimes neglected by critical approaches. Internet  governance, for example,
has particular characteristics related to its specific history and its politicisation process that can not
15 In this last case, it is important to note that Carrol later took on the task of studying the process of unification
(Carroll, 2010).
55
be  directly  related  to  the  global  trend  of  neoliberal  globalization.  The  "technical  community"
featuring mostly computer engineers working in the academia continues to play a vital role in the
governance of the Internet, which sometimes allows it to oppose the logics promoted by the private
sector  and  transnational telecommunications  firms. Libertarian ideas are  an important  source of
ideological discourse of governance actors of the Internet. If these ideas are often compatible with
the dominant neoliberal ideology at the global level, they sometimes differ, especially on the issue
of intellectual property rights. Far from being anecdotal idiosyncrasies, these features are essential
to the understanding of a number of debates and political struggles that might influence other areas
of world politics. Struggles at the ideational level have to be thoroughly analysed in order to shift
the focus from the “hegemony of production”, focusing on material elements, to the “production of
hegemony” (Sum and Jessop, 2013).
Moreover, the critical approaches also tend to study the structural aspects such as the global spread
of  ideologies  and  their  influence  on  political  implementation without  taking  into  account  the
interactions between actors. If individuals are obviously present in the critical approaches of  IPE,
they are often treated as exogenous to the structure, as objects of structural constraints, rather than
as elements of structures (Berry, 2007). Structures do not exist in the absence of their reproduction
by  agents. It is  through these interactions that the  consequences of structural domination  can be
analysed.  As  pointed  Knafo  (2010),  for  any actor  that  is constrained  by  structures,  another  is
empowered  by  it.  While critical authors  seek  to  compensate  for  the  structuralism  of  critical
approaches by considering resistance of non-dominant actors, they study only very partially change
among dominant  actors.  Accordingly,  they  analyse prospects of revolution rather than  evolving
power structures.  Structures are a medium through which some groups  exercise their domination
over other actors (Knafo,  2010).  Because of their focus on macro structures (Bieler & Morton,
2001), critical approaches sometimes offer  a  totalising  image  of  globalisation  that  misses the
specific dynamics that lead to the domination of an ideology or a group of actors in a specific
specific issue-area (Cerny 2010).  Moreover, a structural perspective highlights reproduction  over
change.  Change is  more likely to take place at  a meso level through the interactions of agents
(Knafo 2010). For example, critical accounts of European integration offer examples of the role of
agents in social change (van Apeldoorn, 2002; Bieler, 2010; Cafruny & Ryner, 2007).
Two main attempts to overcome the limitations of critical approaches have developed over the last
few years. The first one is the “practice turn” in  international relations (Adler & Pouliot, 2011a,
2011b;  Adler-Nissen,  2012;  Neumann,  2002). These  scholars  claim that  the  focus  on  practices
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promises to avoid traditional dichotomies such as agent and structure, stability and change and ideas
and matter (Adler & Pouliot, 2011c). Thus, the “practice turn” seems to offer a way to overcome the
structuralism of critical approaches to Internet governance. Practices are located and differentiated
and are also constantly evolving. However, the focus on practices is not a theoretical framework. As
Adler and Pouliot acknowledge, the concept of practices is vague enough for various “theoretical
preferences”  to  accept  it  (Adler  and  Pouliot,  2011c).  The  present  study  adopts  a  particular
standpoint on practices inspired by Bourdieusian sociology (see chapter 3). A theoretically-informed
analysis of practices can fruitfully complement structuralist accounts of Internet governance without
reproducing  the  shortcomings  of  liberal  perspectives.  Against  this  background  Bourdieusian
international political sociology allows for a critical understanding of practices in relation to the
dynamics of sectoral and global domination. 
A second attempt to bring agents back in the analysis of global political economy can be found in
the IPE literature. “Everyday” IPE  promises to  shed light on the relationship between individual
agents'  behaviour  and global  structures of the  political  economy (Hobson & Seabrooke,  2007).
According to Watson (2013), two different strands analyse two elements of this relationship. First
“everyday  politics”  analyses  how  change  is  generated  through  the  undermining  of  existing
structures by small-scale local activities (Kerkvliet, 2005).  Second, “everyday life” analyses how
individual behaviour is disciplined by global structures (Davies & Ryner, 2007).  While everyday
IPE  take agency seriously, the link between local individual agency and global structures is not
completely  theorised  in  these  approaches.  Again,  Bourdieusian  international  political  sociology
enables us to relate individuals with global structures through concepts such as field,  habitus and
capital. Against the focus on non-elite actors of everyday IPE, the present study uses the sociology
of elites to analyse Internet governance.  However, it  acknowledges the critique emanating form
everyday IPE that elite studies often take for granted the legitimacy of elite discourses and actions
(Seabrooke,  2006).  This  is  why,  the  analysis  of  transnational  elites  in  Internet  governance  is
combined with the analysis  of the fragility of consent  of non-elite groups  in order to take into
account the capacity of non-elite groups to “shape change beyond organised resistance” (Seabrooke,
2007). 
To conclude, a complex framework is needed to analyse the richness of Internet governance. The
chapter  argues  that  while  an  interdisciplinary  analysis  is  required,  it  must  be  anchored  in  a
theoretically-informed  disciplinary  debate.  International  relations  and  political  science  offer  an
interesting framework to analyse the power dynamics that are at work in the definition of the rules
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of the  game in  Internet  governance.  These  rules  affect  different  actors,  institutions  and issues.
Mainstream IR approaches are unable to fully address complex, transnational and semi-privatised
governance system such as Internet governance. Critical international political economy is certainly
the most useful framework to analyse Internet governance. However, critical accounts of Internet
governance have often relied on a structuralist understanding of critical IPE and especially, neo-
Gramscian scholarship.  This observation echoes a  broader  dynamic in critical  IPE.  While  Cox'
writings feature elements that allows for the analysis of change and agency, critical IPE has tended
to focus more on stability and structures. 
Against this background, recent strands of literature in IR and IPE have tried to bring agency back
in critical approaches. As the following chapter argues, the contribution of this recent literature can
be included in an international political sociology approach. Agency and practices can be analysed
in  relations  to  structures  and domination.  The  focus  on  agency should  not  necessarily  mean a
neglect of structures. 
Finally, some non-structuralist critical analysis of Internet governance exist and are complementary
to the present study. Foucauldian approaches and science and technology studies offer another way
to analyse power in a non-structuralist way (Antonova, 2008; Flyverbom, 2011). Some feminist
studies of Internet governance also exist and provide crucial elements in the analysis of domination
(Gurumurthy & Gurumurthy, 2008; Gurumuthy, Jeet Singh, Mundkur, & Swamy, 2006). With a
focus  that  differs  from  mainstream  Internet  governance  studies,  these  alternative  accounts  of
Internet  governance  provide  original  thinking  about  Internet  governance  that  will  be  used
throughout this study. 
58
Chapter 3. The study of transnational elites in Internet 
governance
The review of the existing literature on Internet governance takes us back to the core question
addressed by political science: Who governs? As we have seen in the previous chapter, this question
has not been fully answered by existing literature on Internet governance. The focus on states and
on ideology are not satisfying. The common focus on a particular issue fails to tackle the struggle
around the definition of Internet governance. Liberal approaches neglect power differentials among
actors and treat every actor as equal. The critical  actor-centred analysis conducted in this study
draws upon political  sociology to analyse power beyond national societies. It  is centred around
concepts such as elites and field that can be found in the work of sociologists such as Wright Mills
and Bourdieu.  The  following chapter  claims that  these  concepts  can  be  useful  to  construct  an
international political sociology perspective that allows for a detailed description of the specificities
of Internet governance and for a critique of liberal approaches. While the concepts were developed
for the analysis  of national  societies,  this chapter explores  ways to  adapt  them to transnational
settings. As Wright Mills puts it, “for every epoch and for every social structure, we must work out
an answer to the question of the power of the elite” (Wright Mills, 2000, p. 23). The fact that some
contemporary social structure are transnational in scope should not discourage us to take on the task
defined by Wright Mills.
The previous chapter started from the issue of Internet governance to describe its embedding in
international  relations'  problématiques. This  chapter  proceeds  the  other  way  around,  from  the
general question of who governs to its operationalisation in the analysis of the specific case of
Internet governance.  The objective is to present a framework that allows for a non-structuralist
critical analysis of Internet governance.  While sympathetic to the “practice” and the “everyday”
turns in IR and IPE, the following framework is an attempt to anchor an actor-centred analysis in a
critical project related to the general questions addressed by neo-Gramscian scholarship. The focus
on elites and actors represents a “structural constructivist” perspective on the relationship between
actors and structures (Bourdieu, 1987) rather than an underestimation of the effects of structures.  
The  first  section  presents  the  international  political  sociology  approach  that  constitutes the
theoretical framework of the present study. The second section describes the methodology used to
operationalise concepts such as power elite and field in order to study the recent history of Internet
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governance. 
3.1. The International Political Sociology approach
The conceptual framework of the present study is particularly based on the work of two sociologists
that are sometimes combined in critical analysis of power structures. The first author is Charles
Wright  Mills  (1916-1962),  whose  analysis  of  the  “power  elite”  is  here  completed  with  the
Gramscian concept of “hegemony”. The second is Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002), whose concept of
field is used to analyse a space of social interactions that is not limited by national borders but
rather defined by power struggles. 
3.1.1. Elites, hegemony and challenges
The concept of elite(s) has been widely used in political science and political sociology. The iron
law of oligarchy described by Michels (Michels, 2009) that opposes a powerful few to less powerful
or dominated masses has been evidenced by many sociologists and political  scientists since the
pioneering  work  by  Vilfredo  Pareto  (Pareto,  1917).  Still,  the  vagueness  of  the  concept  has
undermined the outreach of elites theories in social sciences (Scott, 2008, p. 27). Charles Wright-
Mills developed a useful classification of elite theories. He listed four main definitions of elites
(Wright Mills, 2000, p. 385): 
• The  first  conception  defines  the  elite  as  a  group  of  individuals  that  hold  important
institutional  positions  in  a  given  society.  Individuals  are  ranked  according  to  their
institutional  position and to  the  position of their  institution  in  the  society.  Heads of the
ministerial cabinets, the main churches, the military or the biggest firms among others form
the elite.
• The second conception ranks individuals according to the statistics of selected values to
characterise  the  highest  tier  as  the  elite.  The  elite  then  comprises  the  richest,  the  most
intelligent or the most skilled individuals in a given area depending on the criteria privileged
by the observer.
• The third conception defines the elite as “a clique-like” set of people. The elite is a network
of  individuals  that  is  “conscious,  coherent,  and  conspiratorial”  (Meisel,  1962).  This
conception describes cohesion among the elite on a scale that ranges from visions of an elite
sharing some values and ideas to a vision denouncing a unified and secret elite conspiring to
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rule a given country.
• The fourth conception is based on morality and claims that certain personality types have
higher morale values than others. Their rule is therefore legitimate and appropriate.
These  four  conceptions  have  very  different  consequences  for  the  analysis  of  elites.  The  first
conception  focuses  on  institutions  and  institutional  power.  The  second  one  focuses  on  assets,
resources, or forms of capital. The third one insists on the unity of the elite, and can be related to the
analysis of a “class for itself” in the Marxist tradition, but also hints towards conspiracy theories.
The last  definition is  a  conservative  one  to  justify  elite  power.  Wright-Mills  sums up the  four
conceptions in one sentence: “[...] What they head up, what they have, what they belong to, who
they really are” (Wright Mills, 2000, p. 385). These four ideal-typical visions illustrate the diversity
of the use of the concept and are useful to classify existing theories on elite(s). Drawing upon these
conceptions, it is possible to formulate a general definition of elites that encompasses the different
visions. John Scott defines elites as holders of power within a social field (Scott, 2008, pp. 27–28).
Elements of the four visions outlined by Wright-Mills can be included in this definition, leaving the
articulation between them to  the empirical  study.  Focusing on power  allows us  to  differentiate
between elites as powerful social groups and other “superior” groups of less relevance to political
and social theory (Scott, 2008). The notion of social field acknowledges the fact that institutions and
sources of power (forms of capital) might be different from one social realm to the other. Moreover,
it does not limit the analysis of elites to the national level. It allows for an analysis of transnational
elites, defined as groups of individuals from different national territories that exercise power within
a particular area of social life and interact as a network beyond national boundaries. Transnational
elites  are  therefore  a  specific  kind  of  actor  in  international  relations.  They  are  individuals  and
groups  rather  than  institutionalised  organisations.  They  exercise  relational  or  structural  power
within  a  specific  social  field  through  political  authority,  economic  dominance,  or  discursive
resources. They act transnationally, in areas of social life that transcend national boundaries and
their influence is to be found at a global level or at least beyond national borders.
Due to the dominant state-centrism in IR theories, the concept of elite has been used mainly in the
sense of a national elite  and there are few studies of transnational elites. The notion of a “foreign
policy establishment” in the United States illustrates this inside-out approach. National elites have
been seen as relevant to the analysis of international politics in that they influence the definition of a
state’s foreign policy. In this view, because of shared long-term interests among military, political
and business leaders, a consensual elite exists in the domain of foreign policy. That is why foreign
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policy  is  believed  to  be  more  consensual  and  stable  than  domestic  policies16.  However,  this
approach to international relations is partial and biased. World politics are not the sum of foreign
policies adopted by the different states of the system, and even less so in a context of globalisation.
Along with national elites, transnational elites exercise power and are therefore relevant to the study
of international relations. The concept of transnational elites allows us to grasp a reality beyond
state-to-state relations and to analyse world politics from a really transnational perspective.
Several approaches are close to what  is here defined as transnational elites (even if  terms differ).
First,  a  Marxist  approach  clearly  applies  elite  sociology  to  the  world  society.  Leslie  Sklair’s
transnational capitalist class comprises the heads of the biggest transnational firms. He interviewed
executive and managers from global firms and analysed their role in the control of the process of
globalisation. He concludes that an emerging transnational capitalist class is beginning to act as a
transnational  dominant  class  in  some  spheres  and  cooperates  to  overcome  the  contradictions
inherent to a global consumerist capitalism (Sklair, 2001). Although Sklair uses the term class to
define his object, elite sociologists could claim that he is in fact studying a corporate elite, based on
institutional  positions,  rather  than  a  class  since  the  global  corporate  elite  lack  the  class
consciousness  associated  with  the  definition  of  class  (Scott,  2008).  A sociological  debate  has
discussed the existence of such a class (Carroll, 2010; Carrol & Carson, 2003; Carrol & Fennema,
2002;  Robinson  & Harris,  2000)  and  evidences  the  transnational  nature  of  the  corporate  elite
(Kentor, Jeffrey Jang, 2004; Wagner, 2005).
However,  most  transnational  historical  materialists  deny  the  a  priori  existence  of  a  unified
transnational capitalist class and use the concept of elites clubs, or planning groups, to describe the
ongoing process of class formation among globalising elites (van der Pijl, 1984). According to these
approaches,  transnational  elite  clubs  serve  as  places  of  cohesion  and  definition  of  projects  of
society. Among them, the trilateral commission played a crucial role in advocating for a liberalised
economy during the 1970s and 1980s, favouring transnationally mobile fraction of capital  over
more geographically stable capital (Gill,  1990). Other examples would include the Mont-Pélèrin
Society and the Davos World Economic Forum (Graz, 2005). Transnational historical materialism
stresses the need for capitalist economy of a project that can be shared among the elite and accepted
by  populations.  Drawing  upon  Gramsci’s  conception  of  hegemony,  such  a  project  serving  the
16 A great number of studies focused on foreign policy preferences in the US. from an elite versus masses perspective
since the Vietnam war, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. For an introduction, see (Chittick and Billingsley, 1989).
A constructivist account of the relation between public opinion and foreign policy elites can be found in Risse-Kappen
(1991).
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interests of the powerful and accepted by the people is defined as a hegemonic project. To sum up
this  approach,  transnational  elites are  groups of  people in  commanding positions  in  the  global
capitalist economy that meet from time to time to consolidate a capitalist hegemonic project. In this
sense, elites come from different types of organisations that share a common interest in the stability
of  a  global  capitalist  system.  These  forums  usually  gather  members  of  governments  and
parliaments, managers and executive of transnational firms, economists and political scientists from
leading  universities  and  some important  individuals from civil  society.  Transnational  historical
materialists use the term elites because a global  capitalist  class would only exist  if it  had a far
greater level of cohesion and shared ideas and values than these elites actually have.
In a more comprehensive though less precise way, Robert Cox described the global economy as a
nébuleuse to which states become more and more accountable.  In his  view, this  nébuleuse is  a
“transnational process of consensus formation among the official caretakers of the global economy”
(Cox, 1992) that takes place through official intergovernmental bodies (OECD, G7, IMF etc.) as
well  as  through  unofficial  forums  (Trilateral  Commission,  Bilderberg  conferences,  etc.).  The
nébuleuse concept translates the blurry nature of this transnational social force. It include the actors
involved in the process, the discourses they promote and the structural power of capital upon which
it depends. 
The idea of a nébuleuse and the focus on processes of formation avoid the limitations of a Marxist
conception of the elite. As we have seen in the previous chapter,  the point  of departure of the
present study is this kind of non-structuralist critical accounts of domination in global politics. One
way to study  nébuleuses and  elite  unification is  to  build upon the  work of  Wright  Mills,  who
addressed a similar research agenda for the post-WW2 US society. 
Wright Mills (2000 [1956]), in his classical research on the power elite in the United States, shows
that  separate and sometimes competing elites may, in certain historical contexts, unite around a
common project that can in turn be imposed on society in general. First,  Wright  Mills identifies
three sources of power embodied by the three most important types of specialized elite: the military
elite, the business elite and the political elite. Wright Mills clearly makes a difference between these
elites and does not presuppose cohesion between them. They are each constituted of independent
individuals at the head of their respective institutions. He rejects the Marxist concept of class that
implies a political domination of the economic elite. His definition of elite is based on the analysis
of institutions:
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“For they are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern
societies. They rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of the state and
claim its prerogatives. They direct the military establishment.  They occupy the
strategic command posts of the social structure [...].” (Wright Mills, 2000, p. 4)
Despite this analytical distinction, Wright Mills shows empirically that the cohesion of the elite in
terms of interests and perceptions, and the circulation between specialised elites were such that one
could  speak  of  a  relatively  unified  power  elite  in  American  society  after  World  War  II.  Such
cohesion is a matter of historical contingency. In times of crisis, the diverging interests of different
fractions of the elite tend to fade away and the preservation of a given order tend to prevail. Indeed,
the analysis of Wright Mills is historical and he explains how the modern US society gave more
power  to  formal  and  centralised  institutions  such  as  the  government,  the  military  and  the  big
corporations. 
Thus, it is important to be able to differentiate between a situation where specialised elites compete
and a situation where a unified power elite  exists.  Apart  from the historical  trend described by
Wright Mills, two elements are crucial. The first criterion is the circulation and interlocking of the
elite. Wright Mills used the term interchangeability to describe the dual phenomenon of multiple-hat
and revolving door that characterise  members of the power elite.  The more interconnected and
porous the institutions are, the more united the elite is.  
“The  inner  core  of  the  power  elite  consists,  first,  of  those  who  interchange
commanding roles at  the top of one dominant institutional order with those in
another:  the admiral who is also a banker and a lawyer and who heads up an
important federal commission; the corporation executive whose company was one
of the two or three leading war material producers who is now the  Secretary of
Defence;  the  wartime general  who dons civilian  clothes  to  sit  on the political
directorate and then becomes a member of the board of directors of a leading
economic corporation.” (Wright Mills, 2000, pp. 287–288)
The  second criterion  defined  by  Wright  Mills  is  a  mix  of  psychological  similarity,  social
intermingling and explicit co-ordination.  This broader aspect includes the class consciousness, the
shared social origins and the similar lifestyles of the members of the elite. These aspects are less
developed in the present study because of the global character of the elite. However, the element of
co-ordination is important since members of the elite sometimes realize that their own interests
could be realized more easily if they work together (Wright Mills, 2000, p. 19). The consequence of
the second element of the unity of the power elite is a shared ideology and a shared political project.
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In the case of post-WW2 America, the shared vision was a definition of international reality as
basically military. This is what Wright Mills refer to as “military metaphysics”, which correspond to
a  Cold  War  mindset.  Indeed,  because  of  pre-existing  psychological  reasons,  and  socialisation
processes, the military metaphysics were already accepted by civilian members of the power elite,
without  the  need  for  indoctrination  by  the  military  (Wright  Mills,  2000,  p.  222).  While  the
unification process on the ideological level  is  less developed in Wright Mills'  work, the shared
political project is a key consequence of both the similar socialisation of the members of the elite,
and of the formal and informal co-ordination among elites. 
Thus, a power elite exist when the two elements of unity are met: the interchangeability of positions
(institutional interlocks and circulation), and the shared  metaphysics (or ideological unity). These
two elements are used by Wright Mills to criticise pluralist theories that theorised the link between
elite competition and democracy (Dahl, 1961).
The  concept  of  power  elite  and  the  methodological  tools  developed  by  Wright  Mills  may  be
particularly useful for a study of change in the forms of governance of the global political economy.
Indeed, the hybridization between private and public authority  that is characteristic of the current
globalisation process is primarily implemented at the elite level, both nationally and transnationally
(Cutler, 1999; p. 203). Transnational elites in the plural, can be recruited from private sector as well
as from national bureaucracies, be composed of experts from universities and business leaders. This
definition allows us to study these new forms of governance identified by the critical approaches of
International  Political  Economy while  focusing  the  analysis  on groups of  individuals  and their
interactions.  It  also  allows  an empirical  analysis  of  the  emergence  of  a  dominant  group  in  a
particular issue-area, how it evolves and how it is contested. The two criteria developed by Wright
Mills  to  evaluate  the pluralism of  a power structure can be used to  study the competition and
unification processes of elites in transnational social spaces as a way to grasp the complexity of a
global restructuring of power (Kauppi & Madsen, 2013). The study of transnational elites addresses
several of the issues outlined in the previous chapter:
1. The study of transnational elites encompasses a wide range of different networks of actors in
the global political economy. Transnational elites include actors such as government official
acting  in  transgovernmental  networks17 (Slaughter,  2004,  2009), scientists  and  experts
17 The  concept of transgovernmental networks allows for a  combination of the analysis of national elites and their
behaviour in transnational settings. In this view, governmental and judiciary elites do not act only through the state but
can act transnationally as networks. Although not synonymous to the notion of transnational elites, the governmental
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organised in epistemic communities (Davis Cross, 2013; Haas, 1992) or invisible colleges
(Stone,  2001,  2002,  2004), professions  and experts  (Abbott,  1988),  and corporate  elites
(Carroll, 2010).
2. The  study of  transnational elites  is  clearly  positioned  in  a  world  politics  paradigm and
avoids methodological nationalism. The study of transnational interactions of elites does not
impose a clear-cut distinction between internal and external policy. Transnational actors are
also rooted and embedded in local  contexts and the study of their  national  origins (and
national capital) is a key element of the analysis of transnational elites (Kauppi & Madsen,
2013).
3. A sociological  approach  to  transnational  elites  avoids  the  structuralism that  characterise
some critical accounts of the global political  economy and takes actors seriously.  As we
have seen in the previous chapter, some Gramscian-inspired analysis, and especially in the
realm of Internet governance, downplay the role of agents in the reproduction and change of
a given order. The sociological study of actors and practices helps to avoid this pitfall.
4. The study of transnational elites allows for a critical  assessment of power struggles and
domination.  The focus on actors sometimes entails a neglecting of structures and tends to
overemphasise competition among actors like in the liberal/pluralist tradition. The concept
of elites is a way to insist on power differentials among actors and stresses the process of
domination in a given social field.
5. Finally, the study of transnational elites can be combined with other sociological approaches
such  as  the  Bourdieusian  conception  of  fields  (see  following section),  and with  a  neo-
Gramscian  understanding of  stability  and  change  in  the  history  of  the  global  political
economy.  While Wright Mills has been criticised for having no theoretical framework to
conceptualise power and stability in a society (Barrow, 2007; Burawoy, 2008), the empirical
and methodological approach designed by Wright Mills is compatible with broader critical
social theories.
The last contribution of the concept of elites to a critical international political sociology perspective
needs to be explained in more details since it does not come out of the previously described work of
Wright Mills.  The concept of power elite does not allow  by  itself to conceptualize stability and
change. The existence of elites or a unified power elite is only possible in relation to the masses or
non-elites.  The stabilisation of  elite power depends on a form of acceptance from the public and
networks can point to the role of national elites acting transnationally. However, this perspective only allows to study
political elites, which are far from constituting the majority of the important actors of the globalising process.
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from its institutionalisation. Whereas Wright Mills offers a detailed description of the power elite,
he only  briefly addresses the masses upon which the domination of the elite is exercised  (Wright
Mills, 2000, pp. 298–324 chap. 13 on “The Mass Society”). 
In this chapter, Wright Mills defines two ideal-types of society. The first type is a society of publics:
a true democracy where the governors act under the active scrutiny of the governed and where the
existence of a power elite is impossible. The second type is a mass society: “an abstract collection
of individuals” where the power elite faces no resistance (Wright Mills 2000: 301-304). The society
of publics is the society described by the liberal enlightenment with an active civil society. The
analysis of Wright Mills is the transformation of the US society into a mass society. The emergence
of mass media and the shift in the ratio of the speakers and the listeners created the conditions for
the emergence of a mass society, where the power elite is left unchallenged by the absence of active
publics. 
Consistent  with  the  neo-Gramscian  scholarship  described  in  the  previous  chapter,  this  study
postulates that the consent of the governed is active rather than passive. This is why, the concept of
hegemony is preferred to the concept of mass society. Sociologists have shown at a micro level how
this active consent work in practice (Burawoy, 1982, 2008). The masses play by the rules of the
game defined by the elite because they are able to defend some interests.  Gramscian hegemony
presupposes that “account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which
hegemony is to be exercised” (Gramsci 2001: 373). 
The Gramscian concept of hegemony, introduced into the IR debate by Robert Cox, goes beyond
the study of elites and analyses the consent of the governed. Hegemony is understood in this context
as a rule in which the consensual aspect of power is in the foreground while coercion is used only in
marginal cases (Cox, 1993).  Whereas Wright Mills examines cohesion within the elite  between
different groups or types of specialized elites, the notion of hegemony extends this cohesion beyond
the elite. We can therefore distinguish two (simultaneous) elements in the manufacturing of consent:
first, different and sometimes competing elites unite around a shared project and circulate between
institutions to form a power elite; second, the acceptance of elite rule is ensured through the creation
of active consent among non-elites. This is Gramsci's third moment in the relation of forces, after
the first moment of material relation of forces, and the second of class consciousness:
“A third moment is that in which one becomes aware that one’s own corporate
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interests, in their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of
the  purely  economic  class,  and  can  and  must  become  the  interests  of  other
subordinate  groups  too.[...]  it  is  the  phase  in  which  previously  germinated
ideologies become “party”, come into confrontation and conflict, until only one of
them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper
hand, to propagate itself throughout society— bringing about not only a unison of
economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the
questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a “universal”
plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series
of subordinate groups.” (Gramsci, 1999, pp. 405–406)
Thus, hegemony is not about imposing its will over apathetic masses. It is the process by which a
particular interest gains its legitimacy as expression of the general interest through political means.
This is why some authors focus on the process of “production of hegemony” in order to stress the
dynamic character of hegemony and the importance of interactions (e.g. Jessop, 2006) The need for
elite  co-ordination and  for  support by non-elites  rules out any automatism of elite power.   The
existence and domination of a power elite is a complex political process that needs to be empirically
evaluated in each case. Moreover, the relative fragility of elite rule opens the door to resistance and
change. 
While hegemony and the institutionalization of elite power allow for a relative stability, it does not
mean that this dominance  is  unchallenged.  To the  contrary,  the  elite  is  constantly reconfigured
challenged  and  influenced  by  the  attitude  of  non-elites  and counter-elites  excluded  from  the
institutionalization of power.  The evolving  context in which the elite operates is also a source of
continuous change.  The first  challenge to  the power elite  comes from counter-elites (organised
resistance).  Counter-elites  are  composed of  large  and formally  organized  groups of  individuals
without formal authority (Rocher, 2005). These challenging elites oppose the power elite and act
outside the formal institutions of power (Scott, 2008, pp. 39–40). They are not in positions of power
in the field dominated by the power elite but might benefit from resources acquired in other related
fields and invest these resources in the field of the power elite in order to bring about a change. The
existence of counter-elites explains the need for adaptation of the power elite in order to discourage
mobilization that would endanger their power. The scarcity of the literature on counter-elites might
result from the fact that researchers have a tendency to privilege the study of successful elites that
made their way into the power elite. However, the excluded elite groups are important to understand
the dynamic character of the rule of a power elite and to analyse the prospect of change. In Wright
Mills' analysis for example, institutions such as churches and families had lost momentum in US
history after WW2. As a consequence, elite families and religious elite were not part of the core of
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the power elite. Their exclusion could be analysed in terms of counter-elites: Powerful groups that
are not taken on board in the unification of a power elite (see chapter 6). 
Second, Resistance to the elite can also come from non-elites. Non-elites, in a hegemonic situation,
do  not  question  the  power  elite.  Wright  Mills  then  speaks  of  masses  in  which  political
communication is rare and mobilisation is absent. The mass can however become a public and play
a role  in  generating change.  One criterion  used  by Wright  Mills  to  evaluate  the  probability  of
mobilisation is the type and level of communication in non-elites on important issues (Wright Mills,
2000, p. 304). This is why studies in global political economy and IR have increasingly studied the
everyday practices of individuals and groups (Seabrooke, 2006). Corporate power depends on the
situation of the firm in the market, hence eventually from the behaviour of the consumer. Political
elites obviously depend directly on their election by non-elite  individuals. Changing patterns of
behaviour might lead to changes in the power elite. Although the influence of non-elites has been
overestimated by pluralist and liberal studies of politics, the accumulation and repetition of non-
elite practices have consequences on the power of a given elite. 
Third, change can occur within the institutions of power, through a reconfiguration of the cohesion
between different  elites (Scott,  2008).  Indeed,  the project  and the ideological  cement that unite
different  factions of the elite,  or different specialized elites,  is  produced and reproduced by the
interaction  of  these  different  groups  and  is  subject  to  change  and  constant  readjustment.  The
inclusion of new groups and new ideas in the power elite is also an example of elite-driven change
(see chapter 8). 
Finally, change can correspond to an evolution of the field dominated by a power elite. The next
section will discuss the emergence and the evolution of field in relation with the global field of
power. 
The stability of the power elite depends on a relatively delicate balance between the various groups
that  compose  it;  on  a  balance  of  power  with  counter-elites  offering  an  alternative;  and  on  a
hegemonic relationship with non-elites. These conditions explain the difficulty for a particular order
to  achieve  stability  and  provides entry  points  for  the  analysis  of change.  Hegemony  is  never
completely achieved and every order contains the seeds of the next one18. Change is most usually a
18 This element has been highlighted by most Neo-Gramscian scholarship, from Cox and his analysis of world orders
(Cox, 1981), to recent developments like Cultural Political Economy (Jessop and Sum,  2014, forthcoming) that
analyses the only partially-constitued  “imagined economies”, and non-structuralist scholarship (Cafruny and Ryner,
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change  in the power elite,  through  a process of elite  reconfiguration around a new project  and
through inclusion / exclusion of new groups. But change can also be a revolution and a change of
the power elite in the case of a seizure of power by counter-elites or in the case of a rallying of the
public to counter-hegemonic projects. Thus, elite sociology can provide interesting insights on the
dynamics of global power and complement existing IR theories. However, an important limit of the
use of elite sociology in global politics is the absence of a global society and a global state. Thus,
concepts  developed  exclusively  for  the  analysis  of  a  national  society  need to  be  adapted  to  a
transnational environment. One way to conceptualise social relations beyond national societies is to
start  the  analysis  from a  different  social  space  of  interactions.  The present  study relies  on  the
concept of field, as developed by Bourdieu, that is increasingly used in international relations to
overcome the limitations of methodological nationalism.  
3.1.2. Fields and transnational power structures 
While  the  sociology  of  elites  brings  the  actors  back in  critical  research,  Bourdieu's  sociology
addresses another limitation of critical IR theories. Bourdieu's social theory is rich and this section
does not attempt to give a comprehensive account of Bourdieu's potential contributions to the study
of international relations. Rather, it explores how Bourdieu's sociology contributes to avoid a certain
universalism  and  an  exaggerated  tendency  to  generalisation  that  characterise  some  critical
perspectives (see previous chapter). It argues that Bourdieu's sociology, and especially the concept
of field, helps to bridge the gap between the study of individual actors and the study of global
structures of power. Thus, I will first define the concept of field and explain how it is used to study
Internet governance as a transnational field. Second, I will explain how Bourdieu can be combined
with the focus on actors of the sociology of elites in order to complement a critical literature in
international relations inspired mainly by Gramsci. 
The concept of field
Research on elites is generally conducted at a national level, and sometimes at a global level. The
literature shows some examples of alternative levels of analysis (usually focused on the European
case, see for example Cohen, 2011; Georgakakis, 2012; Kauppi & Madsen, 2013).However, in areas
such as Internet governance, power lies in a transnational space of social interactions.  As we have
seen in  the  previous  chapter,  the  national  framework is  inadequate  to  study the  dynamics  that
2007) that describes “minimal” hegemony as opposed to “integral” hegemony.
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transcend  borders.  However,  the  assumption  of  the  existence  of  a  global  elite  or  dominant
transnational  capitalist  class  that  dominates  the  entire  international  system is  hampered by the
diversity and complexity of the world politics. As stated by Cerny (2010), whereas the domination
by a small group of agents is possible at a sectoral level, it is much more difficult at a global level.
Actors and issues are  completely different from one domain (issue-area) to another.  This is why
Cerny calls for a world politics paradigm, where the unit of analysis would be the issue-area rather
than  the  state  in  order  to  avoid  methodological  nationalism.  However,  the  sectoral  approach
advocated by Cerny with its transnational neo-pluralist perspective looses sight of the relations and
interdependence between issue-areas and the embedding of specific issue-areas in global dynamics
that transcend sectoral divisions. The neo-pluralist framework also lacks a conceptualisation of the
competition  between  sectors.  The  concept  of  field,  as  developed  by  Bourdieu  (1993,  2000),
provides an alternative to concepts such as sector and issue-area. It helps to consider the complexity
and the heterogeneity of world politics, which are minimised by structural approaches. However, it
does not imply a clear separation between fields, or a competition  within each sector that entails
pluralism. It offers a  more accurate  conceptualisation on two levels. Internally, it allows  for  the
analysis of the one field's specific logic, relatively autonomous from other fields and insist on social
struggles within the field. At the global level, it  provides an outline of  a  theory  of the  unequal
relations between different  sectors and  of the  evolving relationship  between  fields  and a  global
social space.
There is now a growing literature on the use of the notion of field in international studies. Although
Bourdieu developed his framework through the analysis of fields located within a national field of
power, and despite the difficulty of translation entailed by the use of a framework developed at a
national  level  to  study  transnational  phenomena,  the  distinction  between  the  national  and  the
international  is  blurred  by  the  globalisation  process  and  national  and  transnational  spaces  are
interlocking (Dezalay, 2004).  Bourdieu defines a field as a structured space of positions whose
properties depend on their position within this space19. A field is both a field of forces and a field of
struggles. This type of space can be found in a number of areas in the national context, for example
the literary field (Bourdieu, 1991) the scientific field (Bourdieu, 1976), the political field (Bourdieu,
2000) and the national field of power (Bourdieu, 2012). The question of what constitutes a field and
how to define a field's borders has been identified as a major issue in the operationalisation of the
concept. However, a historical and evolutionary perspective allows to identify the autonomisation of
19 The notion of fields is complex in Bourdieu's work and evolves through time. The most comprehensive attempt to 
define it can be found in a book chapter entitled “Some properties of fields” (Bourdieu, 1993, pp. 72–79).
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one issue-area from other pre-existing ones. In the case of Internet governance, as developed in
chapter 4, the stakes are different both from the field of international telecommunications, and from
the field of computer networking. The network grew internationally beyond the scope of the US
national field of power. Thus, it can be argued that because of its relative autonomy from broader
fields, the field20 of Internet governance is a coherent and useful unit of analysis of the meso-level. 
According to a growing literature of more or less orthodox Bourdieusian IR21, the concept of field is
relevant beyond the national borders. A field is not a geographical space but rather a space of social
interactions. As such, it does not necessarily need to be embedded in a national field. Drawing upon
Bourdieu's “Some properties of fields”  (Bourdieu,  1993, pp.  72–79),  Mérand and Pouliot stress
three  principal  dimensions  in  the  definition of a  field  that  can be  used in  international  studies
(Mérand and Pouliot 2008, 2012). First, a field is a space of power relations. Each actor within a
field holds a differentiated position. A field is defined by the domination exercised by a number of
actors.  The position  of  each actor  can be analysed  since  actors  are  holder  of  certain  forms  of
capital22.  Although  Bourdieu  uses  the  term  “dominant”  rather  than  “elites”,  the  analysis  of
domination in a field is compatible with the tools and concepts developed by the sociology of elites
(see sub-section below). Second, fields are defined by the stakes of the game. While the dynamic of
domination transcends fields (homologies), the stakes of the game are specific to each field. This is
why the notion of field helps to avoid the generalising tendency of critical  approaches.  Global
dynamics are translated into field-specific stakes. This makes fields autonomous from one another.
Actors play a game in a field, whose rules are specific to the field. Here the notion of “stakeholders”
that  is  used  in  Internet  governance takes  another  meaning.  The field  of  Internet  governance is
constituted  by the  interactions  of  individuals  and groups that  have  defined common objects of
struggle (common stakes) related to the regulation of the telecommunication network. Third, some
of the rules of the game in the field are taken for granted and allow the interactions of the various
20 Some authors use terms as sub-field, and meta-field in order to provide a scale of the borders of the field. However,
since a sub-field is relatively autonomous from the field and since fields are relatively autonomous within the meta-
field,  both  correspond  to  the  definition  of  a  field.  Thus,  the  concepts  of  sub-field  and  field  are  used
interchangeability depending on the referent. Internet governance is a sub-field of international telecommunications
and of the global political economy, but it is also a field in itself. 
21 It should be noted that theoretical stances on Bourdieu's contribution to IR range from a “war-machine against
traditional IR” according to Bigo, to an approach compatible with existing theories, and especially constructivism,
according for example to Pouliot. These differences were visible during the round-table presentation of the edited
volume on Bourdieu in International Relations (Adler-Nissen, 2012) at the annual convention of the International
Studies Association in 2013 in San Francisco.  
22 Bourdieu is famous for its encompassing definition of capital beyond purely economic capital. The notion of social
capital  is  now widely  used  in  social  sciences.  Cultural  and  symbolic  capitals  are  also  important  elements  of
Bourdieusian IR. The “national capital”, coined by Bourdieu in one of his rare attempts to study the international
could also be useful for an international political sociology. See chapter 9 for an introduction of this particular form
of capital. 
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actors in the field. Bourdieu introduces the concept of a doxa of the field: some elements that are
beyond discussions and outside of the struggles of the field and that are commonly accepted by
actors. Of course, these elements are not neutral and reinforce the position of the orthodoxy, the
world-view  of  dominant  actors.  At  least  in  the  case  of  an  emerging  field  such  as  Internet
governance,  the  doxa  is  evolving and some ideas  and norms structure  the  debates  for  a  small
number of years before a new crisis occur and generate some changes in the doxa. 
With this definition, the notion of field can be used for a variety of transnational social  spaces
characterised by their relative autonomy. Two objects of study have attracted most of Bourdieusian
IR.  First,  the  political  sociology  of  the  European  integration  represent  a  direct  translation  of
Bourdieusian sociology to a supranational (or transnational) context  (Adler-Nissen, 2008; Cohen,
2011; Cohen & Vauchez, 2007; Frankel & Højbjerg, 2007; Georgakakis, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2012;
Georgakakis  & de  Lassale,  2007;  Georgakakis  & Weisbein,  2010;  Guiraudon,  2003;  Jenson &
Mérand, 2010;  Kauppi,  2003, 2005; Madsen, 2007; Mérand, 2006, 2010; Vauchez,  2007, 2008,
2011, 2013). The main goal of the political sociology of European integration is to shed light on the
role of actors, their positions and their ideas in the European integration project (Saurugger, 2008).
This type of analysis draws notably on the notion of field to study European spaces of interactions
between  elites,  professionals  or  “Eurocrats”.  They  provide  an  alternative  to  state-centred  and
institutionalist perspectives on the integration process. The European Union may be the case, where
transnational fields are more likely to emerge since the integration process is more advanced than in
other global regions. At the global level, no sectoral integration process is as developed as at the
European level. It became relatively common for professions and interest groups to be organised at
the European level. The existence and influence of European institutions is also an indicator of the
existence of transnational  European spaces of interactions.  However, this does not mean that the
emergence of transnational fields is limited to the European case. Sectoral global integration has
fostered the emergence of transnational fields in very specialized areas. 
Security  in  its  broadest  sense has  been the  most  studied  issue by Bourdieusian  IR  beyond the
European  case (Bigo,  2005,  2011;  Leander,  2005,  2010a,  2010b;  Olsson,  2013).  Bourdieusian
security studies all contribute to the critique of mainstream security studies and to the emergence of
a more sociological  understanding of security  issues.  Bourdieusian concepts have been used to
explore transnational fields of security professionals (Bigo 2005, 2011). They have also been used
to introduce culture in security studies (Williams, 2012). The focus on practices rather than actors
(states and institutions) has brought new insights on the field of security (Leander  2011;  Pouliot,
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2010). Notions like symbolic violence and symbolic power question the struggles for legitimacy in
security matters beyond the idea of the state's monopoly over legitimate violence (Olsson, 2013). 
The  potential  contribution  of  Bourdieusian  sociology  to  international  studies  is  even  more
important. Beyond the European case and the analysis of the field of security that has been already
prepared by these pioneering works, Bourdieu's concepts and methods could contribute to a critical
perspective on world politics. This contribution would be complementary to the existing literature
on critical  global  political  economy that  constitutes  one  of  the  main  critical  project  of  the  IR
discipline. Recently, this potential has been acknowledged in several congresses, workshops and
publications (Adler-Nissen, 2012; Bigo & Madsen, 2011; Leander, 2011). As Adler-Nissen puts it,
the Bourdieusian project is not about adding yet another dead French thinker to IR (Adler-Nissen,
2012,  p.1).  It  is  about  re-thinking the  key  categories  of  IR,  focusing  a  critical  perspective  on
practices  and  actors,  and  bringing  reflexivity  to  the  discipline.  The  present  study  aims  to  use
Bourdieusian  concepts  beyond the  study of  European integration and security  to  evaluate  their
potential to study Internet governance. It is also an attempt to link the recent Bourdieusian trend in
International Political Sociology to the critical tradition in International Political Economy. In order
to present more than just a theoretical reflection on field, habitus and hegemony, it is rooted in the
empirical analysis of Internet governance and draws upon the less theory-oriented work of Wright
Mills to anchor the theoretical reflection to the more concrete question of who governs the Internet. 
The notion of field is an interesting bridge between neo-Gramscian global political economy and
the sociology of elites. It locates the actor-centred analysis in a social space. Indeed, Bourdieusian
sociology, and especially the concept of field, revolves around the notion of space. Positions within
the field determine to a certain extent the interactions between actors and their discourses. Ideas are
situated within heterodoxy or orthodoxy. And the fields themselves are situated within a national, or
in  the case of  transnational  fields,  global  field of  power.  Moreover,  the issue  of  the  necessary
adaptation of Bourdieusian sociology to International relations remains to be fully explored. Neo-
Gramscian scholarship has a long tradition of debates around the use of Gramsci's theory in the
study of global political economy that could inform the application of Bourdieusian concepts to a
different context. 
As we have seen,  the sociology of elites has mainly been used at  a national  level,  with a few
attempts to investigate a global elite. However, if we take Scott's definition of holders of power
within a field, the study of elites does not need to carried out within a reified container, be it the
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state or global capitalism. Through the notion of field, a meso-level analysis of the domination of
certain actors within coherent social spaces is possible. The power of the elite is exercised in a
determined, though evolving, social  space. And this space can be transnational.  The analysis of
elites in a field level raises some methodological issues that will be discussed in the next section. 
Not only actors and their practices are located within a field of forces, discourses and ideas also
participate to the structuring of the field. First, some elements, world-views and rules of the game
are taken for granted within the field. They represent the doxa, what goes without saying (Bourdieu,
1977, p. 166). The doxa binds the field together since actors have to agree on something in order to
be able to  interact  and compete  (for example the scientific field  relies on reason).  Beyond the
undiscussed doxa, the opposition between orthodoxy and heterodoxy represent one of the dynamic
aspects of the field. The present study insists on the attempt by dominant actors in the field (the
power elite) to  safeguard certain elements of their ideological cement (the orthodoxy) within the
doxa of the field. Some elements such as self-regulation in the 1990s and multistakeholderism in the
2000s lie somewhere between the orthodoxy and the doxa. This process is all the more important
since the field of Internet governance is young and loosely institutionalised. A successful attempt by
the power elite to translate orthodoxy into elements of the doxa automatically excludes heterodox
ideas from the field. They cannot be discussed within the field any more. However, the process of
autonomisation of the field is not irreversible. The existence of a field depends on the existence of a
battlefield. The exclusion of all debates within the field would certainly lead to its loss of relevance
and ultimately to its disappearing. This process has rarely been studied by Bourdieusian sociology
and international political sociology. However, the dynamic character of the relations among fields
and within a field of power  entail a precarious character for the field. The process of excluding
heterodox idea is an ambiguous one. On the one hand, it might reinforce orthodoxy and even put
elements of the orthodoxy  out of the reach of the struggles  into the  doxa. On the other hand, it
threatens the very existence of the field, especially in the case of emerging transnational field that
are still in the process of autonomisation from other fields.
In spite of its relative autonomy, a field is not completely isolated from the rest of social life. The
evolution of a field depends on global structural tendencies. A field is influenced by, and influence
other neighbouring fields. Some authors transpose Bourdieu's conceptualisation of interacting fields
embedded in a national field of power to the global level (e.g. Mérand and Pouliot,  2008). In this
conception, a field is a relatively autonomous and sometimes transnational space with its own stakes
and rules of the game. However,  global dynamics transcend fields.  Homologies can be found in
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different fields. The opposition between a dominant group A and a group B in the social field as a
whole is reproduced in the more specialised fields in homologous forms as the opposition of a
dominant group A1 and a  dominated  group B1 (Lane, 2006 p. 91). Fields emerge and evolve in
relation to other fields. This is why the concept of field allows not only for a detailed analysis of
field-specific stakes and dynamics, but also for an analysis of the relations between fields and of the
position of a given field in the global field of power. The field evolves in a global context with
multiple fields. The frontiers of the field fluctuate in relation with other fields (Bigo, 2005 p. 58).
While  fields  are  differentiated,  Bourdieu's  social  theory  remains  a  global  social  theory.  The
relationship between fields is not theoretically pre-defined and requires an empirical study in order
to keep in mind the complexity of the social world. Bourdieu analyses the exchange rate between
different forms of capital acquired in different fields in order to describe the possibility for agents to
play in different fields (Bourdieu, 1991). A way to conceptualise the relationship between fields is to
postulate the existence of a field of power, a global space of struggle for power, where the hierarchy
between fields is  at  stake and where the exchange rates  between different  forms of  capital  are
determined. Bourdieu describes such a field of power at the national level, generally constituted by
the state itself (Bourdieu, 2012). Some authors use the concept of an “international field of power”
(Mérand and Pouliot, 2008). This notion allows for a re-introduction of ideas such as interstate
competition, and the existence of non-state actors that are influential beyond their specific field, at a
global level. This idea is similar to the “nébuleuse” described by Cox (1996) or to the idea of global
elites.  The notion of international (or global) field of power relates the Bourdieusian analysis of a
specific field to the global vision of critical global political economy. It is within the global field of
power that the hierarchy of the different transnational (sectoral and national) fields is defined and
where change, as analysed by critical IPE, occurs. 
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Table 3.1. From Wright Mills to Gramsci via Bourdieu
Approach Sociology of elites Bourdieusian sociology Neo-Gramscian IPE
Main Author Wright Mills Bourdieu Cox
Main concepts Power elite,
metaphysics
Field, Habitus, capital,
doxa
Hegemony
Contribution to the
project
Unification process of
different elites, focus
on agency
Analysis of relatively
autonomous
(transnational) spaces
Analysis of consensual
domination and order,
agency of the
dominated
Shortcomings for the
project
Lack of a theory of
power and domination,
lack of agency of non-
elites
Difficulty of
operationalisation (e.g.
field frontiers,
methodology)
Over-generalisation,
tendency to
materialism and
structuralism
As summarised in  table  3.1.1,  the definition of one field's  frontier  appears  as  one of the main
challenge for an Bourdieusian approach to IR. The emergence and dynamic evolution of the field,
might re-define the frontiers of  formerly autonomous fields and include them partially or totally
(Bigo, 2005). The analysis of the genealogy of the field, its differentiation and autonomisation from
other fields, the merger of formerly independent fields is necessary but insufficient. The analysis of
the evolution of the field vis-à-vis  the fields that it partially absorbed and replaced; and vis-à-vis
neighbouring and even competing field is also necessary.  Chapter 4 describes the autonomisation
process  of  Internet  governance both from the  field of  computer  science,  and from the field of
international  telecommunication regulation.  However,  this  story is  not  a  thing  of  the  past.  The
evolving relationship between Internet governance and these neighbouring fields continue to shape
the fields' boundaries. Chapter 6 present an interesting example of the evolution of the field at the
turn of the millennium. It takes an evolutionary perspective on Bourdieu's concept of field. Drawing
upon the dynamic readings of Bourdieu by French regulationists (Boyer, 2008; Lordon, 2003), it
explores how a field evolves. Far from the static space of social reproduction that some authors saw
in Bourdieu's work (DiMaggio, 1979; more recently Savage and Williams, 2008), the field is here
understood as a space of change, both internally through the practices of actors and within a global
field of power, through the reconfiguration of its frontiers and through the evolution of its position
within  the  global  field  of  power.  In  a  similar  fashion  to  Boyer,  who  defined  Bourdieu  as  a
theoretician  of  change  (Boyer,  2003,  2008),  and  consistently  with  some  dynamic  readings  of
Bourdieu's  sociology of  elites  (see  below),  Bourdieusian  international  political  sociology often
focus  on  the  dynamic  and  changing  character  of  social  interactions  rather  than  primarily  on
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reproduction. 
Bourdieu, Gramsci and Wright Mills: the hegemony of transnational power elites 
Bourdieu, Gramsci and Wright Mills represent three important contributions to social sciences, and
potentially to international studies. However, they analyse different phenomena with different tools.
This section explains why these three authors are merged in the study of transnational elites in
Internet governance. It argues that these three approaches are compatible and coherent in order to
study Internet governance. First, more and more sociologists combine Wright Mills and Bourdieu in
the study of elites. Second, while the concept of field is interesting in order to avoid the globalising
and totalising tendency of critical IPE, the Gramscian concept of hegemony remains more adequate
than  Bourdieu's  concepts  such as  “common sense”  and  habitus in  order  to  analyse consensual
domination at a transnational level. 
As we have seen, the sociology of elites was very important for early sociologists. Later, the work
of Wright Mills re-created a scholarly debate around the notion of elites. However, this debate has
suffered  from  its  ambiguous  position  in  relation  with  liberal  pluralism  and  Marxism.  Liberal
pluralists rejected the notion of a power elite that criticised the conception of liberal democracy.
Marxists, on the other hand, preferred the notion of class to analyse domination.  They criticised
Wright  Mills  for  his  lack  of  a  general  theory  and for  the  empiricist  character  of  his  research
(Barrow, 2007). Moreover, the definition of the concept of elites has not always been very precise
(Scott, 2008).  As a result, the sociology of elites, including Wright Mills' work on the US power
elite, remained marginal in the social sciences for some decades. However, recently, a number of
sociologists and political scientists re-discovered the sociology of elites, the notion of a power elite,
and  even  combined  Wright  Mills  and  Bourdieu  in  order  to  overcome  the  lack  of  a  general
framework for the study of domination in Wright Mills' research.
Indeed, Bourdieu's conceptual tools allows for a renewed analysis of social structures that draws
neither  upon the  idea of  class,  nor  on a  liberal/pluralist  framework.  According to  Froud  et  al.
(2006),  Bourdieu's main contribution to  the study of elites is  the focus on individual  resources
(forms of capital) rather than on the definition of a class as an aggregation of structural position.
This focus puts human agency at the center of the analysis of social classes (Savage, Warde, &
Devine, 2005). Thus, elites can be studied beyond the traditional focus on the “establishment” or on
the big firms' boards. Individuals can have different resources, assets or capitals that gives them
78
influence in  a given realm. While  a Marxist  analysis  would focus only on economic capital  to
explain domination, a Bourdieusian analysis can describe process of domination in different fields
based on different forms of capital.  Bourdieu's description of the literary or the scientific fields
highlights the importance of non-economic capitals in a number of social spaces. Just like Wright
Mills'  specialised elites,  a  Bourdieusian look on elites allows for  the analysis  of elite  division,
notably because of the different forms of capital that they hold (Froud et al., 2006 p. 35). As we
have already argued, the location of the power of elites within a field is one of the most important
aspect of this type of analysis. The possibility for a number of agents to span fields because of the
capital they acquired in their specific field is all the more important in modern globalised capitalism
(Froud et al., 2006 p. 36).
This short presentation of the use of Bourdieu in contemporary elite sociology evidences a number
entry points for the combination of Bourdieu and Wright Mills. First,  both authors postulate the
existence  within a  given social  space  of  a  number of  different  elites  rather  than  a  pre-defined
dominant  class.  For  Wright  Mills,  elites  come  from  different  institutions  like  the  church,  the
military, or the large corporations. For Bourdieu, they rely on different forms of capital acquired in
different  sub-fields.  Bourdieu  offers a  generalisable  framework that  complements  Wright  Mills'
description of the specific institutions and situation of the post-WW2 US society. On the other hand,
the  detailed  analysis  of  the  unification  process  of  the  power  elite,  with  its  ideological  and
institutional components, is an interesting alternative to Bourdieu's focus on the reproduction of
elites  (e.g.  Bourdieu,  1998).  The  dialectical  process  of  elite  competition  and  elite  unification
described by Wright Mills highlights the dynamic character of elites' interactions. This analysis can
contribute to the efforts by contemporary elite sociology to use Bourdieu's concepts without falling
into the description of the sole process of elite reproduction (Savage & Williams, 2008).
François Denord's analysis of the power elite within a national field of power (Denord, Hjellbrekke,
Korsnes, Lebaron, & Le Roux, 2011; Denord, Lagneau-Ymonet, & Thine, 2011; see also his preface
in the latest French translation of “The Power elite”: Mills, 2012) combines a Millsian analysis of
the unification of a power elite and a Bourdieusian analysis of the field of power as a field of
struggle for power by the holders of different capitals.  In this perspective,  the field represent a
framework for the analysis of the competition and hierarchisations of different elites, along with
their possible unification within a power elite. This type of analysis is particularly relevant at a
transnational level since elites in a transnational field come by definition from different (national
and/or sectoral) fields and are holders of different forms of capital. As a result, they compete as
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much as they seek unification in order to structure the field. The combination of Wright Mills and
Bourdieu gives a contingent and dynamic character to the analysis of elites in transnational fields.
Bourdieu allows for an analysis of elite power beyond national societies and based on different
forms of power and legitimacy. Wright Mills insists on the dynamic relations between specialised
elites rather than on the reproduction and embedding of domination in social practices. This is why
the combination of the two authors has been privileged by Kauppi and Madsen in their analysis of
transnational power elites in the European social space (Kauppi and Madsen, 2013).
While  Bourdieu  seems to provide an interesting framework to apply Wright Mills' concepts and
methods beyond the national social space, some elements justify the fact that this study focuses on
the concept of field but does not rely on a whole orthodox Bourdieusian theoretical framework. In
particular,  the  use  of  Bourdieu  is  here  combined  with  neo-Gramscian  International  Political
Economy, notably its reflections on hegemony, order and change.  Two reasons drove me to build
upon Gramsci's hegemony rather than on Bourdieu's symbolic domination in spite of my use of
Bourdieu's notion of field throughout the study. The first one is the now long tradition of Gramscian
IPE that evidenced the fact that Gramsci's concept of hegemony is useful to address domination and
consent  in  transnational  historical  structures  whereas  Bourdieusian  IPS does  not  provide  many
empirical studies about symbolic domination at a transnational level. The second reason is the more
institutional character of hegemony, as opposed to the deeply internalised character of symbolic
domination  and  habitus.  Bourdieu  defines  the  habitus  “systems  of  durable,  transposable,
dispositions (Bourdieu, 1977 p. 72) As Burawoy (2008) puts it: “Symbolic domination rests on the
bodily inculcation of social structure, and the formation of a deep unconscious habitus whereas
hegemony at work rests on individuals being inserted into specific institutions that organize consent
to  domination,  itself  a  condition  for  the  mystification  of  exploitation.  Symbolic  domination  is
seared  into  the  individual  psyche  whereas  hegemony  is  an  effect  of  social  relations  on  the
individuals who carry them.” Given the recent, transnational, changing and interstitial character of
the field of Internet governance, domination is more likely to be exercised at an institutional level
than at the level of habitus. 
Bourdieu analyses primarily stable fields, with a long history of evolution and reproduction, such as
the French  Grandes Ecoles or the field of literary production.  A direct and full transposition of
Bourdieu's  theoretical  framework  would  undermine  the  analysis  of  one  of  the  most  important
feature of transnational social interactions: their fluidity. This is why Bourdieusian sociologists are
usually  cautious with the translation of Bourdieusian concepts to the transnational realm. A good
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example is  provided by Vauchez's  discussion of transnational fields as “weak” fields (Vauchez,
2008,  2011). In  order  to  avoid  a  reification  of  transnational  fields  and an  exaggeration  of  the
importance of the doxa or the habitus that are long-term productions of “solid” fields, the theory of
domination in this study is borrowed from critical IPE. It draws upon decades of reflections on the
translation of the concepts of power, order, domination and hegemony to the analysis of the global
political economy. The empirical results of this study show the rapid pace of the evolution of ideas
and institutions in the field of Internet governance. While I sometimes use concepts such as doxa,
their application to an emerging and rapidly-evolving transnational field modify their interpretation.
As a result, the point of departure of this study remains the critical IPE literature. As argued in the
previous chapter, political sociology is used as a way to avoid over-generalisation and structuralism.
The focus on elites, individual actors and small groups, puts agency at the heart of the analysis, and
Bourdieusian International Political  Sociology offers a more differentiated perspective on global
politics through the analysis of intermeshed and interacting fields within the global field of power.
The analysis of transnational power elites within a given social field aims to be a contribution to an
already-existing  critical  IPE  literature  and  not  an  attempt  of  translation  of  Wright  Mills'  and
Bourdieu's work to the global level. 
In  parallel  to  my  own  research  on  the  existence  of  a  transnational  power  elite  in  Internet
governance, other researchers tried to combine Wright Mills and Bourdieu and to translate their
concepts for the study of transnational dynamics. In 2013, Niilo Kauppi and Mark Madsen edited
Transnational Power Elites: The new Professionals of Governance, Law and Security (Kauppi and
Madsen, 2013). Their objective is to propose a framework of analysis and a research strategy to
study “the myriad of  formal  and informal institutions and policy-fields”.  Such a  strategy “cuts
across the institutional façade and instead tackles some of the underlying questions of the process at
large” (Kauppi and Madsen, 2013, p. 207). While limited to the study of European integration, their
research is an important contribution to the emergence of an International Political Sociology that
would consider basic sociological questions such as power, identity and class (Kauppi and Madsen,
2013, p. 210). They conclude that their strategy and the sociological concepts they use might be
useful in order to understand inter-, supra- and transnational social configurations. Drawing upon
their conclusions, I argue that these concepts and methods can be an important contribution to the
study of the globalisation process. The present study can indeed be viewed as an attempt to pursue
their  strategy  beyond  the  case  of  European  integration.  However,  since  European  integration
arguably represents the inter-, supra- and transnational social configuration that is most similar to
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the nation-state, the limitations inherent to Kauppi and Madsen's work are even more present when
their research strategy is applied to other transnational objects. 
Kauppi and Madsen identify an interchangeability of European elites that is similar to Wright Mills'
description of post-WWII United States. They also provide some evidence of the class identity of
such elites. However, they do not identify a common metaphysic similar to the military metaphysics
identified by Wright Mills. This difference is not anecdotal. The military metaphysic is the central
project around which the power elite unifies in Wright Mills work. It is the ideological cohesion that
is necessary for a unified power elite to exist. 
The analysis of the ideological cohesion requires concepts and methods that cannot be found in the
work of Wright Mills. As we have argued, the uncovering by Wright Mills of the existence of a
common military metaphysics that united the power elite was more a combination of deep empirical
knowledge and of common sense rather than the result of a methodological analysis of his data.
This is why the sociology of elites is here combined with neo-Gramscian IPE. Neo-Gramscian IPE
has a long tradition of analysis of ideational elements from the importance of ideas in the theoretical
construction proposed by Cox (1981), to the analysis of disciplinary neoliberalism by Gill (Gill,
1995)  or even the cultural  political  economy developed, among others, by Jessop (e.g.  Jessop,
2006). Through concepts such as hegemony, hegemonic project, ideology, and economic imaginary,
neo-Gramscian IPE takes ideational and discursive elements more and more seriously in its analysis
of the reproduction of a capitalist world order.  
Kauppi  and  Madsen  have  no  theoretical  or  methodological  tools  to  analyse  the  ideology  of
transnational  power  elites.  As  a  result,  they  focus  on  institutional  aspects  of  elite  domination
without digging into the ideational realm. One risk associated with such  a  research  strategy is to
reproduce a misleading idea of pluralism in (European and) global politics. While there is no single
conspirational  project  of  European elites,  the  process  of  European  integration  is  not  an  erratic
process depending on the articulation of different elites with different interests and world-views.
There is a strong selectivity in the imaginaries that surround European integration (Jessop, 2004).
As  suggested  by  Neo-Gramscian  literature,  the  metaphysics  of  European  integration  and other
transnational integration projects might be found around the necessity of reproduction of a capitalist
order. Market liberalisation, disciplinary neoliberalism, competitivity and the like could be looked at
as  possible  elements  of  an ideological  cohesion of  European elites  (van Apeldoorn,  2002;  van
Apeldoorn & Horn, 2008; Bieler, 2010).
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Another risk in the study of transnational power elites is the isolation from international relations
debates and the creation of two different strands of research: a global political economy perspective
analysing the global dynamics and world orders but not their specific translations on the one hand;
and  an  international  political  sociology  perspective  analysing  field-specific  or  region-specific
dynamics but lacking the ambition to offer an alternative to mainstream international relations. This
is why the study of transnational power elites is here combined with neo-Gramscian IPE as a way to
overcome some shortcoming of critical IPE without giving up the ambition of an analysis of world
order(s). 
3.2. Methodology: the study of a transnational power elite within a 
transnational field
The framework outlined in the previous section requires both quantitative and qualitative methods
in  order  to  determine  the  evolving  boundaries  of  the  field  of  Internet  governance,  the
interchangeability and ideological cohesion of the power elite, and finally the consensual character
of elite power and its acceptance by non-elites. 
3.2.1 Taking evolution and change seriously
In spite  of the differences between the scientific  traditions that are combined in the theoretical
framework of this study, one main common aspect is the importance of history for these authors. All
of them reject a-historical analysis and explore the evolution of social structures over time. 
One of the main criticism addressed by Cox to mainstream theories is their a-historical character
(Cox,  1981).  Cox,  like  Gramsci,  draws  upon  Vico  to  understand  “human  structures”  as  a
“continuing creation of new forms” that include ever-changing forms of mind and evolving social
relations  and institutions  (Cox,  1981,  p.  213).  To this  end,  Cox uses  the  “method of  historical
structures”  (Cox,  1981,  p.  220).  The  method consists  in  the  analysis  of  a  limited,  historically
located, totality23. A study of the historical situation related to this limited totality, together with the
study of the emergence of rival structures, provides an evolutionary character to the analysis. It is
within this framework that change can be analysed. According to Cox, historicism is a research
program  opposed  to  positivism.  It  aims  to  reveal  historical  structures  that  are  particular  to  a
historical moment and where some kind of regularities might prevail  (see the 1985 postscript of
23 The idea of a “limited totality” is here interpreted not only in terms of chronological limits, but also in terms of 
social limits, as expressed by the concept of field. 
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Cox’s most famous article in Cox, 1986). The most important element of such a research program is
the transformation from one structure to another.  This research can be carried out in two ways
(Bieler & Morton, 2003):
- The research can follow the three levels, or spheres of activity identified by Cox.
First,  the  process  of  production  generates  social  forces  that  differ  form  one
historical  structure  to  another.  These  social  forces  in  turn  produce  ideas,  for
example  in  the  form  of  hegemonic  projects.  Then,  hegemonic  projects  are
concretised through particular forms of states. Finally, the particular form of state
is transferred to the sphere of world order.
-  An alternative research program is  to  focus on the subaltern classes in  their
interplay with the ruling classes.
Neither of these two routes is followed completely in this study. The first type of research is more
adapted to the analysis of the longue durée and relies heavily on the state as a key level, which is
not always the case in modern globalised capitalism. The second route is an important reminder that
elite-research  is  not  self-sufficient  and  that  the  interplay  between  the  elite  and  non-elites  (or
counter-elites)  is  necessary (see discussion above  in  section 3.1.1).  However,  the sole  focus on
subaltern actors reproduces exactly the same limitations it criticises. Instead of the focus on stability
and elites, the focus on the dominated groups and resistance is only half of the story. As a result, the
following chapters are informed by the Neo-Gramscian historicist methodology but rely also on
more empirical and meso-level analysis developed by political sociology.
Whereas power structure research  inspired by Wright Mills  has focused on the study of a given
order (e.g. Dye & Domhoff, 1987) rather than on a historicist view of evolution and change, it
should be reminded that Wright Mills' work is essentially an analysis of the profound transformation
of the US society after World War II. The Power Elite describes the centralisation of power in the
US society during the 20th century. Out of the five orders described in his previous work (Gerth &
Mills, 1953),  only three are central to the specific power structure of post-WWII US society: the
economic, the political, and the military sphere. The bureaucratisation and centralisation of social
life has undermined the role of the kinship and the religious orders. The society turns into a society
of masses, where the power of the elite remains unchallenged. This transformation is, according to
Wright Mills, “one of the keys to the social and psychological meaning of modern life in America”
(Wright Mills, 2010).  Change is thus analysed in each institutional order and at the level of the
whole social structure. Change can occur within the structure through a change of personnel, or
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because of the changing number, type of and power balance between institutions. In this regard, the
thinking  of  Wright  Mills  is  similar  to  the  neo-Gramscian  analysis  of  historical  structures  and
change. As Gerth and Wright  Mills put it:  “every model of social  structure implies a model of
social-historical change; history consists of the changes which social structures undergo” (Gerth &
Wright Mills, 1953 p. 399-401). 
Bourdieusian sociology also offers some valuable tools in order to analyse historical change. First, a
field is a social space of interactions that gradually became autonomous. This is why the genealogy
of a field can be studied. The first step is thus the inquiry of the genesis of this space. According to
Guzzini (2012, p. 88), the first research avenue is for the researcher to establish whether, on the
international or transnational level, a given space of social interactions has reached the degree of
autonomisation that is entailed by the concept of field. The process of autonomisation from other
international fields, and from national fields needs to be analysed in order to define the boundaries
of the field. Second, a field is a dynamic environment. Although Bourdieu has been criticised for his
focus on reproduction, earlier work by Bourdieu provides some interesting ways to analyse change.
This has inspired more  evolutionary readings of Bourdieu, as exemplified by the work of Boyer
(Boyer, 2003, 2008) and Lordon (Lordon, 2003) in the field of political economy. Chapter 6 is an
application of a Bourdieusian analysis of change to the field of Internet governance. Finally, the
position of a field within the global field of power and the exchange rate between any given forms
of capital evolve through time. 
Informed by these  historicist  approaches,  the  present  study analyses  the  emergence  of  Internet
governance  as  an  international  policy  issue,  as  well  as  the  evolution  of  the  field  of  Internet
governance in a time of crisis. Internet governance is thus analysed as a process rather than as a set
of institutions, norms and principles. The process of governing the Internet is part of a broader
process aiming at governing the global political economy. Neither Internet governance nor global
governance in general represent a stabilised order. The purpose of this study is to investigate the
trial-and-error process that emerged in the 1990s and evolved in the 2000s and to analyse the power
dynamics that underpin it. 
First,  this  study  researches  the  genealogy  of  the  field  of  Internet  governance.  It  looks  at  the
technical evolution that led to the creation of the global network, but also, and most importantly, at
the autonomisation of Internet governance. Internet governance became gradually autonomous from
computer  networking science  and from international  telecommunication regulation.  However,  it
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remained closely linked to these two fields.  The genealogy of the field of Internet  governance
allows for a definition of its (evolving) boundaries. Internet governance is not only about creating
technical standards and protocols that allow the interconnection of several computers. It is not either
a typical issue of telecommunication regulation: the actors and stakes were different from the early
structuration of the field. In particular, this study focuses on the first institutionalisation of the field
in the late 1990s. The institutionalisation of the field represents a first moment of crisis in the field,
that  was triggered by the commercialisation of the network and ended with the creation of the
Internet  Corporation  for  Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).  The crisis  occurred  between
1992 and 1998, with the bulk of the political crisis taking place between 1996 and 1998. During this
period, not only the boundaries of the field have been defined, but also the dominant principles and
coalitions of actors have emerged. The changes within the field correspond to more global dynamics
since the institutionalisation of Internet governance was deeply influenced by the power of the US
on the international scene and by the ideology of neoliberalism. 
Second, this study looks at the World Summit of the Information Society (2002-2005) as a new
crisis in the field of Internet governance. Again, the dynamics within the field are related to more
global structural tendencies such as the emergence of new powers, the consequences of the terrorist
attacks of September,11, 2001on international relations, the burst of the Dotcom bubble etc. These
structural trends were translated in the field of Internet governance through a growing discontent
with the existing governance system embodied by the ICANN. This is why this historical sequence
witnessed a reform of the ICANN, several discussions on Internet governance at the global level,
and especially the emergence of Internet governance as the main item on the agenda of a historically
important UN conference. The second crisis of Internet governance gave birth to several changes
within the field in the form of new institutions, new norms and principles and a reconfiguration of
the position of different actors in the field. 
The definition of these historical moments does not  entail  the  analysis of  several different and
unrelated  power  (or  historical)  structures.  Following  Cox,  what  is  of  most  interest  here  is  the
transition to one order to another. Only through the analysis of the constant evolution of the field,
one can have a critical perspective on the power dynamics at any given time. This is also true for
the  current  situation  that  is  often  analysed  a-historically  by  liberal  pluralists.  The  historical
perspective provides a way to understand the  long-term power dynamics and the structuration of
current debates. 
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3.2.2. Analysing Internet governance as a transnational field
The validity of the concept of transnational field depends on the possibility to identify a coherent
social  space  where  actors  struggle  around  common stakes.  This  entails  the  crucial  issue  of
determining the social topology of the field.  A field is defined by its boundaries as well as by the
varied positions of the actors within the field. In his field theory, Bourdieu rejects substantialist
thinking and advocates for a “relational” thinking, which “identifies the real not with substances
but with relationships” (Bourdieu, quoted in Swartz, 2012, p.61)24. Two methods seem to best fit the
Bourdieusian project of a relational thinking about social structures: correspondence analysis and
social  network  analysis  (de  Nooy,  2003).  While  Bourdieu  himself  and  most  of  his  followers
preferred  correspondence  analysis25,  some authors  argue  for  the  introduction  of  social  network
analysis in the analysis of fields (Anheier et al., 1995; Mohr, 2013; de Nooy, 2003). According to
them, social  network analysis can contribute to the analysis of fields on several accounts. First,
recent developments in social network analysis allow for different analysis than what existed when
Bourdieu advocated for correspondence analysis, especially in terms of visualisation. Contemporary
visualisation algorithms distribute the nodes in the graph and help visualise the proximity of actors
and  organisations  in  a  similar  fashion  to  multidimensional  scaling  techniques  used  in
correspondence analysis (De Nooy, 2003, p. 315). Social network analysis has thus become a useful
tool to visualise fields. More importantly, social network analysis points to a different understanding
of  social  structures  that  can  be  useful  to  analyse  transnational  fields  (de  Nooy,  2003).  Social
network analysis shows manifest relations between individuals. In the present case, these manifest
relations include co-authorship of documents, affiliation to the same organisation, attendance to the
same  event,  or  comments  on  one  another’s  statements.  In  a  Bourdieusian  perspective,  these
intersubjective relations result from social structures. As a result, a focus on intersubjective relations
is  at  least  insufficient,  or  even  misleading.  This  is  why  most  Bourdieusian  sociology  anlayse
properties of people and organisations (attributes) rather than intersubjective relations. However, the
fact that intersubjective relations are a consequence rather than a cause of social structures does not
disqualify social network analysis in the study of fields (de Nooy, 2003). Intersubjective relations
and institutional affiliations are manifestations of the structure of the field. Social network analysis
can thus map out the actors, institutions and the effects of the structure of the field. While further
work is required to investigate the less visible structure of the field, social network analysis  is a
24 The  term  relationship  might  be  misleading  here:  Bourdieu  differentiates  between  intersubjective  interactions
between agents and objective relations that exist “independently from individual will and conciousness” (Bourdieu
and Wacquant, 1992, p. 72). The object of his sociology is the study of objective relations.
25 Although Bourdieu defines a field as a network (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; p. 77), he explicitly rejects social
network analysis as a method to analyse fields relationally (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).
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relevant method in order to analyse the topology of the field. 
Another objection to the use of social network analysis is its focus on the present rather than on the
historical  emergence  of  a  given  structure.  Social  network  analysis  provides  a  snapshot  of  the
relations between actors and institutions at time t but does not include data on the emergence and
evolution of a given situation. Consistently with the theoretical framework outlined in the previous
section, the methods used in the present study are first and foremost historical. This is why several
networks have been built in order to focus on evolution and change rather than stability. A first
network (though not relying on comprehensive data) evidences the transnational character of the
emerging field of Internet governance as soon as in the 1980s (see chapter 4). A second network
tries to map out the field of Internet governance in the second half of the 1990s (see chapter 5).
finally, a third network analyses the interactions of the agents form the field of Internet governance
that  were participating in the World Summit for the Information Society in the mid-2000s (see
chapter 7 and 8). The particular attention given to the genealogy of the field and its evolution avoids
the a-hisotricist character of some social network analysis and ensures the coherence between the
theoretical argument and the data analysis in the present study.
Just like some of Bourdieu's theoretical framework requires adaptation for the study of transnational
fields (see previous section), social network analysis seems to be an interesting way to outline the
topography of a transnational field such as Internet governance. Bourdieu's use of correspondence
analysis has been criticised for its tendency to reduce struggles in a field to a unique logic: the
control of the whole field (Mohr,  2013). In long-established sub-national fields, this limitation is
balanced by the fact that the researcher might be able to identify the main logic of the field since
actors are well conscious of it after decades of interactions. However,  in emerging transnational
field, the variety of stakes and logics among very different actors is a crucial element that needs to
be acknowledged at  the  theoretical  as  well  as  at  the  methodological  level.  Consistent  with the
introduction  of  Wright  Mills'  concepts  in  the  theoretical  framework  in  order  to  study  the
differentiated socialisations, capitals and practices of transnational elites, social network analysis
does not determine a priori the most important dimensions that structure the field but rather offers a
visualisation  of  institutional  affiliations  and  social  interactions  that  is  a  first  step  towards  an
understanding  of  the  underlying  logics  and  the  objective  positions  held  by  actors  in  the  field.
Moreover, the focus on institutions is coherent with the use of Gramscian hegemony to describe a
domination that relies more on institutions rather on an acquired habitus in emergent transnational
fields such as Internet governance. Finally, social network analysis tends to focus on practices rather
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than attributes in the description of the field (de Nooy, 2003). Again, this type of thinking seems to
fit well the study of emerging transnational fields, where practices are constantly evolving and the
relative value of capitals and attributes are still subject to rapid change.  
As a result, social network analysis can be a useful tool to study fields in terms of power, especially
transnational fields, since it focuses on one aspect that is essential: the interactions between actors.
It  can be useful in order to reconstruct the field and to analyse practices.  However,  Bourdieu's
objections to social network analysis should remind us that the method cannot be used as the unique
methodological tool to analyse the field. Further methods are necessary to explore the structure of
the field beyond interactions and to reveal the objective positions of actors within the field. This is
why social network analysis is used more in an exploratory fashion in the present study and why it
is combined with critical discourse analysis and prosoprographical elements. 
Social network analysis is used mainly in two ways. First, it is used as a way to draw the boundaries
of the field. Active participation in the debates around the definition of Internet governance is a
good  indicator  of  the  inclusion  of  an  individual,  or  an  organisation,  in  the  field  of  Internet
governance. There was no single forum during the first period. The data used in the construction of
the network includes the list participants to a number of conferences,  summits, and hearings on
Internet governance, the authorship of policy documents, the search for influential commentators
between two different  versions  of  the  same document and the boards  of  the major  institutions
involved in the debates in the 1990s. This sources helped to build a database of 343 individuals and
100 organisations, as well as documents and events (see annex 2). The data is not exhaustive. The
archive of some conferences were not available and some events and institutions might be missing.
However, the  repetition of the same names after the inclusion of a number of institutions in the
database tends to show that the bulk of the actors of Internet governance in the 1990s is included in
the  data.  For  the  second time period,  the  data  includes  the  list  of  participants  to  the  different
preparatory meetings of the WSIS, the list of participants to the two phases of the summit, and the
list of participants to the process of the Working Group on Internet Governance (members of the
group, secretariat, commentators). This data represent a database of approximately 550 individuals
and  250 institutions. In  addition  to  the  individuals'  names  and  institutional  affiliation,  their
statements during the Summit are used to build networks of participants (see Annex 4). The field of
Internet  governance in the mid-2000s cannot be equated to  the WSIS. However,  the increasing
importance of the WSIS as a key forum in the discussions about Internet governance ensured a
representation  of  all  important  organisations  in  the  Summit.  The  network  analysis  is  slightly
89
different from the first time period since by definition, all participants to the WSIS participated in
the same event. The analysis looks rather at the regularity and inequality of the participation to the
meetings  (participation  is  weighted according to  the  status  of  the  participant  form audience  to
speaker, and chair). In spite of the differences in the collection and treatment, the data allows for an
analysis of the evolution of the elite between the 1990s and the WSIS  (see annex  2 and 4).  The
analysis  is  conducted  using  the  UCINet  software  and  visualisations  are  produced  in  NetDraw
(Borgatti et al., 2002; Borgatti, 2002). 
Second, social network analysis is combined with more qualitative methods to draw the topography
of the field,  the relative position of actors within the field and the structure of power of the field .
The visualisation of a  field in the form of a network can provide indications of the respective
positions of actors within the field. First, the inclusion of an actor (individual or organisation) in the
network  depends  on  its  participation  to  Internet  governance  debates.  Moreover,  isolates26 are
generally excluded from the graphs for the sake of clarity. Second, the position of nodes in the
network is also an indication of their position within the field. For example, visualisation algorithms
seek the visualisation that present the shorter links and the less intersections possible (Borgatti et al.,
2014). As a result, actors that have more relations among them tend to be grouped in the same area
of the graph, while marginal actors appear in less connected areas of the graph. Moreover, measures
of centrality are often used in network visualisation as a way to highlight more connected actors.
The three following figures  illustrate  the  way social  network  analysis  can help highlight  some
properties of a field. Figure 3.1. is a random network of 8 nodes and 10 links. It could represent 8
individuals having relations of friendship (links between two nodes) or not (no links between two
nodes). 
Figure 3.1. Example of network
Figure 3.1 has been drawn “free-hand” and does not result from a visualisation algorithm. The same
26 Isolates are nodes without any ties to other nodes. 
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network looks different when re-drawn by a social network analysis software based on a layout
algorithm (see figure 3.2)27.
Figure 3.2. Example of network visualised in a spring embedder layout
The second graph highlights the different positions of nodes  such as  1 and 7 in the network. The
more marginalised position of node 7 appears clearly. Node 6 is an isolate: it has no link to any
other node in the network. Finally, if we add a centrality measure  to determines the size of the
nodes28, the relative position of each node in the network is stressed. This is what is shown in figure
3.3. 
27 In this case, the network has been drawn in Visone 2.7.3 and re-drawn by the software using the spring embedder 
layout algorithm. 
28 In this case, the betweenness centrality determines the size of the node. Betweenness centrality is the number of 
shortest paths between all vertices that pass through that node. It is often used to determine “broker” roles of actors 
within a network (Borgatti et al., 2014).
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Figure 3.3. Example of network with node size determined by betweenness centrality 
These simple indicators are used in the present study in the definition of elites, counter-elites and
non-elites. The mapping of a complex field such as Internet governance in the form of a network
helps  to  visualise  the  more  connected,  more  central  actors  that  form  the  elites  and  the  more
marginalised actors. These observations are then complemented by qualitative data analysis in order
to  confirm and  substantiate  these  findings.  Indications  given  by  the  graph  produced  by  social
network analysis is even more interesting if the network includes discourses and statements rather
than individuals and institutions only (see more details on discursive elements below).
The network visualisation is here used  mainly  as a descriptive method. No further calculation is
applied to the data and the analysis is corroborated with qualitative analysis. However, using social
network analysis coupled with qualitative content analysis is useful in order to locate documents,
discourses, and actors within a given negotiation, and ultimately within the field. Compared to other
methods used in Bourdieusian sociology (for example multiple correspondence analysis), it focuses
on actor practices and discourses in a given process rather than on their long-term characteristics. It
also highlights  actors'  discourses  and arguments that are more dynamic than their  habitus.  The
social network analysis of discourses also represent an interesting addition to the “institution-based”
social network analysis usually used in the Millsian tradition of power structure analysis in order to
evidence elite circulation and interlocks29 (see section below). 
29 See See http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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3.2.3. Investigating the existence of a power elite
The study of power structures in a Millsian tradition  generally relies on social network  analysis
coupled  with content analysis30.  Social network analysis is a useful method in order to study the
institutional interlocks that are characteristic of the existence of a power elite. The method is used to
test  the  first  criteria  defined by Wright  Mills  to  determine  the  existence  of  a  power  elite:  the
interchangeability of positions. It can show for example whether individuals holding key positions
within  an  institutional  order  such  as  the  military  or  large  companies  are  closely  linked  with
individuals holding power position within political institutions. However, interchangeability is not
sufficient to prove the existence of a power elite. Social network analysis helps to visualise links but
does not tell much on the nature of these links. Qualitative analysis is required in order to analyse if
these links evidence competition or cohesion.  
Interchangeability: social network analysis and qualitative data
While social network analysis can be useful to determine the topology of a field, it is also used more
traditionally  in this research  as a way to analyse the relationships between actors, and especially
elites (for an overview of social network analysis in political science, see Ward, Stovel, & Sacks,
2011). Social network analysis is useful to visualise and analyse the connections and flows between
different  types  of  nodes  (actors,  organisations,  documents,  etc.).  Such analysis  allows to  study
patterns in relationships between units. In the case of elite sociology, interlocking directorates is one
oft-used method to research the existence of a unified economic (or business) elite at a national and
at  a transnational  level  (Carrol  & Fennema, 2002; Kentor,  Jeffrey Jang, 2004; Mach, David, &
Bühlmann, 2011; Mizruhi, 1996).  Social network analysis is also used for the study of political
elites, or transgovernmental networks (e.g. Thurner & Binder, 2009).  In the case of the emerging
field  of  Internet  governance,  social  network  analysis  is  mainly  useful  in  order  to  present  an
alternative view to the pluralist/liberal tradition. The purpose is to analyse the links between actors
and institutions in order to de-construct the stakeholder categories. Social network analysis looks
beyond the main affiliation of actors and analyses the links between different elites. It focuses on
elite  circulation and elite interchangeability.  The different specialised elites involved in Internet
governance rely on different resources (or different forms of capital): technical knowledge, financial
capital,  political  power,  etc.  They  are  affiliated  with  different  types  of  institutions  (private
organisations,  standardisation  bodies,  companies,  governments,  intergovernmental  organisations,
30 Ibid.
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etc.).  However,  social  network  analysis  can  reveal  to  what  extent and  in  which  settings  they
collaborate.  The method used here is mainly the elaboration of a database of a large number of
individuals,  their  institutional  affiliation,  and  their  participation  to  different  processes  such  as
conferences, the direct drafting of policy documents, or the submission of comments on these drafts.
This data is then visualised in the form of 2-mode networks (fig. 3.4) or one-mode network (fig.
3.5). 
Figure 3.4. Example of a 2-mode network Figure 3.5. Example of 1-mode network
A 2-mode network includes individuals and institutions (organisations, documents, events). In the
example in figure 3.4, individuals 1, 2 and 3 participated in event A. 2-mode networks provide an
institutional  definition of  the  elite,  as  used  in  the  Millsian tradition.  Elites  are  powerful  actors
affiliated to powerful institutions. The same data can also be visualised as direct links between 1, 2
and 3 (fig. 3.5). One-mode networks help to visualise the interchangeability of the elite. Instead of a
focus on institutions, one-mode networks highlight interpersonal  relations.  A repetition of these
links between members of groups that are a priori different in terms of national origins, institutional
affiliation,  resources  and  attributes  (forms  of  capital)  gives  an  alternative  perspective  to  the
dominant stakeholder narrative. 
The  network  visualisations  are  elements  of  a  study  of  power  relations  and  –  combined  with
qualitative analysis – illustrate the existence of an elite.
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Node Description Example 
A Key institution in Internet
governance
Internet Engineering
TaskForce
B Key document in Internet
Governance
ICANN by-laws
C Key institution in Internet
Governance
IBM
D Marginal document in
Internet Governance
Non-binding civil
society declaration
E Marginal institution in
Internet Governance
UNESCO
Figure 3.6. Power differentials in a two-mode network31
Figure 3.6 is an imaginary network that exemplifies a reading of a network visualisation in terms of
elite power. Elite actors are connected to key institutions (A,C) that participate in the drafting of key
policy documents (B). The individuals represented by nodes 1,2 and 3 are likely to be part of the
elite of Internet governance whereas individuals 4,5 and 6 are likely to be part of non-elite actors or
of  a  counter-elite.  Centrality  measures  (node  size) tend  to  strengthen  this  observation.  This
institutional definition of the elite then requires to be complemented by the qualitative analysis of
the practices of these actors. 
Indeed, the interconnections between elites does not prove the existence of a power elite in itself
31 Visualisation of fig. 3.6 is a spring embedder graph of a two-mode network with a measure of eigenvector centrality 
determining the size of the nodes. 
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since social network analysis is not able to demonstrate whether the cooperation is competitive or
consensual, or even conspirational. However, it present a systematic mapping of the relations within
a field at a given historical moment  and hints towards an interchangeability of elite positions.  It
represent a first step in the analysis of the existence of a power elite within a given field. The rest of
the analysis depends on qualitative data, and the historical perspective that allows for an analysis of
socialisation processes within the field. 
Prosopography  has  been a  key component  of  elite  studies,  especially  in  historical  perspectives
(Verley,  2001;  Daviet-Vincent,  2006).  It  is  also a  method used by Bourdieu and his followers.
Prosopography is a kind of collective biography that can help to explore the structure and evolution
of a field. Broady (2002) defines Bourdieusian prosopography as the study of individuals belonging
to  the  same  field  through  a  comprehensive  collection  of  data  for  each  and  every  individual.
However, the purpose of prosopography is not the study of individuals but rather the study of the
field (Broady, 2002). This type of research is certainly useful under the conditions described by
Broady. The clear identification with Bourdieusian sociology and the objective of field-analysis
helps to  avoid the lack  of  theory of  prosopography criticised by some authors (Lemercier  and
Picard, 2010). 
However,  prosopography  suffers  from  a  number  of  limitations.  The  first  limitation  is  the
“comprehensive”  character  of  the  data  that  is  required.  The  collection  of  the  data  requires  an
important amount of work, especially for the study of transnational fields. Second, the comparison
between biographies  is  made difficult  by the  variety  of  origins and features of the  individuals.
Because of these limitations, and especially because of the impossibility of a comprehensive data
collection, no systematic prosopographical study has been carried out for this research. Instead, the
biographies of a sample of individuals have been analysed in order to define typical elements of the
biographies of certain specialised elites. 
The  data  used  in  the  analysis  of  biographical  information comes from the  biographies  of  elite
individuals that are available on the websites of their various organizations. This data is completed
with information from websites such as icannwiki.org, where contributors can post biographical
elements on individuals involved in Internet governance. Social networks like facebook.com, and
especially  linkedin.com  are  also  valuable  sources  of  information.  While  not  systematic  and
comprehensive, this method allows for the description of several typical biographies that correspond
to specialised elites. Then, these different biographies can be compared in order to understand their
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significance for the field. For example, it is interesting to see what type of institution individuals
were affiliated to when they were first involved in Internet governance. Here, specialised elites such
as the “technical” elite, the civil society elite, the political elite and the business elite can be defined.
Then the circulation of these elites is interesting to compare. The collected data is important to de-
construct the stakeholder categories that are used by mainstream Internet governance studies. It is
also interesting to look at gender and differences in terms of nationalities in the different specialised
elites.
This type of analysis is conducted for the board members of the ICANN since its creation, for a
number  of  randomly  selected  members  of  institutions  like  the  Working  Group  on  Internet
Governance and the Internet Engineering Taskforce, or the G8 DotForce. Prominent individuals,
whose names are often to be found in the various forums of Internet governance over the years,
have been preferably chosen for two reasons. First, they are more likely to present a pattern of
evolution  within  the  field  compared  to  individuals  that  might  come  at  grips  with  Internet
governance on a given occasion and then go back to other fields. Second, the fact that they are well-
known individuals multiply the data available on their successive affiliations. They are more likely
members of different expert groups, where their biographical information is used as a legitimation
element. They are also more likely to be listed in websites like icannwiki.org and to be the subject
of newspaper articles. 
The combination of social network analysis, prospographical elements and a historical perspective
on the evolution of actors' circulation among institutions offers multiple ways to investigate the
interchangeability of elite positions, which is the first element that proves the existence of a power
elite in the Millsian tradition. 
Metaphysics: critical discourse analysis and social network analysis of statements
Wright  Mills  further  investigates  the  existence  of  a  power  elite  through  the  study  of  shared
metaphysics32 among the members of the elite. In other words, ideological cohesion is a necessary
condition in the definition of a power elite. Ideological cohesion is analysed in this study through
qualitative content analysis inspired by critical discourse analysis,  and through a social network
analysis of statements.
32 For a  different  presentation of  the research on ideological  cohesion anchored in a  Cultural  Political  Economy
framework, see Chenou, 2013a. Wright Mills “shared metaphysics” could be understood as a “dominant economic
imaginary”. 
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The debates on Internet governance have taken place to a large extent online and within arenas
where meetings minutes, report, preparatory and final documents are archived. As a result, several
thousands of pages from hundreds of documents were retrieved for this research. It should be noted
that some on-line documents were accessed through the Internet Archive since some web-pages do
not exist any more. Some important sources like the archive of the NewDom mailing list could not
be completely retrieved. The data analysis follows two different paths. For the first time period, the
less  structured  and  incomplete  data  is  analysed  through  the  construction  of  categories,  the
identification of broader discourses about Internet governance and the analysis of their position
within the field of Internet governance. For the second period, the data is gathered from two UN
websites and the archive is complete. Thus, the research strategy was slightly different. Rather than
broad discourses,  precise statements are categorised and identified within the documents.  Then,
their  relationships are  visualised using social  network analysis, and their  influence – or lack of
influence – on the final documents of the conference is analysed. 
For the first time period, the study is based on the qualitative content analysis of 15 versions of 4
main policy documents produced between 1996 and the creation of the ICANN in 1998 (See Annex
3).  These are the documents that explicitly  described a governance model  for the Internet.  The
analysis  follows an  inductive  category-building  approach  in  order  to  compare  common themes
among  documents (Boyatzis,  1998).  I  created  categories and  used  them  to  evaluate  the
commonalities  and differences  between the models  presented in  each document.  Categories are
related to the possible modes of governance of the Internet, ranging from public to private, from
national to global, from technical to political, and from non-market to market-enabling.  The same
categories were then applied to public comments on these documents as well as to other documents
from the same period that did not describe a concrete governance model but reflected key principles
advocated by specific groups (e.g. Clinton & Gore 1996, ICC 1998, Boston Working Group 1998;
Open Root Server Confederation 1998). The results were interpreted to identify broader discourses
about  Internet  governance  (see  chapter  5)  in  relation  with  concepts  that  can  be  found  in  the
literature of the late 1990s such as neoliberalism and global public goods.
The  identification  of  discourses  through  the  analysis  of  a  number  of  statements  is  a  common
research strategy in critical discourse analysis. Discourses can be understood “as the general domain
of  all  statements,  sometimes  as  an  individualisable  group  of  statements,  and  sometimes  as  a
regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements.” (Foucault, quoted in Fairclough, 2003,
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p. 121). Discourses are ways of representing aspects of the world from a particular perspective
(Fairclough 2003, p. 124).  In this case, they relate to the regulation of Internet and echo broader
discourses about the governance of globalisation.  The identification of discourse is an important
element of elite research. Discourses are not equal within a given field, they are elements of the
relationships  between  agents  in  the  field.  Thus,  they  compete,  and  one  discourse  or  several
discourses can dominate others. Bourdieu, used the distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy
to refer to the unequal position of a given discourse within a field (Bourdieu, 1984). Discourses are
at the same time object of struggle to define the orthodoxy of a field and resources that individuals
deploy in relating to one another (Fairclough 2003, p. 124). Critical discourse analysis thus tries to
identify the “naturalized preconstructions […] that are ignored as such and which can function as
unconscious instruments of construction” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). 
The identification of discourse relies on an analysis of the texts that draws particular attention to the
use of a certain vocabulary and certain semantic relations.  For example, some documents refer to
the Internet as a global marketplace (e.g. Clinton & Gore, 1996) while others refer to a global public
good (IAHC, 1997). Some documents insist on security issues, while others stress the emancipatory
potential  of the network.  The debates evidence the  different  representations of the Internet that
existed at a given time and can be categorised as discourses. Their relative influence in the drafting
and adoption binding and non-binding policy documents shows their position within the field. This
influence can be evaluated qualitatively (see  Annex 3) and quantitatively (see  below). Moreover,
critical discourse analysis can help to investigate the emergence of a consensual discourse among
different elites – through the imposition of a dominant discourse, or through the hybridisation of
several dominant discourses. This consensual discourse is a crucial element of the cohesion of the
power elite as well as a necessary step towards hegemony. 
Qualitative content analysis based on inductive category-building is coupled with social network
analysis.  The purpose of adding social network analysis to the qualitative content analysis is to
focus on the relationships between individuals, institutions and the categories that can be found in
the documents. This is why, instead of the broad discourses identified in the first phase, the analysis
of the second time period relies on the visualisation of the varied positions of actors' statements
within the field. Since the data on the second period is comprehensive and located in one given
place (the WSIS website), a process of negotiation can be usefully described. Both the coding of the
documents and the matrix of the statements' network is made with Discourse Network Analyzer (see
Annex  4).  This  software  was  designed  precisely  to  analyse  policy  processes  and  negotiations
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through the analysis of the linkages between statements from various actors and institutions. After
the same process of inductive category-building used for the first period, the documents are coded
in the software according to the following model:
Actor/Institution/Document A stated on date D that X (e.g. UNESCO stated on
October 12, 2004, that Internet governance should be multilateral)
A link exist when two actors, institutions or documents share the same statement (within a given
time-window). The result is a visualisation of different types of network (Leifeld, 2012):
- one-mode networks of actors (only one set of actors), institutions or documents sharing
one or several statements (see fig. 3.5)33;
-  two-mode networks of actors,  institutions or document as the first  type of node;  and
statements as a second type of node (see fig. 3.4)34.
These networks highlight the differentiated positions of discourses within the field as well as the
relations between actors and discourses. They are important to investigate the ideological cohesion
of elites. They are also used in order to measure the consensual character of elite rule.
3.2.4. Measuring hegemony
As we have seen in the theoretical framework, the cohesion and interchangeability of the power
elite  are  crucial  elements  for  the  establishment  of  an  order  within a  given field.  The  level  of
acceptance  of  elite  rule  is  the important  factor  to  determine  the  stability  of  this  order  and the
potential  for change.  As a  result,  measuring hegemony is  part  of a  historicist  and evolutionary
research agenda. 
The analysis of hegemony in Internet governance evaluates two criteria. First, the study measures
the consensual character of elite rule. Second, the research investigates the existence of alternative
discourses and social  forces.  This type of analysis  combines the two research strategy of Neo-
Gramscian international political economy outlined before (Bieler & Morton, 2003). 
First, the analysis of the consensual character of elite rule reconstructs the Coxian combination of
33 In this case, 1,2 and 3 would represent individuals, while edges would represent shared statements.
34 In this case, A would represent a statement and 1,2 and 3 would represent individuals or organisations. 
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social  forces,  ideas  and institutions.  The fact  that  particular social  forces produce a hegemonic
project  that  is  then  institutionalised,  for  example  in  the  form  of  the  ICANN  or  the  Internet
Governance Forum, shows a certain level of acceptance. This is why Cox relates the creation of
institutions to hegemony (Cox, 1981, p. 137). Thus, the creation of the ICANN and the IGF are here
analysed as processes of hegemony production. Institutions tend to legitimise a particular order and
to canalise  resistance.  As a  result,  the Coxian framework is  used here to  analyse the historical
process of hegemony production as the creation of a negotiated and institutionalised order. This type
of  analysis  relies  primarily  on  the  identification  of  hegemonic  project  and on  the  institutional
history of the field of Internet governance. It corresponds to the historicist approach outlined before.
Second, the analysis of hegemony requires the identification of potential alternative discourses and
social  forces.  This is why the present study analyse the evolution of the position of discourses
within the field. Formerly marginal discourses can become dominant over time. This is for example
the case of a sovereignist discourse on Internet governance with its focus on security issues that
became dominant after the 2001 terrorist attacks on the US territory. Alternative social forces are
analysed  through  the  concept  of  counter-elites.  The  analysis  of  counter-elites  entails  the
identification of organised forms of resistance outside the dominant institutions of the field. The
emergence of an academic counter-elite after the creation of the ICANN illustrates this process (see
chapter 6). The study of alternatives is conducted through qualitative analysis of discourses and of
the  history  of  institutions.  It  is  also  complemented  by  social  network  analysis  of  individuals,
organisations,  and statements.  Indeed,  the  two main types  of  social  network analysis  described
earlier both evidence the existence of alternative actors and discourses. They can be used to measure
the  position of  these alternative actors.  These alternative actors can  remain  marginal  – a  small
number of marginalised actors that are not united around a counter-hegemonic project – or they can
constitute a counter-elite with a shared discourse and organised around particular institutions. 
To conclude, the combination of international political economy and political sociology offers a
complex and flexible framework to analyse the history of Internet governance as the history of the
emergence  of  a  transnational  field  organised  around  the  struggle  for  the  definition  of  Internet
governance.  This framework can be operationalised through the combination of  qualitative  and
quantitative methods in order to investigate the emergence and evolution of a field, the existence of
a power elite and the process of hegemony production. The following chapters present a particular
perspective on the history of Internet governance relying on a series of concepts and a historical
data collection analysed through mixed methods.  
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Chapter 4. The history of telecommunication regulation and 
the autonomisation of the transnational field of Internet 
governance 
On  May,  24  1844,  Samuel  Morse  officially  opened  the  first  electric  telegraph  line  between
Washington D.C and Baltimore when he sent the famous words “What hath God wrought” over the
60-kilometre line. Although this was not the first transmission of a message at some distance, the
technology was simple and reliable enough to become an important mean of telecommunication
over the years. Rich countries rapidly built their own national network, which contributed to the
unification of sometimes distant territories. However, problems of interconnection and compatibility
between different national networks remained.  For example, a message sent from Paris to Brussels
had first to be transmitted to operators on the French side of the border who handed it  over to
operators on the Belgian side of the border; the message could then be sent to Brussels. Lines were
generally  not  connected  internationally  and technically  incompatible.  States  thus  began to  sign
bipartite agreements and regional agreements to allow and regulate international telegraphy. 
In  1865,  some  twenty  years  after  Morse's  message,  20  state  plenipotentiaries  gathered  at  a
conference in Paris that gave birth to the International Telegraph Union (ITU). The ITU was one of
the  first  intergovernmental  organization35.  Intergovernmentalism  became  a  prominent  mode  of
governance in world politics in the late 19th century and in most of the 20th century, covering a
wide range of issues and broadly studied by International Relations scholars. The preamble of the
treaty of Paris contains the principles that were going to be promoted by many international regimes
and that are core to liberal state-centred approaches to global governance such as regimes theory. 
“Equally animated by the desire to ensure to telegraphic correspondences exchanged 
between their respective states the advantages of a single a reduced fare, to improve 
the current conditions of international telegraphy, and to establish a permanent 
understanding between states while keeping their freedom of action regarding 
measures that do not affect the whole service, decided to conclude a convention to this 
effect.”36
State  sovereignty  (here  the  freedom  of  action  of  states  on  their  own  territory),  inter-state
35  See  “International  Telegraph  Conference  (Paris,  1865)”,  available  on  the  ITU  website  at
http://www.itu.int/en/history/plenipotentiaryconferences/Pages/1865Paris.aspx, last accessed 8 April 2014.
36 See  “Convention  télégraphique  internationale  de  Paris”  (1865),  pp.1-2.  Available  on  the  ITU  website  at
http://www.itu.int/en/history/plenipotentiaryconferences/Pages/1865Paris.aspx, last accessed 8 April 2014, author's
translation.
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cooperation  (with  the  idea of  shared  interests  and absolute  gains  through cooperation)  and the
project of a durable liberal peace (here called permanent understanding) seemed to be key principles
for the functioning as well as for the academic understanding of international regimes. The Internet
has a somewhat similar history and is to a certain extent a more recent development of the same
global communication infrastructure. However, the development of the Internet was not regulated
by the  ITU and it  did  not  gave  birth  to  another  intergovernmental  organization  either.  On the
contrary, the governance of the Internet as it exists rejects the idea of intergovernmentalism. 
While many studies of Internet governance explain this institutional difference by the nature of the
technology itself (see for example Mathiason, 2008, p. 33), the analysis offered in this chapter tries
to  link  the  specific  institutional  history  of  Internet  governance  to  the  broader  history  of
telecommunications governance in a political economy perspective. The basic premise behind such
a perspective is that the use and the governance of a technology is shaped by a broader social and
historical  context  rather  than the other way around. Technological determinism might lead to a
certain neglect of history because of a focus on present and future governance. It has even been
used  in  some  cases  to  advocate  for  changes  in  the  institutions  based  on  technical  reasons.
Intergovernmentalism is allegedly bureaucratic and inefficient while privatized and technical forms
of governance are seen as efficient and responsive. On the contrary, a historical perspective on the
emergence of Internet governance as a political issue allows for a contextualisation of the issues at
stake, the positions of actors, and the origins of discourses. The chapter presents first the historical
context of telecommunication regulation as epitomising the changes in the global political economy
since the late 19th century. Then, it focuses on the emergence of a relatively autonomous field of
Internet governance in the last decades of the 20th century. This historical context is necessary to
understand  the  more  recent  developments  of  the  1990s  and  2000s  in  the  field  of  Internet
governance.
4.1. The history of telecommunication regulation
This  section  rejects  the  periodisation  used  by  many Internet  governance  studies  that  takes  the
invention  of  the  Internet  (or  its  popularization)  as  a  breaking  moment  in  the  history  of
telecommunications. For example, Mathiason (2008) divides the history of telecommunications into
two  periods  of  time:  before  the  Internet  and  after  the  Internet.  Drake  (2009)  identifies  three
“NetWorld  orders”  in  the  history  of  telecommunications  regulation.  While  there  are  strong
similarities  between  the  second  one  (1980-1995)  and  the  third  one,  especially  in  terms  of  the
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dominant ideology, Drake argues that the changes implied by the invention of the Internet justifies a
division between these two orders. Contrary to this technology-based classification, this section
calls upon a periodisation that is more common in International Political Economy and arguably
more adequate to analyse institutional change in telecommunication governance (Wilkin 2001; Lee
1996).  The section explores three different periods of time that are characterized by a particular set
of ideas, institutions and social forces (Cox 1981). The first period is the 19th Century liberalism
and internationalization that witnessed the creation of the ITU. The second period is the post-war
liberalism that has been conceptualized as “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982). This is a time of
intergovernmental cooperation in the form of intergovernmental organizations. The ITU remained at
the center of telecommunications regulations in spite of many technological “revolutions” such as
satellites. The last historical period is characterized by globalization and neoliberal regulation. Like
in other issue-areas, deregulation, privatization and liberalization affected telecommunications. It is
in this last period that the Internet was actually created and popularized. 
4.1.1. The origins of telecommunication regulation in the 19th century 
liberalism
The  liberal  internationalist  tradition  has  long  advocated  for  the  creation  and  empowerment  of
international institutions in order to allow the emergence of a peaceful and prosperous world (for an
overview, see Murphy, 1994). Liberal internationalists, despite their differences and the width of the
historical scope considered, have played the role of intellectual leaders in the foundation of a world
order  relying  upon  intergovernmental  organizations  (Murphy,  1994,  pp.  33-34).  According  to
Murphy, liberal international institutions have historically carried out two primary tasks, each one
linked with  either political or economic liberalism. The first task has been to foster industry. The
second  has  been  to  manage  potential  conflicts.  The  regulation  of  telecommunications  and  the
history  of  the  International  Telecommunications  Union  needs  to  be  analysed  according  to  this
framework.  Telecommunications  are  essential  to  the  creation  and  perpetuation  of  international
markets.  They  are  part  of  the  infrastructure  that  allow  what  has  been  described  as  the
internationalization or the globalization of the economy. But telecommunications have also been
subject to politicization because of the importance of the technological gap between developed and
developing countries.
The  International  Telegraph  Union  is  the  product  of  a  first  wave  of  institutionalization  of
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international  regulation in  several  realms of  the  international  political  economy before the first
World War. The ITU was the first among a number of Public International Unions built along liberal
institutionalist lines37.  This wave took place in a context of economic internationalization under
British leadership. The creation of the ITU in 1865 corresponds to the apogee of  Pax Britannica
(Cox, 1992), if we consider the British hegemony started to decline already in the 1870 (Lee, 1996).
The ITU mandate was clearly to foster industry by enabling international telecommunications. The
creation of the ITU fostered the creation of a pan-European telegraph network through the adoption
of the Morse code as an international standard for telegraph transmissions (Codding and Rutkowski,
1982).  Moreover,  it  also  offered  an  institutional  framework  to  resolve  future  issues  related  to
technological innovation in the telegraph system. The Paris Telegraph Convention provided that the
parties to the Convention would meet on a regular basis to keep up with technological change. In
1868, an International Bureau was established in Berne, giving the ITU the formal structure of a
modern intergovernmental organization. It also applied the liberal ideals with the establishment of
the “one state, one vote” principle that was going to become a basic rule of intergovernmentalism.
However,  the  ITU  was  loosely  integrated  with  the  technical  consultative  committees  being
independent from the secretariat and the plenipotentiary conference. The consultative committee on
telephony  had  even  its  own  secretariat.  The  only  links  between  the  Berne  Bureau  and  the
committees were the right for any member-state to participate in the work of the committees, and
publication by the secretariat of the committees' recommendations (Codding Jr 1991). 
The  ITU  originally  gathered  member-states  that  had  a  publicly-owned  telecommunication
infrastructure. This is why both Britain and the United States with their privately-owned networks
did not join the ITU. Britain attended the 1868 conference and accepted the final documents in the
name of British India. After nationalizing its own domestic telegraph network, Britain fully joined
the ITU at the following conference. Britain soon imposed a rule that allowed colonial powers to
vote  on  behalf  of  their  colonies  (Hills,  2002). The  US declined  to  join  until  1932.  From the
beginning, the US advocated for a full participation of private companies in ITU proceedings. These
efforts had some success since private companies were allowed to participate and advise, but not to
vote, on the revision of telegraph regulations from 1872 (Lee, 1996, pp. 61; International Telegraph
Conference, 1872). In telephony, however, the existence of private companies was more widespread
and the consultative committee on telephony was open to Recognized Private Operating Agencies
(RPOA) (Codding, 1991).
37 Public “International” Unions here mainly means “European” since the United States did not join many of these
unions and relied more on a hemispheric cooperation. However, given the extent of European imperialist rule, these
unions actually had a global reach despite their European origins.
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The record of the ITU in this first historical period according to its goal of fostering industry by
providing a telecommunication infrastructure to international markets was partially met. The ITU
was essential to the internationalization of markets within Europe (Murphy, 1994,  pp.  86-88) but
was  increasingly  undermined  by  nationalistic  and  imperialistic  behaviour  and  mercantilist
protectionism (Lee,  1996,  p.  59). The telegraph was together  with the transportation revolution
essential to the internationalization of the economy of the late 19th century but it was also a vector
of nationalism since it provided an 'efficient means of establishing central control and government'
(ITU centenary publication quoted in Codding and Rutkowski, 1982). Nationalism and imperialism
at the end of the Pax Britannica influenced the evolution of telecommunications regulation. The
ITU fostered the unification of a European telegraphic network but never managed to impose a
single fare for telegraphy, which was part of its initial mandate. Despite these shortcomings, the
number of member-states grew steadily until the first World War. In 1914, the ITU had 48 members
and the Radio-telegraph conferences 43.  
Hills  (2007,  pp.  10-15)  describes  five  models  of  national/international  telecommunications
regulation, three of which already existed before the second World War (see figure 4.1). The first
half of the 20th century witnesses a competition between these models, parallel to a competition
among powerful  countries that advocated for one or the other model.  First,  the European State
model was the one implemented by the International Telegraphic Union. National monopolies (Post
and Telecommunications administration, acting both as service providers and regulators) operate
within  their  national  borders  and international  traffic  goes  from a  national  terminal  to  another
national  terminal  before  its  internal  distribution.  Second,  the  end-to-end model  operates  across
borders  through  a  unique  operator's  network.  This  model  was  implemented  by  International
Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) company in the 1930s (Hills, 2007, p. 10)38. The British Empire also
followed this model, with a monopoly of Cable & Wireless Ltd from 1928 onwards39. The Western
Union Model is similar to the end-to-end model as far as international traffic operated by domestic
companies is concerned. On the other hand, foreign companies' traffic towards domestic market (in
this  case  US  market)  is  stopped  at  the  border.  Transatlantic  telegraph  networks  before  1939
followed this model40 which is a mix of protectionism of the American market and imposition of
38 ITT is a private  telecommunications company (now ITT Corporation) that acquired several telecommunications
firms abroad in the 1920s, notably in Puerto Rico, Cuba and Spain. The expansion of its network allowed ITT to
control the traffic from these countries to the end user in the US using their own lines. 
39 Cable & Wireless Ltd results from the merger of Eastern Telegraph Company and Marconi Wireless Telegraph 
Company.
40 In 1911 Western Union and AT&T refused to interconnect British transatlantic lines to the U.S domestic network. 
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free trade abroad. The evolution of institutions in the first half of the 20th century favoured both the
United States as a country and the end-to-end model, fostered by the participation of private actors
in the regulation of the sector at an international level.
Figure 4.2. Models of National/International Regulation, adapted from Hills (2007, p.11)41 
Before the second world war, telecommunications went through two major technical innovations
combined with the continuing decline of Britain and the rise of several powers. First, the telephone
was invented in the 1870s but was not widely used until the end of the first world war. It was then
incorporated into the technologies regulated by the ITU. However, the most important technological
change was the invention and diffusion of wireless telegraphy. Wireless telegraphy was all the more
important before the war since it allowed communications between ships and the land. Because of
the scepticism of national public monopolies, most of the development of radio was led by the
private sector. Thus, the importance of private actors such as Marconi, the Italian father of long-
distance radio transmission was acknowledged as early as in the first preliminary conference on
wireless telegraphy in 190342. One of the main purpose of this conference was to stop Marconi's
monopolistic practices. Indeed, the Marconi company refused the telecommunications between their
own equipments and other equipments (Codding, 1991). While the attempt was defeated by the
support of Britain and Italy to Marconi, the conference did succeed in the creation of an 'informal'
As a result, American companies could use the British network whereas British companies could not use the U.S 
network. (Hills 2002, 138-139; Hills 2007, 11-12) 
41 Hills describes five models, only the first three correspond to the early years of the ITU. Hills adds an 'Empire rules' 
model to describe American hegemony in telecommunications during Pax American, and a WTO model that 
entered into force with the WTO 1997 agreement on basic telecommunications.
42 The Italian delegation to the conference made reservations to the final protocol of the conference related to alredy
signed agreements with Marconi. See the Final Protocol of the Preliminary Conference on Wireless Telegraphy
(Berlin, 1903) avaliable at http://www.itu.int/en/history/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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organization  to  regulate  wireless  telecommunications  (Codding,  1991),  the  International  Radio-
telegraph Union (IRU). Wireless telecommunications became regulated separately from the wired
telegraph under the Radio-telegraph Convention. Unlike wired telegraphy that was regulated by a
convention  signed  by  states  that  had  monopoly  over  telecommunications,  the  radio-telegraph
convention was signed both by monopolist and non-monopolist states. If countries like the United
States  could  develop  a  wired  network  independently  from Europe,  radio-telegraphy  required  a
centralized allocation of frequencies (Hills, 2007,  p.  31). As a result, the United States as well as
Great Britain participated from the beginning to the regulation of wireless telecommunications43.
Radio frequencies were allocated according to the 'first come, first served' principle like Internet
domain were going to be allocated towards the end of the century. This minimal regulation is a way
to let the market decide rather than establishing a heavy regulation as it existed in the wired sector.
The Radio Regulations of 1927, outcome of a conference held in Washington, illustrate this attitude
towards regulation. The limited resource of radio frequencies would be best exploited if the users
were able to choose freely without much regulatory interference (Lee, 1996,  p.  62). Efficiency is
already associated with the market while unnecessary regulation is seen as an interference. A strong
participation  of  the  private  sector  within  advisory  committees  was  also  foreseen  (International
Radio-telegraph  Union,  1927,  art.  33). In  the  conference  itself,  the  participation  of  private
companies was already “impressive” (Anon., 1928, p. 76). These elements evidence the domination
of a competitive model of regulation, as advocated by the United States on the negotiations (Hills,
2007). The  United  States  had  been  proposing  a  merge  of  the  two  conventions  into  a  single
organization (for example with a proposal for a Universal Electrical Communications Union in the
early 1920s). Meanwhile, the ITU also evolved with a more important role given to expert technical
committees. Technical committees were not allowed to take full part to the negotiations of new
regulation but had an important advisory role. This dual nature of telecommunications regulation in
the early 20th century and the debates between intergovernmentally-regulated national monopolies
and internationally-regulated competitive markets is reminiscent of more recent debates on Internet
governance,  even  if  national  monopolies  have  disappeared  under  neoliberal  pressure  towards
liberalization and privatization. 
In 1932 at  the Madrid conference, the international telegraphic convention and the international
radio telegraphic convention merged. The cohabitation within the same institution of a 'continental
43 Great Britain had been reluctant to participate to an organization that threaten its position in the telecommunications 
sector as a country and through the Marconi company. However, the Titanic disaster of 1912 convinced the British 
government that the necessity of interoperability was more important for its economy than the narrow interests of 
Marconi patentees (Murphy, 1994, p. 88). 
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European' approach to telecommunication regulation, a British 'empire rule' and an American 'end-
to-end' approach gave the newly-born International Telecommunications Union44 a hybrid status.
With its origin in the  Pax Britannica period of liberal internationalism in Europe, the institution
kept elements such as the 'one state, one vote' principle and its headquarters in Europe. However,
the  increasingly  important  role  given to  the  private  sector,  expert  committees,  and  the  private
ownership of telecommunications networks gave the ITU the characteristics of a standard-setting
body for international markets. The division between states that had a monopolistic position on their
territories  over  telecommunications  services  and  states  that  had  a  privately-held,  competitive
telecommunications  sector  raised  issues  about  the  functioning  as  well  as  the  mandate  of  the
institution (Anon., 1932). The first  few years  of the new ITU were not impressive in  terms of
achievements since internationalism decreased in the 1930s and since governments had more urgent
issues to deal with than international telecommunications. 
It  is  during  the  second  World  War  that  the  shift  from  British  to  American  hegemony  in
telecommunications materialized. The United States had tried to open up the telecommunications of
the British Empire before the war without much success. It was only with the signature of the Lend-
Lease  that  the  US  was  in  position  to  impose  its  national  interest  in  the  telecommunications
regulations of the British empire (Hills, 2007, pp. 34-35). Great Britain was forced to abandon the
monopoly of Cable & Wireless Ltd. and to allow competition between radio companies on the same
routes. Without the benefits of a monopoly in the British empire, Great Britain was not in a position
any more to compete with the United States in the design of a new ITU after the war.
4.1.2. Post-war embedded liberalism and the evolution of the ITU
After the war, the ITU started its activities again, yet with some major changes. As Hills (2007) puts
it, the ITU was brought under US control. It became an important part of what has been described
as Pax Americana (Cox, 1992). As a symbol, the post-war conferences that revived the ITU were
held in Atlantic City, in the United States. Because of the war, the attitude of the United States
towards regulation had changed45. In 1943, a telecommunication act divided the international from
the national market. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had acquired a key role in
44 While the acronym of the organization is the same as the International Telegraphic Union (ITU, before 1932), the
change in the naming is important. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU, after 1932) has a mandate
that covers any type of telecommunications, wired and wireless. 
45 The role of the State and the military during the war, as well as the ambiguous attitude of firms like ITT towards
Nazi Germany explain this change. For example, the US army had the largest wire and radio system in the world.
Hills (2007) analyzes in depth these domestic changes in the U.S. 
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the regulation of the sector, and a state-to-state model prevailed as far as the international market
was concerned (Hills, 2007, pp. 36-39). The vision proposed by the US differed from 19th-century
liberalism. As Murphy (1994, p. 168) puts it, the United States like all capitalist states had embraced
some version of the Keynesian orthodoxy that  linked labour and capital at a national level  and
foresaw a greater role for the state. Intergovernmental organizations were seen as essential to this
liberal world order. The Europeans, sometimes reluctant to participate to these changes, were not
able to impose many concessions to the triumphant United States46. The new state-centred vision of
telecommunications  regulation  did  not  imply  an  exclusion  of  the  private  sector.
Telecommunications firms, especially from the US, were also present at the conference. However,
they were part of a member-state delegation, generally headed by a civil servant from a ministry of
PTT or a regulation agency such as the Federal Communications Commission in the US47. Whereas
private companies had had until then the right to have direct relationships with the Berne Bureau,
they were subordinated to governments in the renewed ITU (Hills, 2007,  p.  50). While the  most
common affiliation  amongst the  delegates  and  representatives  was  a  civil  administration  (PTT
ministries, public broadcasting and telecommunication companies, diplomats and MPs) accounting
for  57  per  cent  of  the  participants,  the  private  sector  still  represented  18  per  cent  of  the
participants48. 'Embedded liberalism' is also a form of liberalism that gives priority to the market,
but the market is embedded within a set of institutions that regulate it. The ITU was part of the
complex structure of the United Nations System that institutionalized the new liberal world order.
The ITU, both because of its inclusion within a broader set of intergovernmental organizations, and
because  of  its  new structure  represent  a  good example  of  the  institutions  that  characterize  the
'embedded liberalism' period (Ruggie, 1982). The new structure of the ITU was far more integrated
than the loose institution that it used to be. Four organs were created. The conference claimed that
the  ITU  was  a  technical  organization,  which  mandate  was  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of
telecommunications while preserving the sovereign autonomy of member-states to regulate them on
their  own territory (International Radio-telegraph Union, 1947, Preamble)49.  The Plenipotentiary
Conference became the supreme legislative organ where the 'one state, one vote' principle applied.
46 They could however keep the secretariat in Switzerland although the US government had planned to move it to
New York.
47 The list of participants and their institutional and country affiliations are available in the directory of the conference, 
available at http://www.itu.int/en/history/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
48 Ibid.
49 The technical  character  of the ITU has been used by delegates throughout the conference to  make some very
political points about the exclusion of Spain, the associate member status of countries like the Baltic countries and
the People's Republic of Mongolia or to rule out the two-third majority that existed in the United Nations (Summary
Records  of  the  Plenary  Meetings  of  the  Plenipotentiary  Conference,  Atlantic  City,  1947,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/en/history/, last accessed 8 April 2014).
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It met once in a decade until the 1960s and on a more frequent basis since then. The Administrative
Council is a more restrained body of 18 member-states that represented and continued the work of
the Plenipotentiary Conference between the conferences. While the Berne Bureau of the ITU had
strong links with the Swiss administration50, the new General Secretariat was an internationalized
body,  supposedly  more  independent  from  the  interest  of  a  single  member-state.  After  harsh
negotiations, the Secretariat was moved form Berne to Geneva. The already existing International
Consultative  Committees  (CCIs  to  use  the  common  French  acronym)  were  integrated  in  the
structure of the ITU. There was one for Radiography (CCIR), one for telephony (CCIF) and one for
wired telegraphy (CCIT) (International Radio-telegraph Union, 1947, art. 3). As 'technical' organs,
they were supposed to remain independent from the Plenipotentiary Conference and thus had their
own secretariat (International Radio-telegraph Union, 1947, art. 8). CCIs are the organs of the ITU
that  allowed participation  of  the  private  sector  since  personal  of  “recognized private  operating
agencies” could be members of the CCIs (International Radio-telegraph Union 1947, art. 8 §3).
Finally, a new organ was created: the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB). The IFRB
was  supposed  to  manage  the  radio  frequency  spectrum  according  to  purely  technical  criteria.
However, because of the reluctance of great powers to abide by IFRB rules, the “first come, first-
served” principle remained the basis of frequency allocation after the second world war  (Lee, 1996,
p. 72).  It is worth noting that the International Telecommunication Convention of 1947 excluded
part  of  the  business  of  private  operating  companies  from its  regulatory  mandate  (International
Radio-telegraph Union 1947, art. 40)51. This, in fact, meant that end-to-end networks operated by
private companies, most of them from the US, were not subject to ITU regulation (Hills, 2007, p.
62). 
With the institutionalization of telecommunications regulation around a single intergovernmental
organization, the post-war governance system was solid and could adapt some major technological
changes that had emerged during the war and developed in the following years. Indeed, the post-war
period was a turning point in the history of telecommunications with an exponential rise of the
telecommunications sector in the global political economy. Much of this expansion was linked to
military-industrial complexes in a context of cold war. The research on encryption that was essential
50 All Directors of the ITU until 1947 had been Swiss citizens.
51 Article 40 reads : “Members and Associate Members reserve for themselves, for the private operating agencies
recognized by them and for other agencies duly authorized to do so, the right to make special arrangements on
telecommunication matters which, do not concern Members and Associate Members in general. Such arrangements,
however, shall not be in conflict with the terms of this Convention or of the Regulations annexed thereto, so far as
concerns the harmful interference which their operation might be likely to cause to the radio services of other
countries”.  International  Telecommunication Convention, 1947, available at  www.itu.int/history,  last accessed  8
April 2014. 
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during  the  second world  war  continued  and led  to  swift  progress  in  computing.  Likewise,  the
military  expenditures  related to  rockets boosted  the  research  on launchers  and satellites,  which
became central to modern telecommunications. In the US, companies like ITT (Hills, 2007, pp. 54-
56) and  AT&T,  but  also  to  companies  involved  in  spacial  research  benefited  form the  public
investments of the beginning of the Cold War.  In Europe, most of these large companies were
publicly-owned  and  benefited  from  a  status  of  national  champions  in  the  competition  for
international market shares.    
While the ITU played an important role in the technical regulation of some of the most recent
technologies,  the  decolonisation  movement  created  another  major  issue  in  the  realm  of
telecommunications. In the 1960s, a growing number of developing countries had other concerns
about international telecommunications governance. The basic concern was that despite political
independence gained through the decolonization process, developing countries from the periphery
remained economically dependent of the centre. Questions of underdevelopment and equality were
highly political and differed from the technical aspect the negotiations on telecommunications had
taken within the ITU. As such, the claims by developing countries were not only a threat for the
position of rich countries but also a threat for the post-war liberal order as institutionalized in the
ITU. In the United Nations in general, claims of a New International Economic Order grew stronger
during the 1970s. In the more specific realm of telecommunications, developing countries tried to
impose  a  New  World  Information  and  Communication  Order  (NWICO)  on  the  agenda  of
international telecommunications regulation. The basic issue was the unequal flow of information
from  the  centre to  the  periphery.  The  means  as  well  as  the  content  of  information  and
communication were an instrument of domination of the periphery by the centre, especially the US.
While  the  bulk  of  the  struggle  for  a  NWICO  took  place  in  the  United  Nations  Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) that was seen by developing countries as a better
terrain  to  make  their  demands,  the  movement  affected  the  ITU.  The  debate  on  content  of
information and communication was limited in the ITU but the issue of equity in the regulation of
technical  means  of  telecommunications  was  raised.  The  first  outbreak  of  the  struggle  led  by
developing countries took place during the 1965 Plenipotentiary Conference. Taking advantage of
their numerical superiority, developing countries tried to expel Portugal and South Africa from the
ITU because of their political practices. They could use the precedent of the denial of the voting
right of Spain after the second world war. This first affirmation of their newly-acquired power led to
more  fundamental  demands. Lee  (1996,  p.  82),  points  out  three  main  demands  related  to  the
NWICO in the ITU in the early 1970s. First, developing countries claimed for an equitable access to
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the orbit-spectrum resource. Second, they advocated for an increased development assistance by the
ITU.  Finally,  they  demanded  an  increased  representation  of  low-income countries  in  decision-
making bodies. 
Orbit spectrum management was one of the first issue to be politicized by developing countries in
the realm of telecommunications regulations. The United States and the USSR, along with other
rich countries, were occupying the best portions of the orbit spectrum at the expense of developing
countries that did not have the material  resources to compete for them. As a result,  developing
countries started claiming for a more planned allocation of orbit-spectrum resources that allowed for
an equitable access to telecommunication resources. The 'first come, first served' principle that had
prevailed according to the liberal ideal of unhindered innovation was increasingly criticized, both
by developing countries and some developed countries such as France, Sweden and Canada.  As a
more technical aspect of the NWICO, this claim made its way to the World Administrative Radio
Conference  on  Maritime  Mobile  Telecommunications  (WARC-ST)  of  1971  (International
Telecommunications Union, 1971). To these allegedly technical claims, the ITU gave a technical
response. As a result, the share of the radio frequency spectrum allocated to space services was
increased in the benefit of latecomers. The WARC-ST also recognized the limited aspect of the
orbit-spectrum resource and denied to any country the privilege of priority of access. However, it
did  not  take  any action  to  tackle  the  inequity  problem.  A most  radical  attempt  by  developing
countries to claim their rights was the Bogotá declaration of 1976. The declaration, signed by eight
equatorial  countries,  aimed  at  the  recognition  of  their  sovereignty  over  the  segment  of  the
geostationary  orbit  that  corresponded  to  their  territories  (Equatorial  Countries,  1976). The
declaration met as little success in the ITU as in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (UNCUPOUS). It was ruled out by the ITU as being a legal and political issue
rather than a technical issue (International Telecommunication Union, 1977). Although the NWICO
movement failed to change the global regulation of orbit spectrum, it was seen as an increasing
politicization of  the  ITU and a  threat  to  dominant  interests  within  the  Union.  As  a  result,  the
rejection of these claims was an important step stone in the affirmation of the ITU as a technical
organization as defined by the most powerful actors. 
The second claim by low-income countries met much more success. The need for development
assistance  had been acknowledged by the institution since the 1952 Plenipotentiary Conference
(Codding, 1989). Programs existed, led by the Secretariat's technical cooperation department, with
funds coming from the UNEP and voluntary contributions by member-states (Lee, 1996,  p.  88).
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However,  the  assistance  activities  of  the  ITU  remained  very  limited.  The  issue  became  more
important as the number of developing countries in the ITU grew. The Plenipotentiary conference of
1965 established a special fund for technical cooperation (International Telecommunication Union,
1965).  However,  these  elements  clashed  with  the  dominant  vision  of  the  ITU  as  a  technical
coordination institution. In the NWICO context of the 1970s, low-income member states continued
to criticize this narrow vision of telecommunications regulation. The ITU recognized on various
occasions  during  the  1970s  that  underdevelopment  resulted  from  colonization  and  that
underdeveloped  countries  needed  assistance  (Codding,  1989).  In  the  1982  Plenipotentiary
conference, Algeria, the Maldives and Pakistan proposed to allocate 10 per cent of the ITU budget
to development issues. Although developing countries failed to pass the proposal because of the
strong opposition of rich countries, the idea of a development fund in the ITU budget began to make
its way. Ten years later, the Telecommunication Development Sector (ITU-D) was created.
The last claim is the now classical issue of participation. In 1974, developing countries comprised
about 74 per cent of the total ITU membership (Lee, 1996,  p.  90). Although the Plenipotentiary
Conferences abide by the 'one state, one vote' principle, equal participation was only a smokescreen.
As we have seen from the 1947 participation figures, the size of the delegations varied a lot from
one member state to the other. Of course, low-income countries faced much more difficult issues
regarding participation. Furthermore, participation does not necessarily mean active participation.
Non-material  resources  such  as  knowledge  of  the  English  or  French  languages  and  technical
expertise  were  even  tougher  obstacles  to  the  active  participation  of  developing  countries.  The
problem  was  even  worse  in  the  less  democratic  bodies  and  especially  in  the  CCIs,  where
transnational private interests were represented and active – unlike developing countries. Despite
continuing demands by developing countries, the only response was the openness of ITU organs,
which consistently with liberal thinking should have led to representation of a plurality of interests.
The ITU, from its creation to its relative politicization by the NWICO, has been at the centre of
telecommunications  regulation  despite  major  technological  changes.  Institutional  changes  have
been limited to reforms of the Union rather than the creation of competing institutions. However,
both the changes within the global political economy and the increasing importance of information
and  communication  technologies  in  the  development  of  capitalism offered  a  new  context  that
fostered  radical  institutional  change  during  the  emergence  of  Internet  governance.  While
technological determinism sees the information revolution as the main reason for the institutional
changes  that  occurred  in  telecommunications  governance  in  the  late  20th  century,  critical
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perspective  analyse  the  information  revolution  within  a  historical  trend  in  the  global  political
economy. The importance of the information revolution in contemporary capitalism must not be
underestimated. However, the global trend towards neoliberalism needs close attention to explain
the regulatory changes. 
4.1.3. The neoliberalization of telecommunications
As we have seen, research on coding and decoding during the second world war led to a rapid
progress  in  computing.  Computers  were not  intended to become means of  telecommunications.
Even the first research on networking were not trying to create a telecommunication network (Peter,
2004). However,  computer networking and data  exchange are key elements in the “information
revolution”  that  changed  the  international  regulation  of  telecommunications.  Simpson  (2004)
describes  thoroughly  the  rise  of  the  neoliberal  networking  drive  and  the  birth  of  a  “digital
capitalism”. Data communications were needed by big companies for applications such as real-time
transactions (for example airline ticketing), production scheduling and research and development.
Data communications were outside the national monopolies' domain (Drake et Wilson III, 2009, p.
17) and thus escaped their control. In the US, big companies like banks, insurance companies, retail
chains,  car  manufacturers  and  oil  companies  began  to  advocate  for  competition  and  private
networks in the Federal Communications Commission. They claimed that computers data network
were independent from the existing telecommunications networks and thus should not be regulated
in the same way. In fact, computers networks increased the use of the existing infrastructure and
competing  lines.  Big  business succeeded in changing what  was the  fundamental  feature  of  the
telecommunications regulation in the United States. Since these companies were transnational firms
and that firms in other countries saw the risk of a technological gap between them and the US
companies, the pressure for liberalization soon went global. These pressures echoed the global trend
towards neoliberalism. Harvey defines neoliberalism as:
“a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best 
be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework 
appropriate to such practices.” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2)
While neoliberalism was a massive ideological movement in every sphere of social life from the
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1970s and at least to the early 2000s, the link with information and communication technologies is
especially strong. Since every action is  integrated into the market,  every action needs to be an
informed decision based on a sufficient amount of information. Information and communication
technologies are needed to produce, store, transfer and analyse this amount of information (Harvey,
2005, p. 3).
The rise of neoliberalism originated in the crisis of the “embedded liberalism” world order, in which
the ITU played the most important role in the telecommunications sector. As we have seen in the
ITU, developing countries had begun to demand changes in the governance system. These demands
were even stronger in the United Nations with the call for a New International Economic Order. In
reaction to these demands, neoliberalism became a guide for political action  for powerful states,
based on four premises (Cerny, 2010). First, the economy must be more open, the flow of goods and
capital  must be free.  Second, the state  must adopt  a strict  financial  orthodoxy through an anti-
inflationary and deficit reduction policy. Third, it must transform itself to limit its interventionism
and turn into a competition and regulatory state. Finally, governance must be reinvented through the
inclusion of the private sector and non-state actors. Thus, Cerny (1990; 1997) describes a shift in
the functions of the state during this period from a welfare state to a competition state. Unlike the
welfare state that applied outcome-oriented policies, the competition state acts like a firm trying to
gain market  shares in  the world economy. One necessary way to achieve this  goal  is  to  create
markets where they did not previously exist. As a result, the function of the state changed from the
decommodification of economic and social sectors to the commodification of the state itself. In this
view, services such as telecommunications can not stay away from the market under the justification
of a greater public interest. They need to become competitive markets open to transnational capital,
which requires privatizations, liberalization, and deregulation of the telecommunications sector. 
Parallel  to  the  emergence  of  the  competition  state,  the  role  of  intergovernmental  organizations
changed. While the post-war multilateral organization was seen as a regulative institution for the
creation of an international market where states maintained autonomy in their internal matters, the
neoliberal intergovernmental organization foster neoliberal policies among its member states and
participate  to  the  creation  of  de-regulated,  competitive  markets  at  the  global  level.  Like  the
competition  state,  intergovernmental  organizations  have  become  transmissions  belts  for
neoliberalism. This conception of a changing role for intergovernmental organizations is based on a
broader  notion  of  international  organization  'as  a  historical  process  rather  than  a  given  set  of
institutions'  (Cox,  1979,  p.  374).  Neo-Gramscian  accounts  of  intergovernmental  organizations
117
propose an interesting framework to analyse changes over time in the relative influence of one or
the  other  institution,  or  the  changes  of  influence  within  an  institution.  The  first  intuition  of
neoliberal  governments  such  as  the  Reagan  administration  was  to  move  away  from
intergovernmental organizations, even from the International Monetary Fund. However, they soon
realized that some global governance was needed because international free trade requires some
global rules of the game (Harvey, 2005,  p.  80). As a result,  the panorama of intergovernmental
organizations changed drastically. The 'politicized' organizations that had been at the centre of the
struggle for a New International Economic Order were victims of the neoliberal moment. The US
and its closest allies withdrew from UNESCO, and cut their funding of the United Nations. On the
other hand, 'economic' institutions benefited from the changes. The Bretton Woods institutions and
the OECD became central to the diffusion of neoliberal practices. Given the neoliberal focus on
competitive markets and intellectual property rights, organizations such as the WIPO, the GATT and
later the WTO were strengthened by the neoliberal turn. This empowerment was accompanied by a
move towards construction of legal or constitutional devices to remove or insulate substantially the
new economic institutions from popular scrutiny or democratic accountability (Gill, 1992). In this
sense, international economic institutions are seen as part of a new constitutionalism that sets up a
market civilization (Gill, 1995). Finally, the 'technical' institutions were alternatively criticized and
used by dominant forces, depending on the perceived degree of politicization of the discussions and
the utility of the institution for market purposes. While the beginning of the neoliberal wave was
associated with the crisis of multilateralism (Cox, 1979; Murphy, 1994), the decade of the 1990s
marked  a  renewed  interest  in  intergovernmental  institutions  with  the  rise  of  the  discourse  on
globalization  and  global  governance.  In  the  global  governance  discourse,  intergovernmental
organisations  are  seen  as  key  actors  in  the  management  of  the  negative  externalities  of  the
globalisation process. The discourse on global governance is not necessarily in contradiction with
neoliberalism since it does not question the neoliberal character of globalisation. By stressing the
possibility  of  a  “sustainable”  capitalist  globalisation,  the discourse  on global  governance offers
“terrains of compromise” rather than an alternative. This is why it can be described as a hegemonic
discourse (Brand, 2005). In this view, intergovernmental organisations are necessary to the stability
of a neoliberal world order. 
Under  the  triple  activism  of  transnational  firms,  competitive  states  and  neoliberal  IGOs,  the
regulation of telecommunications changed drastically at the turn of the 21st century, providing a
particular context for the creation of a governance system for the Internet. 
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In the telecommunications sector, the outcome of neoliberal thinking comprises the privatization of
publicly-owned telecommunication companies, the liberalization of telephone and data markets, the
creation of new markets for long-distance and data communication, the deregulation and neoliberal
re-regulation  of  existing  markets,  the  shift  to  a  neoliberal  state  with  its  consequences  on  the
telecommunication ministries and regulation agencies,  and finally the transformation of existing
actors  and  the  emergence  of  new  actors  in  the  regulation  of  telecommunications,  including
transnational firms and intergovernmental 'economic' organizations. 
The neoliberal trend in telecommunications originates in the data networks. During the 1970s, data
telecommunications began to expand faster than voice (Hills, 2007, p. 94). Big users of data such as
the  Society  for  Worldwide  Interbank  Financial  Telecommunications  (SWIFT)  or  the  Société
Internationale des Télécommunications Aéronautique  (SITA) were allowed to operate their  own
private  networks.  Recommendation  D.6  of  the  ITU's  International  Telegraph  and  Telephone
Consultative Committee of 1984 represent a breach in the telecommunications monopolies:
“Recognizing the principle that (circuits and message) switching and transmission are
the exclusive function of Administrations, the establishment of a private leased circuit
network may be authorized to meet the specific technical and operational requirements
of  certain  customers,  if  requirements  cannot  be  met  by  the  public  network  or  by
specialized networks set up by Administrations.” (CCITT, 1984, § 6.1)
Similarly, in the US, a distinction was introduced by the 1980 Computer II decision between 'basic'
(i.e.  voice)  services  and  'enhanced'  (i.e.  data)  services  (Federal  Communications  Commission,
1980)52. The idea was that users of data  services could be gradually recognized as Recognized
Private Operating Agencies and thus meet the condition to escape ITU's regulation thanks to the
'special  arrangements'  clauses that had existed since 1947.  At the same time, several  countries
liberalized  their  telecommunications  market.  For  example,  Great  Britain  privatized  its  national
carrier in 1984 and opened the market  for competition.  The US and Japan also introduced and
reinforced  competition  in  their  domestic  market.  Through  the  data  networks  regulations,  these
countries tried to impose liberalization to the rest of the world.  The combined efforts to globally
liberalize telecommunications did not prove really efficient in the 1980s with only nine countries
following  the  trend  (Schiller,  1999,  p.  44). The  global  move  towards  neoliberalism  was
accompanied by international organizations rather than neoliberal states.
52 For a legal account on the FCC Computer decisions and their consequences see Cannon (2002).
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The ITU changed during the 1980s and 1990s.  Similarly to when it embraced the post-war  Pax
Americana model, the ITU transformed  again  to become an important element of the neoliberal
world order. According to Lee (1996), the ITU fulfilled five functions within the new world order.
First, it embodied the material, ideological and institutional forces of particular historic blocs, first
the  post-war  embedded  liberalism,  then  neoliberalism.  Second,  the  ITU  embodied  rules  that
facilitated the expansion of hegemony. Third, the ITU ideologically legitimated the norms of the
hegemonic world order thanks to its aura of 'technical' institution. Fourth, the ITU co-opted the
elites from peripheral member-states to prevent the formation of counter-hegemonic forces. Finally,
the ITU absorbed counter-hegemonic ideas such as the NWICO movement. 
The transformation of the ITU was not immediate and undisputed. At the beginning of the 1980s,
the US almost withdrew from the ITU because of its technical assistance programs that were seen as
similar to the work of other UN specialized agencies (and thus not 'technical') (Murphy, 1994,  p.
258)53. But soon, the ITU promoted policies that were more compatible with neoliberal ideas with
relative success. In 1988, the International Telecommunications Regulations of the ITU opened the
way to competition in long-distance communications54. However, because of the concerns about the
interoperability of private networks using proprietary standards raised notably by Nordic countries,
the neoliberal end-to-end model was not endorsed by the ITU. The state-to-state model – despite the
recognition  of  private  networks  and  the  sovereign  right  of  member  states  to  regulate
telecommunications on their  own territories – was reaffirmed.  The GATT, the World Bank,  the
OECD,  the EU and the WTO took the leading roles in the neoliberalization of telecommunications
(see below). The ITU was rather a follower and it is only in the 1990s that it fully embraced the
neoliberal ideology. At the end of the 1980s, the secretary general of the ITU appointed a group of
experts to write a report on the restructuring of the ITU. The expert group published a report in
1989  that  was  very  critical  of  public  telecommunication  operators  and  of  the  involvement  of
governments in the regulation of telecommunications (Hansen, 1989). This report was put on the
agenda of  the 1989 Niza Plenipotentiary Conference,  which also witnessed the appointment  of
Pekke Tarjanne, that had led the privatization and liberalization of the Finnish telecommunications
sector, as ITU new secretary general (Anon., 1989). Together with an important ideological change
towards  neoliberalism,  the  ITU  also  went  through  an  institutional  restructuring.  The  ITU  was
divided in the three sectors that still exist within the institution. The ITU-R sector is responsible for
53 The threat of a U.S withdrawal from the ITU came just after the first plenipotentiary conference was organized in a
developing country in Nairobi in 1982. Since the 1970's,  developing countries represented the majority of the
member states.
54  See, ITU (1988) “International Telecommunications Regulations”, available at http://www.itu.int/publ/T-REG/en,
last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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the  radio-communication  sector  and  replaces  the  CCIR  and  the  IFRB.  The  ITU-D  sector  is
responsible for development policies and is a concession made to the developing countries. The
ITU-T  is  the  standardization  body  both  in  wireless  and  wired  communication  technologies.
Consistent  with  neoliberal  restructuring  elsewhere,  the  role  of  the  secretary  general  was
strengthened and he was to be supported by a Strategic Policy and Planning Unit and a Business
Advisory  Forum that  represented  the  interests  of  the  private  sector  at  the  highest  level  of  the
institution.  Each  sector  had  its  own  plenipotentiary  conference  to  avoid  the  huge  'politicized'
plenipotentiaries of the 1970's and 1980's. The restructuring also  enhanced the partnership with the
World Bank (Hills, 2007, p. 126). 
While  the ITU followed the general neoliberal  trend, it  did not assume the leading role  in the
worldwide movement of liberalisation,  privatisation and deregulation of the telecommunications
sector. Intergovernmental organisations that were not active in the telecommunications sector took
the initiative to promote neoliberal reforms. The British case became an example for international
liberalisers.  British Telecom was a  bureaucracy and became in  1982 a  private  company55.  The
privatisation was also accompanied by the creation of a regulator in the telecommunications sector
that was independent from the government. Soon after, the World Bank published its first report on
telecommunications  and  development  to  promote  the  British  model  (Saunders  et  al.,  1983).
However,  the  Bank expertise  led to  the  creation of  private  monopolies  rather  than competitive
markets. Thus, the state-to-state system survived the campaign (Hills, 2007, p. 174). Liberalization
and the creation of competitive markets stemmed more from regional institutions in the North.
Already in 1987, at a time when most of the telecommunication regulation still took place within a
state-to-state system, the European Commission published a Green Paper on the development of a
common market  for telecommunications (European Commission,  1987).  The paper stressed the
'inevitable  trend' towards restructuring of the telecommunications sector.  It placed the European
Commission in a position to advocate for liberalization of the telecommunications sector at  the
occasion of the creation of the single market in 1992. In 1994, the European commission agreed to
liberalize the telecommunications market by 1998. In other regions, the pressure of the US for a
liberalization of telecommunications sectors proved successful. When the NAFTA came into force,
the telecommunications sector was explicitly included (NAFTA, 1994, chap. 13). The OECD was
also a  forum where  neoliberal  policies  in  the  telecommunications  sector  were  promoted  but  it
lacked  the  power  to  implement  its  ideas.  An  important  role  in  the  neoliberalization  of
55 Hills (2007, 158-159) describes he privatization of British Telecom as a 'socialized' privatization since shares were 
offered at a discounted price to the general public with some advantages in order to get consent from the population 
and weaken unions' opposition. According to Hills, this practice is equivalent to 'mass bribery'. 
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telecommunications has been played by the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the World
Trade  Organisation.  After  more  than  a  decade  of  lobbying  efforts  by transnational  service
companies for the introduction of service in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, a group
for Negotiations on Services was created during the Uruguay Round, starting in 1986 (Drake and
Nicolaidis, 1992). The idea was to write a legally-binding telecommunication annex to the GATS.
The  first  draft,  presented  in  October  1989  envisaged  the  liberalization  of  telecommunications
markets (Hills, 2007, p. 186). The provisions of the document went clearly in opposition to the ITU
rules with the authorization of private end-to-end networks, proprietary standards and a limitation of
state  sovereignty  in  telecommunications  matters.  Under  pressure  from the  EU  and  developing
countries, the draft annex was limited to 'enhanced' services. The final document adopted in 1994
recognized the role of the ITU in regulation and did not replace its practices by new policies (Hills,
2007, p. 195). However, as we have seen, the ITU had changed by that time and was more eager to
implement  neoliberal  policies.  The  newly-created  World  Trade  Organisation  then  started  to
negotiate on basic telecommunications, a sector that had been excluded from liberalisation until that
date. In 1997, the Basic Agreement on Telecommunications was the first sectoral agreement under
the  General  Agreement  on  Trade  in  Service.  Telecommunications  that  once  were  regulated  by
“cooperatives arrangements” became a globally traded service (Guermazi, 2009). The role of the
state changed and market-led governance became the rule (Humphreys and Simpson, 2008). Basic
telecommunications  became  part  of  the  mandate  of  the  GATS  together  with  enhanced
telecommunications. A framework was given for further unilateral  liberalization that could then
become legally-binding and subject to the WTO dispute settlement procedures. This is under this
new regime that most of the liberalizations took place.
Figure 4.6. Commitments to liberalization under WTO regime (1996-2012)
The end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, when the Internet became global, were the
years  of  major  liberalization  and  privatization  of  telecommunications  on  a  global  scale.  The
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involvement  of  'economic'  intergovernmental  organization  in  the  regulation  of  the
telecommunication sector illustrates the changing role of telecommunications in a 'post-industrial'
society (Bell, 1976). The globalised service sector was perceived as the major source of growth for
the following decades. Telecommunications were central to the development of a service-oriented
global political economy (Mansell and Raboy, 2011). First, telecommunications had become a key
product  both  in  services  and  in  production  of  telecommunications  goods.  Second,
telecommunications are essential to the development of the financial sector, which relies on the
rapid transmission of data. Third, telecommunications are at the heart of the revolution in military
affairs and the security sector. As such, the stakes for a regulation favouring growth and profits and
the status quo in terms of dominant interests, have grown higher during the second half the 20th
century. The Internet, which had first developed as a by-product of the computer scientists' efforts to
build computer networks, changed to become the “backbone” of the telecommunications sector.   
4.2. The genesis of the field of Internet governance
If we rule out technological determinism as an explanation of the institutional changes brought
about by Internet governance issues, two other frequent explanations are the material domination of
the US and the ideological domination of neoliberalism. While both are historically true, none of
them seems to be sufficient.  American hegemony and the supposed distrust  of the US towards
intergovernmentalism is  questioned by the history  of  the ITU. As Lee (1996)  argues,  after  the
politicization of the ITU in the 1960s and 1970s, the Union had returned to its “technical” role,
consistent with both US and neoliberal interests. In the 1990s, the ITU transformed itself in an
organization convinced by neoliberal premises and working in cooperation with the World Bank and
the WTO. Thus, when Lee wrote her analysis, the ITU was back at the heart of the institutional
framework of the US-dominated neoliberal world order. There was no reason, neither for the US,
nor for neoliberal capitalist interests, to bypass the ITU and to create new institutions. I argue here
that  the  explanation  of  these  institutional  changes  are  to  be  found  in  the  creation  of  a  new
transnational  policy  field,  strongly  related  but  yet  relatively  autonomous  from  the  traditional
telecommunications  field.  New actors  and new ideologies  that  were  not  equally present  in  the
telecommunications field had an impact on institutional changes.
4.2.1. Origins of Internet governance in computer science
The Internet can be technically defined as a computer network based on the Transmission Control
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Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol suite. As such, the Internet is the direct successor of
the ARPANET, a network financed by the US Department of Defence and created in the 1970s. This
explains why most histories of the Internet are US-centric (Ceruzzi, 2003; Ceruzzi, 2012; to a lesser
extent  Abbate,  1999).  While  the  influence  of  US engineers  and  the  US government  has  been
essential to the development of the Internet, the focus on the US is not without consequence on the
conceptualization of the governance of the network. The governance of the Internet, perceived as a
US technology, has been considered as a US domestic issue. The 'internationalization' of both the
technology and its governance is thus described as a second phase, stressing the importance of the
distinction between the national and the international. Despite the involvement of US actors, it is
worth taking a transnational look at the history of the Internet. The ARPANET was indeed funded
by the  US Department  of  Defence,  but  network  engineers  had  enough  autonomy to  build  the
network  they  wanted  (Townes,  2012).  The  role  of  European  engineers  has  long  been
underestimated. The network was in fact transnational almost from the start. In contrast with the
dominant American Internet history, Townes shows that already in 1972, foreign engineers were
invited  to  a  demonstration  of  ARPANET and  an  'International  Network  Working  Group'  was
created. Moreover, the first non-US connection to ARPANET was created in 1973, only 5 years
after the launch of the project and 4 years after the first nodes were created in the US (Townes,
2012).  The  social  space  where  different  visions  and  strategies  competed  to  acquire  scientific
authority can be described as a scientific field (Bourdieu, 1975; Bourdieu, 1976). 
When computing developed in the 1950s, computers were very expensive and enormous machines
used  at  the  same  time  by  several  users.  The  first  method  of  sharing  the  resource  was  batch
processing, which meant taking the tasks one after the other. Abbate (1999,  p.  24) describes the
arduous process:
“In the typical programming cycle, the user of a batch processing computer would
begin by writing out a program on paper. Then the user or a keypunch operator would
punch holes in a set of computer cards to represent the written instructions. The user
would bring the deck of punched cards to the computer center,  where an operator
would feed them into a punched-card reader and transfer the data to magnetic tape.
When the computer became available, the operator would load the tape and run its
batch of programs, and eventually he or she would return a printout of the results to
the various programmers. If a user's program turned out to have errors, the user would
have to rewrite it,  punch another set of cards, and submit the cards again, perhaps
waiting hours for a chance to return the program and collect the results. Often users
had to repeat this cycle numerous times before a program would work correctly.”
Progress in the sharing of computer resources was urgent. Time sharing made the situation for users
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much better. Instead of running an entire program after the other, time-sharing computers would
treat data from various terminals at the same time, devoting a fraction of second to each program.
Thus, response from the computer was almost immediate and the resource much better exploited.
Terminals could be in the same building as the main computers but they could also communicate
with the computer through a modem and a telephone line (Abbate, 1999, 25). Packet switching
came as an improvement of the communication between host computers and terminals. Donald W.
Davies,  a  computing  researcher  at  the  British  National  Physical  Laboratory  (NPL),  proposed
dividing the messages into standard-size packets travelling through a network of nodes from the
terminal to the host computer. Packet switching was a way to reduce the costs of communication
and improve the quality of message transmission (Abbate, 1999,  pp.  26-27). It was much more
efficient than other data transmission models that required extensive use of telephone lines or even
dedicated leased lines. In the late 1960s,  the NPL built a packet switching network that would
become a model for other attempts such as ARPANET. Around the same time, Paul Baran and Larry
Roberts in the US were also working on 'distributed network' to transmit information along different
routes to make networks more resilient, and on the splitting of information into pieces. In the 1960s,
the computer science community was beginning to gather around the Advanced Research Projects
Agency of the US Department of Defence that had the much-appreciated advantage of a very rapid
and generous policy regarding the allocation of their important funding. Through personal networks
and scientific conferences, the persons and institutions that were going to participate into ARPA
computer network were selected by their peers (Hafner, 1998; Abbate, 1999, p.  56).  In 1968, the
ARPANET was theoretically designed but the researchers still needed a machine capable of serving
as Interface Message Processor, an essential part of the network. While several manufacturers were
proposed, a small consulting firm Bolt Beranek and Newmann (BBN) was chosen by Larry Roberts,
then head of the networking project. The choice of the company over much larger manufacturer like
IBM or already functioning machines such as the ones developed by DEC and Honeywell can also
been  explained  by  the  scientific  nature  of  the  field  where  academic  credentials  and  personal
networks are capitals that are more valued than pure material capabilities. BBN was part of the
personal network of the research team, and scientific dialogue already existed between the team and
BBN  researchers  like  Robert  Kahn.  Most  of  the  staff  of  BBN  were  former  or  active  faculty
members of Harvard and MIT (Robert Kahn, quoted in Abbate, 1999, p. 57). Without the capacity
of actually  building the Interface  Message Processor,  BBN would then use  its  strong ties with
Honeywell  to  sub-contract  the  hardware manufacturing.  In  1969,  the ARPANET was launched,
connecting  several  computer  science  centres  throughout  the  US and using  packet-switching  to
transmit data. The ARPANET became the largest computer network in the world but an important
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step was still to be taken. Several networks existed and used different protocols. The challenge was
to find a way to make these different networks communicate to create an Internet. During the 1970s,
computer scientists tried to integrate existing networks through the standardization of the packet-
switching protocols. The field was informally institutionalized around the Network Working Group
convened by Roberts to work on host protocols. 
Despite the origins of the funding, the Network Working Group and its collaborators functioned in a
relative autonomy from the Department of Defence. The management of the group served as a link
but also as a filter between researchers and the Department of Defence. As Townes (2012) shows,
some of the elements of the research were kept outside of the reports to the funding authorities.  For
example, the transnational spread of the network was constantly minimized in order to stay within
the  scope of  the military mandate.  The British  and Norwegian nodes  of  the  network were not
represented in one of the most reproduced map of the ARPANET published in 1985 and a footnote
explained that  experimental  satellite  connections  were  not  shown on the  map (Townes,  2012).
Interestingly, in a period marked by the controversies on the US intervention in Vietnam, the debate
was absent from the discussions of the computer science field (Abbate, 1999). This tends to show
that  the  military  applications  of  the  research  were  not  salient  in  the  minds of  the  researchers.
Tensions within the field were rather related to the status of the research, with the division between
engineering and fundamental research being reproduced in the field. The engineers at BBN had a
difficult  relationship with the theoretical scientists  at  UCLA and Network Analysis Corporation
(Abbate,  1999).  These  tensions were managed,  like in  most  academic environments,  through a
culture of debates and open dialogue within informal environments. Instead of a top-down rule-
making process, the field adopted the practice of the Request For Comments (RFC) in 1969. The
name suggest the idea of a work-in-progress rather than an authoritative rule. The RFC 3 summarize
the philosophy behind RFC as as a “hope to promote the exchange and discussion of considerably
less than authoritative ideas” (Crocker, 1969a, RFC 3). However, as essential elements of the social
struggle of the field, the RFCs were clearly a form of legitimizing certain ideas while rejecting
others.
“Documents proposed to be RFCs are reviewed by the RFC Editor and  possibly by
other reviewers he selects. The result of the review may be to suggest to the author
some improvements to the document before publication. […] In some cases it may be
determined that the submitted document is not appropriate material to be published as
an RFC. In some cases it may be necessary to include in the document a statement
based on the reviews about the ideas in the document. This may be done in the case
that  the  document  suggests  relevant  but  inappropriate  or  unsafe  ideas,  and  other
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situations. The RFC Editor may make minor changes to the document, especially in
the areas of style and format, but on some occasions also to the text.”. (Postel  and
Reynolds, 1997, RFC 2223)
RFCs became an institutionalized way to exercise some form of censorship of heterodox ideas,
which is one of the most profound domination practice of the scientific field (Bourdieu, 1976,  p.
100)  Against this background, the 15 most prolific RFC authors accounted for 23 per cent of the
RFC production from 1969 to 199756. This is a share similar to the 20 per cent produced by the 665
authors of a single RFC in the same period57. It also comes as no surprise that the RFC editor, Jon
Postel from UCLA, himself author of almost 6 per cent of the RFCs from 1969 to 199758, became a
key actor  of  Internet  governance  debate  in  the  following  years,  even  when the  scientific  field
collided with much broader political economic interests.  
Figure 4.7. Pioneers: Postel, Crocker and Cerf use zucchini, tin cans and drawings to represent the
primitive Net they helped create,  Newsweek, August, 8, 199459. 
56 The 15 most prolific authors were respectively J. Postel, M. Rose, A. McKenzie, J. Reynolds, K. McCloghrie, S.
Crocker, R. Braden, D. Crocker, V. Cerf, Y. Rekhter, G. Malkin, A. Bhushan, E. Harslem, W. Simspon, and D.
Walden. The percentage is calculated from a directory of RFCs by author created by Graphcomp in 1997, available
at http://graphcomp.com/info/rfc/rfc_stat.html, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 The three computer  scientists  have  reportedly spent  8  hours  preparing  the photo that  was shot  for  Newsweek
magazine  at  the  occasion  of  the  25th  anniversary  of  the  ARPANET  and  in  a  period  of  rapid  growth  and
commercialization of the Internet. See http://www.refondation.org/blog/1247/jon-postel, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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The scientific field model tends to make power relations less visible  and the image of relaxed,
informal and consensual discussions that is often presented does not correspond to the stakes raised
by the millions of dollars of research funding and sub-contracting that were available for computer
scientists. The struggle for scientific capital have also been harsh since computer networking was at
the edge of computer science during these years and was also recognized beyond specialized circles.
The comments following the sudden death of Jon Postel in 1998 demonstrate the position acquired
in the field by the main holders of scientific capital  (Cerf, 1998, RFC 2468). 
As the following network visualization shows (figure 4.8), most of the institutions that were central
to the structuration of the field were academic networks or universities. The universities play a dual
role of cultural capital providers and institutionalization of the relations of power within the field.
The role of former graduates students at UCLA or the MIT is central to the governance of the field.
Moreover,  some universities  became the  nodes  of  the  ARPANET,  giving  their  researchers  and
students a research object to compete for scientific capital. On the contrary, private companies, with
the important exception of Bolt, Beranek and Newmann were not as involved in the research as they
were going to be in the following years. The more practically-oriented research conducted by the
R&D departments did not have the same prestige as the research conducted at universities. While
providing most  of the funding,  the ARPA and its  specialized Information Processes Techniques
Office (IPTO) did not employ directly a majority of researchers. Its role was more directed towards
coordination  and  subcontracting  to  universities.  The  creation  of  an  International  Networking
Working Group (INWG) in 1972 is essential to understand the transnational character of the field60.
The  INWG  was  created  at  the  occasion  of  an  academic  conference  and  became  a  Technical
Committee  of  the  International  Federation  of  Information  Processing  (IFIP),  a  scientific
organization that had been established under the auspices of the UNESCO in 1960. One of the
concerns behind the creation of the International Working Group was the possibility to influence
international standards on internetworking. Through the IFIP, the researchers gained access to the
ISO and to the CCITT of the ITU (McKenzie, 2011). 
60 One of the member of this group published an account of the role of the INWG in the creation of the Internet,
available  at  http://alexmckenzie.weebly.com/inwg-and-the-conception-of-the-internet-an-eyewitness-account.html,
last accessed 8 April 2014.
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Figure 4.8. The network of actors and institutions of the early computer internetworking research
field (1970s)6162
The network representing the affiliation of computer networking scientists (see fig. 4.8) provides
evidence of the central role of the International Networking Group (INWG) and of the NetWorking
Group (NWG). Elite universities of the US were the main institutions involved in the computer
networking field (especially UCLA, Stanford and the MIT). The link with the military-industrial
61 This affiliation network draws upon data on individuals and insitutions involved in the development of the Internet.
Sources of  secondary literature include Abbate 1999; Townes 2012;  Mueller  2002; Hafner 1998 and Norberg,
O’Neill, and Freedman (1996). Primary sources include accounts by the actors of the period (McKenzie 2011),
(Stewart  2000);  oral  histories  collected  by  the  Computer  History  Museum  available  at
http://www.computerhistory.org/collections/oralhistories/, last accessed 8 April 2014; and Crocker (1969), RFC 3,
Rulifson (1969), RFC 5 and Crocker (1969b), RFC 24). A total number of 69 individuals are considered important
actors of the field in the 1970s.
62 In this representation of the networks, nodes represent individuals and institutions, their size corresponds to their
eigenvector centrality in the network (The centrality of a node is proportional to the centrality of the nodes to which
it is adjacent). While centrality needs to be used with caution in affiliation networks, it is useful here to show the
centrality of both actors and institutions, taking into account the size of the institution (Faust 1997). 
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complex is evidenced by the relatively important position of Bolt, Beranek and Newman. While the
transnational scope of the field appears in the network visualisation, the differentiated positions of
US scientists with respect to European scientists are shown by the relatively marginal position of
European actors within the network in terms of location (position in the network) and in terms of
centrality (node size). The transnational perspective on the history of Internet governance requires
an acknowledgement of the crucial role of US national capital in the field's genealogy. The network
also highlights the key position of some individuals such as Vinton Cerf, whose key role in Internet
governance has continued until now; Robert Kahn, often referred to as one of the “fathers” of the
Internet;  and  BBN's  Alex  McKenzie.  The  dominant  actors  in  the  scientific  field  of  computer
networking became later key actors in the autonomisation of Internet governance from the field of
telecommunication regulation. Moreover,  various informal networks and  institutions such as the
Request for Comments  were created in the 1970s within a scientific field. While the networks of
actors and structures of the field evolved in the 1980s, they kept the model of a scientific field,
organized around universities and research centres. It is only in the early 1990s that the situation
was going to change with the commercialization and the popularization of the Internet.
4.2.2. Competing logics between fields
Unlike traditional national fields as studied by Bourdieu (1991; 1998; 2000a), the autonomisation of
the  field  of  Internet  governance  does  not  come from a  historical  process  of  specialization  and
complexification that provide the field with a distinct logic and a relative autonomy. The emergence
of a field usually corresponds to the gradual differentiation and autonomisation of a specific space
of social interactions (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 265). Computer science had become a scientific field on
its own long before the researches on internetworking. What was at stake was rather the ability of
the field to maintain its independence when it converged with the field of telecommunications. The
issue  of  convergence  is  thus  not  only  a  technical  issue  related  to  the  convergence  of
telecommunications towards Internet-based telecommunications (telephony, broadcasting etc.), it is
also  a  convergence  of  social  and  political  universes.  Since  computer  communications  used
traditional telephone lines, convergence was inevitable. When electronic mail was introduced on the
ARPANET,  the  network  that  had  been  designed  for  resource-sharing  became  an  actual
communication  network.  Soon,  the  e-mail  became  by  far  the  most  important  activity  on  the
network. However,  the  emerging field of  Internet  governance  was not  swallowed by the  much
bigger field of telecommunications.  Internet  governance is marked by its origins in the field of
computer science and, as Townes argues, reflects the traditional norms of academia (Townes, 2012,
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p. 22).  As  such,  it  was  originally  different  from  the  regulation  of  other  means  of
telecommunications. 
However, Internet is no longer regulated by scientists and scientific prestige is not the main capital
around which the struggles are structured. Internet started as a scientific experiment but was then
commercialized as a revolutionary mean of telecommunication. One of the decisive moments for
the evolution of the field is arguably the choice of the networking standards during the 1970s. If the
Internet is technically defined as a network using the TCP/IP protocol suite, it is because TCP/IP is
the 'winning' set of standards for internetworking. In the 1970s, it was only one form among other
of data transmission between computers. Thus, there is a need for an explanation of how the TCP/IP
standard became dominant. Internetworking was about allowing networks to communicate, using
the same language. Standards selection was the first political economic issue of Internet prehistory.
Elite scientists and technicians from the computer science field were able to impose the standards
they had created, and therefore did not abide by the norm that dominated the telecommunication
field.
In 1977, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) developed by Vinton Cerf and Robert  Kahn
became functional. One year later, Xerox engineers added the Internet Protocol (IP) for message
routing purposes. TCP/IP was used to connect the ARPANET to a satellite-based network called
SATNET. Internetworking proved effective. However, TCP/IP was not the only standard developed
to interconnect networks. It was not even the unique protocol used in the ARPANET until 1982
(Townes,  2012).  Several  proprietary  standards  existed.  IBM  developed  a  System  Network
Architecture  in  1974;  Xerox proposed the  Xerox Network Services  and the  Digital  Equipment
Corporation came out with the Digital Network Architecture (Abbate, 1999,  p.  149). Proprietary
standards were problematic since they worked only with hardware developed by the company. Only
IBM seemed to be in a position to impose its proprietary standards because of its position in the
market. Telecommunications companies saw the threat of a domination over data communication by
IBM and its proprietary standard. They lobbied in the ITU and the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) for the creation of international public standards. This is how the prominent
competitor of TCP/IP emerged: ITU's X.2563. The difference between TCP/IP and X.25 is part of the
historical  struggle  in  telecommunications  regulation  between  end-to-end  private  networks  and
63 The ISO developed a standard for interconnection that was meant to deal with the threat of incompatible proprietary
standards: The Open Systems Interconnection. Many countries adopted the standard and both X.25 and TCP/IP
claimed to fit in OSI. However, because of the relatively instable field of computer technology, the standard remain
very general and incomplete. By 1992, OSI was "clearly dead" (Salus 1995,  226 quoted Townes 2012) .
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national monopolies. 
TCP/IP relies  on the idea that the users' computer take the primary responsibility for maintaining
reliable connections. That meant that the network in itself did not need to be as reliable as telephone
networks since the error checking was made by end users' computers. As advocated among others
by Pouzin, the network functions were reduced to a minimum (Abbate 1999, p. 125). This concern
stems from the  unreliable  packet  switching radio network that  Kahn wanted to  connect  to  the
ARPANET. TCP had the capacity to provide error-free connection form host to host through an
unreliable  network and by checking for errors and re-sending the packets that contained errors.
However, the problem of interconnection with non-TCP networks remained. That was the role of IP,
a  simple  protocol  that  could  be  used  on  gateways  that  connected  different  networks.  Hence,
gateways did not need to do any re-routing, their role was limited to the transfer from one network
to another, with the end computers doing the routing job. Because of military funding, the TCP/IP
protocol suite was presented in terms of military usefulness. However, both Abbate and Townes
argue that the protocol suite reflected the ideas and interests of the transnational community of
researcher far more than any military or economic interest (Abbate 1999,  p.  150; Townes, 2012).
Consciously or not, these interests of the computer scientists were in line with those of computer
firms and opposed to public and private telecommunications firms. Telecommunications firms had
been  trying  to  provide  the  most  reliable  networks  for  technologically  simple  terminals  like
telephones. TCP/IP reversed the vision of the network by relying on sophisticated terminals like
computers and diminishing the importance of the quality of the network. Computer terminals were
the part of the network that was controlled by scientists. Network connections such as telephone
lines were controlled by telecommunication operators. 
ITU X.25 standard remained in the logic of the field of international telecommunications, where
data  communications  were  perceived  as  an  extension  of  telephony.  In  the  early  1970s,  most
telecommunications firms from developed countries were planning to build large data networks on
national  territories  and  to  connect  them  internationally.  They  turned  to  ITU's  Consultative
Committee on Telegraph and Telephony to develop a common standard. The X.2564 was rapidly
created in order to be approved by the CCITT 1976 plenipotentiary conference. X.25 foresaw a
much more important role to the network than TCP/IP. X.25 networks could be accessed through
relatively simple terminals because the routing was made by the network's nodes65. For this reason,
64 X is the letter of the data communication protocols in the ITU.
65 The most famous X.25 network was the French Minitel, shut down in 2012, which provides an interesting example 
of a simple terminal (leased by France Telecom) connected to a centrally-monitored network. 
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the network had to be reliable. Several data networks used X.25 in the following year for network
communications and internetworking. The move was successful since the hardware manufacturers
and even IBM started to incorporate X.25 in their software (Abbate, 1999,  p.  154). However, the
'Internet community' that had developed the TCP/IP protocol suite, backed by the US government
were harsh critics of X.25. While TCP/IP and X.25 were not technically incompatible, the vision of
a data network they represented was completely different.   
TCP/IP allowed for a more diverse Internet, connecting different private and public networks, while
X.25 was intended to be a universally-shared standard. In a context of liberalization in the 1970s in
the US and 1980s in Great Britain, TCP/IP had the advantage to be able to connect competing
networks. X.25 was designed for highly reliable monopolistic networks. As we have seen in the
previous section, the general trend was towards liberalization and diversification of the networks.
Moreover,  Internet  governance issues  escaped the  traditional  telecommunications field.  It  stood
between the field of computing and the field of telecommunications and was soon to emerge as a
relatively  autonomous  transnational  field  (see  below).  Computer  manufacturers  and  computer
scientists  were  important  actors  in  the  debates  and  were  clearly  opposed  to  the
ITU/telecommunication approach. Finally, the US supported TCP/IP as a US and publicly-funded
technology that also had military purposes. Against this background, X.25 could not become the
dominant standard in data communication and networks converged towards TCP/IP and ARPANET
in the following years.
Table 4. 1. Internet Precursor, Associated and Similar Networks, 1969–89 (adapted from Townes
2012, 14.
Network Protocol Funded by Use Year Begun
NPLNET packet-switching UK research before 1969
ARPANET TCP/IP US research, govt 1969
CYCLADES packet-switching France research early 1970s
SATNET TCP/IP US research 1975
USENET UUCP users public 1979
EUNET X.25, later TCP/IP users (Europe) academic mid-1980s
ACSNET UUCP Australia academic 1980s?
SPEARNET X.25 Australia academic 1980s?
CSNET TCP/IP, X.25 NSF (US) academic early 1980s
BITNET IBM protocol users academic 1981
FIDONET Fido protocols users public 1984
EARN UUCP users (Europe) academic, research 1984
JUNET UUCP corporations (Japan) academic 1984
NSFNET TCP/IP NSF (US) academic 1986
NORDUNet X.25, also TCP/IP Nordic countries academic 1986
UUNET UUCP commercial commercial 1987
WIDE TCP/IP Japan academic, research 1988
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The victory of TCP/IP over X.25 is important in the definition of the rules of the game in Internet
governance.  Rather  than  a  network  heavily  controlled  by  telecommunications  companies,  the
network relied on the ability of computers hardware and software to manage the connection. This
element  gave  computer  scientists  and  computer  manufacturers  a  central  position  in  the  field.
Although the logic of a telecommunication network took over the Internet, the scientific elite was
able to impose its position on a crucial issue. The choice was made through a campaign by scientists
to de-legitimise the X.25 based on scientific arguments (see for example Padlipsky, 1982, RFC 874
and its mix of academic and informal style). The strong ties of the scientific field (through previous
funding and subcontracting relations) between the scientific field and the US government provided
the TCP/IP with a strong ally when it came to international definition of standards. However, it is
the transnational scientific elite as a whole that advocated for the TCP/IP against X.25. Some of the
most vocal critics of the X.25 were the members of the French research team led by Louis Pouzin
(Abbate, 1999). 
While networks converged towards what was becoming 'the' Internet, the use of the network and the
applications  changed.  First,  the  Internet  did  not  become a  resource-sharing  network  to  use  the
power of computers remotely. Rather, the calculation capacities of computers grew exponentially
and most of the work could be carried out at a local level. Use of the Internet diversified since the
early days of ARPANET. The File Transfer Protocol was developed in 1972 and one year later it
was beginning to be used to send e-mails. E-mails became rapidly the most successful application
of the Internet. Although e-mailing already existed in time-sharing computers, the possibility to use
it  on  a  transnational  network  made  it  an  indispensable  tool.  E-mail  was  the  application  that
transformed a computer network into a telecommunication network (Abbate, 1999,  p.  111). After
these breakthroughs, applications did not develop as fast as the network and Internet remained a
text-based interface with few applications. The situation did not change drastically until the 1990s.
In the early 1990s, services like Gopher and Wide-Area Information Server (WAIS) started organize
the information available on the network but there was no single program to connect to the different
services and use the different applications available to the user (Ceruzzi, 2003). The real change
came with the invention of the World Wide Web by Tim Berners-Lee and his team at the CERN.
The revolution of the Web was to organize information through hypertext and to add multimedia to
the text-based experience of early users (Berners-Lee and Fischetti, 2008). The Web allowed new
services to be developed and paved the way to the massive popularization of the Internet.  The
CERN team started distributing the Web software through the Internet in 1991. Two years later, a
134
US researcher team developed the first web browser called Mosaic. Acknowledging the business
potential  of web browser,  this team soon left  the research to work on a commercial  version of
Mosaic called Netscape. With the development of Personal Computers, search engines and other
software, the Web became popular beyond the tech-savvy Internet community. In the mid-1990s,
the  regulation  of  the  Internet  became  an  issue  of  global  political  economy,  different  from
telecommunications regulation and outside the specialized field of computer science.    
4.2.3. The structure of the field in the mid-1990's
As we have seen, the Internet was at first a research network. Even if it was funded by the US
Department of Defence, academics were increasingly autonomous in the daily management of the
network. During the 1980s, the number of civilian users connected to the ARPANET increased and
the military users moved to their own network (Abbate, 1999, p. 183). This is why the focus on the
military aspects of Internet history is not sufficient. The rise of civilian Internet was fostered by the
creation of a research network funded by the US National Science Foundation (NSF). After some
discussion, including around the choice of a protocol, CSNET became operational in 1982 and was
a university network based on the TCP/IP protocol and connected to the ARPANET. The network
was supported by the ARPANET elite. CSNET became the heart of Internet growth. Contrary to the
ARPANET,  the  conditions  to  connect  to  the  network  were  relatively  non-restrictive,  even  if
commercial use was prohibited. Already in 1983, the Department of Defence split the ARPANET
into the MILNET, dedicated to military activities, and the civilian ARPANET (Abbate, 1999,  p.
185). During the 1980s, the NSF took the lead and built a large high-speed national network that
would serve as backbone for dozens of regional networks. However, the regional networks were
created but were still connected through the ARPANET.  At the end of the 1980s, the NSFNET
replaced the ageing ARPANET as the Internet backbone. The transfer occurred between 1988 and
1989. On 28 February 1990, the ARPANET (to which were connected all the networks that built the
Internet) was officially dismantled.   
During the “academic” period of Internet governance and until 1992, commercial use of the public
infrastructure – the NFSNET backbone – was prohibited. However, commercial activities started in
1988  when  Vinton  Cerf  convinced  the  government  to  provide  MCI  with  limited  access  for
“experimental use” of commercial e-mail services (Shah and Kesan, 2007). Towards the end of the
1980s and the beginning of the  1990s, the privatization of the backbone was demanded by many
actors. Consistently with the structural trend of the period, privatisation was the dominant proposal
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and alternative plans were hardly considered (Kahin, 1990, RFC 1192). 
A first step towards privatisation was the creation of Advanced Network Services (ANS), a not-for-
profit corporation created by MCI and IBM. ANS became the subcontractor of NSF that managed
the backbone. Later, ANS created a for-profit subsidiary to offer commercial services on the same
infrastructure as the NSFNET (Abbate 1999, 196). The monopoly situation of ANS in commercial
services drew much criticism and lead to Congressional hearings that recommended the competitive
privatization of the Internet backbone in order to offer opportunities to other commercial services
(Shah et  Kesan, 2007). Parallel  to the public backbone, a number of privately-held commercial
networks existed operated  by telecommunications carriers.  The dominant  idea was to  hand the
backbone over to these companies (Abbate, 1999, p. 198). 
In 1992, commercial use was allowed under certain conditions and the plan for privatization and the
management of the backbone through multiple  commercial  backbone providers was envisioned.
Finally, in 1995, the transition was effective and the NSFNET was retired. The Internet did not rely
any more on a backbone network such as the ARPANET or the NSFNET. Multiple commercial
backbone  providers constituted  a  market-operated network.  Consistent  with  the  privatization  of
telecommunications network in many pioneering countries in the 1980s, the Internet was a loosely-
regulated private network. The operators of the new Internet backbone were telecommunications
companies such as Sprint and AT&T. Internet governance was not subject to computer scientists
regulation any more but emerged as a relatively autonomous sub-field of the telecommunications
field, just when the latter became one of the most important aspect of the global political economy.
As long as the regulation of the network was embedded in the field of computer science, economic
and political stakes were low and actors struggle for forms of capital typical of the academia such as
academic prestige and research funding. Democratic procedures and representation issues were not
at the heart of the debates.  Peer-reviewing and consensus-based decision making were the main
regulation practices. Institutions created within the scientific field of computer networking such as
the Internet Engineering TaskForce have often been taken as an example of Internet's consensus-
based  decision  making (Froomkin,  2003).  However,  this  type  of  functioning  does  not  exclude
domination. Mueller (2002) speaks about an ARPANET elite of the most senior networking experts
that continued to manage the network as it was growing beyond academia.
The first institutionalisation of Internet governance took place within the field of computer science.
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US computer scientists dominated the field and the institutionalisation, while transnational in scope,
occurred in the US. First, an Internet Activities Board (IAB) was created in 1983. The IAB was a
board of 10 persons, each supervising a task force. The chair appointed the board member and Vint
Cerf served as a chair during the first 8 years of the IAB. Jon Postel had a specific role in the early
regulation of the Internet since he was the “de facto  Internet standard process” (Mueller, 2002).
With  the  Internet  growing  and  the  NSF  taking  more  responsibility  in  the  management  of  the
network, one of the original task force supervised by the IAB took more importance and began to be
open to participation. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) began to meet publicly in 198666.
The  IETF  was  a  loosely-institutionalized  organization  without  formal  membership,  organized
around  mailing  list  and  functioning  according  to  rough  consensus.  Informal  rules  (including
dressing code), openness, the non-proprietary nature of the standards contributed to the vision of the
IETF  as  a  model  of  non-hierarchical  decision-making  (Froomkin  2003)67.  However,  the  IETF
remained under the supervision of the IAB controlled by the ARPANET elite (Mueller 2002). In the
1980's, the scientific field maintained the same logic of functioning that it had in the 1970's despite
some  evolution  in  the  positions  of  agents  in  the  field.  Institutions  were  funded  by  various
departments and agencies of the US government, establishing strong links between the scientific
field  and  a  national  field  of  power.  In  1988,  the  Internet  Assigned  Numbers  Authority  was
mentioned for the first time (Internet Architecture Board, 1988, RFC 1083). Jon Postel  was the
person  acting  as  the  IANA.  As  such,  he  was  in  charge  of  domain  names  and  IP addresses
assignment functions. According to the ARPANET elite, his authority stemmed from the legitimacy
of the IAB (Malkin,  Marine,  and Reynolds,  1991, RFC 1207).  The standard-setting institutions
gained access to the ITU during the neoliberal turn in the Union. Anthony Rutkowski, a US adviser
to  ITU's  secretary  general  Tarjanne  was  appointed  to  the  IAB to  serve  as  a  transmission  belt
between the computer science field and its open and flexible nature and the telecommunication
world (Mueller, 2002). Finally, in 1992, the creation of the Internet Society organized the various
institutions of Internet governance. The Internet Society (ISOC) was to head the IAB, the IETF and
the Internet Research Task Force,  to provide a legal umbrella to the participants to the various
activities  of  the  technical  community;  and  to  provide  the  institutions  with  reliable  funding.
Rutkowski became ISOC's first chair. Rutkowski's appointment, as well as the tensions around the
role of the institutions at the beginning of the 1990s and the privatization efforts of the NSF, show
the transition from a scientific field to an emerging field, strongly related to the telecommunications
field. 
66 See http://www.ietf.org/meeting/past.html, last accessed 8 April 2014.
67 One striking example of the return of hierarchies on an allegedly non-hierachical insititions is the June 1992 IAB's
decision to implement an OSI protocol against the recommendation of the IETF (Mueller 2002).
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The regulation issues at the beginning of the 1990s were also changing, reflecting the shift from
academic struggles to the constitution of an autonomous sub-field of the global political economy.
With the Internet becoming an important telecommunications network as well as a booming market,
the issue of domain names became crucial. Domain names were originally created to facilitate the
technical operation of the Internet. As the Request for Comments that created the Domain Names
System states: 
“As applications grow to span multiple hosts,  then networks, and finally internets,
these  applications  must  also  span  multiple  administrative  boundaries  and  related
methods of operation (protocols,  data formats,  etc.).  The number of resources (for
example mailboxes), the number of locations for resources, and the diversity of such
an  environment  cause  formidable  problems  when  we  wish  to  create  consistent
methods for referencing particular resources that are similar but scattered throughout
the environment.” (Mockapetris, 1983, RFC 882) 
The different labels of domain names were not supposed to have any particular meaning other than 
technical. They were used to translate an easily readable string of letters into an IP address.  For
example,  the  DNS  can  resolve  the  address  www.google.com into  an  IP  number  such  as
64.233.191.255. What was only intended to be easy for human beings began to become valuable.
With  the  growing  commercial  use  of  the  Internet,  trademark  owners  claimed their  intellectual
property, not only on their brands and products names but also on similar names. The domain names
thus acquired economic value and generated intellectual property conflicts. Hence, the major issue
around which the structuration of the field crystallized was the allocation of domain names. The
system that had prevailed in the computer science field could no longer work in such a competitive
and economically-valued sector. The issue of who is in charge of the domain names echoes the
broader issue of Internet governance. The debates about domain names triggered struggles of how
Internet should be regulated and by whom. The emerging field of Internet governance still had to
decide the way it was going to be institutionalized in order to define the arena in which struggles
were going to take place and the rules of the game that were going to structure the field. 
The actors that participated in the debates of the mid 1990s were not only the computer scientists
and  network  engineers  that  had  regulated  the  Internet  so  far.  The  US  government  obviously
remained in an important position during the debates. However, the responsibility shifted from the
NSF and defence  research  agency to the  Department  of  Commerce.  The change  illustrates  the
continuing conversion  of  the  US state  into a  neoliberal  competition  state.  The US government
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helped to create a market for domain names rather than keeping the Internet out of the market for
research purposes. 
Figure  4.9.  Separated  fields  of  early  Internet  governance  and  international  telecommunications
before the commercialization of the Internet
While Internet governance became a sub-field of international telecommunications, it acquired its
own  logic  and  maintained  a  certain  autonomy  in  relation  to  the  field  of  telecommunications.
Despite its embededness in the field of international telecommunications, Internet governance as a
sub-field has “its own logic, its rules and its specific regularities” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p.
79). The fundamental struggle at stake in the field was the definition of a governance system for the
Internet. Many agents struggled to impose their vision to the field. Computer scientists managed to
translate the scientific capital (prestige and scientific legitimacy) and the social capital (networks of
people in the industry and in the US government) acquired in the scientific field to be able to play a
crucial role in the emerging field of Internet governance. It is because of its specific history of the
field and the powerful scientists that the field of Internet governance differs in terms of logics and
rules of the game from the broader  field of international telecommunications.  In this  particular
context, scientists participating to the debates organised through mailing lists and elite experts were
in a position to struggle for the definition of the Internet governance system on an equal footing
with powerful government representatives, intergovernmental organizations and transnational firms.
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Figure 4.10.  Emergence of  a  new sub-field in  the  international  telecommunications  field  (mid-
1990s)
A great variety of actors were involved in the emergence of a new field of Internet governance. The
traditional actors of the telecommunications field were directly affected by the decisions made on
Internet  governance,  the  most  promising  business  sector  of  telecommunications  in  the  1990s.
Telecommunications  firms  (some  of  them  already  privatized,  some  of  them  as  public
administrations)  tried  to  defend  the  model  prevailing  in  telecommunications  governance  which
granted them with important power. Intergovernmental organizations, both technical (the ITU and
the ISO) and economic (WTO, OECD,  WIPO) were also involved in the field's struggles of the
1990s. Similar to the scientific elite, computer manufacturers and early Internet-oriented businesses
used  the  sub-field  of  the  Internet  to  gain  access  to  the  telecommunications  field.  Powerful
government and their communication administration were also part of the key players of the field
(among others the US and the FCC, the European Commission and the DG of Information and
Communication Technologies). As the Internet was perceived as an extension of existing markets,
transnational  firms organized  around the  defence  of  intellectual  property and their  associations
entered the field of Internet governance. As a result of technological convergence, content producers
such as entertainment companies were already deeply involved in the field of telecommunications
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governance. Finally, individuals and organizations from the public (users of the Internet and more
generally  civil  society  actors)  got  involved  at  a  very  early  stage.  Interestingly,  because  of  the
scientific and academic origins of the field, academics of other disciplines (especially lawyers) were
easily integrated in the emerging field (see chapter 6).      
The emerging field was institutionalised with the creation of the ICANN in 1998 (see chapter 5).
Institutionalisation  is  a  process  of  elite  coordination  and  is  an  essential  part  in  the  process  of
imposing hegemony in a field. The emergence of a new transnational field of Internet governance,
different in terms of actors and stakes from the computer science field that had regulated the early
Internet led to institutional change. This change cannot be explained only by the structural dynamic
of neoliberalization at work in the broader field of telecommunications. It cannot be explain by the
sole field-specific characteristics either. Institutional change, that led to the creation of the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), is best explained by the parallel dynamics
of  a  changing  context  in  the  broad  field  of  telecommunications  and  the  emergence  of  an
autonomous sub-field of Internet governance, deeply marked by its origins in the field of computer
science in terms of ideology and actors.
Conclusions
The institutions of Internet governance created in the 1990s stem from two different dynamics. The
first one is the more structural trend in the global political economy towards neoliberalization. This
dynamic transformed the field of telecommunications through the privatization of public service
providers, the liberalization and deregulation of existing markets and through the creation of new
markets. Because of this trend, new actors, such as the 'economic' intergovernmental organizations,
entered  the  field.  The  historical  actors  were  transformed  by  the  neoliberalization  of
telecommunications. States became competition states and commercialized what had been public
administrations, and gave away their regulatory power to independent regulation agencies. On the
contrary,  private  carriers  were  reinforced  by  the  neoliberal  moment.  Finally,  the  International
Telecommunication  Union,  that  has  been  the  keystone  of  international  regulation  of
telecommunications since the late  19th century,  transformed into a neoliberal intergovernmental
organization  fostering privatizations and market  creations.  The second dynamic  took place at  a
much more micro level. A part of the scientific field concerned with computer networking started
organizing their field through institutions such as networks and informal standard-setting bodies.
When the Internet was commercialized in the early 1990s, some of the elite computer scientists
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were able to exchange the scientific capital acquired in their field into a political power to influence
the debates of the emerging field of Internet governance, which became an autonomous sub-field of
the international telecommunications field.
Thus,  the  three  main  explanations  of  institutional  change  in  Internet  governance  do  not  seem
sufficient to explain the nature of the change. The creation of the ICANN is not only a consequence
of  the  decentralized  nature  of  the  network  and  the  technical  impossibility  of  a  central
intergovernmental regulation. It is not a unilateral decision by the US government to take advantage
of  its  power  over  the  Internet  either.  Finally,  it  is  not  the  simple  application  of  the  neoliberal
ideology to the realm of Internet governance. The fact that Internet governance in the late 1990s had
some characteristics of a scientific field while responding to a neoliberal logic of regulation gave
birth to innovative institutions. The ICANN epitomizes this institutional change with its private not-
for-profit  nature,  the  role  of  computer  scientists  and  its  market-enabling  mechanisms.  This
perspective on the emergence of the transnational field of Internet governance allows us to analyse
institutional change both at the structural level of the meta-field and at the micro-level of the field.
It  avoids  the  pitfalls  of  technological  determinism and structural  determinism and  provides  an
alternative to conventional explanations of the history of Internet governance. 
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Chap. 5. The Emergence of a Transnational Power Elite of 
Internet Governance
While the previous chapter has focused on the emergence of Internet governance as a relatively
autonomous transnational field, the present chapter explores the emergence of a transnational power
elite  within the field.  This perspective draws on two arguments.  First,  Internet  governance  was
discussed  at  an  elite-level  in  the  1990s  and  the  debates  excluded non-elite  actors  through  the
marginalisation  of  some  discourses  and  some  institutions.  Second,  contrary  to  the  pluralist
perspective that became dominant in Internet governance studies, the different elites within the field
were not competing. Their practices during the 1990s fulfilled the two criteria that define a power
elite in Wright Mills' theory: they were ideologically coherent and institutionally interchangeable. 
This perspective contrasts with the dominant multistakeholder mythology of Internet governance
studies. For  example,  Mueller  (2002) analyses  the  process  as  a  competition  between  different
stakeholders  groups. According to Mueller, there were eleven stakeholders in Internet governance
that  participated  in  the  debate  of  the  1990s:  the  US government,  Network  Solutions  Inc.,  the
“technical  community”,  research  and  education  networking  organizations,  trademark  and
intellectual property interests, large telecommunication and e-commerce corporations, prospective
market entrants, local and regional Internet services providers, country-code registries, civil society
and civil liberties organizations, and international organizations and national governments (Mueller,
2002; table 8.1). All of them had clear and expressed interests. The creation of a new governance
regime resulted from the debate between these stakeholders. 
Although  the  history  of  Internet  governance  evidences  the  power  differentials  among
“stakeholders”, most authors still rely on the misleading concept of multistakeholderism to describe
Internet governance (Mathiason, 2008). This chapter argues that the debates on Internet governance
in the 1990s are better described as the process of unification of different specialized elites to form a
transnational  power elite  of Internet governance.  Since the responsibility over the network was
unclear in the mid-1990s, several groups of actors issued documents that proposed new governance
models. Most of these documents were publicly commented upon and debated. Different views of
what Internet governance should be underpinned the debate. Some perspectives were in a dominant
position and were represented in the most influential documents, while others were marginalized.
The first section explores the consensus-building process that can be found in the policy documents
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and analyses multistakeholderism, Internet exceptionalism and technical regulation as the base of
elite  consensus as well  as the hegemonic discourse of Internet governance.  The second section
describes the institutional circulation of the elite and stresses the existence of individuals affiliated
to several organisations at the same time (multiple-hat phenomenon) among the key players of the
debates. The analysis is carried out thanks to social network analysis and prosopographic elements.  
5.1. Elite ideological cohesion
The competing discourses on Internet governance stemmed from very different actors who did not
have the same institutional position. However, like Wright Mills' specialized elites, the authors of
the discourses had some legitimacy in their own domain and benefited from powerful positions
within  their  institutional  hierarchies68. The “technical community”  of  computer  scientists  had
controlled and regulated the Internet for many years, and they claimed to have the right to continue
to do so. As we have seen in the previous chapter, they had organised a governance system of their
scientific field around a series of institutions. The authors of the policy documents appeared at the
top of the organizational charts of organizations such as the Internet Architecture Board, the Internet
Society  and the  Internet  Engineering  Task Force.  They were  often affiliated  with  top-level  US
universities. The Clinton administration had the state legitimacy to rule over what was seen by
many as an American network.  Intergovernmental organizations had also some legitimacy since the
Internet was part of a telecommunication system that had been historically regulated by the
International Telecommunications Union. The  ITU  as  well  as  the  World  Intellectual  Property
organisation were key institutions in fields closely related to Internet governance. The whole debate
was open and many commentators claimed their legitimacy as representatives of the “Internet
community.” The Internet was only beginning to become a political issue. There was no pre-existing
model for its governance and it was possible for almost each of these elite groups to influence the
institutionalisation of Internet governance.
5.1.1 The policy documents of the Internet governance debate of the 
1990s
During the debates on Internet governance, several successive documents suggested different
models of governance. Each of the documents listed below was a possible basis for the creation of a
governance model because of the institutional status of the authors and because of the inclusion in
68 In Bourdieusian terms, specialised elites' members held different forms of capital acquired in their “home” field, as 
described in the previous chapter for the case of the scientific-technical elite. 
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the documents of most of the features of a governance system. Documents that were describing a
governance system with the creation of institutions and the specifications of a market for domain
names are not included in the list. For example, the declaration on e-commerce made by diverse
corporate and US governmental  interests are not included (Clinton & Gore,  1996),  ICC 1998).
Documents that were not backed by the important institutions of the field are not described either
(Boston Working Group, 1998; Open Root Server Confederation, 1998)  69. The list of documents
that are analysed in this section is consistent with  what is generally analysed by the  literature on
Internet governance debates in the 1990s (especially, Mueller 2002)70.
69 These advocacy groups were created in the last years of the politicisation of Internet governance and were not in a 
structural position to impose their views. 
70 It should be noted that the present study insists on the process of redaction of the documents and takes into account 
drafts and comments, which is not always the case in the literature. Moreover, the authorship of the documents is 
not analysed in terms of stakeholders but rather in terms of coalitions of specialised elites. 
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Table 5.1. Overview of policy documents, comments and modifications from 1996 to 1998
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➢ Draft Postel
The first document, the Draft Postel, was a document produced by Jon Postel (who had been in
charge of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority71) and other Internet Engineering Taskforce
members on the basis of a technical and political discussion where cyber-libertarian elements were
included. The legitimacy of the document to propose a new governance system stemmed from the
fact that the IANA had been in charge of the allocation of domain names and thus claimed the right
to continue to do so under new circumstances. Domain Names policies were to be controlled by the
scientific/technical organization created in the scientific field and before the commercialization of
the  network.  Other  aspects  were  intended  to  be  “determined,  and  coordinated,  by  contractual
agreements between private interests” (Postel 1996: Abstract). The main objectives of the document
were to allow open competition in domain name registration and to provide a legal and financial
umbrella to the IANA in its activities related to domain names policies since “the net becomes
larger  and  more  commercial”  (Postel  1996:  §1.5.3).  The document also stressed the idea of
competition and introduced the statement which claimed that open and free-market competition had
proven itself in other related services (Postel, 1996: 1.5.2). Furthermore, it stated that domain names
were not supposed to reflect trademarks and that the trademark problem had no solution, which
prompted many reactions.
➢ GTLD-MoU
A few months later, the generic Top-Level Domains Memory of Understanding (gTLD-MoU) was
drafted by the International Ad Hoc Committee, whose creation was recommended in the Draft
Postel. However, it was not only a technical committee as described by the Draft Postel, since it
included representatives from various intergovernmental organizations, the National Science
Foundation, and trademark interests, as well as intellectual property lawyers. The language was
different from the Draft Postel:
”The Internet top level domain space is a public resource and is subject to the
public trust.  Therefore any administration, use and/or evolution of the Internet
TLD space is a public policy issue and should be carried out in an open and
public manner in the interests and service of the public. Appropriately, related
public policy needs to openly balance and represent the interests of the current
and future stakeholders in the Internet name space.” (IAHC 1997)
The  IAHC  proposed  a  non-  regulatory  policy  framework  in  the  form  of  a  Memorandum  of
71 See chapter 4.
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Understanding  (MoU)  signed  by  both  the  public  and  private  sector.  The  International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) was to be the depository for the gTLD-MoU and to publish the list
of  signatories.  Trademarks  were  strongly  protected  with  a  60-day  publication  period  of  any
application for a domain name prior to its inclusion in the database. This period would have left
trademark  owners  with  a  lot  of  time  to  investigate  possible  trademark  infringement.  This
internationalized  governance  system  was  the  first  attempt  to  introduce  a  multistakeholder
governance system for the Internet. The gTLD-MoU also relied on a global public good discourse
and stressed the importance of intergovernmental organizations. This policy document, emanating
from  technical/scientific  elite  as  well  as  from  the  historical  regulatory  institution  of
telecommunications and strongly influenced by the corporate elite of trademark holders was about
to be implemented in the late 1990s. However, small Internet entrepreneurs and cyber-libertarians,
backed by the US government  criticized the proposal for not taking into account their  interests
(Mueller 2002).    
➢ White Paper
In parallel to the gTLD-MoU process, the White Paper on Internet Governance was drafted by the
US Department of Commerce after a process of consultations and negotiations. It had also benefited
from the previous work and collaboration of some of the authors of the previous documents. It took
into account the criticisms raised at the gTLD-MoU and proposed a competitive market for Internet
domains. This market was to be regulated by private bodies rather than public organizations: 
“The US. Government is committed to a transition that will allow the private
sector to take leadership for DNS management. Most commentators shared this
goal. While international organizations may provide specific expertise or act as
advisers  to  the  new corporation,  the  US.  continues  to  believe,  as  do  most
commentators,  that  neither  national  governments  acting  as  sovereigns  nor
intergovernmental  organizations  acting  as  representatives  of  governments
should participate in management of Internet names and addresses.” (NTIA,
1998)
The  US  government  claimed  its  control  over  Internet  governance  through  the  contract  it  had
established with NSI for domain names registration. It thus intended to hand over this control under
some conditions:
“In withdrawing the US. Government from DNS management and promoting
the establishment of a new, non-governmental entity to manage Internet names
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and addresses, a key US. Government objective has been to ensure that the
increasingly global Internet user community has a voice in decisions affecting
the Internet's technical management.” (NTIA 1998)
The White paper only dictates a number of conditions under which the private sector was to create a
new institution. It is more a set of policy guidelines than a comprehensive institutional framework
proposal. However, the requirements are precise and not neutral. They address the same issues as
the other documents and favour some types of solutions. The White Paper is thus a crucial element
of the debate. 
➢ ICANN by-laws and Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Commerce
Finally, the ICANN by-laws  and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) are the documents that
actually created the institution. They were drafted by a group of individuals, including Jon Postel,
the leader of the technical community that was organized around the Internet Society and the
Internet Engineering Taskforce, employees of Network Solutions Inc., the company that had the
monopoly on Internet registration, and two lawyers. They proposed the creation of a new
corporation that followed the rules established by the White Paper on Internet Governance. This
document represents the views of what Mueller (2002) called the “dominant coalition”.  As
described in the following section, these documents evidence an evolution of the governance system
towards  a  consensual  institutionalisation,  accepted  by  distinct  elite  groups.  In  this  sense,  these
documents were instrumental in the unification of  a power elite as described by  Charles Wright
Mills (2000). The proposed institution was a not-for-profit corporation acting under a Memorandum
of Understanding with the US Department  of  Commerce.  Its  mandate was the collaboration in
domain names policies, including trademark issues, the creation of new top-level domain names and
the promotion of competition in domain names registration: 
“in  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  Internet  is  an  international  network  of
networks,  owned  by  no  single  nation,  individual  or  organization,  the
Corporation shall, except as limited by Article 5 hereof, pursue the charitable
and public purposes of lessening the burdens of government and promoting the
global  public  interest  in  the  operational  stability  of  the  Internet  by
(i) coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to
maintain universal connectivity on the Internet; (ii) performing and overseeing
functions related to  the coordination of the Internet Protocol  ("IP") address
space; (iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of
the  Internet  domain  name  system  ("DNS"),  including  the  development  of
policies for determining the circumstances under which new top-level domains
are  added  to  the  DNS  root  system;  (iv)  overseeing  operation  of  the
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authoritative Internet DNS root server system; and (v) engaging in any other
related lawful activity in furtherance of items (i) through (iv).” (ICANN, 1998)
The articles of incorporation of the ICANN also stress the role of the organisation in the creation
and management of new markets:
“The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a
whole,  carrying  out  its  activities  in  conformity  with  relevant  principles  of
international law and applicable international conventions and local law and, to
the  extent  appropriate  and  consistent  with  these  Articles  and  its  By-laws,
through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open entry
in Internet-related markets. To this effect, the Corporation shall cooperate as
appropriate with relevant international organizations.” (ICANN 1998)
The next section will explore in further details the evolution of the policy debate that led to these
particular documents. 
5.1.2. The evolution of regulation in the policy documents
While these documents emanate from different institutions, they were not competing. Most authors
were involved in the drafting of several of these policy documents. They do not appear at the same
time but rather as a series of documents taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the
former ones. This evolution is consistent with the view of a unification of different elite groups with
different projects towards a consensual project. However, the evolution does not correspond either
to a pluralist competition of interests. The broader discourses about Internet governance outlined
below show us the similarity and ideological compatibility of dominant discourses as well as the
necessary  exclusion  of  alternative  discourses.  The  evolution  of  the  policy  documents  and  the
process of unification of different elite groups fit well with the intermediate theoretical position of
Wright Mills. Should a single ruling class (global elite or transnational capitalist class) have existed
prior to the politicisation of Internet governance, the consensus-building phase would not have been
necessary. Diverging views and interests would have been less important and conflictive. However,
a  pluralist  competition  would  have  shown  a  much  greater  degree  of  variety  of  ideological
perspectives  and  a  far  narrower  degree  of  compatibility  among  competing  documents.  The
exclusion of a wide range of alternatives stresses the lack of openness of the political arena. 
As Table 5.2 shows, the Draft Postel starts from a technocratic and limitedly inclusive perspective
that evolved towards the imprecise notion of multistakeholderism. This move evidences the need to
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include  other  groups,  already  called  stakeholders  in  the  1990s,  to  create  a  viable  institutional
framework. The description of this framework evolves but remains within a similar objective. 
Although the documents have different statuses and writing styles, they all propose a governance
system organized around new institutions. While some stress the technical aspects of the transition
and others envisions the functioning of a new market, several categories can be found throughout
the documents. The following categories have been constructed inductively from the comparison of
the four families of documents outlined before (see Table 5.1). Consistently with critical discourse
analysis, statements were identified and then grouped into categories (see Annex 3). Finally these
categories were analysed in order to find correspondences between these categories and broader
discourse  about  Internet  governance  (Fairclough,  2003).  The discourses  reflect  the  main  issues
associated  with  the creation  of  transnational  private  authority  as  described  by a  rich  literature
(Cutler et al., 1999; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Haufler, 2001; Graz and Nölke 2008). They
offer a framework to analyse the nature of the envisioned governance system as well as the structure
of the market  for domain names.  They address the nature of the market  in terms of degree of
competition and protection of existing trademarks (which relates to the role of existing dominant
firms).  The  categories  also  analyse  the  institutional  nature  of  the  new  governance  system.  In
particular, the institutional embededness of the new system is discussed (the relation between new
institutions and existing ones, and particularly the US state and intergovernmental organizations),
the nature of the funding as well as the importance of the budget. The categories are also concerned
with the nature of the policies that were going to be implemented by the new institution, as well as
the type of resources needed and the scope of participation. Two categories require special attention
since they answer the crucial questions of what is Internet governance (policy type) and who should
govern  the  Internet  (scope  of  participation).  These  two  categories  are  crucial  to  differentiate
between  several  discourses  on  Internet  governance  that  existed  in  the  1990s  and  that  will  be
described in more details in the next section.   
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Table 5.2. Institutional models of Internet governance72
Document Draft Postel gTLD-MoU White Paper ICANN by-laws andMoU
Date June 1996 February 1997 June 1998 November 1998
Degree of competition
Very high (many
TLDs73 and
competing
registrar
s74/registries75)
High (competing
registries and
registrars, few
TLDs)
Average (competing
registrars, few TLDs)
High (competing
registries and registrars,
few TLDs)
Trademarks protection None
Very strong (a
priori)
Very strong for
famous TM (a
priori), strong for the
rest (a posteriori)
Very strong for famous
TM (a priori), strong
for the rest (a
posteriori)
Institutional embededness Organ of theInternet Society
MoU76 signed by
private
organisations,
states , and
international
organizations
MoU with the US
Department of
Commerce
MoU with the US
Department of
Commerce
Funding
Private funding
of the Internet
Society by
applicants and
registries (small
budget)
Private funding by
applicants and
registries
(average budget)
Private funding by
domain name
registries and
regional IP registries
(reasonable budget)
Private funding by
registries and public
funding (estimated ¼
public funding for the
first 6 months) (large
budget)
Policy type Technicalregulation
Technical regulation
(with some broader
policy-related
aspects)
Technical regulation Technical regulation
Resources Technical/Scientific expertise
Technical expertise,
financial and legal
resources,
legitimacy
Technical expertise,
financial and legal
resources
Technical expertise,
financial and legal
resources
Scope of participation
Technical experts
only
Internationalized
multistakeholderism
Multistakeholderism
Advisory
multistakeholderism
and explicit rejection of
(inter-)governmental
participation
72 Table 5.2 relies on categories inductively built from the qualitative content analysis of the documents described in
Table 5.1 (Boyatzis, 1998). Conceptually, they correspond to different features that allow for a characterization of
“hybrid” transnational private authority (Graz, 2006) on the public-private continuum, the local-global continuum,
and the market-state continuum.  The table containing the statements that were used in order to construct  these
categories is reproduced in Annex 3.
73 TLDs stands for Top-Level Domains such as ”.com”, ”.org” etc.
74 "Registrar"  means the  entity  which  is  authorized  to  enter  and  modify  the  Second Level  Domain  (SLD) data
maintained by a Registry, in response to requests by entities seeking to be assigned a SLD (IAHC 1997).
75 Registry means those roles and activities involved in the administration of a Top Level Domain (such as ”.com”) in
the Domain Name System, and encompasses all of the services needed for assignment and maintenance of that TLD
and its registrations.(IAHC 1997).
76 Memorandum of Understanding
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Table 5.2 shows an evolution of the proposed models from a scientific/technocratic independent
private regulation of an unregulated market with no trademark protection towards an institution
closely related to the US state promoting a competitive market but also strong trademarks protection
and stakeholder participation. However, the shift should not be overstated. Most of the elements of
the  first  documents  can still  be  found in the  more recent  ones.  The first  drastic  change is  the
inclusion of trademark protection, whose importance was denied by the Draft Postel. It became a
central element as soon as in the gTLD-MoU. The second important change is the participation of
stakeholders  beyond  the  scientific/technical  elite  that  had  regulated  the  Internet  before  its
commercialisation. Most of the other elements are more or less stable through the documents. The
compatibility of the documents and the relative stability of the solutions provides evidence a certain
ideological coherence. In our view, this clearly reflects the similarities between the three dominant
discourses on Internet governance and the exclusion of marginal ideas.  
5.1.3. Dominant and marginalized discourses
The policy documents produced in the second half of the 1990's in order to create a governance
system for the Internet echo three dominant discourses. Two other discourses can be found in the
commentaries to the policy documents. They can be qualified as alternative discourses since they
were not  represented in  the documents that  concretely prepared  the  creation  of  the  governance
system and were not supported by dominant institutions in the field. Finally, the documents that
actually created the ICANN reflect a hegemonic discourse in the sense that it was able to build a
consensus among the elites in spite of the differences between their favoured discourses. At the
same time, the hegemonic discourse was able to co-opt non-dominant actors without “touching the
essential” of an elite-driven governance system (Gramsci 2001: 373). Discourses are broader than
plans to  develop a  particular institutional  framework to  regulate  the  Internet.  They address the
issues  of  what  Internet  governance  is  and  who  should  govern  it.  The  characterisation  of  the
suggested institutional frameworks into broader discourses helps us  to  understand the underlying
ideas and principles that can be found in the documents. However, they are not necessarily explicit.
The extrapolation of the policy documents into broader discourses is based on several publications
of the end of the 1990s. This categorisation is essential to understand the possibility of a consensual
discourse among elite groups and the necessary exclusion or co-optation of ideologically different
views of the governance of the network.   
153
➢ The neoliberal discourse
The White Paper on Internet Governance issued by the Clinton administration can be described as a
neoliberal project. The neoliberal views were also the most influential in the documents that
actually created the ICANN. While  neoliberalism  is  a  multidimensional  phenomenon,  some
important  elements are  the focus on individual  freedom, the protection  of  private  property and
economic laissez-faire (Harvey 2005)77. The Clinton administration had described its vision of the
Internet  in  a  more  generic  document  about  e-commerce a  few months before the  White  Paper
(Clinton & Gore, 1996). The document foresees an active role of the state in the creation of new,
loosely-regulated markets. As the third principle reads:
”Where governmental involvement is needed, its aim should be to support and
enforce  a  predictable,  minimalist,  consistent  and simple legal  environment  for
commerce.” (Clinton & Gore, 1996: 3)
The main purpose of the neoliberal regulation of the Internet is the creation of a market for domain
names (ICANN and DoC, art. II, section C §2). The institutions and rules that are created by the
documents are bound to ensure a smooth functioning of the market; they are the by-products of its
creation. The role of the institution is to ensure stability for the infrastructure of the network, to
protect private (intellectual) property, and to foster competition. For neoliberals, the market is the
locus of  innovation  and efficiency,  and the  problem-solving capacity  of  a  transnational  private
governance system is based on its promotion of market forces. Multistakeholderism is also praised
as more inclusive, and thus more legitimate, than intergovernmentalism through the participation of
stakeholders.  The  role  of  the  state  is  important  to  actively  create  and  support  transnational
institutions in order to delegate some of its functions. The neoliberal discourse is supportive of a
transnational and private model of governance based on the principles of multistakeholderism and
limited to technical issues:
”As set out below, the US. Government is prepared to recognize, by entering into
agreement  with,  and  to  seek  international  support  for,  a  new,  not-for-profit
corporation formed by private sector Internet stakeholders to administer policy for
the Internet name and address system. […] The organization and its board should
derive legitimacy from the participation of key stakeholders.” (NTIA 1998) 
Multistakeholderism is an individualization of political participation in which individuals do not
rely on institutions to take part in decision-making. The competition and market-based arbitration
77 See chapter 4 for a more detailed description of the translation of the neoliberal ideology in telecommunications.
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between individual interests is seen as the most efficient type of regulation. The neoliberal discourse
can be summarized by the idea that individualized, market-based competition are superior to other
modes of organization (Mudge, 2008, p. 706-707). Multistakeholderism in a neoliberal perspective
is the institutionalisation of such a mode of organization. 
➢ The Cyber-libertarian discourse 
The cyber-libertarian discourse is best illustrated by the Draft Postel. It emerged in the early days of
the Internet and can be summarized by its motto: “Hands off the Internet” (Thierer, 2009). Cyber-
libertarian discourse was very common among IT and networking specialists and a “cyber-elite” of
science fiction writers and young entrepreneurs whom gravitated around Wired magazine. The
discourse was thus influential in the small population that was aware of the potential of the Internet
in the first half of the 1990s (Flichy, 2001: 126-133). The basic premise of cyber-libertarianism is
Internet exceptionalism: The Internet creates a new world and changes social relations, which
makes existing regulations obsolete. Cyberspace is, by definition, a world of freedom and equality,
and any intervention might threaten these characteristics. 
“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come
from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the
past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty
where we gather. [...] We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and
the common-weal, our governance will emerge. […] We hope we will be able to
build our particular solutions on that basis. But we cannot accept the solutions
you are attempting to impose.” (Barlow, 1996) 
Cyber-libertarian positions on commercial aspects of the Internet are less clear. They favour market
solutions over regulation and strongly defend individual economic freedom. While some cyber-
libertarians seem to reject the concept of property in cyberspace and its implications for intellectual
property rights protection (Atkinson, 2010: 2), others are defenders of intellectual property rights as
an extension of traditional property rights (Thierer 2009). The cyber-libertarian discourse proposes
a model of transnational private governance that escapes the authority of the state. It is based on a
different understanding of the history of the Internet where the network has been created by private
initiatives  independently  from  the  state.  Legitimacy  of  the  governance  model  stems  from  the
technical and scientific validity of the solutions proposed, as evaluated by peers. Participation to
technical forums is open but relies on knowledge resources. The Internet questions in this view the
idea of sovereignty and conceptualize Internet governance outside the power structures of the global
political economy. The Draft Postel does not explicitly refer to cyber-libertarian ideas, although
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some of its authors are cyber-libertarians (see section 5.2). The self-organization of the Internet
community  through  its  own institutions  and the  total  absence  of  any  reference  to  government
contracts  is  an  implicit  endorsement  of  a  cyber-libertarian  discourse.  Moreover,  Internet
exceptionalism has been influential in the more recent documents.     
➢ The Global Public Good discourse 
Although the concept of global public goods has only been popularized since the end of the 1990s
by researchers of the United Nations Development Program (Kaul 1999), the discourse on the need
for international cooperation to manage trans-boundary flows and threats had been present
throughout the 1990. As far as Internet governance is concerned, the global public good discourse
can be found in the declarations by intergovernmental organizations and some non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). The gTLD-MoU, authored by members of the technical community with
representatives from IGOs reflects, to a certain extent, this discourse. Public goods are defined in
economic literature as goods that are non-rival in consumption (consumption by one person does
not prevent further consumption) and nonexcludable (no people or groups of people are excluded
from the use of the good). Kaul et al. add a criterion to qualify a good as a global public good: their
benefits are quasi universal in terms of countries (covering more than one group of countries),
people (accruing to several, preferably all, population groups), and generations (extending to both
current and future generations, or at least meeting the needs of current generations without
foreclosing development options for future generations) (Kaul et al. 1999: 2-4). Drawing upon the
definition by Kaul et al., Spar (1999) defines the Internet as a public good. According to this
discourse, Internet governance requires state intervention at both a national and multilateral level
(Spar 1999: 356-358). As a global public good, it cannot be unilaterally managed as a US policy
issue by the US government. These elements were strongly acknowledged by the gTLD-MoU78,
which was written in the name of the Internet community as a whole, but also in the ICANN by-
laws  that stressed the importance of international representativeness.  The  global  public  good
discourse  is  ambiguous  on  the  respective  roles  of  the  state,  the  market  and  intergovernmental
organizations.  While  a  maximalist  definition  of  global  public  goods  would  imply  a
decommodification of public goods, a minimalist definition refers to the failures of the market and
the  means  to  address  them  through  collective  arrangements,  without  questioning  the  power
structures that lie behind them  (Bissiriou and Kern 2005). In this perspective, the market is the
referent and the economy defines the field of action of the policy (Gabas and Hugon, 2001; p. 33).
The global public good discourse related to Internet governance epitomizes a minimalist definition
78 See references to the Internet as a public resource in the previous section. 
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of  global  public  goods  (IAHC  1997)  and  favours  a  transnational  private  governance  model
involving states and intergovernmental organisations.
➢ Marginalized discourses
Marginalized discourses were absent from the proposed models of Internet governance. However,
they clearly appear in the comments and reactions to the proposals. They also existed as more
scholarly discourses as the institutionalization of Internet governance was debated. The status of
these discourses changed over time and they were the basis of the opposition to the neoliberal
model that prevailed with the creation of the ICANN. The sovereignist  and the anti-marketisation
discourses underpinned the resistance to  the ICANN and the alternatives that have been proposed
since its creation. 
First, a sovereignist  discourse envisions a governance system where states play a crucial role. It
generally focuses on the security issues related to the Internet and the need for regulation to address
them. During the 1990s, some people in the United States developed a nationalistic discourse on
Internet governance. This discourse was influential in the US Parliament.  The Internet had been
created by US citizens with US citizens' tax money and, thus, could not be “given away”  (Parisi
1998). These  kinds  of  arguments  were called upon by US industry representatives during the
congressional hearings on the Domain Name System (US House of Representatives 1997). National
security issues and geopolitical interests were evoked. The sovereingist  discourse also exists  in
other countries as a reaction to US domination of the Internet. Early comments on the Internet as a
new technology discussed the threat of its use for criminal purposes and terrorist activities (G7/P8
1996). For the sovereignist discourse, the legitimacy of Internet governance institutions clearly lies
in the state. National jurisdictions should be able to control portion of the Internet. In this sense,
multistakeholderism was not seen as a viable mode of regulation of the network.
Like the sovereignist discourse, the anti-marketisation discourse is sceptical about the premises of
the  information  society  and  the  new  economy.  The  anti-marketisation  discourse  was  already
weakened in the mid-1990s by the previous marketisation of the backbone of the Internet. It was
still an important discourse in social science faculties and non-dominant universities.   As Birdsall
puts it, in a clashing speech given at the I'Net 96 conference,
“I do not accept that it is the Internet that is transforming society. [...] I maintain
that the Ideology of Information Technology is a set of values and propositions
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that  represents  an  inherent  extension  of  capitalism's  drive  to  commodify  all
spheres  of  economic  and  cultural  life.  This  ideology  links  the  adoption  of
information  technology  with  free-market  values  and  the  commodification  of
information.” (Birdsall 1996)
According to the anti-marketisation discourse, the main change that was occurring along with the
emergence of the “information age”  was the commodification of information as a new realm of
capitalist development. The Internet is one of the elements of digital capitalism (Schiller 1999). The
embedding of the global network in capitalistic structures prevents emancipatory use of the Internet
and favours dominant actors and big businesses (Simon 1998). In order for the Internet to fulfil its
emancipatory potential, a real political arena had to be created where Internet governance could be
debated beyond elite circles (Birdsall 1996).  According  to  this  discourse,  transnational  private
governance cannot address social issues because of its narrow scope. Moreover, it does not offer
sufficient participation and legitimacy and represent an institutionalisation of neoliberalism. Like
the sovereignist discourse, it was hardly audible in the 1990s.
Figure 5.1. Internet governance discourses and hegemony
5.1.4. Internet exceptionalism, technical governance and 
multistakeholderism as elements of an ideological cohesion 
among elites
The identification of dominant and marginal discourses as well as a number of precise statements
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belonging to a specific discourse allows for the analysis of common and diverging elements. Three
elements can be considered consensual among dominant discourses on Internet governance: Internet
exceptionalism, the technical character of Internet governance and multistakeholder participation.
Out of these three elements, two are issues of organisation of the regulation that can be found in the
policy documents  and one is  a more  general  understanding of  the Internet  as illustrated in the
discourses. The general assumption is Internet exceptionalism. The organizational principles are the
notion of a technical governance of the Internet and multistakeholder institutions. The emergence of
a hegemonic discourse about Internet governance can be unfold as two concomitant processes. First,
the ideological unification of an elite is necessary to find a common point of view among elite
groups. This element is key in the definition of a unified power elite. Second, the imposition of this
point of view to non-dominant groups must rely on a certain degree of acceptance by those groups
(the Gramscian notion of hegemony). This section will focus the first process while the second one
will be analysed in further details in the chapter 6. Even if some degree of coercion is possible
because of the involvement of sovereign governments, the consensual aspect of power is even more
salient in a transnational field than at a national level. 
The ideological cohesion of the elite is not as simple domination of a particular discourse and/or a
particular  group of  actors  in  Internet  governance,  it  is  a  process  of  consensus-building  among
different discourses and different elite groups (see figure 5.1). While consensus that emerged among
dominant  discourses of  Internet  governance  is  not  in  contradiction  with  neoliberal  ideas  that
dominated the global political economy of the 1990s, it results from field-specific dynamics and
represent  an  aggregate  of  dominant  discourses.  The  focus  on  the  market  as  the  principle  of
organisation of Internet governance is the main contribution of the neoliberal discourse to the field
of  Internet  governance.  This  focus  on  the  market  has  implications  in  terms  of  promotion  of
competition and elimination of “unnecessary” regulations.  From the cyber-libertarian discourse, a
discursive rejection of (inter-)governmental participation prevailed. The focus on technical expertise
and  the  references  to  the  “Internet  community”  are  also  consistent  with  a  cyber-libertarian
discourse.  Finally,  the  global  public  goods  discourse  imposed  elements  on  the  “international”
character  of  the  network  and  the  rejection  of  unilateralism.  The  consensus  between  the  three
dominant discourses is reflected in the three principles discussed in this section.       
The idea of a major change in social, political, and economic life brought about by the Internet is
shared by the neoliberal, cyber-libertarian, and, to some extent, the global public good discourses.
The expression “Internet exceptionalism”  (Wu  2010)  is derived from the notion of American
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exceptionalism that can be traced back to Alexis de Toqueville (de Toqueville, 1840: 36-37).
According to Internet exceptionalism, cyberspace would be a terra nullius in which social relations
and laws have no historical existence and must be re-invented. Thus, tenants of Internet
exceptionalism advocated for the abolition of existing rules and the creation of a totally new
governance system. The overarching role of the state and intergovernmental organizations was to be
replaced by the initiatives of the individual actors. Private funding ensured the impossibility for the
state to co-opt the process. Without a state or an international institution to arbitrate between
individual initiatives, the regulation was left to market forces. Transnational private  governance
could thus be presented as the adequate base for the creation of a governance regime. 
The notion of Internet exceptionalism is most obviously advocated by cyber-libertarians who see
the information age as the age of freedom, away from traditional government and state sovereignty
(Huber 1997; Postel 1996). But Internet exceptionalism can also be found in neoliberal thinking on
the network, as advocated by the Clinton administration (Clinton and Gore 1997: 1). The global
public good discourse, as used by the UNDP, advocates for an important involvement of
governments and international organization in world politics. It does not clearly sympathize with
the notion of the information society (Kaul, 1999). However, the tenants of the global public good
discourse acknowledge that the power of the state is undermined by globalization and especially by
the Internet. While the Internet is considered a public good, authors like Spar rules out any public
provision of the network. She even sees the regulation of private provision as “unwieldy” because
of the specific history of the Internet. According to Spar, the only solution left to the state is a
subsidiarity principle in which governments only intervene where the market does not (Spar, 1999:
355-356). By acknowledging the specificity of the Internet, the global public good discourse was
not in a position to offer an alternative to the Internet exceptionalism thesis. It tends to accept the
idea that the Internet transforms the way in which governments can intervene. The gTLD-MoU,
which uses this kind of discourse, thus recognizes “the unique characteristics of the Internet”
(IAHC 1997: 1), and proposes a self-regulatory structure (IAHC 1997: 2) in an attempt to re-invent
global public good governance beyond multilateralism.  This  is  why  the  global  public  good
discourse remained with a minimalist definition of global public goods and did not oppose Internet
exceptionalism. 
The second organisational principle that is shared in the documents as well as in the discourses is
the purely technical nature of the regulation. The issue at stake in the 1990s was the assignment of
domain names and IP addresses. These two activities were important aspects to determine who gets
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what in the emerging markets related to the Internet. Yet, the issue was framed in terms of stability
and technical feasibility. The economic, political and social aspects were not developed in the policy
documents.  The  Draft  Postel  ignores  the  non-technical  consequences  of  Domain  names
management. It even negates the trademarks and intellectual property problem. Litigation is left to
national  courts and no policy-making body is envisioned (Postel  1996).  The generic Top Level
Domain Names Memorandum of Understanding is the documents that most clearly address policy
issues. 
“Conscious, that  the  management  and  administration  of  the  DNS  raises
significant public policy issues that include, inter alia, appropriate and equitable
allocation  of  global  name  resources,  market  supply  and  access  to  DNS
registration services, and intellectual property concerns;” (IAHC 1997, Preamble)
The document even foresees the creation of a Policy Oversight Committee to specifically address
issues  that  were  not  purely  technical.  However,  the  mandate  of  the  committee  as  well  as  its
composition  remains  technically-oriented.  The  members  of  the  committee  were  to  be
knowledgeable individuals from the scientific institutions such as the Internet Architecture Board or
the Internet Society,  and representative of the ITU, the WIPO, and the International  Trademark
Association (IAHC 1997, section 6). The only policy issue beyond technical management seem to
be the protection of trademarks. As we can see from the most recent history of the politicisation of
the Internet, this issue is only a limited aspect of the political implications of Internet governance.
Moreover, the mandate of the Committee is limited to technical changes such as the addition of a
new Top-Level Domain or a new registrar (IAHC 1997, section 6). 
The White Paper limits the functions of the new institutions to four domains, all of them closely
related to the technical management of Internet names and numbers: 
”1. oversee the operation of the Internet root server system; 2. To oversee policy
for determining the circumstances under which new top level domains would be
added to the root system; and 3. To coordinate the development of other technical
protocol parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet.
4. To set policy for and direct the allocation of IP number blocks” (NTIA 1998)
Once again, the broader social and economic aspects of these operations are underestimated. For
example, the document states that:
“The  new corporation  does  not  need any special  grant  of  immunity  from the
antitrust laws so long as its policies and practices are reasonably based on, and no
broader than necessary to promote the legitimate coordinating objectives of the
new corporation.” (White Paper)
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This type of statement shows that the consequences of this purely technical management of domain
names and IP addresses were not acknowledged. The assignment of different tiers of IP addresses
blocks to companies had important consequences in the market power of a given firm and had been
harshly  criticised  during  the  1990s79.  Domain  names  allocation  also  prompted  significant
commercial disputes. Several antitrust lawsuit have indeed been filed against ICANN several years
after its creation with the argument that the Corporation had use its monopolistic position to distort
the market on several occasions80. 
Finally,  the  ICANN by-laws  and  Memorandum of  Understanding  with  the  US Department  of
Commerce stick to the technical mandate defined by the White Paper (ICANN and DoC 1998, art. 2
section B). Policy advice was to be provided by other institutions such as the WIPO. Issues of
access or civil liberties that were raised in the comments81 to the various proposals were not taken
into account in the design of the institution. 
While the technical nature of Internet governance has been widely questioned and criticised in the
early 2000s, the third organizational characteristic of Internet governance has remained at the core
of the  doxa of the field of Internet governance since the 1990s. Multistakeholderism is both an
organizational model and a normative stance on how the Internet should be governed82. This dual
nature of the concept can be traced back to its origins in management studies in the 1980s. The
stakeholder  perspective  on  the  corporation  is  an  alternative  way  to  look  at  the  firm,  more
comprehensive – and even democratic according to some authors – than the shareholder/stockholder
perspective (Crane, Driver, Kaler, Parker, & Parkinson, 2005; Matten & Crane, 2005). The idea is to
include “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the activities of
an organization” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). This imprecise definition leave space for interpretation in
various contexts. 
The elitist character of the stakeholder model is evidenced by Kochan and Rubenstein (Kochan &
Rubinstein, 2000, p. 373), who suggest three criteria for identifying signiﬁcant stakeholders:
79 Interview with Karl Denninger, 3 October 2012. For an overview of IP addresses classes and classful and classless
networking, see http://oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/chapter/appb.html, last accessed 8 April 2014.
80 One recent example is the lawsuit filed by the porn company Manwin because the ICANN was imposing a fee to
protect  the  company's  domain  name  in  the  newly-created  ”.xxx”  top-level  domain.  See
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/181077/judge-allows-antitrust-lawsuit-against-icann.html,  last
accessed 8 April 2014.
81 See for example the comment of CNNIC to the IAHC proposal, 15 January 1997.
82 Multistakeholderism was not as commonly used in Internet governance in the 1990s as it was during and after the
WSIS. Many documents referred to self-regulation. This is why most authors associate the emergence of the term
with the WSIS. As stated in the following paragraph, the term stakeholder was already used in the 1990s. Moreover,
there is no substantial difference between what was called self-regulation in the 1990s and multistakeholderism in
the 2000s. This is why the term is described here as part of the doxa of Internet governance since the late 1990s. 
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1. They supply resources that are critical to the success of the enterprise.
2. They place something of value “at risk”; that is, their own welfare is directly “affected by
the fate of the enterprise.”
3. They have “sufﬁcient power” to affect the performance of the enterprise, either favourably
or unfavourably. (definition quoted in Post et al., 2002)
While the first two criteria are not discriminatory enough in order to provide a precise definition of
stakeholders, the third one clearly establishes a distinction between stakeholders and other affected
groups based on power. 
The notion of stakeholder is also associated with the retreat of the welfare state (MacIntyre, 1999;
Froud et al., 1996), especially as a way to re-frame the description of the redistribution of benefits
in  a  privatisation  process.  The  notion  of  stakeholder  benefits  plays  down  the  benefits  of  the
shareholders and focuses on the benefits of the consumers and employees. The context of Internet
governance was somewhat similar, with a need to re-invent an inclusive governance  system after
the  privatisation  of  the  network.  Against  this  background,  the  problematic  concept  of
stakeholderism emerged in Internet governance, with its imprecise scope, elitist implications, and
negation of redistributive conflicts (see Ruwet, 2010 for a discussion in a similar context). 
The first reference to the participation of stakeholders to the governance of the Internet appeared in
the gTLD-MoU. Governance mechanisms were supposed to include “the widest possible range of
Internet stakeholders” (IAHC 1997), including both “current” and “future” stakeholders (IAHC, art.
1, sect. 2). The White Paper also mentions stakeholders several times, albeit with different qualities.
Sometimes the stakeholders are used in a general sense, sometimes the document refers to “private
sector” or “key stakeholders”. It even warns against capture of the future institution by “a narrow
group of stakeholders”. The variety in the use of the term evidences the lack of a clear definition of
Internet stakeholders. 
The  ICANN by-laws  create  a  multistakeholder  governance  model  since  they  follow  previous
requirements  in  that  domain,  even if  they  do not  use  the  term in  1998.  The  Memorandum of
Understanding between the ICANN and the US Department of Commerce recalls the principles of
competition and private coordination as a way to meet and enhance Internet users’ choice as well as
their needs (ICANN and DoC 1998: art. II, section C). As a strictly private institution, the ICANN
Board excludes the official representation of national governments and intergovernmental
organization (ICANN 1998: art. V, section 5). The documents rule out any intergovernmental type
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of governance and restrains (inter-)governmental participation to an advisory committee that
consults with the board of the corporation. Furthermore, unlike other advisory committees (e.g.,
DNS root server, membership, and independent review), the governmental advisory committee does
not have the power to initiate a procedure of advice on its own: The Board is supposed to notify the
committee of any proposal upon which it seeks comments (ICANN 1998: art. VII, section 3a).
Multistakeholderism usually puts state and non-state actors on an equal footing, which is consistent
with  a  neoliberal  conception  of  the  state.  However,  multistakeholderism  in  the  ICANN  does
explicitly exclude governmental and intergovernmental participation. This exclusion is consistent
with the idea of private stakeholders expressed in the White Paper. Moreover, multistakeholderism
in the early ICANN is only an advisory mechanism, since the board of the corporation must have
the initiative of regulation. The documents that created the ICANN go further than the limited role
of the state as advocated by the neoliberal discourse. The market-enabling institutional role is not
carried out by the state but by a private transnational not-for-profit corporation.
It is worth noting that the strictly transnational and private character of Internet governance was less
an actual commitment than a discursive tool for the elites to find a common ground. In fact, the US
Department of Commerce retains a crucial role in Internet governance. The description of this role
is to be found in the Memorandum of Understanding between the US Department of Commerce and
the ICANN (ICANN and DoC 1998) rather than in the by-laws. The MoU came after the creation of
the ICANN and after the heated debates on the transnational and private character of the institution.
The Department of Commerce was responsible for providing oversight to the work of the ICANN
(ICANN and DoC 1998: art. V, section A) and was expected to fund one-fourth of the expenses of
the organization in the first six months (ICANN and DoC 1998). Moreover,  the  role  and  the
expertise of intergovernmental organisations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization
was  recalled  (ICANN  and  DoC 1998:  art.  V,  section  C).  The  European  Commission  and  the
Australian government also participated informally in the nomination process of the ICANN board
(Mueller 2002: section 8.2.3). In practice, powerful governments, and especially the United States,
and some intergovernmental organizations were playing an important role in the new governance
system. Multistakeholderism is a flexible concept that permitted the inclusion of all powerful actors.
On the discursive level, however, the role of governments and intergovernmental organization was
negated in order to stick with the idea of private multistakeholderism that was instrumental for the
cohesion of the power elite.  The different fractions of the elite were thus able to unite around the
creation of the ICANN. 
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The following section will focus on the individuals and groups that benefited from this consensus
based on Internet exceptionalism, technical regulation and multistakeholderism. 
5.2. Interchangeability: circulation of elites and interlocking institutions
In addition to the ideational aspect of the unification of the power elite,  the links between the
individuals  pertaining  to  different  specialized  elite  groups  question  the  multistakeholder  and
pluralist perspective on early Internet governance debates. This section present the elite networks of
the 1990s in the field of Internet governance and focuses on some key actors that exemplify the
circulation of elites. The pluralist view underestimates the connections of the actors beyond their
stakeholder group. If we stick to the description of the two processes, there seems to be a clear-cut
distinction  between  the  main  stakeholders.  The  different  documents  produced  during  the
politicisation  of  Internet  governance  have  different  natures.  On  the  one  hand,  the  technical
community  produced  their  documents,  first  on  their  own  and  then  by  including  some  other
stakeholders.  On the other hand, the US government produced their documents through a more
classical political process. At the end, a consensus was found in the documents that created the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers by including most of the stakeholders and
reconciling the two leading stakeholders (see Table 5.3). The documents have different authors and
the resulting consensus include directly or indirectly all of the key stakeholders.
Table 5.3. The multistakeholder view of Internet governance in the 1990s (participation of the main
stakeholders to Internet governance documents)
Stakeholder Date Technical
community
US
government
Network
solutions
Trademark
holders
Draft Postel August 1996 X - - -
gTLD-MoU February 1997 X - - X
White Paper June 1998 - X - X
ICANN by-
laws
November
1998
X X X X
However, a closer look at this process could tell something different. If we make a network analysis
including the actors of Internet governance in the 1990s, not only the main authors but also the
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influential commentators and if we look at the institutional affiliation of the individuals, we can see
many links between the actors and the stakeholder categorisation becomes blurred.
5.2.1. Elite networks in the 1990s
Wright Mills' approach to the power elite is based on the institutional positions of individuals that
give them the ability to make decisions having major consequences (Wright Mills 2000). According
to Wright Mills, it is not important whether these individuals actually make the decisions or not,
they are able to act because they are in command of the “major hierarchies and organizations of
modern society” (Wright Mills 2000). This strictly positional method has been criticized, especially
with the development of social network analysis that can help combine various methods in order to
study elite networks and power structures (Knoke, 1993). This is why the following elite networks
constructions rely on positional, decisional and to some extent reputational and relational methods. 
The positional method requires the identification of key institutions in the field and the analysis of
the individuals at the top positions within these institutions. In the case of Internet governance, both
the transnational nature of the field and its lack of institutionalization make this study difficult.
However, some institutions can be taken into account in order to identify specialized elites similar
to Wright Mills' corporate, political and military elites. First, a technical/scientific elite had created
institutions within the scientific field of computer science. Thus, members of the Internet Society
Board of Trustees, the Internet Engineering TaskForce Steering Group, the Internet Architecture
Board and the Board of Trustees of the American Registry for Internet Numbers and the IANA
Transition Advisors Group were in a position to speak in the name of the “technical community”.
On  the  US governmental  side,  the  Inter-agency  Working  Group  on  Internet  Domains  and  the
National  Telecommunication and Information Agency of the Department  of  Commerce and the
subcommittees on Trade and on Technology and Innovation of the US House represented the major
institutions  involved  in  Internet  governance.  Foreign  governments  and  intergovernmental
organizations granted some highly-positioned individuals specializing in Internet governance with
important influence over the debates. This is the case of the personnel from the DG XIII of the
European Commission, the representatives of the French, Australian, German, Japanese and English
governments,  and  the  officials  of  the  ITU  and  the  WIPO.  Finally,  the  corporate  elite  was
institutionalized around the Global Internet Project, the World Information Technology and Services
Association and the International Chamber of Commerce. 
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The  decisional method  aims to identify the actors that were effectively influential in determined
decision-making  situation.  Based  on  the  policy  documents  described  in  the  previous  section,
influential  actors  can  be  identified.  First,  the  authors  of  the  documents  were  clearly  the  most
influential  actors.  Second, while  the documents were generally  open to public comments,  some
commentators of the documents proved more influential than others. This influence can be observed
in  the  changes  between  different  versions  of  the  policy  documents  and  between  the  different
documents. The Draft Postel resulted from a series of four documents, each of them being largely
commented on the NewDom mailing list. The gTLD-MoU came after two draft documents, each of
them commented publicly and on the NewDom mailing-list. The Council of Registrars MoU, an
application document of the gTLD-MoU was also the object of a round of public comments. The
archive  of  the  specific  IAHC  mailing  list  is  not  available  any  more.  The  NTIA Request  of
Comments  and  the  Green  Paper  were  the  most  widely  publicly-commented  documents.  The
discussion, as well as the numerous conference calls and meetings among elite actors (Interview
with Karl Denninger, October, 3, 2012), provided the elements for the redaction of the White Paper.
Finally, the ICANN by-laws were modified on 7 occasions and a round of public comments, as well
as an international forum, competing proposals and several mailing lists, brought many diverging
ideas  into the  discussion.  Qualitative appreciation of  the  impact  of  these  changes  is  necessary.
Substantial changes regarding trademarks and the role of the governmental monopolistic contractor
Network Solutions Inc. have occurred during the debates. The changes in the by-laws of the ICANN
to  include  more  participation  and  transparency  were  more  discursive  and  did  not  affect  the
institutional structure of the ICANN on the long term (see chapter 6). The table 5.2.2 presents a
summary of the different versions of the documents and lists some example of changes advocated
by some commentators.
The reputational method has not been used systematically to construct the database of elite actors.
However,  the  literature  on  early  Internet  governance  and  especially  Mueller  (2002)  provide  a
number of names that were used to check the collected data. The interviews conducted during the
research process were also opportunities to provide some perspectives on who the influential actors
were during the processes. 
Finally, the relational method has also been used as a control with the inclusion in the database of
several  socializing  events  that  took place  during  the  historical  period  and  that  were  related  to
Internet governance issues. Participants to the plenaries of several conferences bringing together
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scholars and practitioners, such as the yearly Inet conferences or the conferences organized by the
Berkman Center of Harvard University were included in the network analysis. 
The  social network  analysis of  Internet  governance  in  the  1990s  results  in a  2-mode  network
comprising  of  343  individuals,  affiliated  to  100  organizations,  involved  in  the  redaction  of  6
families  of  policy documents and participating to  10 events.  This general  data  allowed for  the
creation  of  the  following  visualizations  and  the  formulation  of  the  following  remarks  on  the
structuration of the field of Internet governance in the 1990s. 
As shown in the first visualization (figure 5.2), the network of individuals, organizations and policy
documents  does  not  show a  clear-cut  distinction  between  stakeholder  groups.  Even if  network
analysis should be used with caution because of the non-public and undiscovered links that might
exist between individuals and institutions, a multistakeholder environment should have evidenced
the existence of several groups whose relations are more important within the group than with other
groups. However, none of the standard functions available in the software provide elements hinting
towards the existence of coherent stakeholder groups83. What can be found in the visualization is the
existence  of  a  centre of  more  closely-related  actors  and  institutions,  directly  involved  in  the
redaction of the documents and a number of peripheral nodes. The scientific elite organized around
the Internet Society and its related organizations is represented in the centre of the graph, along with
the  corporate  elite  (essentially  computer  and  telecommunications  firms  and  obviously  the
monopolistic  government  contractor  NSI)  and  the  political  elite  is  represented  by  the  US
Department of Commerce, other US governmental agencies and the European Commission. Some
broker institutions between specialised elites – like the FNCAC as a forum gathering the technical
and the US political elite – appear as central in the network. Of course, the visualisation has some
limitations since it shows only the relationship that are explicitly stated in the available archives.
For example,  no direct connection between the core participants and the Australian government
appears in the graph despite the important role that the latter played in the nomination of the first
ICANN board (Mueller 2002)84.  In spite  of  the failure of the International  Ad Hoc Committee
(IAHC)  to  implement  a  governance  system  for  the  Internet,  the  centrality  of  the  Committee,
evidenced by the size of the node in fig. 5.2, shows the influence of its members. It is also an
indicator  of  the  interchangeability  of  the elite  rather  than of  the competition  between different
interests. Several elite actors participated in the different attempts to create a governance system for
83 The cliques, clans, K-core and factions describe groups that transcend stakeholder classification in terms of actors
and institutions (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002).   
84 An individual  from Australia  was nominated  among the  Board  member  but  had  no institutional  ties  with  the
Australian government.  
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the Internet.
NSI: Network Solutions Inc. ORSC: Open Root Server Confederation FNCAC: US Federal Networking
Council Advisory Committee
DoC: US Department of Commerce ISOC: Internet Society GIP: Global Internet Project
IAHC: International Ad Hoc Committee ITAG: IANA Transition Advisory Group CORE: Council of Registrars
ICANN  MoU:  Memorandum  of  Understanding
between the ICANN and the DoC
IAB: Internet Architecture Board ISP: Internet Service Provider
Figure 5.2. The network of actors, institutions and policy documents of Internet governance in the
1990s85 
85 For the sake of clarity, socialization events have been removed from the data, therefore reducing the number of 
individuals. The visualization excludes the “isolate” nodes that are not connected to other nodes. Square nodes 
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The  focus  on  institutions  provides  an  overview of  the  important  actors  of  the  global  political
economy involved in the debates on Internet governance in the 1990s. The second visualization,
focusing on organizations rather than on individuals tend to show the hybridisation of the field with
an interrelated network of scientific, economic and political organizations (see figure 5.3). 
represent institutions and circles represent individuals. The size of the nodes is related to the eigenvector centrality 
of the node in the network. As recalled before (see chapter 4), eigenvector centrality in 2-modes networks should be 
analyzed with caution but provide interesting information o the centrality of a node.  Colors stem from the measure 
of k-core groups but are not necessarily relevant here (Borgatti et al., 2002). 
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APNIC:  Asia  Pacific  Network
Information  Center  (Regional
Internet Registry)
ITAG:  IANA  Transitory
Advisory Group
W3C:  World  Wide  Web
Consortium
ETNO:  European  association
of Telecommunication Network
Operators 
ARIN:  American  Registry  for
Internet Numbers
NSF:  US  National  Science
foundation
IAHC:  Internet  Ad  Hoc
Committee
INTA: International Trademark
Association 
IETF:  Internet  Engineering
TaskForce
IAB:  Internet  Architecture
Board
UIT: International
Telecommunication Union
NSI: Network Solutions Inc.
DoC:  US  Department  of
Commerce
FNC:  US  Federal  Networking
Council
GIP: Global Internet Project
ISOC: Internet Society DoD:  US  Department  of
Defence
EFF:  Electronic  Frontier
Foundation
Figure  5.3. Network  of  organizations  involved  in  the  redaction  of  Internet  governance  policy
documents and early institutionalization of the field in the 1990s86
86 This network is based on the same data than the previous one (i.e. excluding socialization events and isolates) and
represent an affiliation network of the organizations and documents (the relations between the nodes depend on the
affiliation of individuals and their participation in the redaction of the documents even if the individuals are not
shown in the graph).
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The network of the organizations of the field of Internet governance in the second-half of the 1990s
provides evidence of the rapid commercialization of the network of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
While  academic purposes were mandatory to  connect  to the NSF backbone until  1992, several
commercial  companies had gained access to the network.  Start-ups were created by technically
well-informed individuals and the requirements of scientific  purposes were considered a "joke"
because of the quasi-automatic acceptance of the application87. Moreover, large telecommunication
companies had begun to operate parts of the network. This is why AT&T, Sprint and even European
telecommunications  firms  are  represented  in  the  network.  Computer  manufacturers  were  in  an
influential position during the debates because they hired directly some of the individuals that were
in  charge  of  the  network  through  their  universities  and  research  centres.  Compared  with  the
scientific field of the 1970s (see chapter 4), the role of corporate actors is salient. BBN Planet, the
Internet  Service  Provider  division  of  the  precursor  firm  of  the  Internet  governance  field  was
acquired by GTE in 1997. This acquisition exemplifies the empowerment of telecommunications
firms. Indeed, GTE was one of the largest independent telephone company after WWII. As a result
of the juridicisation of the stakes of Internet governance, several law firms played a key role in the
period. Because of the reduced size of law firms, they do not stand out in the network visualization
but their role as brokers was crucial for the institutionalisation of Internet governance. 
The Global Internet Project deserves special attention since it was created as a corporate platform
specialising in Internet governance to advocate for corporate interests in the negotiations. It was an
an international  group of  senior  executives  and served as  an advisory committee  to  the  World
Information and Telecommunication Association (WITSA). According to its website, the WITSA is
a consortium of ICT industry associations and currently has members from 82 countries around the
world  and represent  more  than 90 percent  of  the  world ICT market.  This kind of  professional
association is a form of institutionalisation of global specialized elites and the GIP represented this
structural power within the field of Internet governance. Members of the GIP came from several key
players  of  the  information  and  telecommunication  sector  such as  Visa,  Deutsche  Telekom and
Fujitsu The Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) served as secretariat for the
GIP. While the GIP was not the loudest voice in the public comments to the policy documents, its
determination to have a say in the debates was evidenced by their website:
"The  GIP is  not  a  lobbying  organization.  Its  primary  goal  is  not  to  shape
government regulation, but instead promote industry actions that will minimize
87 Karl Denninger, himself an early Internet entrepreneur (see following pages) has not heard of any application being 
rejected (interview with Karl Denninger, October, 3, 2012). 
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the need for such regulation.  The GIP calls upon governments to encourage
private sector solutions to Internet policy challenges. Its members are working
to anticipate and address potential situations that could develop as the Internet
grows so that government action will not be required."88
The  International  Chamber  of  Commerce  was  also involved  in  the  debates  but  with  a  less
specialized  focus  on  Internet governance  and  a  broader  perspective  on  the  Internet  economy
(International Chamber of Commerce, 1998). 
Far  from  a  cyber-libertarian  view  of  Internet  governance,  US  governmental  agencies  and  the
European  commission  remained  at  the  heart  of  the  field.  While  the  documents  stressed  the
importance of the exclusion of governmental and intergovernmental actors in the management of
domain names and IP addresses, the network of actors clearly shows that US governmental agencies
related to the National Science Foundation and the Department of Commerce were central for the
gathering  of  different  elites.  The European Commission was a  latecomer in  the  debate but  the
political and economic power of the European Union granted the Commission with an important
power of influence when the ICANN was created and its board selected (Mueller 2002).  
The network also evidences the unequal balance between national affiliations of the different actors.
US-based  organizations  represent  a  large  majority.  Several  actors  from  the  Triad  that  was
dominating the global political economy in the 1990's are involved, as well as organizations from
Oceania. The Asia-Pacific region  is often mentioned (e.g. The APNIC registrar, the Asia Pacific
Political and Legal Workshop in June 1996) but it is completely dominated by actors from Australia
and Japan, with some participation from New Zealand. Together with the neoliberal ideology, the
domination of the Triad over the global political economy is an essential feature of the 1990s. Its
translation in the field of Internet governance evidences the importance of the national capital in
transational fields. 
5.2.2. Elite career and institutional interlocks
The linkages evidenced at a general level by the network analysis of the Internet governance debate
of the 1990s can be illustrated by some more precise examples of actors that were in a brokering
88 See the ”About us” page of the Global Internet Project  available at http://www.witsa.org/gip/about/, last accessed 8
April 2014.
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position between specialised elites. Different profiles were represented in these broker positions. 
First, some individuals came from a different field and could thus adopt a more "neutral" stance and
language in order to  create consensus on several  issues. This is  the case of Ira  Magaziner,  the
information technology czar of the Clinton administration. In spite of his experience in the private
sector in consulting firms89, most of Magaziner´s careers is linked to the US political field and more
specifically to the Democrat party. His role in Internet governance started as he was asked by the
US President to draft a report on electronic commerce. According to Magaziner, the consensus-
building was at  the heart  of the project after the failure of the health care system reform 90. His
institutional position gave him an arbitration role in the debates of the 1990s. Magaziner initiated
the neoliberal policy of Internet governance by introducing the principles that were going to lead
future action, among them the leadership role of the private sector, the minimalist role of the state,
the uniqueness of the Internet and the need to create a large electronic market. A similar consensus-
building role was played by lawyers, among them the influential Joe Sims who drafted the ICANN
by-laws. Legal language was important to reconcile diverging views and to find a common base
between groups of individuals with very different professional backgrounds. 
Another type of profile is the individual deeply involved in the institutions of his specialized elite
groups  but  who  is  also  affiliated  with  other  specialized  institutions,  either  at  the  same  time
(multiple-hat phenomenon), or through chronological circulation (circulation of elites). The most
famous example is Jon Postel. He was in charge of the allocation of domains names and Internet
Protocol addresses until the reform of the system and thus held a dominating position within the
field of computer science before the commercialization of the Internet (see chapter 4). He was one
of the senior IT specialists involved in the development of the Internet and a founding member of
the Internet Society and of the Internet Architecture Board (Cerf, 1998). As such, his voice was very
influential  among  the  so-called  technical  community.  He  had  worked  on  government  research
projects, especially on Internet's ancestor ARPANET since he was a graduate student (Postel, 1997).
Jon Postel had strong contacts within the US administration. Much has been written on the mistrust
between the technical community and NSI´s monopoly on the .com domain that would have started
the  debates  about  Internet  governance.  However,  Jon  Postel  had  been  working  in  a  close
relationship  with  NSI  for  years.  He  was  part  of  NSI´s  application  to  the  National  Science
Foundation contracting solicitation. Postel was to become the chairman of an advisory panel and his
89 See http://www.energycongress.com/program/iramagazinerbio.htm, last accessed 8 April 2014.
90 See http://www.pbs.org/newshour/cyberspace/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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Information Science Institute at the University of Southern California was to become subcontractor
of NSI for several specific tasks91. As the IANA, Postel was responsible of the allocation of class A
IP addresses to several large companies such as IBM and AT&T, which allowed them to have a
substantial competitive advantage by owning a much larger choice of IP addresses than smaller
firms92.   Postel was directed by the ISOC Board to develop a business plan to implement his project
presented in the Draft Postel93. Consequently, Postel appointed the IAHC members. In 1998, Postel
appointed  a  IANA Transition  Advisory  Group  (ITAG)  together  with  Brian  Carpenter,  an  IBM
employee. The role of the ITAG was to reflect on the creation of a new non-profit corporation to
manage Internet names and numbers (Mueller 2002).  In order to put pressure on the government,
Postel re-directed the root from NSI´s official root server to a server he operated at the University of
Southern California (Mueller 2002). While this redirection could have been considered as a federal
offence, Postel claimed that he was running a test and no charges were raised against him. This test
occurred just when the government was finishing the redaction of the Green Paper (Mueller 2002).
Postel then endorsed the Green Paper and suggested modifications94. Thanks to his position in the
debates, he was later able to co-author the by-laws of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers with Don Telage, CEO of the monopolistic commercial registrar of Internet domain
NSI (ICANN, 1998). Don Telage and Jon Postel were serving at the same time in the board of the
American Registry for Internet Names. The fact that the ICANN was considered favouring large
corporate interests and even a gift made to IBM, NSI and other companies95 has to be analysed in
relation with the role of Jon Postel in the processes. The charismatic character of Jon Postel gave his
actions a special significance. Muller (2002) describes an "emotional" endorsement of the Postel-
Sims ICANN proposal at the 42nd IETF meeting in August 1998:
"A member of the audience stood up and asked the attendees to give Jon Postel
a standing ovation for all his good work the last 20 years and his work on his
latest 'new IANA' draft". Postel efforts were endorsed by acclamation with a
few  notable  exceptions.  Almost  all  of  those  present  had  never  read  either
proposal." (Mueller 2002, section 8.2.2)  
Jon Postel died of a heart attack in October 1998, just before the official creation of the ICANN.
91 See http://www.rs.internic.net/nsf/nis/, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.
92 See the allocation of IPv4 class A addresses at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_assigned_/8_IPv4_address_blocks, last accessed 8 April 2014.
93 See the minutes of the meeting of the ISOC Board of Trusteees at 
http://www.isoc.org/isoc/general/trustees/mtg09.html, last accessed 8 April 2014.
94 See Public comments available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/comments/comments.html, last accessed on 8 
April 2014.
95 See ”Secret Meeting Shows ICANN - IBM Dependence”, at http://www.cookreport.com/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=157:811&catid=47:2000&Itemid=63, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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According to Muller, a large part of the legitimacy of the new institution was lost with his death
(Mueller 2002, section 8.2.3). 
Similarly important was the role of Postel's  close high-school  friend Vinton Cerf, also a senior
networking specialist and co-inventor of the TCP/IP protocol suite that is the technical basis of the
Internet  (Abbate, 1999).  Vinton Cerf was also involved in the governmental networking projects
financed by the  US department  of  defence  (Abbate,  1999).   But  he was also vice-president  of
technology strategy at MCI (later MCI-Worldcom), one of the major telecommunications company
in the United States. As we have seen, MCI was involved in the commercialization of the Internet.
At the end of the 1980s, it started providing the transmission circuits for the NSF backbone96. Cerf
was  also  responsible  for  the  creation  of  the  first  commercial  e-mail  service  for  MCI,  which
happened before the official authorisation of commercial activities on the Internet (see chapter 4).
Vinton Cerf was also very active in the institutionalisation of the networking computer science field
as the promoter of the idea and later a founding member of the Internet Society and served as its
chair  from 1992 to  200197(Mueller  2002).  In  1998,  he worked directly  for  the  Global  Internet
Project, the business lobby involved in Internet governance issues (Mueller, 2002; section 8.1.2). In
this position, he was a broker between computer scientists and large transnational companies, like
Postel  had  been  with  NSI.  Therefore,  he  played  a  crucial  role  in  gaining  support  from large
transnational firms to the ICANN. He organized the fund-raising effort that was essential for the
ICANN to start functioning: 
"IBM, MCI Worldcom, Ascend Communications, GTE Interworking and Cisco
Systems are proposing that the GIP take the lead in an effort to raise upwards
of $500,000 necessary to "bootstrap" the new, non-profit Internet management
corporation.  The  GIP envisions  raising  $25,000  to  $50,000  from 15  to  20
companies  to  achieve  this  goal.  Such  start-up  funding  would  cover  the
expenses of the corporation for the first 4-6 months of operation.” 98
Vint Cerf had also close ties with the U. S government since he reportedly participated since the
very beginning to the governmental efforts to ensure the creation of a new governance system. He
has been praised for its involvement in the drafting of the Framework for E-commerce issued by the
96 See http://www.nsf.gov/about/history/nsf0050/internet/launch.htm, last accessed 8 April 2014.
97 See http://www.isoc.org/isoc/general/trustees/board.php, last accessed 8 April 2014.
98 Press release by the Global Internet Project in September 1998, available at www.gip.org, last accessed through the 
Internet Archive 8 April 2014.
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White House99. He was certainly a strong supporter of the process100. While speaking directly in the
name of MCI during the debates101,  Cerf consistently refused to be portrayed as an advocate of
corporate interests and insisted on his university and research experience:
"just  one  question  about  the  analysis,  you sort  of  put  me in  the  "supplier"
pigeon  hole.  I  just  wondered  whether  my  involvement  with  ISOC/ISTF,
Gallaudet University (board member), Wiley (Networking Council series) and
other  assorted  educational  and  research  activities  (e.g.  Internet2,  IPNRG)
counted for anything in your calculus.
[...]  In the GIP, I do try to represent  an industry perspective – that was the
intention in forming GIP. However at ICANN, I try very hard NOT to represent
industry alone or the protocol/technical community, alone, or any other group
alone.  I  see the job of ICANN director as much broader than that and that
ICANN, and those who depend on its choices, are not well served by narrowly
viewed perspectives."102 
While not directly involved in the nominations of the ICANN Board members in 1998 (Mueller
2002), he became himself a board member for the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers from 2000 to 2007103. Cerf is now a Chief internet Evangelist at Google Inc.104; a board
member of the American Registry for Internet Numbers105; and the president of the Association for
Computing Machinery106.
Another individual involved with the institutionalization of the computer networking field, Anthony
M.  Rutkowski had a different personal  history.  Rutkowski had a  formation both in  law and in
electrical engineering. He worked at the Federal Communication Commission for 12 years from
1974 to 1986107. During his time at the FCC, Rutkowski worked as a US delegate to the ITU and
99 See  comment  by  Educom  Net  to  the  Green  Paper,  available  at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/comments/comments.html,  last  accessed  on  8
April 2014.
100 See Vinton Cerf's interview with PBS, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/cyberspace/, last accessed 8 April 
2014.
101 Cerf  signed  the  comments  by  MCI  to  the  Green  Paper,  available  at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/comments/comments.html,  last  accessed  on  8
April 2014.
102 See the exchange3 between Hans Klein and Vint Cerf in the comments of the Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility (CPSR) report on ”Cyber-Federalist No. 4 -- Analysis of the ICANN-Named At Large Nominees”,
available  at  http://cpsr.org/prevsite/internetdemocracy/cyber-fed/Number_4.html/,  last  accessed  7  October  2012.
The whole dialogue is an interesting illustration of the limits of the stakeholder concept and multistakeholdersim
governance model.  
103 See http://www.icann.org/en/general/board.html, last accessed 8 April 2014.
104 See http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/vintcerf.html, last accessed 8 April 2014.
105 See http://www.arin.net/about_us/bot.html, last accessed 8 April 2014.
106 See http://www.acm.org/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
107 See http://www.ngi.org/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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participated to the MacBride Commission at the UNESCO108. He was at the same time a part-time
faculty member at the New York Law School109. He authored a book and several articles about the
ITU and international telecommunication regulation (see for example Codding & Rutkowski, 1982).
In  1986,  Rutkowski  joined  the  MIT  and  worked  among  other  things  on  Open  Network
Architectures. The MIT was among the most active universities since the beginnings of computer
networking. At the same time, Rutkowski was Counsellor to two different Secretary-Generals of the
ITU110.  The second one was Peter Tarjanne, the architect of the neoliberal turn of the ITU (see
chapter  4).  Rutkowski  participated  in  the  transformation  of  the  ITU and was conscious  of  the
changes he had helped bring about:
 "When I left the ITU and went back to the private industry, I'll never forget the
emphatic  statement  by  a  leading industry  corporate  president  in  a  planning
meeting – We the industry are the ITU today" (Hills, 2007, p. 130)
Rutkowski  was  invited  by  Cerf  to  join  the  Internet  Architecture  Board  in  1990 to  become its
'international person' (Mueller 2002, section 5.4.4). Rutkowski became the executive director of the
Internet Society at its creation. He was an admirer of the IETF methods and considered them a
model  for  international  standardization.  However,  maybe  because  of  Rutkowski  different
background, conflicts  arose in the ISOC and Rutkowski  left  the Board in 1995 (Mueller 2002,
section 5.4.4). From 1992 to 1994, Rutkowski worked as Director of Technology Assessment in the
Strategic  Planning Group of  Sprint  International,  a  telecommunication  company that  was  very
active in early commercial Internet. He was also Sprint's White House liaison during these years111.
When the IAHC formed by Postel made their draft report public, Rutkowski's harsh critique was
very influential112. He stressed the intergovernmental character of the IAHC agreement and the lack
of adequate legal procedure. He refused the idea that the Top-Level Domain Space could be seen as
a public resource and appealed to the US government to regulate the process. It is not clear whether
Rutkowski was already a consultant for NSI at the time of the publication of the brief or if the
consultancy  began  later  (Mueller  2002,  section  8.2.1).  Nevertheless,  the  need  for  government
intervention was clearly in the interest of NSI, a long-date government contractor. Rutkowski then
was member of several groups close to US government-led efforts  to create a new governance
system such as the President's  Framework for Global Electronic Commerce task force,  and the
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Brief of Anthony M. Rutkowski, 2 April 1997, available at www.wia.org/pub/dns-brief.html, last accessed through
the Internet Archive 8 April 2014.
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Harvard Kennedy School GII Project. Rutkowski took part of the efforts to propose an alternative to
the ICANN in 1998 in the International Forum on the White Paper. Rutkowski was appointed vice-
president of NSI in 2000. When NSI was sold to VeriSign Inc., a large Internet registry and registrar
company, Rutkowski continued to work with the firm. In 2009, Rutkowski returned to the  ITU
where he was appointed as ITU-T Study Group 17 (Security) Rapporteur for Cybersecurity113.
Other individuals like John Patrick had a far lower degree of circulation since he joined IBM in
1967 and left the company when he retired in 2001. However, this durable position did not impede
Patrick to be involved in several other institutions that were very important in the creation of a new
governance system for the Internet in the 1990s. In 1994, Patrick was a founding donor of the World
Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the leading standard organization for the Web114. Patrick was also a
member of the Internet Society and a senior member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers  (IEEE)115.  In 1995, Patrick became IBM's Vice President  of Internet  technology. The
same year, he founded the Global Internet Project and became its chair. Despite IBM history of
proprietary internetworking standards (see chapter 4), the company managed to become rapidly a
leader of TCP/IP Internet. The Global Internet Project became a platform to push forward the ideas
of  self-regulation  of  the  Internet,  with  IBM in  a  structurally  dominant  position.  Patrick  stated
modestly that:
"One surprise is that most of the governments of the world have resisted the
temptation to regulate the Internet, I wouldn't say it was because of the Global
Internet Project. It's more because governments realized that they really didn't
understand it."116 
Patrick and IBM were instrumental in the support of the fragile ICANN in its first years (see chapter
6) and were able to manage the tensions between ICANN and NSI in order for the Corporation to
survive the power struggles. 
These individuals were at the heart of the connection between the institutions dating back to the
structuration of the scientific field of computer networking and the large computer and networking
companies. They are core to the power elite described in greater details in the following section.
However  the  networks  of  the  previous  section  show  other  actors,  who  were  to  some  extent
influential  in  the  process  but  who can  not  be  described  as  member  of  the  power  elite.  Small
113  See http://www.ngi.org/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
114 See http://fr.opera.com/press/releases/2004/01/30/, 8 April 2014.
115 See http://fr.opera.com/press/releases/2004/01/30/, 8 April 2014.
116 See http://newsroom.cisco.com/feature-content?articleId=668094&type=webcontent, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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entrepreneurs and individuals affiliated with small companies, together with some scholars tried to
oppose the elite project. Network visualisation tend to obscure the nature of the relationships and
some individuals listed before had rather antagonistic relationship with the power elite. If the power
of this elite rested upon their institutional positions (Wright Mills 2000) in the computer networking
field,  in  the  academia,  in  government-funded  specialized  institutions,  in  intergovernmental
organizations or in large corporations, some other important actors can be found in what can be
described as a counter-elite, primarily that had the knowledge resources to participate both in the
technical/scientific  debates,  and  in  the  more  general  policy  debate.  Their  lack  of  institutional
leverage condemned their attempts to determinate some features of the new governance system, but
their voice had to be heard in order for the system to have some legitimacy and for the power elite
to reach hegemonic status (see chapter 6).   
The counter-elite can was organized around the Open Root Server Confederation (ORSC) and the
Boston Working Group (BWG). These two institutions struggled until the creation of the ICANN to
defend a perspective that was consistent with the field's doxa (based on Internet exceptionalism; and
neoliberal, cyber-libertarian or minimalist public good discourses) but that was in favour of non-
dominant actors. 
Karl Denninger was a member of the ORSC. He founded MCSNet in 1987 and became CEO of the
company. MCSNET was a successful Internet company in the Chicago area around the time of the
commercialization of the network. Denninger was opposed to the attempts by Postel to design a
new governance system. He published an Internet Draft as soon as January 1996 to propose the
creation  of  a  great  number of  new general  Top-level  Domains  to  introduce  competition  in  the
market of domain registration.  A strong supporter of the cyber-libertarian discourse117,  the main
objective of Denninger was to avoid monopolistic behaviours in the market for domain names.
Together  with  other  pioneering  entrepreneurs,  he  founded  the  ORSC  to  make  an  alternative
proposal to the ICANN by-laws that were very conservatives it terms of new top-level domain
names. Although this attempt failed and Denninger denounced the capture of the new corporation
by a handful of individuals, he thinks that this movement was influential in the long-term since the
ICANN is now changing its policies118. The counter-elite has indeed participated in raising concerns
about the ICANN and to question its legitimacy, which led to the fragility of the consensus around
117 He declares that his political views are libertarian and was among the first individuals who launched the idea of a
Tea  Parties  movement  in  the  US  after  the  election  of  US  President  Obama.  See  www.market-ticker.org and
interview with the author 3 October 2012.
118 Interview with the author, 3 October 2012.
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the corporation (see chapter 6). 
Among the Boston Working Group, Karl Auerbach has been one of the loudest opponent to the
concept of multistakeholderism119. Auerbach was also a small entrepreneur even though he worked
for Cisco between 1998 and 2001. He participated to the elaboration of the TCP/IP protocol. The
Boston Working Group has been influential in the enhancement of participatory and transparency
mechanisms in the ICANN. As an advocate of elections to the ICANN Board, Auerbach was a
candidate and was elected as a board member for North America in the only ICANN election that
took place in 2000 (see chapter 6). He is also famous to have successfully filed suit against ICANN
when he was a board member for the lack of transparency of the institution (see chapter 6). 
As we can see with these examples, the classification of an actor in one or the other stakeholder
category is arbitrary or at least historically unstable. The "power elite vs. counter-elite" perspective
offers a more useful way to categorize the actors of the Internet governance debates of the 1990s120.
The  examples  given  in  this  section  illustrate  the  circulation  and  multiple-hat  phenomena  that
marked  Internet  governance  elites.  However,  this  individualistic  perspective  aims  at  a  better
description  of  a  broader  picture.  The  following  section  tries  to  bridge  the  gap  between  the
prosopographic analyses and the analysis of institutions by providing an attempt to characterize the
institutional structure of the field of Internet governance in the 1990s. 
5.2.3. The transnational power elite of Internet governance in the ICANN
The  connections  among  different  actors  evidenced  in  the  former  section  can  be  theoretically
described as the emergence of a power elite of Internet governance. This concept allows us to grasp
the  history  of  Internet  governance  with  a  different  look  and  can  help  understand  the
institutionalisation of Internet governance in the 1990s as the institutionalisation of a particular field
within a more general context. 
The debates on the allocation of Internet domain names and Internet Protocol addresses in the 1990s
led to the creation of what was defined earlier as a transnational power elite. The political process
was not a competition among diverging interests and world views. It was a process of inclusion-
exclusion that defined which actors were going to be part of the power elite of Internet governance.
119 See ttp://www.cavebear.com/archive/rw/igf-democracy-in-internet-governance.pdf, last accessed 8 April 2014.
120 The description of the counter-elite is developed in chapter 6.
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The heart of the power elite is to be found in the US around some elite technical experts, a few key
institutions  of  the  US  government,  especially  in  the  department  of  commerce,  the  computer
manufacturer and leading telecommunications companies. This emerging power elite had to cope
with the vast majority of the private sector who were only interested in the protection of trademarks
and some influential law firms and integrated these actors. On a transnational/international level,
some big transnational companies, especially form Europe and Japan, as well as some powerful
governments were able to weigh in the debates. The European Commission, the OECD and the
WIPO were the key intergovernmental organisations whose employees participated in the creation
of a transnational power elite of Internet governance.  This emerging elite was unified around a
project described in the various documents published during he debates and especially the By-laws
of  the  newly-created  ICANN.  The  idea  behind  this  project  is  the  creation  of  a  new,  loosely-
regulated  market  for  Internet  domain  names.  This  lucrative  market  was  to  be  free  from state
regulation and from international oversight, except for a strong protection of intellectual property
rights of  the big transnational  firms. The matter  was treated as  a  technical  issue,  that  had few
political and social consequences. As such, the ICANN had a technical mandate and was led by the
technical authorities.  
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers is only one institution among others
that takes part in the governance of the network. However, it is the institution that better illustrates
the result of the political struggles of the 1990s. The ICANN represents the institutionalisation of
the  power  of  the  transnational  elite  of  Internet  governance.  The  other  institutions  of  Internet
governance were not as politicized as the ICANN (for example the standardisation bodies such as
the IETF or the W3C), others were national or regional (ministries, Council of Europe etc.), others
were focusing on a specific issue such as e-commerce (OECD) or intellectual property (WIPO).
Moreover, most of these institutions played a role in the debates surrounding the creation of the
ICANN or its early functioning. Finally, the structure of the ICANN illustrates the elitist tendency
of the institution despite the claims of an open and participative system.  Mueller (2002; section
8.2.3) despite his description of a pluralist process reaches the conclusion of an institution captured
from the start by the dominant actors. 
The ICANN's structure is clearly dominated by the Board and  by  the  technical  management. As
stated by the by-laws: "the powers of the Corporation will be exercised, its property controlled and
its business and affairs conducted by or under the direction of the Board" (ICANN 1998, art. IV
§1a). The board is also entitled to change the by-laws and the structure of the organization. The
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Supporting Organizations can make recommendations and nominate a certain number of members
of the Board (ICANN 1998, art. V §4 and art. VI).  The elite within the ICANN is thus to be found
among the people  that chose the initial Board members beforehand, the Board members and the
supporting organizations (see figure  6.1). The advisory committees, especially the governmental
advisory committee, were given little power (see chapter 6).
According to Muller (2002), a list of board members was first drafted by an IBM lobbyist, Roger
Cochetti, with suggestions from Postel and his lawyer, the European Commission and the Australian
government.  While this closed process remains largely undocumented,  the resulting project was
criticised by the public, especially for the elitist character of the board election121. The most reliable
source on the issue is the answer sent by the US Department of Commerce to the inquiry of the
chairman of the Committee on Commerce of the US house of representatives, Thomas J. Bliley, Jr
about  the  involvement  of  the  Department  of  Commerce  in  the  ICANN  creation  process122.
According  to  the  Department  of  Commerce,  Jon  Postel,  Joe  Sims  and  the  organizers  of  the
International Forum on the White Paper were officially in charge of the selection. Canada, Australia
and the DG XIII of the European Commission expressed their interest to have respective nationals
represented  on  the  Board:  the  European  Commission  had  three  candidates,  the  Canadian
government had two and the Australian one. IBM's Roger Cochetti was indeed preparing a list of
individuals in the summer of 1998 and told the Department of Commerce that he had selected
Esther Dyson (see below). While the official position of the Department of Commerce was to avoid
any suggestion or intervention, Ms. Burr recognized in the letter that she had recommended that
critics of IANA such as Jay Fenello, a ORSC member, be involved in the selection of the Board.  
The names of the members of the interim board of the ICANN in 1998 are consistent with this
process. Three Europeans and one Australian were selected; and Esther Dyson was appointed as the
board chairman123.  Besides the selection of Esther Dyson by an IBM employee,  a former IBM
employee,  George  Conrades  was  selected,  showing  the  influence  of  the  company  on  the
corporation. Conrades had also worked at another Global Internet Project Company, GTE and at
BBN. The European Commission chose the deputy-director of the DG XIII, Eugenio Triana,  to
121 Public comments available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/comments/comments.html, last accessed on 8 
April 2014. 
122 Letter from John Sopko, Chief Counsel for Special Matters, U.S Department of Commerce to Thomas J. Bliley, Jr,
chairman of the Committe on Commerce of the U.S house of representatives, 5 November 1998, reproduced at
http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/text/acn9-2.articles/acn9-2.a04.txt, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
123 See http://www.icann.org/en/news/announcements/icann-pr-26oct98-en.htm, last accessed 8 April 2014. It seems 
that the Canadian governement was not as successful in its lobbying effort as other governments.
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become an ICANN director. Linda S. Wilson was a former advisory council member for the US
National  Science  Foundation  Director.  Her  profile  of  scholar  is  reminiscent  of  the  academic
management of the network in the 1970s and 1980s. Jun Murai was also a scholar and an Internet
Society Board Member.  In spite  of the technical mandate of the institution, the board selection
evidences an attempt to represent a variety of powerful actors in the field of Internet governance.
Rather  than  a  strictly  transnational  private  authority  as  described  in  the  discourses  and policy
documents, the selection of the Board illustrate a more classical concern of geographical repartition
and a mix of direct and indirect relations between the institutional elite and the corporate elite.
Figure 5.4. Ego-network of the first ICANN board124 
124 Network visualization based on the figure 5.2.2, focusing on the ego-network of the ICANN board (Borgatti et al.,
2002). An ego-network is a subset of a larger network focusing on one node, in this case the first ICANN board. It
represents the “neighbourhood” of the node: the nodes that are connected to the ego through a short path. The aim is
here to show the institutional affiliations of the members of the first ICANN board to provide evidence of the
influence of some members of the power elite. See Hanneman, R and Riddle, M. “Introduction to social network
methods”, available at http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/C9_Ego_networks.html, last accessed 8 April 2014.
184
The  structuration  of  the  field  of  Internet governance  in  the  1990s  illustrates  the  concept  of  a
transnational field. A set of institutions organize the power struggles of the agents of the field. One
central institution, the ICANN, has been at the center of the debates in the second-half of the 1990s
and epitomizes both the unification and the hybridization of the field. The creation of the ICANN
was the first Internet governance issue to raise public concern and all the agents and the institutions
of the field participated. As such, and as described by Mueller (2002) the issue of the Domain
Names  System  is  constitutive  of  Internet  governance  as  a  global  political  issue.  It  is  also
constitutive of a transnational field. The field is hybrid since it results from the collision of the
scientific  field  of  computer  networking  and  the  global  political  economic  field  of
telecommunications. The central institution of the field illustrates this dual nature. It has a primarily
technical mandate and the technological-scientific elite played a crucial role in its creation. On the
other hand, its board is populated by political and business elites that participate in the regulation of
a new telecommunication market.
The field of Internet governance is divided between dominant agents pertaining to transnational
power elite and dominated non-elite groups. Some of the non-dominant groups attempted to change
the rules of the game in the field by relying on some strong ideological elements such as private
initiative and Internet exceptionalism. While they had some influence on the institutionalization of
the field, they were not able to impose a different model.  
Conclusions
A transnational power elite emerged at the occasion of the institutionalization of the field of Internet
governance in the second half of the 1990s. Ideological cohesion was ensured by a neoliberal model
of governance with the co-optation of some other important discourses such as the cyber-libertarian
and a minimalist version of the global public goods discourse. Marginalized actors were excluded
from the debates if they did not abide by the doxa of the field, mainly characterized by Internet
exceptionalism. The power elite was also unified by the circulation of its members. The circulation
of elites was chronological, with individuals moving from one organization to the other; as well as
simultaneous, with individuals having multiple affiliations at the same time. The unification of the
power elite has been described both by a social  network analysis and prosopographic methods.
These  findings  question  the  multi-stakeholder/pluralist  model  that  describes  the  competition
between interest  groups  and institutional  models.  The chapter  shows that  this  competition  was
limited  to  a  number  of  projects  that  were  consistent  with  the  doxa  of  the  field  and  that  the
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boundaries between stakeholder groups were unstable and blurred. Counter-elite groups, relying on
cyber-libertarian  and  global  public  good  discourses  were  co-opted  to  ensure  institutionalized
consent. However, the consensus was very fragile and the concessions made by the power elite were
so marginal that the model was highly unstable. It exemplified the idea of a  “minimal hegemony”
(Carfruny and Ryner 2007). The following chapter further investigates the fragility of the consensus
and the dialectics of hegemony and resistance in the first years of existence of the ICANN. 
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Chap. 6. Broadening the scope of Internet governance (1999-
2002)
The institutionalization of the field of Internet governance around the creation of the ICANN in
1998 did not bring about a stabilization of the field's frontiers and structure. The hegemonic project
of the ICANN failed to create a consensus beyond elite groups. The rapid transformations of the
field at  the turn of  the millennium further  undermined its  stability.  The elite-led  reform of the
ICANN was not sufficient to avoid an open crisis of the field and the redefinition of its frontiers.
This chapter  analyses  the  transition  period between the  creation  of  the  ICANN and the  World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) that took place between 2003 and 2005. This transition
is important because of the redefinition of the frontiers of the field that took place during these
years.  While  Internet  governance  was  institutionalized  in  1998  with  a  focus  on  technical
management of the network and with a clear exclusion of political and social issues, the WSIS
debates illustrate the broadening of the realm of Internet governance.  Several accounts of Internet
governance in  the 1990s and the creation of  the  Internet  Corporation for  Assigned Names and
Numbers  (ICANN)  exist  (Froomkin,  2000;  Klein,  2002;  McDowell  & Steinberg,  2001), many
authors studied the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003-2005 (Flyverbom,
2011; Frau-Meigs, 2012; Raboy, Landry, & Shtern, 2010). Some authors even  analysed the two
moments  separately  (Antonova,  2007;  Kleinwächter,  2000;  Kleinwächter,  2008;  Mueller,  2002;
Mueller, 2010). However, few of these studies address the changes that occurred between these two
historical moments. Internet governance in the 1990s was focused on the issue of the domain name
system: the question of who decided to assign a given name in the “.com” or “.de”  to a particular
person or organization. The debates during the WSIS had a much broader definition of what Internet
governance was, and addressed social and political issues related to the management of the network.
This  is  an  important  change  in  the  understanding  of  the  issue.  Yet,  the  literature  on  Internet
governance often takes the change for granted and explain the broadening of the issue-area by the
discontent provoked by the ICANN. This explanation is far from sufficient since every governance
system is criticized and even fought by a certain number of actors without generating change in a
systematic  way.  The  sociology  of  Bourdieu  allows  us  to  think  about  change  in  a  more
comprehensive way. Changes in the nature of actors and in their strategies are analysed in relation
with their positions in the field. Change in the practices of actors have a different impact on the field
depending on their positions within it. 
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The chapter explores first the fragility of the hegemonic project of the elite and the failure of the
manufacturing of consent in the field. It then addresses the factors of change that existed in the field
during the transition period by applying a typology of factors developed by Bourdieu (Bourdieu
2005) and used by French regulationists (Boyer 2003, 2008) to analyse institutional change. Finally,
the chapter analyses the failure of an elite-led reform to restore hegemony in the field.
6.1. The fragility of the hegemonic project of the power elite
The consensus that permitted the creation of a power elite of Internet governance in the second half
of the 1990s was only one of the two elements that are required for the stability of a field.  The
acceptance of elite rule by non-elites is also necessary for a given order to prevail. As we have seen
in chapter 3, the notion of hegemony, taken from Gramsci is an interesting addition to Wright Mills'
power elite. that presupposes that “account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups
over which hegemony is to be exercised” (Gramsci 2001: 373).  Unlike Wright Mills, Gramsci
elaborates on a situation where mobilisation exists, but where the active rather than passive consent
of  the  public  allows  the  power  elite  to  rule  (Burawoy 1982,  2008).  The dynamic  character  of
hegemony and the importance of agency need to be analysed in the process of managing active
consent  (Birchfield  1999).  In  this  view,  hegemony  is  a  bidirectional  movement:  a  centrifugal
movement  of  domination  from  the  power  elite  towards  non-elites,  but  is  also  a  polycentric
movement of active consent that involves non-elites (Graz, 1999, p. 132). The power elite needed
more than a passive consent of non-elite groups. It had to secure the active consent of already
mobilised  groups  that  were  not  included  in  the  dominant  positions  of  the  field.  The  ICANN
represented not only a repartition of institutional power among elite groups, it was also a hegemonic
project seeking broader consent in the field. 
6.1.1. The manufacturing of consent and the notion of 
multistakeholderism
The first and most sustainable aspect of hegemony is the consent of the dominated. The process of
manufacturing consent through the creation of institutions has been studied by neo-Gramscian IPE.
Open institutions are key elements of the stability of the field.  Institutions are an expression of
hegemony (Cox 1996: 137), and the ICANN can be described as an expression of the hegemony (or
at least a hegemonic project) of a transnational power elite in Internet governance. The emerging
power elite of Internet  governance had to make some concessions in  order for their  rule to  be
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accepted by non-elite groups. To be able to speak in the name of “the Internet Community,” as
claimed by the gTLD-MoU (IAHC 1997: 1), the emerging power elite had to express its leadership
in terms of the general interest or that of Internet users. As Cox puts it:
“Institutions may become the anchor for such a hegemonic strategy since they
lend  themselves  both  to  the  representations  of  diverse  interests  and  to  the
universalisation of policy.” (Cox 1996; p. 137) 
The emerging power elite had to institutionalize Internet governance in a way that provided some
space for the participation of actors with diverging views without endangering its domination. That
is why, after the initial Draft Postel that only proposed an expert group, the notion of participation
appeared as new documents were drafted and several options were envisaged. Different notions are
used in  the  documents  (i.e.,  participation,  representation,  openness,  inclusiveness),  but  all  were
based on the idea that the new governance system had to include the variety of Internet governance
actors  and Internet  users.  This  necessity  paved the  way for  the  creation  of  a  multistakeholder
governance  system.  Because  of  the  unclear  definition  of  a  stakeholder,  this  was  an  unbinding
measure to allow participation. 
Intergovernmental participation as proposed by the gTLD-MoU (IAHC 1997: introduction and art.
II,  section  6)  and  consistent  with  a  global  public  good  approach  was  ruled  out  by  the  US
government. It disappeared from other official documents. According to a realist understanding of
world  politics,  this  decision  can  be  seen  as  a  mere  defence  of  the  national  interest.  The  US
government  had  a  hegemonic  position  in  Internet  governance  that  it  was  not  eager  to  let  go.
However, this exclusion of any (inter-)governmental participation can be best understood as part of
a consensual elite discourse that relies upon both neoliberal and cyber-libertarian assumptions (see
chapter 5). Arguably, the US had little to fear from the representation of the ITU and the World
Intellectual Property Organization, which accounted to no more than two votes in a 12-member
board; or from the signature of the gTLD-MoU by other governments. 
International participation was replaced by the less precise notion of multistakeholderism, which
recommends the inclusion of the various interest groups with stakes in Internet governance. The
notion  of  multistakeholderism opens  the  door  to  the  participation  of  some powerful  states  and
intergovernmental  organizations  without  endangering  the  discursive  cohesion  among  the  elite.
Multistakeholderism also foresees the participation of non-elite actors and is, thus, at the heart of
the “manufacturing of consent” (Burawoy, 1982). The White Paper on Internet Governance remains
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unclear  about  the  actual  role  of  the  stakeholders  that  are  supposed  to  participate  in  the  new
institution, but the ICANN by-laws describe in great detail the ways in which participation would
be carried out. In fact, Internet governance debates in the 1990s had aroused a relatively strong
interest beyond elite circles. Many of the newcomers and outsiders, along with small businesses,
were not taken into account when the ICANN was created. The International Forum on the White
Paper  (IFWP),  that  was  designed  to  discuss  the  issues  raised  by  the  White  Paper  on  Internet
Governance and to imagine the new institution, was bypassed with the drafting of the ICANN by-
laws by well-connected members of the emerging elite. Mueller, who was a IFWP participant, offers
a first-hand account on this process (Mueller 2002). The issue of participation was thus crucial to
gain some support, or at least to prevent vocal hostile reactions, from non-elite actors.
The ICANN by-laws, as of November 1998, provide for three types of participation/representation
(ICANN 1998: article VI):
• The supporting organizations (SO) with substantial power in the institution (initiative) and the
competence to elect Board members;
• The advisory committees, which have far less power (advisory on their own initiative or even
asked by the Board); and
• The at-large membership,  which the drafting team was reluctant to include and whose actual
creation and powers remain vague in the by-laws.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the power elite was central in the selection of ICANN
Board members and also in the management and staff of the ICANN.  It was also represented in the
Board and the supporting organizations (see figure below, adapted from Mueller (2002: section 9.1).
The participatory discourse – aimed at non-elite groups – concerned the at-large membership and
the advisory committees125. 
125 The chart in the figure 6.1.1 only shows the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). The ICANN by-laws also 
provides that two other advisory committees be created : the DNS Root Server System Advisory Committee and a 
temporary Advisory Committee on Membership (ICANN 1998, art. VII §3). 
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Figure 6.1. The ICANN organizational chart in 1998 (adapted from Mueller 2002)
The  ICANN is  a  structure  that  is  clearly  dominated  by  the  Board.  The  advisory  committees,
especially  the  governmental  advisory  committee,  were  given  little  power.  However,  the  mere
inclusion of non-dominant  actors in  the structure of the institution hints at  a softer  exercise of
domination, based on its consensual character. Thus, the ICANN can be described as a hegemonic
project. While the notions of Internet exceptionalism and technical regulation appealed to powerful
actors whom might see regulation or the involvement of governments as a threat to their power, the
notions of participation and multistakeholderism126 are aimed at the non-elite groups that seek some
arena in which to express their concerns in a more or less democratic way. Participation, as a key
126 The notion of multistakeholderism served both as an element of cohesion among elite groups because of its focus
on private actors, but it was also useful to co-opt non-elite groups. That is why the notion of multistakeholderism is
so central in the field of Internet governance. 
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category of the formal documents, is the central notion around which the consensual aspect of the
domination by the power elite  is  constructed.  As such, it  is  central  in the documents that were
written  by  the  elite  and  aimed  at  a  larger  public.  However,  the  hegemonic  strategy  of  the
institutionalisation  of  Internet  governance  maintained  serious  contradictions  in  the  relations
between the power elite and non-elite groups. It can be described as a “minimal hegemony” that
proved  unstable  (Cafruny  &  Magnus  Ryner,  2007).  It  relied  not  only  on  the  openness  and
consensual  participation of non-dominant  actors but  also on the exclusion of actors and on the
coercion of others.
6.1.2. The coercive character of domination
First,  the  failure  of  the  International  Forum  on  the  White  Paper  (IFWP)  process  marked  the
exclusion  of  counter-elites.  This  movement,  together  with  the  more  consensual  aspect  of
participation illustrate the dual nature of hegemony where persuasion is protected by the armour of
coercion (Gramsci, 1999, p. 532). The exclusion of actors is an important aspect of domination and
a necessary  step  to  manage consensual  rule.  If  this  exclusion  applies  to important  actors  with
institutional power in the field or especially in other fields, the process of exclusion is not a step
towards consensus but rather the creation or the strengthening of counter-elites. The case of the
failure  of  the  International  Forum on the  White  Paper  illustrates the  difficult  balance  between
consensus-building and the strengthening of counter-elites.
The International Forum on the White Paper was created in July 1998 at the Global Incorporation
Alliance Workshop in Reston,  Virginia.  The Forum intended to be the “open” and “consensus-
driven” process including all “stakeholders” called upon by the White Paper on Internet Governance
released by the US government one month earlier (NTIA, 1998).  The first meeting included many
of the important actors that had been discussing the governance of the network in the previous years
and a number of newcomers, many of them from the academia127. Several issues were discussed like
the profile of the future entity that was going to manage Internet domains, the composition of the
board and the membership, trademarks, but also the broader issues of privacy and security128. Other
meetings were held in Geneva and Buenos Aires. From the beginning, members of the power elite
127 The role and the participation of the Berkman Center of Harvard's Law School evidence the increasing influence of
legal scholars in the field. See http://www.domainhandbook.com/giaw-attend.html, last accessed 8 April 2014. The
center became the moderator of the workshop for the following meetings (Mueller 2002). 
128 This is one of the first attempt to broaden the definition of Internet governance that is characteristic of the factors of 
change discussed in the following section. 
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tried to restrain the mandate of the Forum:
“We need to design and implement a new organization and this new organization 
needs to take up the challenge of sorting out a number of aspects of the domain 
name system. However, we can separate the formation of the organization from 
solving the domain name issues.”129
As we have seen, the power elite was already working on the creation of the institution and needed
the  consent  of  non-dominant  groups  through  the  meetings.  They  did  not  want  to  see  the
fundamental  issues  discussed.  However,  despite  the  efforts  of  the  power  elite,  the  Forum was
suggesting a model that diverged in may ways from the first drafts by the elite (Mueller 2002). The
participants to the Forum criticized the institution designed by the elite for the lack of a membership
structure, the self-selection of the board, the fact that articles could be changed at any time by the
board, with no particular majority required  and the by-laws that  could be changed by 2/3 of the
board 130.
As a result, the IFWP process was by-passed by the elite and the institutionalisation of Internet
governance continued without the support of the Forum (see chapter 5). Consensus was impossible
on a broad basis. Some of the participants to the Forum questioned the legitimacy of the future
institution. Concerns were especially raised by legal scholars. These actors were thus excluded from
the final negotiations. Consensus was obviously easier to reach on a narrow participatory basis but
important  actors  were  left  aside.  Some early  Internet  entrepreneurs  and  many academics  were
outraged by the failure  of  the IFWP.  More than marginal  actors,  they were real  counter-elites,
threatening the stability of the consensus. Indeed they were powerful individuals and organisations
that held scientific and technical capital rather than non-elites. As a result, the failure to gain their
support significantly undermined the legitimacy of the ICANN in the field (see following section).
The use of coercion and the explicit  exclusion of important actors illustrate the fragility of the
consensus established by the elite. The IFWP was an attempt to persuade non-dominant groups. Its
failure represented a source of instability for the domination of the power elite in the field. 
While a transnational institution like the ICANN does not have a monopoly of legitimate violence
like the state does, coercion was also part of the hegemonic project of the power elite. The US
129 Statement  by Jon Postel  at  the Reston meeting,  written  on the 1st  of  July 1998 and Read by Tamar Frankel,
availbale through the Internet Archive at http://americas.ifwp.org/statement.postel.htm, last accessed 8 April 2014.
130 Exchange between Jim Dixon and Amadeu Abril i Abril on the IFWP mailing list on 25 August 1998, availbale at
http://list.ifwp.org/archive/1998/aug/25/, last accessed through the Internet archive on 8 April 2014.
193
government intervened in some occasions to set the boundaries of legal political action in Internet
governance. During the negotiations on the future of domain names managements, several actors
took steps towards an alternative solution, incompatible with the emerging elite's project. In 1996,
entrepreneurs like Karl Denninger and Eugene Kashpureff started set up alternative registries that
were independent  from the  official  registry held by  Network Solutions.  New top-level  domain
names  were  available  on  these  alternative  registries  such  as  “.biz”,  “.web”  or  “.xxx”.  These
alternative domains could be accessed through alternative DNS root but needed to be included in
the official DNS root zone in order to become accessible to the majority of users131. Soon, these
entrepreneurs  started  registrations  in  their  own  registries  of  new  domain  names.  Efforts  by
alternative registries to have their top-level domain names inserted in Network Solution's database
to become official were frustrated. In July 1997, Eugene Kashpureff hacked the Network Solutions'
registration  procedures:  registrants  were  redirected  to  his  AlterNIC website  and  encountered  a
protest  message against  Network Solutions' monopoly (Mueller,  2002, Chapter 7.3.2). The page
also had a link to the official registration page. In spite of the relative harmlessness of the hack,
Kashpureff  faced a  civil  lawsuit  by  Network Solutions,  and a  criminal  lawsuit  by  the  Federal
Bureau of Investigations on charges of wire fraud (Diamond, 1998). The civil lawsuit was settled by
the payment of a token amount for legal fees and a public apology made on the Internet. However,
Kashpureff was arrested in Canada in October 1997. He was extradited to the US after two months
of custody in Canada while fighting extradition, and pleaded guilty during his trial 132. Kashpureff
was sentenced five years of probation. In spite of the support from some circles, Kashpureff and the
alternative root movement were de-legitimized by the hack and their position was weakened in the
longer term133.  
The response of the US government was different when Jon Postel, a prominent member of the
emerging power elite, hijacked most of the traffic on the network. On January 28, 1998, only two
days before the US government released an important policy documents on the management  of
Internet domains, Jon Postel sent an e-mail to all secondary root servers134 asking them to re-direct
131 The shifting from the official DNS root to an alternative one is a simple configuration that can be carried out in all
operating systems. It only requires adding new IP addresses to the DNS server list. Once changed, users can still
access the official DNS root but also alternative top-level domains. Alternative roots have always existed since
1996  and  some  are  still  active.  For  an  overview,  see  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_DNS_root,  last
accessed 15 November 2012. The Internet Architecture Board expressed its hostility towards the idea of multiple
roots, stating that “There is no getting away from the unique root of the public DNS” (Internet Architecture Board,
2000) 
132 See the record of the U.S attorney at  http://www.irational.org/APD/CCIPS/kashpurepr.htm, last accessed  8 April
2014. 
133 Interview of the author with Karl Denninger, 3 October 2012. 
134 There were thirteen root servers  in 1998. ”The root name servers are a critical part of the Internet because they are 
the first step in translating (resolving) human readable host names into IP addresses that are used in communication 
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the traffic to his own server rather than the usual A root server operated by Network Solutions. Two
third of the secondary root servers followed the order and re-directed their traffic to Postel's server.
To illustrate the potential consequences of the re-direction, Mueller (2002) stresses the fact that
Postel could have changed the root domain, the top hierarchy of the whole domain names system.
He could have for example added or deleted any top-level domain. While he did not do so, the
importance of the political action was much greater than Kashpureff's protest message. However,
Postel was asked by the US government to stop his “experiment” and no charges were pressed
against him. Ira Magaziner, The US government Internet czar only publicly stated that any further
attempt to manipulate the root would be prosecuted as a criminal offence (Muller 2002). 
Non-compliance with the rules of the game could be sanctioned by coercive measures by the state
depending  on  the  position  of  the  non-compliant  actor.  The  authoritative  position  of  the  US
government  on  the  Kashpureff  hack or  on  the  recognition  of  a  specific  institution  as  the  new
corporation that  would manage domain  names illustrate  the ambiguous position of  the state  in
transnational fields. It is always a coercive institution of last resort when consensual domination
fails. The role of the US government in the institutionalisation of Internet governance in the 1990s
also evidences the coercive aspect of domination. While soft law, open dialogues and consensual
agreements were raised as the standards of decision-making in the field of Internet governance,
governments and national courts played a crucial role to maintain a certain order in the field.  
6.1.3. The formation of counter-elites
In their 2007 book, Cafruny and Ryner differentiate between an “integral hegemony” that prevailed
during the Bretton Woods system;  and a “minimal hegemony” in the post-Bretton Woods crisis
(Cafruny & Ryner,  2007). In the integral  hegemony era,  the dominants were prepared to make
concessions to promote stability and legitimacy. In a minimal hegemony, they draw “on [their]
structural  power to  pursue  a  more narrowly based policy that  externalizes domestic  social  and
political problems.” (Cafruny & Ryner, 2007, p. 8). The system remains hegemonic: subordinate
forces still consent to the prevailing order. However, the stability is not ensured since the consent is
not based on concessions by the dominants but rather on the power of structures and inter-subjective
norms. A minimal hegemony is likely to produce discontent and counter-elites since consent is only
normative and does not correspond to an actual repartition of the benefits of a given order. 
between Internet hosts.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_name_server, last accessed 8 April 2014). The A root 
server is the authoritative one and was operated by Network Solutions. The twelve other root servers are called 
secondary root servers.  
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The concept of minimal hegemony describes the situation in the field of Internet governance after
the creation of the ICANN. While a certain consensus still existed on the principles that ruled the
field such as Internet exceptionalism and multistakeholderism, the institutionalisation of the field
clearly left aside a number of important actors.  This section briefly describes the discontent of
important actors and the formation of counter-elites before the factors of change in the field are
analysed from a broader perspective (see section 6.2).
While individual actors such as Auerbach (see chapter 5) have been important in the transition of
the field, I will focus here on academics as counter-elites, since they represent a more coherent
social group.  ICANN as an institution has been criticised in academic circles, especially by law
scholars. This critique gained scientific legitimacy with some publications in academic journals and
found  an  institutional  basis  in  research  centres.  Counter-elites  were  dominated  in  the  field  of
Internet governance but followed their capacity to span fields to bring the challenging to another
field,  where  they  had  the  opportunity  to  prevail.  Counter-elites  are  thus  not  only  powerful
individuals, they are powerful individuals that are formally organised  (Rocher, 2005) and that act
outside of the formal institutions of power of the field  (Scott, 2008, pp. 39-40). The formation of
counter-elites is a critical failure of the hegemonic project.
Academics participated as commentators in the debates on Internet governance in the 1990s.  The
Berkman  Centre  for  Internet  and  Society  of  the  Harvard  University  Law  School  became  the
institutional base of the International Forum on the White Paper. Lawrence Lessig, a member of the
Centre was consulted as am expert on the ICANN during the US House hearings on the ICANN
(Investigations, 1999). Jonathan Zittrain, another member of the Centre, was deeply involved in the
IFWP and ran later for election as an at-large board member of the ICANN. Other legal scholars
were important members of the Forum, including Michael Froomkin, from the University of Miami,
Victor Khanna and Tamar Frankel from Boston University. Scholars from other fields were also
included like David Farber, from the University of Pennsylvania who was working between the
fields of computer science and public policy; Milton Mueller, from the University of Syracuse; and
Craig Simon from the University of Miami. Froomkin and Farber also created Icannwatch, whose
mission can be read on their website:
“Our  premise  can  be  simply  stated:  The  Internet  is  a  global  resource  of
incalculable value, and nothing is of greater importance to its future than the way
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in which ICANN performs its role as manager of the Domain Name System. All
Internet users worldwide have a stake in these ongoing events, and our job is to
serve as a central point of reference, a kind of hill overlooking the often-chaotic
information landscape, from which anyone seeking a better understanding of these
developments can survey the ever-changing terrain.” 135
The academic counter-elite has played a crucial role to foster the transformation of the field that
occurred  between  1999 and 2005.  As  we will  see  in  the  following section,  their  writings  and
statements  accompanied  the  factors  of  change  in  the  field  of  Internet  governance.  They
continuously questioned the legitimacy and the procedures of the ICANN and served as references
for the demands made by new actors in the field. For some of them, they are also a link between the
narrow field of Internet governance in the 1990s and the broad field during the World Summit on
the Information Society. 
The action of counter-elites cannot be analysed without looking at the broader conditions for change
that existed in the field, but their leading role in the production of ideas and discourses should not
be underestimated. The hegemonic project of the power elite failed to create an enduring consensus.
As a minimal hegemony, it relied on the coercive power of the US state and on the exclusion of
important actors. However, the exclusion of important actors led to the creation of a counter-elite of
academics, full of resources in their own field to question and threaten the elite project.  The field of
Internet governance at  the turn of the millennium, thus, presented an unstable environment  that
created the conditions of the success of the factors of change in the field. 
6.1.4. Non-elites, technology, and changes in the use of the Internet
The regulation of a rapidly changing medium like the Internet raises some issues of adaptation.
While the governance system of the ICANN resulted from a debate that dated back to the mid-
1990s,  the  Internet  had  changed at  the  turn  of  the  millennium.  While  it  is  necessary  to  avoid
technological  determinism  in  the  study  of  Internet  governance,  the  changes  in  the  use  of  a
technology are key elements in the evolution of its governance (Akrich, 2012a).
First, the number of Internet users rose from 16 millions to 587 millions between December 1995,
at the beginning of the debate on Internet governance, and September 2002. From less than 0.5 per
cent of the world population, the use of Internet – and thus its governance – concerned almost 10
135 See http://www.icannwatch.org/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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percent of the world's population at the time of the ICANN reform136. The reach of the regulation of
the network exceeded by far the technology enthusiasts and the academic communities of the mid-
1990s  to  become a  significant  issue  for  many individuals,  with  no  technical  background.  The
geographical distribution was also starting to change, with more users from Japan and Europe.
The  use  of  the  network also  change in  nature.  Whereas  sex and entertainment  represented the
majority  of  web  search  in  1997,  keywords  related  to  commerce  and  people  were  increasingly
searched for in 2001 (Spink, Jansen, Wolfram, & Saracevic, 2002). While e-commerce was more an
ideological argument of the Clinton administration in 1996 (Clinton & Gore, 1996), the economic
importance of the network was increasing. The technology went through a period of significant
extension of its uses, fuelled by the growing number of users and improvements in bandwidth and
user experience. 
The  cumulative  innovations  in  the  uses  of  the  network,  from instant  messaging  to  blogs  and
Internet-based file sharing, was described by some commentators as the rise of the web 2.0. This
adaptation (Akrich, 1998) did not result from a technological change of the network itself but rather
of the software and social uses present on the Internet (Oreilly, 2007). Much like the e-mail was an
unexpected  innovation  that  changed  the  resource-sharing  network  into  a  telecommunication
network (see chapter 4 and Abbate, 1999), the Internet at the turn of the millennium was a very
innovative technology, which made new issues raise and change the importance of existing issues.
For example, some commentators argued that with the generalisation of the use of search engines,
domain names were not as important as they were in the 1990s. Even if such statements need to be
nuanced, the changing practices of Internet were a challenge for the governance of the network. It is
thus necessary, when analysing the factors of change in the field of Internet governance, to bear in
mind the importance of the technology itself, and of the practices of the non-elites, even if their
influence on the institutions of the field were minimal. 
The turn of the millennium can be thus described as a process of translation (Callon,  1986). The
small circle of specialist and the limited uses of Internet in the 1990s were transformed into a major
and  comprehensive  telecommunication  medium  connecting  millions  of  people.  This  process
entailed the displacement and reformulation of interests, actors and of the network itself  that  is
described in the following section as a profound evolution of the field of Internet governance.
136 Data  collected  by  Internet  World  Stats,  available  at  http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm,  last
accessed 8 April 2014.
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6.2. Factors of change in the field of Internet governance
As we have seen in chapter 3, a dynamic reading of Bourdieu allows for an analysis of evolution
and change within a field, beyond a more traditional focus on reproduction and  habitus137.  In the
context of the analysis of economic issues and global capitalism, the French regulation school has
used Bourdieu in order to analyse change in institutions and in forms of regulation (Boyer, 2003,
2008; Lordon, 2003).  This section represents an attempt to use Bourdieu's categories in order to
analyse change in the field of Internet governance between the creation of the ICANN and the
WSIS. While the field is a space of positions that determines the extent of the possible, social agents
have freedom of actions and do not only reproduce the structure of the field, they also affect it. They
are “virtuosos” (Bourdieu, 1977) who can improvise and do not need to follow strictly the rules of
the game.  This explains why the very definition of the stakes in the field of Internet governance
changed so drastically between 1998 and 2003. Boyer (2008) summarizes five factors of change in
Bourdieu's attempt to create an economic anthropology (Bourdieu, 2005). They will be applied to
the field of Internet governance in the following paragraphs. 
First, change can be brought about by dominant actors in the field. Innovation by dominant actors
rules  out  the  identical  reproduction  of  the  field.  In  fact,  for  the  domination  to  be  effective,
dominants  have  to  innovate  and  dictate  the  “tempo”  of  the  transformations  (Bourdieu,  2005).
Change can thus be part of a strategy by dominant actors to reproduce the inequalities of the field.
While Bourdieu, and consequently Boyer focus on dominant actors, it could be added that non-
dominant  actors can also initiate  change under  certain conditions.  Counter-elites  (non-dominant
groups in a position to contest the domination of the dominants) can acquire a “feel for the game”
and innovate with efficient strategies.  
Another common factor of change in a field is the entry of new agents. These agents may be able to
exchange a specific capital acquired in another field to become important in their new field. The
sociology of elites has studied the ability of elites to span fields (Savage & Williams, 2008). The
process of entry of new agents is continuous in many fields but emerging fields or fields in crisis
(see below) are more likely to experience massive migrations of agents. 
137 According to some authors, the dual nature of Bourdieu's sociology is irreconcilable. One strand of his work would 
focus on reproduction and habitus while another would analyze practices and change (King, 2000). For others, this 
duality represent a complex and nuanced approach that can be applied to concrete practices and interactions (Bigo, 
2011; Boyer, 2003, 2008). Finally, other authors argue that there is an evolution in Bourdieu's work towards a more 
dynamic sociology (Swartz, 2003; Lordon, 2003).   
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Fields, while relatively autonomous, are related and occupy different positions within the national
or global field of power. Bourdieu has been concerned during most of his life by the national field
of power but some of his  latest  writing hint  towards a stronger focus on globalization and the
international (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1999; Bourdieu, 2005). The frontiers of the field can change
because of the changes in the broader context and this, in turn, can affect the structuration of the
field. 
The state is, according to Bourdieu, the most important factor of change affecting the field from the
outside. Even if this idea is more obvious at a national level, it  is still relevant for the study of
change in transnational fields. The competition for power over state power remains as the conflicts
over public intervention do not disappear in a globalising world. The opposition between the public
and  the  private  have  in  fact  been the  most  debated  issue  throughout  the  existence  of  Internet
governance.
The last factor of change is the de-synchronization of the field. The de-synchronization between the
habitus and the field is related to the other changes outlined before. It is however a more profound
change since it is a crisis of the field. Internet governance was arguably in a state of crisis since its
institutionalization around the ICANN and the study of individuals factors of change can help us
describe the nature of this crisis. 
Bourdieu presents therefore a complete framework to analyse change, which is compatible with
certain reflections of institutional economics (Boyer,  2008) and which seem promising to study
changes in transnational contexts. Despite the particularities of the field of Internet governance at
the turn of the century, it is an interesting case of a rapidly-changing and transnational field that is
likely to present many of the factors of change described by Bourdieu. However, this framework is
used here simultaneously with a transversal perspective on elites and non-elites. While Bourdieu
focuses his analysis on dominant actors and actors entering the field directly at dominant positions,
the factors for change in the field of Internet governance have to be understood in relation with the
formation of a counter-elite and in a context of changing practices by the masses, as described in the
previous section. 
In order for the ICANN governance system to work, three elements were required: a consensus
among  elite  actors  on  the  ICANN;  a  consent  from non-dominant  actors;  and  an  exclusion  of
political and social issues that had to be dealt with in other fields. However, these elements were not
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met despite the hegemonic project of an emerging elite. Tensions soon appeared among dominant
actors such as the newly-created ICANN together with supporters like IBM and the Department of
Commerce  on  the  one  side,  and  the  monopolistic  domain-name  registration  company Network
Solutions Inc. on the other side. The “minimal hegemony” (Cafruny & Magnus Ryner, 2007) that
had prevailed when the creation of the ICANN obtained some support by civil society organizations
and scientific elites did not last  when the board of the new corporation started meeting behind
closed doors,  rejected participation and openness,  and decided to create  a  tax on domain-name
registration (Liu, 1998). Finally, non-technical issues could not be delegated to other fields on a
long-term basis. The rapid growth of the Internet inevitably raised issues such as access and privacy
that were to become more and more important in the following years. The situation from 1999 to
2002 was a situation of continuing crisis that was not settled by the institutionalization of the field.
Against this background, factors of change were numerous and pressing.
6.2.1. Innovation and dominant actors
The  first  factor  of  change  is  the  behaviour  of  dominant  actors.  The  hegemonic  project  of  the
ICANN, backed by a  corporate  elite  organized  around the  Global  Internet  Project138;  powerful
governments; the scientific elite and the monopolistic Network Solutions Inc. was put in danger by
the different understandings of the following steps towards Internet governance. 
Network Solutions (NSI) signed in October 1998 an amendment to its cooperative agreement with
the US government (US government & Network Solutions Inc.,  1998). The company agreed to
recognize the future ICANN and to hand over some of its function to the new corporation after a
transition period. The possibility for Network Solutions to operate as a registry or a registrar after
this period was included in the agreement139. Thus, Network Solutions could continue its lucrative
business, had no hurry to recognize the ICANN and to enter in an agreement with it, and was going
to be able to benefit from its former position as a monopolistic company in the future market for
138 The Global Internet Project is  a corporate platfrom specilizing in Internet governance to advocate for corporate
interests in the negotiations. It is an an international group of senior executives and served as an advisory committee
to the World Information and Telecommunication Association (WITSA).  According to its website, the WITSA is
consortium of  ICT industry  associations  and  currently  has  members  from 82 countries  around the  world  and
represent more than 90 percent  of  the world ICT market.  See  www.gip.org, last  accessed through the Internet
archive on 8 April 2014. 
139 "Registrar"  means the  entity  which  is  authorized  to  enter  and  modify  the  Second Level  Domain  (SLD) data
maintained by a Registry, in response to requests by entities seeking to be assigned a SLD. Registry means those
roles and activities involved in the administration of a Top Level Domain (such as ”.com”) in the Domain Name
System,  and  encompasses  all  of  the  services  needed  for  assignment  and  maintenance  of  that  TLD  and  its
registrations. (IAHC, 1997)
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domain names. This position was in contradiction with ICANN's interests. The corporation needed
the contract with Network Solutions and especially the financial contribution in order to function
(Mueller 2002). The tensions between these two key actors of the system led to an evolution of the
structuration of the field. The consensus that existed around the ICANN faded away as Network
Solutions  was  trying  to  gain  support  within  the  US political  elite  by  taking  advantage  of  the
multiple  criticisms raised at  the ICANN. ICANN supporters, and especially the Global  Internet
Project and some key member of the scientific elite wanted to get rid of Network Solutions (Cook,
2000). As early as 1999, the ICANN as a corporation was in danger of bankruptcy (Cook, 2000). 
However, these tensions were settled and the  elite  consensus on the existence of the ICANN was
preserved.  The Global  Internet  Project  (GIP)  launched  a  fund-raising  campaign to  provide  the
ICANN  with  sufficient  funding  until  the  agreement  with  Network  Solutions.  IBM  and  MCI-
Worldcom were the coordinators of the campaign140. The Committee on Commerce of the US House
of Representative organized hearings that brought together the two conflicting parties on July, 22,
1999. Although the title of the hearings was: “Domain Name System Privatization: Is ICANN out of
control?”, Network solutions was on the defensive during the hearings and while ICANN could be
presented as “nothing more or less than the embodiment of the consensus of the Internet community
as  a  whole”  (Investigations,  1999  Testimony  of  Esther  Dyson,  Interim  Chairperson,  ICANN),
Network Solutions failed to convince the Committee members that the ICANN was “off-track”. A
week later, a meeting gathered representatives of IBM, Network Solutions and the Internet Society
to settle the dispute. According to Cook, “both sides had agreed that it was in the interest of each
that NSI survive in order to pay the ICANN tax” (Cook, 2000, p. 31) . The remaining issues of the
amount that Network Solution would pay to the ICANN and how long they could benefit from their
monopoly were solved within a few months and in September 1999, tripartite agreements were
signed141. Network Solutions recognized the ICANN and abandoned some of its privileges in the
registrar business in exchange of an extended monopoly in the registry business. Towards the end of
1999,  the  elite  consensus  was  saved  and  the  ICANN  could  again  claim  its  position  as  the
overarching institution of Internet governance. 
However, the main weakness of the ICANN was not the possible lack of consensus on the existence
of the corporation; it was  its  limited and technical  mandate that proved problematic. Dissensions
140 See www.gip.org, last accessed through the Internet archive on 8 April 2014. 
141 See http://archive.icann.org/en/nsi/nsi-agreements.htm, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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appeared on this issue among intergovernmental organizations previously supportive of the ICANN.
The OECD – an early supporter of the privatization process and adviser to the ICANN – quickly
moved away from domain names and addressing issues to address the broader issues of digital
divide  and  the  promotion  of  global  economic  growth  through  the  Internet.  The  inclusion  of
development issues was especially threatening  to the technically-oriented governance system by
pointing at one of the most pressing issue on a worldwide basis: inequalities in Internet access. Two
reports illustrate this broadening of Internet governance issue in the OECD: “Understanding the
Digital Divide” (OECD 2001a) and “Bridging the Digital Divide:  Issues and Policies in OECD
Countries” (OECD 2001b) raised a number of issues that were far beyond the scope of the ICANN
and that broadened the definition of Internet governance. The reports acknowledge that the lack of
access  to  ICTs  and  especially  the  Internet  hindered  the  development  of  a  “knowledge-based
economy”(OECD  2001a,  1).  While  confident  that  competition  and  liberalization  would  foster
Internet  access,  the  reports  included  issues  such  as  education,  urban/rural  divide,  age,  gender,
ethnicity and multilingualism. These issues already existed before the creation of the ICANN but
they were thought to be outside the scope of Internet governance. Only non-dominant actors raised
them in the comments to the official policy-documents but they were excluded from the discussions
(see  chapter  5). The  inclusion  of  social  and political  issues  by dominant  actors  soon after  the
creation of the ICANN reflected changes outside the field (see section 4), but also an increased
awareness from the  dominant  actors  that  Internet governance  could not  be limited to  technical
issues. 
The European Union is another example of such a change. It had participated in the creation of the
ICANN and especially in the board selection process (see chapter 5). However, the interests of the
European governments differed from those of other dominant actors in the field. While supportive
of the ICANN, the European Union manifested in several documents concerns about other issues.
The European Council resolution on the “Organisation and management of the Internet”, of October
2000 stressed the transitional character of Internet  management  and the need to  resolve further
issues  and  the  importance  of  for  example  “personal  data  protection”  besides  competition  and
Intellectual  Property  Rights (Council  of  the  European Union,  2000,  para.  3).  The Council  also
encouraged intergovernmental initiatives in the Governmental Advisory Committee of the ICANN,
the WIPO and the ITU (Council of the European Union, 2000, para. 4). 
Even the scientific elite overcame its neglect of broader policy issue with the success of the Internet
and the possibilities it  opened on a worldwide basis. Vinton Cerf's Request for Comment 3271
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(2002) summarized the new spirit of the Internet Society hierarchy with its motto “Internet is for
everyone”,  and  its  focus  on  issues  such  as  access  and  privacy  instead  of  a  narrow  technical
definition of Internet governance. 
The move by dominant actors towards a broader definition of Internet governance was a direct
threat to the technical governance system organized around the ICANN. While the tensions about
the  functioning  of  the  ICANN  could  be  overcome  without  changing  the  focus  of  Internet
governance by a simple re-adjustment of the repartition of the benefits among dominant actors and a
more  inclusive policy of  the  corporation  (Mueller  2002,  chap.  9),  the changing focus  of  some
dominant actors was a more serious threat, albeit less obvious at the time, to the consensual aspect
of the system. 
6.2.2. Entry of new agents
The entry of new agents in the field of Internet governance is closely linked with the issue of
consent. While a precarious consent had been created around the ICANN in 1998, the rapid growth
of the number of individuals and organizations involved in Internet governance between 1999 and
2002 represented a threat for the equilibrium of the field. The elite of Internet governance needed to
open the field and its main institution in order to keep some legitimacy. Because of the lack of
openness in the board selection and later in the first board meetings, the perception of the ICANN
was not  good in many circles (Liu,  1998). The death of Jon Postel,  one of the creators  of the
Internet and a charismatic moral support for the ICANN system, just before the creation of the
corporation “robbed the organization of its moral centre, a good part of its institutional memory and
most of what  remained of its legitimacy” (Mueller,  2002, 8.2.3).  Against  this background,  the
ICANN elite had to implement some transparency procedures and to organize at-large elections of
five at-large directors to the board. The board of the ICANN also permitted the empowerment of the
Governmental Advisory Committee to gain some legitimacy at the international level. These moves
opened the door of the field, and even of its core institution, to new actors. Two main categories of
actors entered the field during this period: the hackers and developing countries.
The elections of five at-large directors to the ICANN board on October 2000142 saw the victory of
142 The election took place on-line through the www.election.com website from the 1st to the 10th of October 2000. 
34035 individuals voted. See http://members.icann.org/index.html and 
http://www.election.com/us/icann/icannresult.html (through the Web Archive), last accessed8 April 2014 .
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opponents to the ICANN in Europe and in North America. Karl Auerbach, who was elected in
North America was part of the effort of the Boston Working Group to form a counter-elite group
during the last rounds of negotiations around the creation of the ICANN. He was thus already an
actor if the field, though a non-dominant one. His election is part of a classical struggle between
orthodox and heterodox positions within a field. His candidate page read:
“ICANN  is  Internet  governance.  ICANN's  decisions  affect  all  users  of  the
Internet. ICANN should be open to all. ICANN should be fair. ICANN should be
impartial. ICANN is few, if any, of these things. My candidacy is one of reform
—  deep,  substantial,  and  fundamental  reform.  My  candidacy  is  one  that  is
founded on the belief that the Internet should not be controlled and dominated by
those who aspire to nothing higher than mass marketing. It is my position that
individual people ought to have a major voice in the governance of this revolution
we call the Internet.”143
The case of Andy Mueller-Maguhn, who was elected in Europe, is slightly different. He had been a
member of the Chaos Computer Club since 1985 and its speaker since 1990. The Chaos Computer
Club (CCC) describes itself as the biggest European association of hackers144. The CCC had not
been involved in the debates of Internet governance in the 1990s. However, the evolution of the
Internet towards a commercial network with “anti-theft locks, filter, police and prisons” (Müller-
Maguhn,  2000)145 forced  the  hackers  to  act  and  try  to  infiltrate  what  they  saw was  Internet's
government:
“Since we – the Netizens- do not want to let these thieves wreck our public space,
we had to get pro-active [...] Personally I am also in the government now and de
jure  somewhere in November. And, also then, I will still keep the public space
free from commercial rules of the game, protect the free flow of information and
give  the  bits  their  free  space.  [...]  and  since  governments,  as  centralistic,
hierarchic systems, only invite to abuse it, and are obstacles to its development, I
will let the whole thing run as decentralized as possible, and for this reason, it
must be transparent”(Müller-Maguhn 2000)146
While the cyber-libertarian discourse had had some influence during the debates that led to the
creation of the ICANN, this type of anti-marketisation discourse inspired by hacker philosophy was
143 Available at http://members.icann.org/cand/16.html, last accessed 8 April 2014.
144 See http://www.ccc.de/de/home?language=en, last accessed 8 April 2014.
145 ”Und da natürlich Diebstahlsperren einbauen wollen, Filter, Polizisten und Gefängnisse”. Translation by the author.
146 ”Und  da  wir  -  die  Netzbewohner  -  jetzt  keine  Lust  haben,  uns  den  öffentlichen  Raum  durch  diese  Diebe
kaputtmachen zu lassen, mußten wir ein bißchen pro-aktiv tätig werden.[...]  Nominell bin ich jetzt  also in der
Regierung und de jure irgendwann im November. Und auch dann will ich immer noch den öffentlichen Raum frei
von kommerziellen Spielregeln halten, den freien Informationsfluß hüten und den Bits ihre Freiräume geben. [...]
und  da  Regierungen  als  zentralistische,  hierarchische  Systeme  nur  dazu  einladen,  mißbraucht  zu  werden,  und
entwicklungshemmend sind, würde ich das Ganze gern so dezentral wie möglich ablaufen lassen, und dazu muß es
transparent werden”. Author's translation. 
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new in the field at the beginning of the 2000s. Around the same time, the free software community
began to address the issue on freedom on the Internet, as illustrated by the request of a “.gnu” top-
level domain by the Free Software Foundation in 2000 in order “to support the public and defend
the public's rights in cyberspace”147. While at-large members were marginalized in the board and the
critical directors resigned in the following years (Muller 2002), the entry of actors such as hackers
and their discourses in such a visible position was not without consequences on the field.
The other important category of new actors in the field is developing countries. The Governmental
Advisory Committee (GAC)  permitted the entry of developing countries and their empowerment.
Originally, the GAC had been designed as the least powerful of the advisory committees, acting
only on ICANN board's  request (ICANN, 1998). Influence by powerful governments had taken
place  elsewhere.  The  US government  supervised  the  ICANN  according  to  a  Memorandum of
Understanding between the ICANN and the US Department of Commerce (ICANN & DoC, 1998)
and the Australian government as well as the European Commission had actively participated to the
selection of the board of the corporation148. Developing countries had been largely excluded from
the debates. However, during the first years of operation of the GAC, developing countries started
participating  in  the  debates  on  Internet  governance,  and  the  GAC was  empowered  within  the
ICANN  and  in  the  field  of  Internet  governance  more  broadly.  At  the  first  GAC  meeting  in
Singapore in March 1999, several important developing countries were present, such as Argentina,
Brazil or China149. The GAC quickly became a key player and could be considered soon another
supporting organization with power by far exceeding those of a simple advisory committee (Mueller
2002, 9.7). Governments claimed authority on the Country Code top-level domains (such as “.ch”
or “.dk”) and a say on names referring to territories, languages or regions (Mueller 2002). While
Europeans governments  were  among the  most  active  in  the  GAC,  together  with  the  European
Commission, the representation of developing countries grew steadily (Kleinwächter, 2002). Even if
the  direct  effects  of  this  participation  was  limited  in  the  early  2000s,  it  was  essential  to  raise
awareness about Internet governance issues as well as to create knowledge of the institutions and
mechanisms in developing countries  (Antonova, 2007, pp. 285–286).   
147 http://archive.icann.org/en/meetings/yokohama/eoi12.htm  , last accessed 8 November 2012. 
148 See the letter from John Sopko, Chief Counsel for Special Matters, U.S Department of Commerce to  Thomas J.
Bliley,  Jr,    chairman of the Committe  on Commerce of  the U.S house of  representatives,  5 November 1998,
reproduced at  http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/text/acn9-2.articles/acn9-2.a04.txt, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
149 See https://gacweb.icann.org/display/gacweb/GAC+Meetings+Archive, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Africa 2 3 3 7 13 17
Middle East and North
Africa 3 4 4 5 6 8
Asia – Pacific 14 18 19 19 21 24
Europe 23 26 30 30 31 37
Latin America and the
Caribbean 5 7 9 10 11 11
North America 2 2 2 2 2 2
Members 49 60 67 73 84 99
Observers 5 5 5 6 6 9
Total 54 65 72 79 90 108
Table 6.1. Composition of the Governmental Advisory Committee of the ICANN, by region, 1999-
2004 (adapted from Mathiason, 2008, p. 89)
The  entry  of  actors  that  were  completely  outside  the  doxa of  the  field  participated  to  the
transformation of the field and the open crisis of 2003-2005. Hackers had links with a number of
NGOs interested in human rights and privacy protection and the entry of developing countries set
the conditions for a renewed debate on a New World Information and Communication Order in the
Internet era. Both categories of actors were favouring a politicization of the debates and denouncing
the “technical” aspect of Internet governance in the ICANN system. 
6.2.3. Changes outside the field
While Internet governance was a relatively autonomous field drawing limited attention at the turn of
the century, changes in the global political economy and in the global field of power affected this
situation and created the conditions for change within the field. The period from 1999 to 2002 is a
contrasted one. In the months that followed the creation of the ICANN, the Dotcom bubble grew
and the contribution of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to economic growth
and productivity gains, especially in the US was praised (Oliner & Sichel, 2000). The idea of a
knowledge-based  economy relying  on  the  development  of  ICTs  became  part  of  the  economic
imaginary of many actors of the global political economy (Jessop, 2005). The most famous example
of the importance that ICTs and the knowledge economy took in this period is the Lisbon strategy of
the European Union (European Council, 2000).
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The  Dotcom bubble  is  a  consequence  of  the  enthusiasm generated  by the  prospects  of  a  fast-
growing economy and a fourth industrial revolution. The low interest rates in the US in 1998-1999
participated to the growth of the Dotcom bubble. From 1995 to 2000, the NASDAQ composite
index rose exponentially from 1000 to 5000 points with a doubling of the index in only one year
between  1999  and  2000150.  While  telecommunications  companies  (many  of  them  recently
privatized)  and hardware manufacturers invested to  meet  future demand,  a booming number of
start-ups  found investors  ready to  invest  in  any project  related  to  the  ICTs  and especially  the
Internet.  Companies such as the clothes retailer  “boo.com” in Europe or “pets.com” in the US
illustrate  the  tendency:  they raised important  amounts  of  money and gained visibility  but  sold
hardly anything. The climax was reached in March 2000 but changing monetary policies and the
condemnation of Microsoft in a monopoly case marked the end of the growth of the bubble.
The burst of the Dotcom bubble, the financial scandals, and the terrorist attacks of September 2001 
in the US also marked the period of transition, leaving the field of Internet governance transformed 
by the rising political and economic concerns around the Internet.
First, the Dotcom bubble collapsed in March 2000. Within a year or so, many Dotcom companies
disappeared through mergers, acquisitions or bankruptcy during this period, while the remaining
ones saw their shares' prices  sharply drop. The structure of the Dotcom market was profoundly
transformed with some large surviving firms such as Amazon, Google or E-bay dominating the
market. The end of the Dotcom bubble also affected the broader field of telecommunications. In
early 2001, America Online merged with Time Warner in the biggest merger operation in American
business  history,  which  illustrate  a  movement  of  merger  and  acquisitions  that  affected  the
telecommunication and entertainment markets in this period (Arango, 2010). Another giant of the
field, Worldcom (that resulted from the merger of MCI and Worldcom) saw its growth strategy
undermined by concerns on the creation of a monopoly and started massive fraud, which led to the
scandal and its bankruptcy in 2002 (Romero & Atlas, 2002).  
The burst of the Dotcom bubble did not put an end to the enthusiasm towards a knowledge-based
150 http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/StatisticalMilestones.aspx#Nasdaq%20Composite%20Index%20Records  , last
accessed 8 April 2014.
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economy and the potential of ICTs and the Internet. Soon after the collapse of the bubble, observers
warned against  an overestimation  of  the effects  of  the  bubble  (Litan,  2001). Many economists
described the Dotcom bubble as an adjustment period that was not going to affect further growth.
They differentiated the Internet bubble, a short-term and highly unstable growth, and the Internet
boom, a long-term improvement of productivity and a vector of new markets (Varian, Farrell, &
Shapiro, 2004). 
The burst  of  the  bubble  coincided with  the  terrorist  attacks  in  the  US in  September 2001 that
increased the financial consequences of the economic turmoil. Moreover, the attacks put security
issues  at  the  heart  of  Internet  governance151.  While  the  ICANN  system  had  been  created  to
accompany  the  creation  of  a  market  for  domain  names  and  the  development  of  E-commerce,
cybersecurity became the buzzword of Internet governance in the early 2000s. Between 2002 and
2003, the  UN General  Assembly passed two resolutions  related to  cybersecurity  (UNGA 2001,
2002) and several governments increased the legal framework to combat cybercrime and cyber-
terrorism.  In 2002 at  the Prague Summit,  the NATO put cyberdefence for  the first  time on its
political agenda152. The political and security aspects of Internet governance were not tackled by the
ICANN system. However, the became pressing issues in the early 2000s. The security aspect was
part of the movement towards the broadening of the scope of Internet governance and contributed to
the idea that the ICANN was not sufficient to tackle all Internet-related policy issues.
At the end of the transition period, the field of Internet governance had experienced the effects of a
changing context. Internet was still seen as a vector of economic growth, but also as an unstable
market  and a  potential  tool  and target  for  terrorist  and criminals.  Against  this  background,  the
optimistic  view  of  a  technical  and  private  governance  of  the  network  suffered  an  important
drawback and more traditional political issues emerged.
6.2.4. Competition of power over state power
Much has been written on the authority of the US government on the ICANN. One of the most
striking example can be found in the amendment 11 to the cooperative agreement between Network
151 While the issue of cyberterrorism appeared already in the 1990s in the media, especially in France because it was 
then the target of terrorist attacks, very few mentions of issues related to cybersecurity appear in the documents of 
the 1990s. The dominant vision in the US was that of a cyber-marketplace.  
152 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B7A14B06-0777A6C2/natolive/topics_78170.htm?, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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Solutions and the US Department of Commerce. The agreement provided that Network Solutions
“shall request written directions from an authorized USG [United States Government] official
before making or rejecting any modification, additions or deletions to the root zone file”  (US
government & Network Solutions Inc., 1998). This meant that neither the ICANN not Network
Solutions had the authority to add or delete top-level domains. The US Department of Commerce
still  had  legal  authority  over  the  domain  name  space  despite  the  creation  of  the  ICANN.  As
Froomkin puts it:
“ICANN’s only reason for existence, and the sole source of its power over the
DNS,  is  that  the  thirteen  root  servers  treat  it  as  authoritative,  and  that  the
government instructed NSI, another contractor, both to defer to ICANN on policy
and to pay it money.” (Froomkin 2000, 108)
The result of the creation the ICANN was a hybrid system where the boundaries between the public
and the private were blurred (Zittrain, 1999).  This situation led to problems of legitimacy and a
debate  on  the  role  of  the  US government  (Froomkin,  2000).  While  the  ICANN  managed  the
technical functioning of the Internet (the “plumbing” in Dyson's words153), some of its functions had
clear political consequences. Following the guidelines of the US government expressed in the White
Paper  (NTIA,  1998)  the  ICANN  created  a  Uniform  Dispute  Resolution  Policy  (UDRP).  This
dispute resolution mechanism was designed by the World Intellectual Property Organization and
was a strong intellectual property protection mechanism for trademark owners. However, as claimed
by Froomkin (2000), the UDRP lacked the safeguards of a legal process. The registrants suspected
of trademark violation had their legal rights limited in several ways. The choice of a cheaper and
faster process than legal procedures was a significant political choice “changing the legal rights
accruing to more than twenty million contracts” (Froomkin 2000, 101). 
Was the US government handing over authority to an unaccountable private institution? The debate
spread outside the US. The European Commission was for example worried because of the fact that:
“Even within their narrowly defined remit, it is already the case that ICANN and
the GAC are taking decisions of a kind that governments would, in other contexts,
expect  to  take  themselves  in  the  framework  of  international  organisations”.
(European Commission, 2000, para. 9)
Similar  concerns  existed  in  the  developing world as well  as  among civil  society organizations.
While the idea of a reform of the ICANN system was gaining increasing interest from various
153  See Investigations (1999 Testimony of Esther Dyson, Interim Chairperson, ICANN).
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groups, the content of a possible reform did not make consensus. As far as the public/private issue
was concerned, three options were considered: a renewed ICANN or another organization of similar
nature,  an intergovernmental  organization,  or a  free market solution (Zittrain 1999).  A renewed
ICANN or another attempt to create a public-private partnership would have been a way to maintain
the idea that Internet regulation was to take place between the state and the market. The creation of
an intergovernmental organization or the handing over of ICANN functions to the ITU would have
been a drastic change with regard to the (short) history of the network. This solution was a clear
threat to the power elite of Internet governance. The last solution was an unregulated market. It had
been favoured before the creation of the ICANN by cyber-libertarians.  In a context of growing
discontent with the corporation,  the free-market solution was again seen by some as a possible
reform.  
Of all the debates around the ICANN, the choice between public and private regulation and the role
of the state, and especially the United States, was one of the most important. The institutionalization
of Internet governance at the end of the 1990s around the ICANN had only been a very unstable and
precarious  solution  to  the  problem.  While  a  consensus  had been found between different  elite
groups on the public-private character of the ICANN, this solution had not reached a hegemonic
status among non-elite groups that remained critical of the lack of clarity on the issue.  
6.2.5. De-synchronization of the field
As we have seen, the notion of habitus is more difficult to manage in the analysis of transnational
fields. The variety of national habitus coexisting within a field and the evolutionary and interstitial
character of transnational fields makes it difficult for durable dispositions to emerge. However, the
autonomisation of Internet governance from the field of computer networking science (see chapter
4) created  a  certain  incompatibility  between  pre-existing  logics,  procedures,  world-views  and
institutions, and the new nature of the field.  While the regulation of the network had some stability
in terms of habitus and strategies of actors in the 1970s and 1980s, the rapid changes that started
with the commercialization of the network in the early 1990s provoked a state of crisis that could
not be solved by the creation of the ICANN. Agents in the regulation of the network before the
commercialization  had  diverse  experience  and  institutional  affiliations.  Many  were  computer
scientists hired by US universities but the field was already transnational (with actors from Europe,
Australia and Japan); it included governmental actors such as the US National Science Foundations
and the US Department of Defence; it also included private companies (government contractors and
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computer manufacturers). The field of telecommunications was related to Internet governance but it
remained relatively autonomous.  In  spite  of  this  diversity,  a  certain homology existed between
different  habitus that  allowed the  field  to  follow certain  rules  of  the  game.  Competition  and
domination took place within a field where the stakes were common to all actors. In that situation,
the habitus could function as:
“the product of the incorporation of objective necessity, of necessity turned into
virtue,  [it]  produces  strategies  which  are  objectively  adjusted  to  the  objective
situation  even though  these  strategies  are  neither  the  outcome  of  the  explicit
aiming  at  consciously  pursued  goals,  nor  the  result  of  some  mechanical
determination by external causes. Social action is guided by a practical sense, by
what we may call a ‘feel for the game’” (Bourdieu, quoted in Bigo, 2011)  
After the commercialisation of the Internet, the main objective of Internet governance became the
creation of a new market. New logics and new stakes appeared in the field. Long-standing practices
such as informal meetings, Requests For Comments and consensus-building between peers proved
inefficient to manage a global telecommunication network. Not only the actors changes, but also the
practices of rule-setting became more politicised and the stakes of decision-making became higher.
The field did not turn into a classical international policy field with established diplomatic rules and
behaviours. It remained a hybrid transnational field, where scientific practices and technical logics
mixed with transnational business practices and geopolitical struggles. Against this background, the
creation of the ICANN did not solve the issue of the definition of Internet governance and did not
define the nature and boundaries of the field.   
6.3. The failure of the ICANN as a hegemonic project
In order to respond to the increasing pressures for change in the field of Internet governance, the
power  elite  developed a  reform project  for  the  ICANN. More than an  institutional  reform,  the
reform of the ICANN aimed at a broader objective of stabilisation of the field and addressed some
of the issue outlined in the previous section. Similarly to the at-large election, the reform was an
attempt  to  co-opt  the counter-elite as well  as some newcomers in  the field such as developing
countries. However, the ICANN reform failed to maintain the ICANN as a hegemonic project and
placed the World Summit on the Information Society as an inevitable  locus of politicisation and
resistance. 
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6.3.1. The reform of the ICANN
On November 15, 2001, the ICANN mandated a Committee to restructure the ICANN. Six months
later,  the name of the Committee  and its  mandate were changed into a  Committee on ICANN
evolution and reform154.  Its mandate was to investigate a possible change in the structure of the
ICANN considering input from the “community” and ICANN's stakeholders. More fundamentally,
it was to prepare recommendations to the board of the corporation on the essential function and
missions to be fulfilled by the ICANN. This broad mandate reflected the concern expressed by the
power elite on the legitimacy of its core institution in the field of Internet governance. The idea was
to clearly state  the technical aspect of ICANN activities and to neutralise the growing political
debate155.  The objectives of the reform were centred around the notion of participation of a full
range of Internet  users, including individuals,  academic institutions, large and small businesses,
non-commercial entities (including consumer groups), and other non-governmental organizations156.
The reform was thus specifically aimed at the emerging counter-elite, whose institutional affiliation
was mainly in the academia and to a lesser extent in NGOs. The Committee on ICANN evolution
and reform was formally launched at a meeting in Accra, Ghana, in March 2002.
The creation of the Committee came just after the publication of a report entitle “ICANN – The case
for  Change”  authored  by  ICANN President  Stuart  Lynn.  The  report  recommended  a  profound
reform of the ICANN. It was a plea for the ICANN model as well as a significant proposal of
reform: 
“To the Internet Community:  ICANN's assigned mission – to create an effective
private sector policy development process capable of administrative and policy
management  of  the  Internet's  naming  and  address  allocation  systems –  was
incredibly ambitious. Nothing like this had ever been done before. ICANN was to
serve as an alternative to the traditional,  pre-Internet model of a multinational
governmental treaty organization. The hope was that a private-sector body would
be like the  Internet  itself:  more efficient –  more  nimble   – more able  to  react
promptly to a rapidly changing environment and, at the same time, more open to
meaningful  participation  by  more  stakeholders,  developing  policies  through
bottom-up  consensus.  It  was  also  expected  that  such  an  entity  could  be
established,  and  become  functional,  faster  than  a  multinational  governmental
body. […] But despite this progress, all the original expectations of ICANN have
154 See resolutions 01.132 and 02.20 in the ICANN board meeting minutes of November 15, 2001 and March, 14,
2002, available at http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
155 “[…] Some in the community believe that it would be useful, in the context of these discussions, to reaffirm and
clarify ICANN's limited mission for technical management and administration of the DNS, administration of Internet
address space, and administration of technical protocol identifiers”, ICANN board meeting minutes 15 November 2001,
available at http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
156 Resolution  02.20,  §  a,  ICANN  board  meeting  minutes,  14  March  2002 ,  available  at
http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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not been realized. [...] for a resource as changeable and dynamic as the Internet, a
traditional governmental approach as an alternative to ICANN remains a bad idea.
The Internet needs effective, lightweight, and sensible global coordination in a
few limited areas, allowing ample room for the innovation and change that makes
this unique resource so useful and valuable.  […]  I have concluded that ICANN
needs  reform:  deep,  meaningful,  structural  reform,  based  on  a  clear-headed
understanding of the successes and failures of the last three years. If ICANN is to
succeed,  this  reform  must  replace  ICANN's  unstable  institutional  foundations
with an effective public-private partnership, rooted in the private sector but with
the active backing and participation of national governments.” (Lynn 2002)
The committee worked during several months, and benefited from comments by many actors in the
field157. From the start of the process, non-dominant actors tried to advocate for substantial changes
in the governance system. The director of the Telecommunications Standardisation Bureau of the
ITU, Houlin Zhao, submitted a note on “ITU-T and ICANN Reform”158. The difference in the tone
adopted by the ITU on Internet governance matters in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s is
striking. While in 1996, Robert Shaw tried to convince the “Internet community” that the ITU was
evolving towards a private governance model159, Houlin Zhao opposed the difficulties faced by the
ICANN to the success of ITU-T: 
“It  is  widely  acknowledged  that  the  ITU-T performs  its  tasks  to  the  general
satisfaction of industry, governments, and the public at large, using processes that
are  open,  transparent,  and  ensure  accountability  to  all  stakeholders.  […]  In
summary, ITU-T is an effective public-private partnership, rooted in the public
sector but with the active backing and participation of industry players.”160
The Director of the Telecommunication Standardisation Bureau of the ITU proposed a cooperation
between the ITU and the ICANN as a way to overcome the limitations of a private not-for-profit
corporation. 
In May and June 2002, the committee on ICANN evolution and reform published a document on
the mission and core values of the ICANN and a blueprint for reform. These documents questioned
157 The  documents  related  to  the  reform  process  are  available  at  http://archive.icann.org/en/committees/evol-
reform/links.htm, some of them through the Internet archive, last accessed, 8 April 2014. 
158 Text  available  at  http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/tsb-director/itut-icann/ICANNreform.html,  last  accessed  through  the
Internet Archive, 8 April 2014.
159 “The ITU-T's process is a very open one. Any company can join and participate in its discussions and proposals.
But currently the voting members - the private sector typically makes these standards. But who has the final vote is
the countries, and that might change in the  near future”.  Transcript from Robert Shaw's presentation at APPLe
workshop, held on 28 June 1996 at the Sheraton hotel in Montreal, Canada. Available through the Internet Archive
at  http://web.archive.org/web/19990422150030/http://www.glocom.ac.jp/resa/APPLe/APPLeTOC.html,  last
accessed 8 April 2014.
160 Text  available  at  http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/tsb-director/itut-icann/ICANNreform.html,  last  accessed  through  the
Internet Archive, 8 April 2014.
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the  doxa  of Internet governance.  While multistakeholderism remained at  the core of the reform
process as well as of the proposed values and structure, the uniqueness of the Internet was less used
as a political argument in the debates. Moreover, the technical character of ICANN activities that
had been instrumental for the project of the ICANN was negated. The committee's Working Paper
on ICANN's Mission and Core Values clearly states that “policy-making is inherent in ICANN's
responsibilities”161 While the private character of the corporation is reaffirmed in the documents, the
need is acknowledged to “act with sensitivity to governmental concerns for the public interest so
that the need for direct governmental action is minimized”162
The Governmental Advisory Committee of the ICANN reacted to these publications and expressed
its satisfaction with the stronger role devoted to the GAC in the proposed structure.  It went even
further to claim a transformation of the above value to:
“While  remaining  rooted  in  the  private  sector,  recognise  that  government  or
public authorities are responsible  for  public  policy and duly take into account
governments' or public authorities' recommendations”163.  
Only  the  US  government's  representative  to  the  GAC  opposed  this  change164.  The  GAC  also
supported the presence of a GAC liaison in the Board of the ICANN, at the exception of several
governments from developed countries such as France, Switzerland and Germany165. The GAC, and
especially  the  developing countries  proposed a  totally  different  ICANN where  purely technical
issues were to be discussed by the Board and technical bodies, while:
“the GAC is  the  main forum for  the  international  discussion of  public  policy
issues  that  may  arise  in  ICANN´s  sphere  of  competence,  along  with  the
competent  international  organisations  (e.g.  ITU,  OECD,  WIPO).  Due  to  the
evolutionary nature of ICANN's mission, a different organisation of government
participation, on a different legal basis, may be contemplated in the future.”166
This move by the GAC was an attempt to import the rules of more traditional diplomatic fields to
161 See  the  section  2  of  the  Working  Paper  on  ICANN  Mission  and  Core  Values,  available  at
http://archi  ve.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-mission-06may02.htm ,  last  accessed  8  April
2014. 
162 ICANN Core Value [l]. Ibid.  
163 See  the  GAC  statement  on  ICANN  reform,  published  on  June,  26,  2002;  available  at
http://archive.icann.org/en/committees/gac/statement-on-reform-26jun02.htm, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid.
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Internet governance and to tip the balance of regulation towards more involvement of governments. 
The result of the reform process was embodied by the new by-laws of the corporation that entered
into force on December 15, 2002 (ICANN, 2002). The resulting ICANN has been described as an
ICANN 2.0 and as a public-private partnership (Froomkin,  2002; Kleinwächter, 2002; von Arx,
2003). The GAC was able to impose its new role in the institution. According to Kleinwächter
(2002),  this  evolution  has  to  be  understood in  relation  with  the  changes  outside  the  field  and
especially  the  terrorist  attacks  on  the  US  territory.  The  reform  was  also  accompanied  by  the
nomination of a new CEO for the corporation, Paul Twomey, a former chair of the ICANN and a
former Australian government member (Mathiason, 2008, p. 83). The GAC, while maintaining its
former structure, became a central body of the ICANN, consistent with the growing role it had
acquired in the first years of operation of the corporation. 
The  structure  of  the  ICANN  also  changed  (see  figure  6.3.1).  Supporting  Organisations  were
reformed to separate the management of generic domain names such as “.com” or “.org” from the
country-code domain names such as  “.ch” or  “.dk”.  The Protocol  Supporting Organisation was
divided  into  three  more  specialised  entities.  More  importantly,  the  reform created  an  At-Large
Advisory Committee. The At-Large Advisory Committee was designed to include the “community
of individual Internet users”167. As such, it became the organ representing the insterests of non-elites
in the ICANN. It replaced the membership that had been advocated for by the counter-elite during
the International Forum on the White Paper. The idea of a global individual membership had been
included in the original ICANN by-laws (ICANN, 1998) but was never implemented. The shift
from a global membership to an At-Large Advisory Committee was a step back from the claims of a
type of global legitimacy of the organisation and secured the marginal position of non-elite Internet
users. The Board – as core organ of the power elite – remained the central decision-making body of
the corporation (Mathiason, 2008). The by-laws provided that the board member be selected by a
Nominating Committee, except from the president and those directors selected by the Supporting
Organisations through their own nomination committee process. The “NomCom” procedure had
been used by institutions like the Internet Engineering TaskForce (Hovey & Bradner, 1996 – RFC
2028)  and  was  consistent  with  the  field's  scientific  tradition  of  peer  nomination  instead  of
representation. The Nomination Committee was selected by the different bodies of the ICANN and
then  selected  board  members  among  candidates  on  a  consensual  basis.  This  process  of  board
selection gave more power to the different bodies of the ICANN and ruled out the principle of at-
167 Definition of At-Large, available at http://www.atlarge.icann.org/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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large elections as experimented in 2000. The consequence was the limitation of the possibility for
counter-elites to join the board and gain power within the organisation.
Figure 6.3. Organisational Structure of the ICANN under the 2002 by-laws168
Compared with the original structure, figure 6.3.1 shows the particular role of the GAC among
advisory committees and the inclusion of an At-Large membership body. The new structure tended
to respond to some pressures for change outlined in the previous section. First, the new role of the
GAC corresponded both to the demands of developing countries and of the European Union; and to
the continuing debate on the role of the state. The idea of the ICANN as a public-private partnership
seemed  more  acceptable  to  many  actors  familiar  with  the  concept.  The  At-Large  Advisory
Committee was a single body to offer participation to all other non-dominant actors. Finally, the
role of the nominating committee was an answer to the legitimacy issues. However, the responses
were insufficient. They left aside most of the controversies and the inclusion of counter-elite actors
168 Available  at  http://www.icann.org/en/structure/,  last  accessed  through  the  Internet  Archive  8  April 2014.  ASO
stands for Address Supporting Organisation; GNSO for Generic Names Supporting Organisation, and CCNSO for
Country Code Names Supporting Organisation.
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was insufficient to make the system stable. 
6.3.2. The failure of the reform and the redefinition of the frontiers of the 
field
In spite of the efforts of the power elite to maintain hegemony in the field through a reform of the
central institution of Internet governance, the reform failed to gain support from all groups of the
counter-elites. While governmental elites were satisfied by the new role of the GAC, scholars and
civil society organizations were not convinced by the At-Large Advisory Committee. Moreover, the
reform addressed the problem of legitimacy and openness to respond to some pressures for change
but most of them remained open after the reform. As a result, the hegemonic project of the ICANN,
despite its reform, was a failure and did not prevent the crisis of Internet governance evidenced by
the debates during the World Summit on the Information Society. 
First, the reform only partially addressed the change in the dominant actors' strategies. While the
documents published by the Committee on Evolution and Reform acknowledged the policy-making
character of the ICANN, it did not specify in which ways the ICANN could address issues such as
access or privacy. It did not make clear either, which institution was responsible of broader policy
issues  were  the  ICANN  not  to  address  them.  The  “thin”  vs.  “thick”  ICANN  debate  was  left
unsettled. A “thin” ICANN focusing on strictly technical issues was demanded by some civil society
organisations because it would allegedly be more accountable169. However, this strictly technical
role  had  proven to  be  unrealistic  since  the  regulation  of  domain  names  and  IP addresses  had
important political and economic consequences170. Moreover, the focus on technical issues of the
main institution of Internet governance left crucial aspects beyond the scope of a “thin” ICANN. As
we have seen, the OECD and the European Union, but also the scientific elite were already moving
beyond domain names to address issues such as access and privacy. If the ICANN could not be the
forum for these governance issues, other forums had to be created. Another solution was to put
Internet governance on the agenda of other existing policy forums. With the increasing number of
169 See  for  example  the  comments  of  the  Center  for  Democracy  and  Technology  to  the  Committee  on  ICANN
Evolution  and Reform,  May,  3,  2002;  available at  http://www.cdt.org/dns/icann/020503ceir.shtml,  last  accessed
through the Internet Archive  8  April 2014. According to its website, the Center  works ”to promote democratic
values and constitutional liberties in the digital  age.  With expertise in law, technology, and policy, CDT seeks
practical  solutions  to  enhance  free  expression  and  privacy  in  global  communications  technologies.  CDT  is
dedicated  to  building  consensus  among  all  parties  interested  in  the  future  of  the  Internet  and  other  new
communications media”; http://www.cdt.org/mission/, last accessed through the Internet Archive 8 April 2014.
170 See  the  section  2  of  the  Working  Paper  on  ICANN  Mission  and  Core  Values,  available  at
http://archi  ve.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-mission-06may02.htm ,  last  accessed  8  April
2014. 
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policy forums addressing Internet governance issues, the unity of the field and its frontiers were at
stake. Meanwhile the ICANN reform was discussed, debates on the directions of future steps in
Internet governance were taking place during the preparatory meetings of the World Summit on the
Information  Society  (WSIS).  For  example,  the  fifth  principle  of  the  European  WSIS  regional
ministerial meeting, held in Bucharest in November 2002, read: 
“[...] the information society is, by nature, a global phenomenon and issues such
as privacy protection, consumer trust, management of domain names, facilitation
of e-commerce, protection of intellectual property rights, open source solutions
etc., should be addressed with the active participation of all stakeholders.”171
Domain names were becoming one among other issues in Internet governance, and the ICANN
could not be the institutional setting for the broader policy debates. 
Second, entering actors were not completely co-opted by the new corporation. New spaces had
opened  up  for  their  participation  without  guaranteeing  them the  power  to  act  within  the  new
framework. The reform of the status of the GAC partially addressed the concerns of the developing
countries. While the increased role of governments in the ICANN was a positive reform for the
developing countries' governments, intergovernmental organisations respecting the one state, one
vote procedures were still  seen as more favourable to their interests. The historical influence of
developing  countries  on  the  evolution  of  the  ITU,  while  limited,  was  based  on  an  equal
representation  of  states,  which  was  not  the  case  in  the  GAC.  In  2002,  the  GAC had only  73
members,  including  30  European  countries  (Mathiason,  2008,  p.  89) compared  to  an  almost
universal membership of the ITU. 
For  the  hackers,  the  ICANN  reform  increased  the  power  of  the  private  sector  and  that  of
governments, which was against their objectives for the Internet. After the visibility acquired during
the 2000 ICANN election, hackers did not find a space to represent their ideas and interests in the
field of Internet governance. Unsurprisingly, the ICANN reform did not provide this specific group
of actors with any opportunity of participation. The hackers organisations thus remained counter-
elite  actors,  whose  knowledge and capacity  of action had some influence on the field,  without
participation in the institutions of the field. 
171 Final Declaration of the Pan European Regional Conference on the Workd Summit on the Information Society, 
Bucharest, November 2002, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=rc|
pe&c_type=all|, last accessed 8 April 2014. Also quoted in (Kleinwächter, 2004)
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Third,  the  reform of  the  ICANN was  to  a  certain  extent  a  reaction  to  the  terrorist  attacks  of
September  2001 (Kleinwächter 2004).  However,  it  did not  address  other  changes  in  the  global
political economy of the Internet. The focus on domain names did not seem as crucial as in the late
1990s, the rise of search engines like Google made domain names less visible and the organization
of content more profitable than its creation (Couvering, 2008). The burst of the Dotcom bubble also
slowed down the speculation around domain names for a few years172. While the regulation of what
was becoming to be called “critical Internet resources” (Internet domains, root servers and Internet
addresses) was still  necessary for the functioning of the network,  the evolution of the political
economy of the Internet,  and the growing importance of the field of Internet governance in the
regulation of telecommunications were far beyond the scope of the limited ICANN reform.
Fourth, while the public-private partnership character of the corporation was successful in clarifying
the status of Internet governance, the overarching role of the US government was still an issue for
non-US actors. The growing importance of governments within the ICANN did not change the
authority of the US Department of Commerce on the corporation. The authority of the ICANN still
relied on the agreements signed by the US government. During the ITU plenipotentiary conference
held in Marrakesh in October 2002, the role of the US government in Internet governance was
harshly  criticised  (Kleinwächter  2004).  The  internationalisation  of  the  ICANN was  not  on  the
agenda of the Committee on ICANN Evaluation and Reform and while it was demanded by many
developing countries, the matter was not discussed during the reform and the debate is still unsettled
today.  
The process of the reform, while open, was still controlled by the ICANN. Some debates that were
thought to be outside the scope of the ICANN were already taking place elsewhere. Some more
radical suggestions for change were ruled out by the Committee as being “inconsistent with the
basic  premise  that  led  to  ICANN's  creation”173.  As  a  result,  the  reform failed  to  re-create  the
conditions of consent in the field of Internet governance. Like the original ICANN, the ICANN 2.0
left  aside important  actors  and important  issues that were likely to  foment the politicisation of
Internet governance and the conditions of resistance to the counter-elites. This is even the case with
the academic and civil society counter-elite that was the primary target of the reform. Hans Klein,
an associate professor at the Georgia Institute of technology summarized the failure of the ICANN
172 See the biggest domain name sales on http://www.domaining.com/topsales/, last accessed 8 April 2014. While the
biggest sales are recent, there were not many big sales between 2001 and 2004. 
173 An  example  of  the  Committee  ruling  out  proposals  can  be  seen  in  the  Committee's  update  regarding  RIR
suggestions,  available  at  http://archive.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/update-16sep02.htm,  last  accessed  8
April 2014.
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reform from a counter-elite point of view during the WSIS (Klein, 2005). He denounces a capture of
the ICANN from the start through the capture of the International Forum on the White Paper by
“powerful industry and technical stakeholders” (see previous section). He then adds three captures
that occurred according to him during the first years of operation of the ICANN. First, the ICANN
board  was  captured  in  2002  since  the  principle  of  open  elections  was  ruled  out  for  board
nominations and since the users representation on the ICANN board was eliminated. Second, the
Internet Society (ISOC), originally a technical/scientific institution, was captured by “its largest
corporate members”, which led to the indirect capture of the “.org” registry operated by the ISOC
and of the At-Large Advisory Committee of the ICANN. Indeed, according to Klein, nearly 60
percent of the user-related organisation represented in the At-Large Advisory Committee were ISOC
chapters. Finally, Klein describes the capture of the “.com” registry by Network Solutions, since the
company  was  able  to  extend  its  control  of  the  domain.  As  evidenced  by  Klein's  account,  the
counter-elite was not co-opted by the ICANN reform; and opposition still occurred outside of the
institution. 
Conclusions: 
The  creation  of  the  ICANN  was  an  attempt  by  the  power  elite  of  Internet  governance  to
institutionalise its domination over the field. As such, the ICANN can be described as a hegemonic
project  with  two  dimensions.  First,  the  ICANN  project  was  a  consensus-building  project  for
different  specialised  elites  in  the  transnational  field  of  Internet  governance.  Second,  it  was  a
hegemonic project in the Gramscian sense of a project aiming at consensual domination. The power
elite  made  some  concessions  to  non-dominant  groups  in  order  to  co-opt  them  in  the
institutionalisation of the field. Once created, an institution can canalise and contain conflicts and
resistance in a way that does not threaten the equilibrium of the field. However, the concessions
made by the power elite were very limited. While a consensual forum had been designed to write
the by-laws of the future institutions,  bringing together the elite and possible counter-elites, the
process was by-passed and the by-laws took little account of the demands emanating form non-
dominant groups. Moreover, what seemed consensual in the mid-1990s was already problematic at
the turn of the millennium. Indeed, the field of Internet governance witnessed rapid changes at the
level of the actors, institutions, ideas and broader context. 
Dominant  actors had  broadened their  focus and designed new strategies  for  the  future  Internet
governance. The limited issue of domain names and IP addresses was not seen by many dominant
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actors as the sole problem of Internet governance any more. Issues such as access, privacy, and
cyber-security were increasingly included in the strategies of dominant actors and were to a large
extent outside the scope of what could be addressed by the ICANN or any other existing institution
in the field.   New actors  reinforced the need to  broaden the definition of  Internet  governance.
Hackers and developing countries, each from its own position, advocated for a more comprehensive
look at the economic and social consequences of Internet governance decisions. The context of the
global political economy also pushed in favour of change. The Dotcom bubble showed that the
economic and financial stakes of the governance of these new markets were very high. Billions of
dollars disappeared from one day to another. Strategies oriented towards production and commerce-
based growth rather than financial speculation on Internet domains seemed more reasonable, and
this called for a geographical extension of the market through an increased access to the Internet.
The development of the Internet became also tightly linked to security issues after the terrorist
attacks of 2001. Technical regulation was not able to address geopolitical and strategic issues. The
division between public and private regulation was not solved either by the creation of the ICANN
(Kleinwächter, 2002). On the contrary, the hybrid character of the institution and its dependence on
the US Department of Commerce raised more issues on the role of the state in Internet governance.
To conclude, the concomitant factors of change in the field of Internet governance after the creation
of the ICANN led to a profound crisis of the field. The fragile consensus that had been achieved
over the definition of Internet governance that permitted different actors to develop their strategies
was wrecked by a growing internal and external pressure for change. Internet governance evolved
into a “weak field”,  and it  still  remains to be seen if  this status has been settled by the World
Summit on the Information Society.
To  this  description,  the  empirical  study  of  Internet  governance  as  well  as  insights  from  the
sociology of elites can bring two elements that enhance the dynamic aspect of the analysis: the role
of elites and non-elites in the evolution of the field at the turn of the millennium. While Bourdieu
focuses on dominant actors and the entry of new (powerful) actors, pressures for change came also
from non-dominant  actors in  the field of Internet governance.  First,  counter-elites were able  to
mobilise their capital in other field to become important figures of the resistance to the power elite.
An  academic/civil  society  elite,  comprising  mostly  of  legal  scholars,  campaigned  against  the
ICANN with a legal discourse on constitutionality, legitimacy and accountability. Governmental
elites, and increasingly among them developing countries' representatives were able to oppose an
efficient resistance to the ICANN model. Some hackers organisations also made their way into the
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field and threatened the existing order.  Finally,  and perhaps more  interestingly,  non-elite  actors
changed the way they used the Internet. The practices of the non-elites affected the debates on the
governance of the network. The “Web 2.0” might not have induced a participatory governance of
the Internet but it definitely changed the way Internet governance could be exercised.
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Chapter 7: Internet Governance in the World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS): the road to the creation of a 
Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG)
The World Summit on the Information Society was a large UN conference that took place between
2002 and 2005. The ITU took the lead role in the preparation of the Summit. The mandate of the
summit was much broader than Internet governance. However, because of the situation of the field
of Internet governance and the growing importance of the network in the global economy, the issue
of Internet governance gradually became central to the Summit. 
The Summit was divided into two phases. The first phase was held in Geneva in December 2003
and was prepared during several events throughout the years 2002 and 2003. As far as Internet
governance  is  concerned,  the  results  of  the  first  phase  were  the  acknowledgement  of  strong
dissensions about Internet governance and the creation of a multi-stakeholder Working Group on
Internet Governance (WGIG). This chapter explores the road to the creation of the WGIG from a
'power elite vs. counter-elite' perspective and follows the development of the transnational field of
Internet governance during the WSIS. 
One of the main characteristics of the Summit is its multi-stakeholder nature and the participation
for one of the first time in UN history of non-state actors in the WSIS174. The participation of civil
society has received particular attention by the IR literature  (Dany, 2012; Kleinwächter,  2008a;
Mueller, 2010; Raboy & Landry, 2005). However, most of this literature focus on non-governmental
organisations while the crucial role of the private sector has been less analysed. The focus of the
chapter is different since it does not look at the WSIS from a statist perspective but rather from a
field  perspective.  As  we  have  seen  in  the  previous  chapters,  the  field  of  Internet  governance
involved different types of actors and governmental elites were one type of specialised elites among
others.  As a  consequence,  the  inclusion  of  civil  society  (and business)  actors  is  analysed  as  a
continuation and generalisation of existing practices in the field of Internet governance. As Internet
became the most important aspect of the field of telecommunications, practices from the sub-field
of  Internet  governance  were  imposed in  the  field of  telecommunications.  The analysis  of  civil
society participation in the WSIS is thus explored, not as an emancipatory movement from the state
174 The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro had paved the way for the participation of non-state actors to UN summits a 
decade before, in 1992. 
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and the market, but rather as a space of struggle, following a neo-Gramscian definition of civil
society (Cox, 1999; Colas 2002).
Struggles in the field of Internet governance concerned primarily the crisis of hegemony in Internet
governance.  The  hegemonic  project  of  a  technical,  semi-privatised,  and  multi-stakeholder
governance of the Internet outside of the pre-existing institutions of telecommunication regulation
became  the  focal  point  of  the  debates.  During  the  analysis  of  this  time  period,  around  1300
documents  were  considered,  including  agenda,  statements,  declarations,  presentations,  press
releases and other documents. A search for the expression “Internet” in the documents produced
around 650 results, around 130 contained the expression “Internet governance” while less than 70
contained  the  expression  “ICANN”.  The  650  documents  mentioning  the  Internet  were  further
analysed in the study and 150 were found to present a perspective on one of the aspects directly
related to Internet governance. Critical discourse analysis was used in order to identify a number of
statements  within  these  documents  (see  Annex  4).  These  statements  were  then  related  to  the
discourses outlined in chapter  5 in order to  analyse the evolution of these discourses.  A social
network analysis of these statements and their relations to individuals and institutions also helped to
determine the positions of the actors and their discourses in the field of Internet governance. This
analysis evidenced the existence of a power elite and a less coherent counter-elite within the field of
Internet governance and a crisis of the hegemonic project of the ICANN. Finally, the issue of the
definition of Internet governance is also analysed as a struggle to define the frontiers of the field of
Internet governance and the questioning of the hegemony of the power elite. 
The chapter first describes the WSIS and explains to what extent it was the consequence of the
crisis of Internet governance. In a second section, the positions of actors and the discourses about
Internet governance are analysed in order to understand the crisis of the hegemony and the rise of a
counter-elite.  The second phase of the Summit,  and more particularly the work of the Working
Group on Internet governance and its influence in the final declaration of the WSIS are explored in
the following chapter. 
7.1. The WSIS
While heated debates on the institutionalisation of Internet governance were taking place in the late
1990s, the ITU had been by-passed since the failure of the Memorandum of Understanding that it
had  supported with some elements of the future elite  of Internet governance (IAHC, 1997; see
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chapter 5). In 1998, the ITU was holding its plenipotentiary conference in Minneapolis, United
States. During the conference, the Union decided to organise a World Summit on the Information
Society that would be an opportunity to define the role of the institution in a changing context. 
7.1.1. From the “Minneapolis deal” to the WSIS
While  the  ICANN was  being  created  in  the  Washington  D.C region,  the  ITU was  having  its
plenipotentiary  conference  in  Minneapolis  in  October  and  November  of  1998.  Despite  the
geographical proximity and the simultaneity of the two events, the issue of Internet governance did
not appear at the top of the agenda of the ITU conference. The Memorandum of Understanding that
was seen a year before as the solution for an internationalised Internet governance was not even
mentioned in the final declaration. The resolution 102 on the “Management of Domain Names and
Internet Addresses” only invited the secretary-general of the organisation ‘to take an active part in
the  international  discussion  and  initiatives  of  the  management  of  domain  names  and  internet
addresses, which is being led by the private sector” (International Telecommunication Union, 1998
resolution 102, §1).  According to Kleinwächter  (2004, p.  240), a 'Minneapolis  deal'  was struck
between the US government and the  ITU. In exchange of the recognition of the private  sector
leadership in Internet governance, the US withdrew its opposition to the organisation of a large
conference  on  the  information  society.  However,  the  deal  did  not  settle  the  dispute  over  the
respective roles of the US and the ITU in Internet governance. As we have seen in the previous
chapter, the difficulties of the ICANN and the changing global context strengthened the position of
the  ITU in the field of Internet  governance.  Already in 1999,  the  ITU secretary-general  Pekke
Tarjanne accused President Clinton’s Internet adviser, Ira Magaziner, during the World Economic
Forum in Davos,  of hypocrisy regarding the private  sector leadership and the autonomy of the
ICANN form the US government (Kleinwächter, 2004, p. 240). 
During the Minneapolis plenipotentiary conference, the proposal by Tunisian president Ben Ali to
organise a World Summit on the Information Society focusing on the issue of development in the
knowledge-based  economy was  endorsed  by  the  organisation  (International  Telecommunication
Union, 1998, resolution 73). The UN system as a whole was involved in the project with the ITU
assuming the leading role (Mathiason, 2008, p. 99).
In  2001,  it  was  decided  that  the  Summit  would  be  divided  into  two  phases,  in  two  different
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locations. The Geneva phase would provide the resources for the Summit while Tunisia would be a
symbolic location in the developing world to address issues of ICT for Development.  The World
Summit was authorised by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA, 2002) that
made no reference to Internet governance. However, during the preparatory meetings of the first
phase of the WSIS, Internet governance started to appear as a key issue of the information society.
The resolution also insisted on the multi-stakeholder character of the future Summit and stressed the
role of international and regional institutions, civil society and the private sector.
The first phase of the WSIS was held in Geneva in December 2003 but the preparatory process
started 18 months before.  The preparatory process included five regional  conferences and three
meetings  of  the  Preparatory  Committee  (PrepCom).  There  was  also  an  intersessional  meeting
between the second and the third meetings of the Preparatory Committee. The third meeting of the
preparatory Committee (PrepCom 3) was itself divided into four sessions to settle the divergences
before the Geneva phase of the Summit held from the 10th to the 12th of December 2003.
The second phase of the WSIS included three meeting of the Preparatory Committee, four regional
conferences, two sub-regional conferences, several sessions of the three working groups (Group of
Friends  of  the  Chair,  Task  Force  on  Financial  Mechanisms,  and  Working  Group  on  Internet
Governance).  Finally,  the  Tunis  phase  of  the  Summit  was  held  from the  16th  to  the  18th  of
November 2005. 
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227
T
U
N
IS PH
A
SE
PrepCom  1,  Hammamet,  24-26
June 2004
PrepCom  2,  Geneva,  17-25
February 2005
PrepCom  3,  Geneva,  19-30
September 2005; and Tunis, 13-15
November 2005
Western  Asia,  Damascus,  22-23
November 2004
Africa, Accra, 2-4 February 2005
Asia-Pacific,  Tehran, 31 May – 2 June
2005
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,
Rio de Janeiro, 8-10 June 2005
WSIS, Tunis, 16-18 November 2005
Figure 7.1. Chronology of the official meetings of the WSIS175
Consistently with the mandate set  by the resolution of the UN General  Assembly (56/183),  the
whole process was open to the participation of non-state actors. However,  the multi-stakeholder
approach was not followed without resistance by the ITU member states. Non-state observers were
sometimes asked to leave the room and some of the early working groups consisted only of member
states  representatives  (Kleinwächter,  2004).  Overall,  the  participation  of  non-state  actors  was
important, accounting to around 45 per cent in the Geneva Phase and to more than 60 per cent of the
Tunis Phase (see Tables 7.2 and 7.3). 
The first phase resulted in the publication of a Declaration of Principles and a Plan of Action while
the  outcomes  of  the  second phase  were  the  Tunis  Commitment  and  the  Tunis  Agenda  for  the
Information Society. These documents are crucial to the field of Internet governance and continue to
set the terms of the debate after a decade and are continuously referred to by the actors as elements
of the rules of the game in the field. 
as of: 2003-12-12
Number of
Participants
Number of
Entities
Represented
States 4590 175
International
Organizations 225 50
UN Bodies 620 37
UN Agencies 347 13
Non-Governmental
Organizations 3310 481
Business 514 98
Guests 471
Media 970 631
TOTAL 11047 1486
Table 7.2. Participation to the Geneva Phase of the WSIS176 
175 Adapted from Raboy and Landry (2005) for the Geneva phase and the official WSIS website for the Tunis phase. A 
number of WSIS-related conferences that took place between 2002 and 2005 outside the official process are not 
included in the chronology. 
176 Source: www.itu.int/wsis/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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as of 18.11.2005 Number ofParticipants
Number of
Entities
Represented
TOTAL 19401
States and European
Community 5857 174
International
Organizations 1508 92
NGOs and civil society
entities 6241 606
Business sector entities 4816 226
Media 979 642
Table 7.3. Participation to the Tunis Phase of the WSIS177 
7.1.2. Internet governance in the broad WSIS agenda
As we have seen, Internet governance was only one among many issue discussed during the WSIS,
it was not even intended to become such a crucial issue. As Kleinwächter (2004) recalls, the issue of
Internet governance gradually made its way into the WSIS agenda.  During the first event of the
WSIS, the Bamako regional conference, the issue of Internet governance was not on the agenda of
any of the 14 workshops. The final declaration does not make any reference to Internet governance.
While  the  first  meeting of  the  Preparatory  Committee  in  Geneva  was  not  focusing on Internet
governance either, several participants raised the issue. The European Union called for:
“[...] new mechanisms for governance at global and national levels encompassing
a) issues  related  to  the  sector  like  electronic  communications  regulatory
frameworks, data protection, network security and cyber-security, legal aspects of
e-commerce and internet governance as well as b) more general issues related to
the new citizenship in the information age” 178
The civil society group, representing 22 NGOs called for the democratisation of international bodies
dealing with ICTs, including the ICANN and the IETF 179. Countries like Brazil even went further
and directly criticised the existing Internet governance system:
“Democratic and representative Governments should not be replaced by arbitrary
groupings  of  private  business  and  non-governmental  institutions  in  decisions
regarding the economic space brewing within powerful digital networks, such as
177 Ibid.
178 Reflections of the European Union, PrepCom 1, Geneva, 24 June 2002, available at 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
179 Reflections of the Civil Society Group, PrepCom 1, Geneva, 5 July 2002, available at 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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the  Internet.  Organizing  this  new  environment  to  the  satisfaction  of  all,  and
ensuring the beneficial participation of developing countries and their societies is
central to our work.” 180
On the contrary,  the Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors, chaired by the
International Chamber of Commerce, expressed its support to existing institutions:
“Business should have a significant role in the formation of policy for technical
management of the domain name system and the development of policy. Through
the  various  Supporting Organizations  of  the  Internet  Corporation for  Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN), and in particular the Business Constituency of the
Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO), business will continue to work
to ensure continued stability and security of the Internet, as well as appropriate
protection of intellectual property. […] Governments should continue to support
ICANN and its  private  sector leadership;  support  initiatives to  ensure  that  the
business community will have a sufficient voice in the technical management of
the domain name system.” 181
In  November  2002,  the  pan-European  meeting  in  Bucharest  included  the  issue  of  Internet
governance  as  a  WSIS  issue,  more  particularly the  management  of  domain  names,  while  not
addressing the substance of the issue 182.  In January 2003, the Asian regional conference, held in
Tokyo, added the issue of IP addresses to the Bucharest declaration 183. Few days later in Bavaro,
the  regional  conference  for  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  explicitly  referred  to  Internet
governance by stating that Internet governance should be “multilateral, transparent and democratic”
184. The rather consensual wording of the Bavaro Declaration was not taken up by the last regional
conference, held in Beirut in February 2003:
“[…] the responsibility for root directories and domain names should rest with a
suitable  international  organization  and  should  take  multilingualism  into
consideration.  Countries’  top  level-domain-names  and  Internet  Protocol  (IP)
address assignment should be the sovereign right of countries. The sovereignty of
each nation  should be  protected  and respected.  Internet  governance  should  be
multilateral, democratic and transparent and should take into account the needs of
the public and private sectors as well as those of the civil society.” 185
180 Statement  from Brazil,  PrepCom 1,  Geneva,  5  July  2002,  available  at  http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/,  last
accessed 8 April 2014.
181 Input by the Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors (CCBI), PrepCom 1, Geneva, 5 July 2002, available
at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
182 Report  from  the  Bucharest  Pan-European  Conference  to  the  WSIS,  9  November  2002,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
183 Report  of  the  Tokyo  Asia-Pacific  Regional  Conference  for  WSIS,  15  January  2003,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
184 Report  of  the  Bavaro  Latin  American  and  Caribbean  Conference  for  WSIS,  29  January  2003,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
185 Report  of  the  Beirut  Western  Asia  Regional  Conference  for  WSIS,  art.  2  §4,  6  February  2003,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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The growing importance of Internet governance in the WSIS preparatory process echoed the heated
discussions about Internet governance during the ITU plenipotentiary conference of Marrakesh in
September-October 2002. The US and EU governments, backed by the private sector membership
of  the  ITU were  supporting  the  ICANN and  the  reform process,  while  a  growing  number  of
developing  countries  criticised  the  ICANN  and  the  role  of  the  US  government in  Internet
governance (Kleinwächter, 2004, p. 242).
As a  consequence  of  this  controversy,  the  resolution 102 was  modified  in  order  to  reflect  the
considerable critique addressed at the existing system. The references to the leadership and the key
role of the private sector were replaced by the recognition of the important role of the private sector.
The  sovereignty  of  member-states  over  the  country-code  top  level  domains  was  emphasised
(International Telecommunication Union, 2002, resolution 102). Moreover,  a new resolution 103
also stressed the role of ITU member-states in the management of domain names and the need for
an  internationalised  and  multilingual  domain  name  system  (International  Telecommunication
Union, 2002, resolution 103). However, the separation of technical tasks and policy matters in the
final  acts  of  the  Marrakesh  plenipotentiary  conference  can  be  seen  as  a  way  to  isolate  the
management of critical resources from the inevitable politicisation of Internet governance. 
The  second  meeting  of  the  Preparatory  Committee  in  Geneva  in  February  2003  put  Internet
governance at the heart of the WSIS agenda. In July 2003, during the intersessional meeting of the
Preparatory Committee in Paris, an Internet Governance Ad Hoc Working Group was created to
discuss the issue.  The group  gathered state representatives and, apart from the first meeting, was
closed  to  non-state  participants.  The  group  failed  to  reach  a  consensus  and  several  possible
formulations of the paragraphs on Internet governance remained  at  the end of the intersessional
meeting. During the third meeting of the preparatory committee, discussions on Internet governance
continued in the working group. The debate was heated and very polarized (Kummer, 2007). One
observer reported:
“After one hour, I came back to the meeting room and confirmed what happened.
What I could confirm is that there was no change of the deadlock among countries
[…] I was told that the US wanted all internet governance related action items
would be taken out if it could not reach any consensus. And some other countries
proposed to leave those phrases as square bracketed186. But China strongly stick to
186 The common ITU procedure is to leave non-consensual text, or competing terminologies, square-bracketed until
consensus has been reached. 
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their position that all those phrases should be discussed and concluded here and if
it  is  postponed,  developing  countries  should  be  in  bad  situation  during  the
postponed term. […] The whole impression what happened behind the curtain is
that the emotional tension is much more deepening.”187
Internet  governance was among the main issues that required the organisation of an unplanned
session of the third preparatory committee just before the Geneva summit. According to Raboy et al.
(2010), the  Swiss  delegation  was  determined  not  to  let  the  Geneva  summit  fail  and  took  the
leadership in the final stage of the negotiations. Markus Kummer was mandated to push through a
compromise. Because of the irreconcilability of the positions, Kummer quickly concluded that “the
only way out was to establish a process to deal with these issues” (Kummer, 2007). In spite of the
work of the Group and of the ongoing discussions about Internet governance during the last sessions
of meetings of the Preparatory Committee, no agreement was reached before the Geneva phase of
the Summit. Imprecise wording about Internet governance and the call for further negotiations were
seen as  acceptable by the diverging parties.  Because the issue of  Internet  governance was still
unresolved  after  the  first  phase  of  the  Summit,  it  received  an  increased  attention  in  the  final
documents with the creation of a specific Working Group between the two phases of the Summit. It
then became a central issue of the Tunis phase. 
As far as the Geneva phase is concerned, Internet governance was addressed by the two documents
drafted  during  the  preparatory  process  and  endorsed  by  the  Geneva  conference.  However,  the
elements that were addressing Internet governance were debated and the consensus that was found
was on the further discussion of the issue in another institutional setting. 
Internet governance in the Declaration of principles
Despite the difficulties met by the WSIS participants to reach a consensus on Internet governance,
the issue had become central in the debates and needed to be addressed by the final documents.
Many  articles  touched  upon  Internet  governance.  For  example,  the  Declaration  of  principles
addressed the issue of cyber-security and privacy (WSIS, 2003a, art. 35) even if it remains vague on
the implementation of the principles.  The only indication in the text  was the need to reach the
objectives of a global culture of cyber-security by enhancing security, data protection and privacy
through international cooperation and with the support of all stakeholders and “international expert
187 Unofficial  report  of  the debates  on Internet  governance  by Chun Eung Hwi,  General  Secretary,  PeaceNet,  25
September 2003, available at http://www.wsisasia.org/chun-7-sep.25.htm, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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bodies”.  Likewise,  the protection of intellectual property rights,  that had been so crucial  in the
Internet governance debates of the 1990s, was also discussed during the first phase of the Summit.
While early drafts and comments by certain states and civil society called for a balance between
intellectual property protection and the public interest188, the final declaration only  acknowledged
the role of both intellectual property and knowledge-sharing in the development of innovation and
creativity without stressing the need to strike a balance between them (WSIS, 2003a, art. 42). The
argument for the new formulation was brought in particular by the Coordinating Committee of
Business  Interlocutors:  existing  agreements  on  intellectual  property  protection  were  already
reflecting a balance between the protection of property and the public interest189.
Three articles addressed directly and specifically the management of the network. They read:
“48. The Internet has evolved into a global facility available to the public and its
governance should constitute a core issue of the Information Society agenda. The
international management of the Internet should be multilateral, transparent and
democratic,  with the full  involvement of governments, the private sector,  civil
society and international organizations. It should ensure an equitable distribution
of resources, facilitate access for all and ensure a stable and secure functioning of
the Internet, taking into account multilingualism.
49. The  management  of  the  Internet  encompasses  both  technical  and public
policy issues and should involve all stakeholders and relevant intergovernmental
and international organizations. In this respect it is recognized that:
- Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of
States.  They  have  rights  and  responsibilities  for  international  Internet-related
public policy issues;
- The private sector has had and should continue to have an important role in the
development of the Internet, both in the technical and economic fields;
- Civil society has also played an important role on Internet matters, especially at
community level, and should continue to play such a role;
-  Intergovernmental  organizations  have  had  and  should  continue  to  have  a
facilitating role in the coordination of Internet-related public policy issues;
-  International  organizations  have  also  had  and  should  continue  to  have  an
important  role  in  the  development  of  Internet-related  technical  standards  and
relevant policies.
50. International  Internet  governance  issues  should  be  addressed  in  a
coordinated manner. We ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations to set up
188 Draft declaration of principles, WSIS, Sub-Committee 2, art. 21,  available at  http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/,
last accessed 8 April 2014.
189 CCBI  comments  on  the  Draft  declaration  and  action  plan,  14  November  2003,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
233
a working group on Internet governance, in an open and inclusive process that
ensures  a  mechanism for  the  full  and active  participation  of  governments,  the
private sector and civil  society from both developing and developed countries,
involving relevant intergovernmental and international organizations and forums,
to investigate and make proposals for action, as appropriate, on the governance of
Internet by 2005.” (WSIS, 2003a)
The three articles are the result of the long negotiations and the heated debate that characterised the
discussions  on  Internet  governance  during  the  preparatory  process.  The  debates  on  article  48
focused mainly on the description of the Internet as a  global  facility,  as opposed to competing
wordings such as global public good, as advocated for example by the Brazilian representatives, or
global resource190. The affirmation that Internet governance should constitute a “core issue of the
information  society  agenda”  was  also  debated  during  the  preparatory  process.  The  formulation
legitimated the role of the WSIS in Internet governance although some members of the power elite
wanted to exclude any reference to Internet governance in the official documents191, or even that
Internet governance was a misleading phrase and that only technical management of the network
existed192.  More importantly, divergences on the wording of article 48 existed on the qualifying
elements of Internet governance. Many developing countries and some civil society organisations,
as well  as the ITU itself,  advocated for an  intergovernmental management of the Internet.  The
power elite – representatives of the private sector, of other civil society organisations and of most
developed  countries  –  wanted  to  exclude  the  ITU or  any  intergovernmental  organisation  from
Internet  governance.  Since the idea of an intergovernmental  body was a  threat  for the ICANN
system, the final formulation used the less precise term of “multilateral”. 
In order to avoid the deadlock of the divisions between supporters of an intergovernmental system
and those of a multi-stakeholder system led by the private sector, article 49 introduced a separation
between policy-related and technical issues and defined the role of each stakeholder according to
the division. This division was a victory for the power elite – especially for the CCBI and ICANN
190 The CCBI and WITSA representative Allen Miller stated that business had “some hesitation regarding the reference
to the Internet as a global public good” and proposed the notion of “global resource”. CCBI intervention during the
Intersessional meeting, 18 July 2003, available at  http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed  8 April 2014.
The facilitation  team on the draft  declaration of  principles  took over the  term “global facility”  coined by the
Nigerian delegation, albeit changing it from “global public facility” to “global facility”.   
191 See for example the intervention by the AT&T representative Philip Wintrebert on behalf of CCBI during the WSIS
in Geneva on 12 December 2003, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
192 This statement was repeatedly made by CCBI and the International Chamber of Commerce. CCBI's final statement
reads: “There has been much discussion at this summit about the issue of so-called 'internet governance'. Business
believes  that  this  term  is  a  contradiction  in  terms/a  flawed  concept/an  oxymoron”.  Text  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed  8  April 2014.  The same argument was used by the  Center for
Global Communications (GLOCOM) of the International University of Japan, whose delegates were also members
of the G8 Dot-Force (see following chapter). 
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delegations  –  over  member-states  delegation  such  as  Brazil,  France  and  New  Zealand;  inter-
governmental delegations such as the UNESCO; and most of the civil society organisations. As we
are  going  to  see  into  further  details  in  the  following  sections,  the  separation  between
technical/economic issues and policy issues paved the way to a division of labour between the
ICANN elite and other actors. The ICANN elite could continue its “technical” management of the
Internet while the role of states, civil society and intergovernmental organisations that were not
already included in the existing governance system was limited to “policy” issues that did not touch
upon the management of Internet core resources. Furthermore, the sovereign right of countries on
their  country-code  top-level  domain  that  was  stressed  in  earlier  drafts  of  the  declaration  was
replaced by the statement of the obvious: “Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues
is the sovereign right of States”. While the declaration of principles addressed “the needs of both
groups”, as stated by Kummer (Kummer, 2005, quoted in M. Raboy et al., 2010, 130), it did not
address them on the same level. Once again, the balance found is better described by the Gramscian
notion of hegemony than by the common notion of consensus (see figure 7.1.3). 
Figure 7.1. The unbalanced consensus of art. 48-49 of the Geneva Declaration of Principles
Internet governance in the Plan of Action
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The other final document of the Geneva phase of the WSIS was the Plan of Action, which aimed to
translate the principles into concrete processes. General dispositions such as article 3 on the role of
the  different  stakeholders  are  relevant for  Internet  governance  issues.  The  concept  of
multistakeholderism that appeared in the field during the 1990s was taken over by the WSIS and the
respective  roles  of  governments,  private  sector,  civil  society  and  international  and  regional
institutions was recalled (WSIS, 2003b, art. 3). The global culture of cyber-security mentioned by
the declaration of principles was translated into an encouragement  to contribute actively to  the
United Nations activities in the field (WSIS, 2003b, art. 12, § f and j), more precise and ambitious
formulation were not included in the final plan of action193. The “enabling environment” section,
which  contains  the  principles  of  Internet  governance  in  the  declaration  of  principles,  outlines
several important initiatives for the management of the network:
“a.  Governments  should  foster  a  supportive,  transparent,  pro-competitive  and
predictable  policy,  legal  and  regulatory  framework,  which  provides  the
appropriate  incentives  to  investment  and  community  development  in  the
Information Society.
b. We ask the Secretary General of the United Nations to set up a working group
on  Internet  governance,  in  an  open  and  inclusive  process  that  ensures  a
mechanism for the full and active participation of governments, the private sector
and  civil  society  from  both  developing  and  developed  countries,  involving
relevant  intergovernmental  and  international  organizations  and  forums,  to
investigate and make proposals for action, as appropriate, on the governance of
Internet by 2005. The group should, inter alia:
i. develop a working definition of Internet governance;
ii. identify the public policy issues that are relevant to Internet governance;
iii. develop  a  common  understanding  of  the  respective  roles  and
responsibilities  of  governments,  existing  intergovernmental  and  international
organisations and other forums as well as the private sector and civil society from
both developing and developed countries;
iv. prepare  a  report  on  the  results  of  this  activity  to  be  presented  for
consideration and appropriate action for the second phase of WSIS in Tunis in
2005.
c. Governments are invited to:
i. facilitate  the  establishment  of  national  and regional  Internet  Exchange
Centres;
ii. manage or supervise, as appropriate, their respective country code top-
193 The Chinese delegation proposed for example to include concrete measures: “Measures should be taken to actively
and effectively prevent the use of information technologies and resources for pornographic, violent and terrorist
purposes as well as for criminal activities endangering national security so as to ensure the healthy development of
information and networks”, Statement by Wang XuDong, Minister of Information Industry, People's Republic of
China, 10 December 2003, text available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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level domain name (ccTLD);
iii. promote awareness of the Internet.
d. In cooperation with the relevant stakeholders, promote regional root servers
and the use of internationalized domain names in order to overcome barriers to
access.
e. Governments  should continue to  update their  domestic  consumer protection
laws to respond to the new requirements of the Information Society.
f. Promote  effective  participation  by  developing  countries  and  countries  with
economies in transition in international ICT forums and create opportunities for
exchange of experience. […] 
i. Governments and stakeholders should actively promote user education and
awareness about online privacy and the means of protecting privacy.
j. Invite  stakeholders to  ensure  that practices designed to facilitate  electronic
commerce also permit consumers to have a choice as to whether or not to use
electronic communication. […]  
l. Governments, in collaboration with stakeholders, are encouraged to formulate
conducive ICT policies that foster entrepreneurship, innovation and investment,
and with particular reference to the promotion of participation by women. […]”
(WSIS, 2003b)
The general tone of the plan of action illustrated the neoliberal discourse that prevailed in the field
of Internet governance, even if the elements of global public good discourses  were more present
than  in  the  1990s  (see  section  7.2).  The  articles presented a  number  of  requirements  to  the
governments in order to establish an enabling environment for the information society. It can be
noted that if non-state actors were invited in the negotiations of the WSIS declaration, their role was
not defined in the plan of action. 
The mandate of the Working Group on Internet Governance was described in §b. It is interesting to
note that the mandate is limited beforehand to the definition of policy issues related to the Internet
and  leaves  the  technical  and  economic  parts  out.  References  to  the  internationalisation  of  the
management of the Internet that were supported by many countries including the European Union
and Australia were left outside the plan of action194. Spam and other concrete Internet-related issues
were also deleted from the Plan of Action. As a result, the Plan of Action did not include concrete
Internet governance actions except for the creation of the WGIG. The promotion of a competitive
environment and initiatives to raise awareness or to enhance knowledge were only incentives to let
194 An  earlier  draft  version  of  the  plan  of  action  included  a  paragraph  stating:  “governments  should  work  to
internationalize the management of Internet resources in order to achieve a universally representative solution”. See
Draft Plan of Action, 21 September 2003, art. 19 §f, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8
April 2014. 
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the  market  and  the  private  sector  manage  the  Internet,  both  nationally  and  globally,  with  a
minimalist role for the state and intergovernmental organisations. Users were only referred to as
consumers,  which  is  consistent  with  the  view of  the  Internet  as  a  marketplace.  Moreover,  the
references to the participations of stakeholders seem more directed towards the private sector than
towards civil society organisations. 
Despite the relatively harmless character of the Geneva documents for the power elite of Internet
governance, these documents are the more intergovernmentalist documents to date in the field of
Internet governance. While the notion of global public good was removed from the text, references
to the role of the state and of intergovernmental organisations were still present. As we are going to
see in the following chapter, the Geneva documents are more challenging to the power elite than the
Tunis Declaration. It thus comes as no surprise that they have been referred to by counter-elites as a
breach  in  the  dominant  model  of  Internet  governance,  notably  during the  World  Congress  on
International Telecommunications in 2012.  The Preparatory process of the Geneva phase of the
WSIS  remains  the  most  turbulent  period  of  the  crisis  of  the  field.  The  final  documents  that
sanctioned the separation of technical and policy issue and institutionalised the policy debate with
the  creation of  the  Working Group on Internet  Governance  can be seen as  the  beginning of  a
settlement of the crisis and stabilisation of the positions. 
7.1.3. The crisis of Internet governance in the WSIS
The discussions about Internet governance during the WSIS were a direct consequence of the crisis
of the existing institutions of the field of Internet governance and the pressing need for new forums.
The WSIS became a locus of politicisation of Internet governance and redefined the frontiers of the
field. The hegemonic discourse of Internet governance and the hegemony of the power elite were at
stake during the debates. The ICANN had been created along the lines of Internet exceptionalism,
multistakeholderism and technical  regulation  but  these  principles  were  debated  during  the  first
phase of the WSIS. 
First, the idea of Internet exceptionalism had been instrumental to by-pass existing institutions and
particularly the ITU. As the Internet was considered a new cyberspace rather than a development of
existing telecommunication networks, the field gained its autonomy and could invent new rules of
procedures. However, the idea of Internet exceptionalism was not shared by all participants to the
WSIS. From the documents analysed in this study, only two refer to the fundamental differences
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between the Internet and the “old” telecommunication system. The German delegation explained its
support to the existing system by making a reference to the unique nature of the Internet:
“The organisational structures required for the management of the internet need to
take account  of the special  features of this medium and to be able to  respond
rapidly to changing user expectations.”195
The Coordination Committee of Business Interlocutors stayed closer to the type of argumentation
that  existed  in  the  1990s  and  insisted  on  the  fact  that  the  technology  required  a  new type  of
governance: 
“The packet-switched Internet is fundamentally different from traditional circuit-
switched  telecommunications  networks,  and  the  old  settlements  The old
settlement model does not adapt well to the value based Internet market place to
promote infrastructure development and innovation.”196
Despite  these two examples,  the support  to  the ICANN and the  existing system was generally
explained by the success of the existing management rather than the unique and novel nature of
cyberspace. The type of argument used was similar to the “If it ain't broken don't fix it” approach
that was popular among technologists in the 1990s. For instance, the Internet Society spoke highly
of the ICANN system: 
“The unprecedented  growth  and innovation  that  we have  seen  in  the  Internet
sector is due in large part to the lack of regulation and constraints on technology
development. In addition, the processes employed have been open, democratic
and  inclusive  and  it’s  hard  to  see  how  these  could  be  improved  by  a  new
intergovernmental body.”197
This type of argumentation could be found in many interventions by dominant actors. Instead of
simply  stating  that  the  Internet  could  not  be  regulated  by  an  intergovernmental  organisation,
supporters of the ICANN  usually insisted on the possibility  of reform and improvement of the
corporation. 
On the contrary, critics of the ICANN often strongly rejected the idea of Internet exceptionalism.
The UNESCO delegate stated for example that:
195 Intervention of the representative of the German government during the  WSIS, 11 December 2003, available at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
196 CCBI  comments  on  the  revised Draft  declaration  of  principles,  27 October 2003,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
197 ISOC Comments on Draft principles and action plan, 31 May 2003, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/,
last accessed 8 April 2014.
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“There is no need to proclaim new rights or to lay down new rules. Similarly,
rather than seeking to harmonize legal  cultures and systems which  differ from
State  to  State  as  far  as  concepts  of  rights  and  freedoms,  their  scope  and
hierarchical  organization  are  concerned,  it  is  preferable  to  develop  ways  of
making those rights and freedoms effective in cyberspace.”198
This kind of rejection of Internet exceptionalism did not exist in the debates of the 1990s. For many
participants, including representatives of developing countries and civil society organisations, the
Internet  could  be  treated  like  a  mere  medium through which  information  was exchanged.  The
Internet was thus not an entirely new space for social relations that required new rules, but rather a
new technology that needed to be regulated according to existing social realities. This decline of
Internet exceptionalism can be explained by some of the factors of change outlined in the previous
chapter. The burst of the Dotcom bubble and the war on terror that permeated the cyberspace at the
turn of the millennium evidenced the embeddedness of the Internet in existing social and political
relations. The Internet was no exception to the financialisation of the economy or the unilateralism
of the  dominant  state  in  the  international  system.   Against  this  background,  the  claim that  the
Internet constituted a new space free of old rules and divisions was less convincing than in the
1990s. The nature of the forum also changed, and the optimism and technological-determinism that
was shared by the private sector, the technological and scientific elite and the US administration in
the 1990s was not  dominant  in an intergovernmental  forum full  of delegation from developing
countries. Finally, the idea of Internet exceptionalism was less needed by the elite since the ICANN
system had already been created outside of the traditional forums. There was no need to make the
case for a novel governance system. The important point was to make this system acceptable to
non-elite actors. 
As a result, Internet exceptionalism was not a consensual idea in the WSIS199. The attempt by some
actors like the Coordination Committee of the Business Interlocutors to exclude Internet governance
from WSIS debates on this ground was a failure. However, the decline of Internet exceptionalism
was not translated into a critique of the whole  doxa of the field. The exclusion of the ITU from
Internet  governance was already deeply integrated in  the field.  Likewise,  other  basic  principles
such as  the  idea of  multistakeholder  governance  and the  focus  on technical  regulation  resisted
opposition and remained crucial in the field of Internet governance after the WSIS.
198 Contribution by the  UNECO, PrepCom 1, Geneva, 5 July 2002,  available at  http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/,
last accessed 8 April 2014.
199 This argument is specially true for the first phase of the WSIS. Internet exceptionalism re-appeared in the WGIG.
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The multistakeholder setting of the WSIS was certainly influenced by the experiments in Internet
governance.  Multistakeholderism was  probably  the  central  principle  around  which  the  field  of
Internet  governance  had  emerged.  In  a  context  of  growing  non-state  participation  in  the  UN
summits since the 1992 Rio summit, the WSIS was in itself a multistakeholder event. It thus comes
as no surprise that multistakeholderism was embraced by many participants to the WSIS. 
Different actors recalled their support to the participation of all stakeholders in the creation of the
information society. State delegations from the developed North as well as developing and emerging
countries  insisted  on  the  inclusion  of  the  different  stakeholders.  The  President  of  the  Swiss
Confederation,  Pascal Couchepin200,  and  the  Chinese  Minister  of  Information  industry201 alike
stressed the need to enhance cooperation between governments, intergovernmental organisations,
the private sector and civil society in the building of the information society.  The private sector,
through the CCBI as well  as  the European Telecommunication Network Operators'  Association
(ETNO)  stressed  the  need  to  take  the  interests  of  the  different  stakeholder  into  account.  The
representatives of civil society organisations also voiced their support to the multistakeholder model
of  governance.  For  example,  Wolfgang  Kleinwächter,  speaking  on  behalf  of  the  civil  society
Internet Governance Caucus (IGC), stated:
“Governance issues related to the Internet, primarily the technical coordination of
internet identifiers, protocols and root servers, is a complex challenge which needs
a complex reaction  and has  to  include  all  stakeholders –  civil  society,  private
industry and governments. No single body and no single stakeholder group is able
to manage these challenges alone.”202
Support to the multistakeholder nature of the governance of the information society, and particularly
of the Internet, was one of the most frequent statement made by the participants, occurring 64 times
in the 150 WSIS documents addressing Internet governance. 
The  general  support  to  multistakeholderism was however  not  always  a  support  to  the  existing
multistakeholder ICANN system. The Cuban delegation insisted on the fact that:  
200 Address  by  Pascal  Couchepin  to  the  WSIS,  Geneva,  12  December  2003, available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
201 Statement by Wang XuDong, Minister of Information Industry, People's Republic of China, 10 December 2003, t ext
available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
202 Statement of Wolfgang Kleinwächter on behalf of the Internet Governance Caucus at the Intersessional Meeting of
the Preparatory Committee in Paris, 16 July 2003, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8
April 2014.  Kleinwächter was one of the legal scholars that were critical of the ICANN in the early 2000s (see
chapter 6).
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“Internet should not  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  main  owners  of  transnational
capitals:  it  is  imperative  to  create  a  democratic  intergovernmental  institution
which  regulates  it  and  promotes  international  cooperation  and  the  transfer  of
financial resources and technology.”203
The  undemocratic  and  non-inclusive  nature  of  the  ICANN  system  was  criticised  by  many
participants from developing countries and civil society organisations. However, the critique was
usually  not  addressed at  the  idea of  multistakeholderism itself  but  rather at  the  capture  of  the
ICANN by particular interests204. As a result, the critiques of the ICANN system were directed at
the lack of stakeholders' representation rather than at the idea of multistakeholderism. For example,
the co-coordinator of the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus regretted that the participation
of  individual  users  had  diminished  with  the  reform of  the  ICANN because  it  undermined  the
necessary multistakeholder nature of Internet governance205. 
Rather  than  an  opposition  between  multistakeholderism  and  another  principle  such  as
intergovernmentalism, the differences between supporters and critics of the existing system related
to the definition of multistakeholderism and the specific role of the different stakeholders in this
kind of settings. While for some, the idea of multistakeholderism justified the leadership of the
private  sector  and  the  limited  role  of  states  and  intergovernmental  organisations,  for  others  it
referred  to  the  inclusion  of  non-state  actors  in  processes  dominated  by  states.  The  Brazilian
delegation offered an example of such a perspective on multistakeholderism by stating:  
“The plan of action [...] should emphasize the state's key role in the formulation
and  implementation  of  ICT-related  policies,  in  partnership  with  international
organizations, the private sector and civil society.”206
This  view,  also  supported  by  organisations  like  the  UNESCO  and  countries  like  the  Russian
Federation, made its way into an early draft  of the declaration of principles. During the second
meeting of the Preparatory Committee in February 2003, the WSIS secretariat and the Working
Group of  the  Committee  on  Content  and  Themes  took  over  the  idea  from the  Western  Asian
203 Statement by H.E. Mr. Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada, President of the National Assembly of People’s Power of the 
Republic of Cuba in the WSIS, Geneva, 11 December 2003, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last 
accessed 8 April 2014. 
204 See for example the statement by the Latin American and Caribbean Caucus at the WSIS in Geneva, 10 December 
2003, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 January 2013. 
205 Statement by  YJ Park, co-coordinator  of the civil society  Internet Governance Caucus  during the Intersessional
meeting of the Preparatory Committee,  Paris, 18  July 2003, available at  http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last
accessed 8 April 2014. 
206 Brazilian comments on the draft Plan of Action, 31 May 2003, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last 
accessed 8 April 2014. 
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regional conference that governments were the primary actors in the pursuit of issues like access for
all207. This idea was included in the section on “enabling environment” but was suppressed in the
final declaration. 
As we can see from the networked visualisation of the concepts used by the participants in the
following section (see figure  7.5),  multistakeholderism was reinforced by the first  phase of the
WSIS  despite  its  criticised  results  in  the  context  of  the  ICANN.  In  spite  of  the  competing
perspectives that  existed,  the  idea that  the information society needed to be regulated with  the
participation of all stakeholders had become essential to the field of Internet governance and was
permeating the broader field of telecommunication governance. 
Another essential principle that prevailed during the debates of the 1990s and that defined the field
of Internet governance was the idea of a purely technical regulation. However, the very idea of a
UN  summit  on  the  information  society  seriously  threatened  the  idea  of  a  purely  technical
management of ICTs and the Internet. The global context had changed since the 1990s and the
socio-economic and political issues associated with the governance of the Internet had become more
salient.  The  most  political  body  of  the  ICANN,  the  Governmental  Advisory  Committee,  had
acquired  a  new  status  in  the  corporation  and  the  digital  divide  was  at  the  centre  of  the
preoccupations that led to the organisation of the summit. Unsurprisingly, many delegations recalled
the need to include non-technical issues in the final documents. The civil society representatives
demanded  in  the  second  meeting  of  the  preparatory  committee  that  the  social  and  political
consequences of technical standards be included in the discussions about Internet governance208.
The  claim was an important  input  of  the civil  society organisations  throughout  the preparatory
process209. Again, the UNESCO and “emerging” countries like Brazil and India advocated for an
inclusion of the broader social consequences of the governance of the information society210. Some
developed countries like France and New Zealand also showed support to this broad agenda211. 
207 See the Beirut Declaration and the two draft declarations of principles published during the second meeting of the
preparatory committee, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
208 Declaración  de  la  Sociedad  Civil  a  la  PrepCom  2,  Geneva,  6  December  2002,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
209 See  for  example  the  Youth  Caucus  Input,  Geneva,  6  December  2002 ,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
210 See the Brazilian contribution to the PrepCom 1 and the comments to the draft declaration of principles; or the
address  by  the  Indian  representative  at  the  WSIS  on  11  December  2002.  All  documents  are  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
211 See the  address by Jean-Pierre Raffarin,  French Prime Minister to  the WSIS, 10 December 2003,  available at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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Although some participants denied  the  need to  discuss  Internet  governance and claimed that  a
technical  management  was  sufficient  (see  previous  section),  the  majority  of  the  contributions
acknowledged  the  importance  of  socio-economic  and  political  consequences.  However,  the
discussions around the articles about Internet governance in the declaration resulted in a separation
of technical issues and policy issues. While Internet governance narrowly defined was part of the
“enabling  environment”  of  the  information  society,  policies  were  treated  in  specific  sections
including “e-health” or “e-business”. Public policy issues were treated as a relevant theme for the
WSIS and further dialogue whereas the technical management was left to the private sector. The
mandate of the Working Group on Internet Governance was primarily to identify these public policy
issues related to the Internet. The consequences of the separation between political and technical
issues  will  be further discussed in  the following sections but  it  can be noted that  it  avoided a
politicisation of the technical management of the Internet, which would have been a direct threat to
the  existence  of  the  ICANN.  The  separation  of  technical  and  policy  issues  was  continuously
advocated by the representative of the Coordination Committee of the Business Interests and the
International Chamber of Commerce. ICANN's CEO Paul Twomey reminded the limited technical
role of the ICANN212. The separation was made clear by the intervention of the Italian delegation on
behalf of the European Union: 
“On  the  Internet  Governance  the  European  Union  has  a  clear  position.
Governments must be involved when public policy issues are at stake, but it is not
the  role  of  governments  to  manage  the  Internet  or  to  interfere  in  its  free
development.”213
The separation of technical and policy issues became a strong element of the struggle between the
orthodoxy of the power elite and the heterodoxy of the counter-elites. Despite some heated debates,
the separation was confirmed by the final declaration and the  doxa of the 1990s prevailed. The
creation of a Working Group on Internet Governance displaced and institutionalised the debate. This
is  why the  WGIG is  given special  attention in  the  next  chapter,  as it  became the  locus of  the
reconfiguration of the elite. 
The first phase of the WSIS addressed directly the issues raised by the crisis of the field of Internet
governance.  The  participation  of  a  number  of  new actors  evidences  the  evolution  of  the  field
212 Speech by Paul Twomey, President and CEO of the ICANN during the WSIS, Geneva, 11 December 2003. Text
available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
213 Intervention of Lucio Stance, Italian Minister for Innovation and Technologies, on behalf of the European Union,
Geneva, 10 December 2003, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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described in the previous chapter. The actors and stakes of the field had changed since the end of the
1990s.  Issues  of  internationalisation,  access,  development  and  human  rights  appeared.
Intergovernmental  organisation  such  as  the  UNESCO  became  involved,  large  organisation
representing business interests replaced the individual specialised firms of the 1990s. Governments
worldwide  participated  in  the  debates  around  the  definition  of  Internet  governance.  From  a
relatively autonomous sub-field of telecommunication regulation, Internet governance had become
a major field of international politics with increased stakes and an important number of actors and
institutions involved. Hence, the redefinition of the boundaries of the field through the struggle of
the  power elite  and the counter-elites can be analysed during this  event.  The next  section  will
explore  the  relationship  between  the  discourses  that  had  existed  since  the  1990s,  the  actors
participating to the WSIS, and the hegemonic discourse of the power elite. 
7.2. Internet governance debates during the first phase of the WSIS
While the deadlock of Internet governance debates was resolved with the final documents of the
Geneva phase, it is interesting to analyse into more details the actors and the discourses that were
struggling for the definition of the frontiers of the field.  The debates of the 1990s triggered the
emergence of a power elite around a shared discourse. However, the changes in the field during the
first years of existence of the ICANN modified the situation. During the first phase of the WSIS, the
participants  were  large  institutions  rather  than  individuals  like  in  the  1990s.  The  neoliberal
discourse  that  had  prevailed  in  the  1990s by  co-opting some elements  of  the  cyber-libertarian
discourse and the global public  good discourse was criticised by many participants. In order to
investigate  the  persistence  of  the  power  elite  in  the  field  of  Internet  governance,  this  section
analyses  the  discourse  that  had  been  identified  in  the  debates  of  the  1990s  and  explores  the
networks of actors in the first phase of the WSIS. The more individual analysis of elite actors will
take place in the following chapter focusing on the second phase of the WSIS,   
7.2.1. The evolving position of discourses within the field of Internet 
governance
During the debates of the 1990s, five discourses offered competing visions on Internet governance.
The neoliberal discourse was able to prevail,  but is was adapted to the field by including some
elements of the cyber-libertarian and global public good discourses. In chapter 5, these discourses
were  labelled  as  “dominant”  discourses  since  they  were  present  in  the  official  documents  that
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discussed the future governance system for the global network. Two other discourses were marginal
and only existed in the comments to the official documents. This section analyses the occurrences of
theses discourses during the first phase of the summit in order to analyse whether the positions of
theses discourses in the field had changed. 
Neoliberal discourse
The neoliberal discourse was still very present during the WSIS.  Three elements best illustrate the
importance of the neoliberal discourse. 
First, the leadership of the private sector in the management of the network was presented as an
essential feature of Internet governance by many participants. Diverse participants from the Council
of Europe to the NGO Consumers International along with countries like the US and Sweden and
obviously with the support of the Coordination Committee of Business Interlocutors advocated for
self-regulation and market-based mechanisms top regulate the information society in general and
the Internet in particular. As a result,  these delegations were supportive of the ICANN because
“private  leadership  [had]  proven  its  worth”,  “especially  in  the  technical  coordination  of  the
Internet”214.  The main argument for market-based regulation were the flexibility of this type of
governance in a rapidly-changing sector and the promotion of innovation215. The ICANN was in this
view the best solution for the management of the Internet:
“The United States believes that Internet  infrastructure  and services should be
market-driven and that Internet interconnection agreements should continue to be
negotiated on a private, commercial basis.”216
Second, the need for a pro-competitive regulation as a way to foster innovation and growth was
another  fundamental  element  of  the  neoliberal  discourse.  The  ITU  had  been  a  promoter  of
privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation since its neoliberal turn in the early 1990s (see chapter
4), the notion of a pro-competitive environment as a necessary element for the development of the
information society was thus not surprising in an ITU context. The support of institutions like the
214 Address  by  the  Swedish  delegation  to  the  WSIS,  Geneva,  11  December  2003,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
215 “This  position  is  based  upon  the  necessity  to  ensure  a  flexible  and  deliberative  process  that  can  work  with
and respond to the rapid development and evolution of the Internet in all parts of the world”, CCBI comments on
the  draft  declaration  of  principles  and  plan  of  action,  27  October  2003,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
216 US  comments  on  the  draft  declaration  and  action  plan,  30  May  2003 ,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. Emphasis by the author. 
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OECD  and  CCBI,  and  countries  like  the  United  States  and  Australia,  to  the  liberalisation  of
telecommunication was consistent with the agendas put forward by these actors in the 1990s. The
pro-competitive argument had also been taken over by the UN ICT TaskForce with a wording that
was very similar: 
“The Summit should address ways of putting in place a regulatory environment
that  will  encourage  competition  and build  incentives  for  the  private  sector  to
deliver  services  more  effectively  to  address  the  financial,  technical  and  social
barriers, especially in developing and least developed countries.”217
The Internet Society also expressed its support to pro-competitive regulation. The Internet Society
was at the heart of the power elite of Internet governance and had adopted a neoliberal discourse
around  the  time  of  the  creation  of  the  ICANN,  departing  from an  originally  cyber-libertarian
discourse:
“Government policies should foster competition in telecommunication services,
Internet  service  provision,  Internet-related  software,  and  e-commerce
applications.”218
Even if  the liberalisation of the telecommunication sector was already at  the agenda of several
forums, including the World Trade Organisation, the first phase of the WSIS was seen by several
actors  as  another  opportunity  to  re-affirm  the  need  for  governments  to  adopt  pro-competitive
policies.  The  final  documents  of  the  Geneva  phase  insist  on  the  need  for  a  pro-competitive
environment: no less than 5 articles of the declaration and 3 articles of the plan of action include
references to competition.   
Third, the debate around the protection of intellectual property rights evidenced the strength of the
neoliberal discourse. Although a critique of intellectual property rights existed during the WSIS (see
next paragraph), the support to existing intellectual property protection mechanisms prevailed. As
we have seen, the need to balance between the public interest and the protection of intellectual
property  rights  was  replaced  by  a  positive  appraisal  of  the  ability  of  existing  mechanisms  to
preserve  the  public  interest.  Once again,  this  was  a  victory  for  the  neoliberal  discourse  and a
continuation of the arrangements of the 1990s.  
217 Contribution  of  the  United  Nations  Information  and  Communication  Technologies  TaskForce  to  the  WSIS
preparatory process, 06 February 2003, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
218 ISOC  Comments  on  the  WSIS  draft  declaration  and  plan  of  action,  31  May  2003,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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The dominant  position that the neoliberal  discourse had acquired in  the debates  that led to the
creation of the ICANN was certainly maintained during the WSIS. However, it is important to note
that the neoliberal discourse in the field of Internet governance had evolved since the 1990s. The
focus on security had given the state a more important role. This hints towards an evolution of the
neoliberal  discourse  away  from  cyber-libertarianism.  While  the  general  balance  and  hierarchy
between  the  different  discourses  had  changed,  this  was  not  at  the  expense  of  the  neoliberal
discourse. The neoliberal discourse, through the notions of private-sector leadership, market-based
regulation,  pro-competitive  environment  and  protection  of  intellectual  property  was  deeply
influential in the Geneva declaration of principles and plan of action. 
Cyber-libertarian discourse
The  change  in  the  position  of  the  cyber-libertarian  discourse  from the  1990s  to  the  WSIS  is
impressive. While most of the documents and many of the comments of the 1990s referred to cyber-
libertarian arguments, the discourse was almost absent from the first phase of the WSIS. As we have
seen, the idea of Internet exceptionalism had lost momentum. Several factors can explain the fading
away  of  cyber-libertarianism  in  Internet  governance.  First,  the  institutional  framework  of  the
debates was completely different during the WSIS. The fact that the summit was taking place in
Europe, far away from the Silicon Valley undermined the position of the cyber-libertarian discourse.
The UN setting, the procedures and norms of the conference favoured more institutional approaches
and  were  not  the  perfect  place  for  “hands-off  the  Internet”  type  of  arguments.  The  nature  of
participants  was  also  different  from  the  debates  of  the  1990s.  Internet  entrepreneurs,  early
enthusiasts and promoters of the discourse were not participating to the WSIS. On the contrary,
states representatives and employees of intergovernmental organisations accounted to more than
half of the participants to the WSIS in Geneva. 
The disappearance of the cyber-libertarian discourse can be nuanced in three ways. First, while a
UN summit was not the most favourable place for cyber-libertarians, other Internet  governance
forums welcomed the supporters of the discourse. More technical bodies such as the IETF or the
W3C still  witnessed  cyber-libertarian  discourses.  For  example,  an  IETF mailing  list  exchange
between  Vint  Cerf  and  Franck  Martin  about  the  WSIS  proposed  that  the  “broad”  Internet
governance  issues  be  treated  by  the  Internet  Society,  as  representative  body  of  the  Internet
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community, rather than intergovernmental forums219.  Second, some of the ideas advocated by the
cyber-libertarian discourse had already been accepted by the  doxa of the field. As we have seen,
Internet exceptionalism was not very successful during the WSIS but it remained one of the basic
principle  of the  field  and influenced the  WSIS.  Finally,  some elements  of  the cyber-libertarian
discourse could still be heard during the WSIS. 
Lawrence Lessig, a member of the Berkman Centre of Harvard University was invited during the
WSIS preparatory process as an information society visionary.  Lessig represented the academic
counter-elite  that  was  criticising  the  ICANN, and  a  certain  vision  of  cyber-libertarianism.  The
cyber-libertarian discourse had been unclear on the issue of intellectual property rights. While a
fringe of the cyber-libertarian were supporters of the intellectual property rights in cyberspace as an
extension of the material property rights, another fringe was very critical of the idea of intellectual
property rights.  The first  fringe was more compatible with the neoliberal discourse and became
involved in the ICANN220. The second one was rather critical of the direction taken by Internet
governance. Lessig gave a speech at the WSIS on intellectual property rights and the information
society:
“There is no doubt that we will have an Information Society. The only question is
whether that  Information Society will be free or feudal. A free society does not
mean  that  there  is  no  property.  It  does  not  mean  that  there  are  no  markets.
Freedom is obviously built in a place where property and markets coexist with the
free exchange of ideas and a free exchange of culture.”221
The vision of new social relations brought about by the Internet is reminiscent of the discourses that
had existed in the 1990s. Other participants, like the Linux society, proposed a similar perspective.
However,  these  elements  of  cyber-libertarianism  remained  isolated  and  did  not  offer  a
comprehensive vision of Internet governance like it existed in the 1990s. The lack of participation
of hackers at the WSIS contrasted with the critical, yet influential position they had acquired in the
ICANN  system.  As  a  result,  no  typical  element  of  cyber-libertarianism  appeared  in  the  final
documents of the Geneva phase of the summit. 
219 Exchange between Franck Martin and Vint Cerf, Internet Engineering TaskForce Discussion, 8-9 December 2003,
available  at  https://www.ietf.org/ibin/c5i?mid=6&rid=49&gid=0&k1=933&k2=17951&tid=1358158990,  last
accessed 8 April 2014. 
220 Esther  Dyson  became  the  founding  chairman  of  the  ICANN  after  having  published  several  cyber-libertarian
manifestos in the previous years (see chapter 5). 
221 “An  Information  Society:  Free  or  Feudal”,  address  by  Lawrence  Lessig,  20  February  2003,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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Global Public Good Discourse
The position of the Global Public Good discourse in the field of Internet governance had evolved
throughout the 1990s. While it was weakened by the by-passing of the ITU in the creation of the
ICANN, some elements on the international nature of the Internet had remained. In a context of US
unilateralism and because of the lack of internationalisation of the ICANN, part of the critique of
the existing system was inspired by a global public good discourse. This became even more the case
as the WSIS focused on development. Information and Communication Technologies, and above all
the Internet, were treated as a way to promote economic and social development. The UNDP book
on Global Public Goods (Kaul et al., 1999) was part of the proposed bibliography of the WSIS222.
However, direct references to the notion of global public goods were scarce. 
As we have seen, the conceptualisation of Internet as a public good that was proposed by some
developing countries and civil  society actors was replaced by the notion of global facility.  The
public character of the Internet was not recognised in the final documents. 
Similarly to the debates of the 1990s, the discourse on global public good remained limited to a
minimalist  definition  and  focused  on  the  internationalisation  of  Internet  governance  (i.e.  the
“global” aspect) rather than on the public interest. The concern on the lack of internationalisation of
Internet governance was broadly shared. Statements in this sense were voiced by countries such as
Australia and Iran, the private sector, civil society organisations like the newly-created “Group for
the  Internationalisation  of  Cyberspace”223 and  even  an  ICANN  representative224.  The  final
declaration and plan of action recalled the need for a “multilateral” and “international” regulation of
the Internet without taking position on the possibly intergovernmental or public nature of it. 
For some (but by no means all) of its supporters, the internationalisation of Internet governance
implied the intergovernmental regulation of the Internet. As we have seen, developing countries like
Venezuela, China, Ethiopia, South Korea and Brazil and the countries represented in the League of
Arab States were advocating for an intergovernmental Internet governance. The lack of consensus
222 See WSIS bibliography,  available  at  http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/bibliography.html,  last  accessed  8  April
2014. 
223 The Group for the Internationalisation of Cyberspace was created in Quito in 2001 by computer lawyers from South 
America. See http://www.alfa-redi.org/gic, last accessed through the Internet Archive, 8 April 2014. 
224 Amadeu Abril i Abril, member of ICANN board of directors acknowledge that the U.S-centric “localisation” of the
ICANN was a point that required improvement, presentation during the round-table of PrepCom 2, 19 February
2003, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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between  these  countries  and  the  Northern  countries  almost  led  to  the  failure  of  the  summit
(Kleinwächter, 2004; Kummer, 2007). 
Despite  the favourable context of the WSIS and the support of many developing countries, the
Global Public Good discourse remained at the margins of the WSIS. Because of the strong demands
made by some delegations on issues related to Internet governance, the door was not completely
closed to intergovernmental (public) regulation of some policy-related Internet governance issues.
The creation of the Working Group on Internet Governance was the guarantee for this type of
discourse to continue to influence the debates.
Sovereignist/developmentalist discourse
While  the  sovereignist  discourse  had  been  marginal  in  the  1990s  and  centred  around  US
nationalism, the situation changed in the 2000s. The United States were not in a position any more
to  bluntly  refuse  internationalisation.  On  the  other  hand,  developing  countries  used  a
sovereignist/developmentalist discourse to advocate for a funding of infrastructure by rich countries
and to demand a democratic “one state, one vote” regulation of the Internet. Discourses on territory,
borders,  government,  sovereignty  and  national  security  had  appeared  in  the  field  of  Internet
governance, especially since the terrorist attacks on the United States (see chapter 6). 
China offered an example of a discourse focusing on national security: 
“Measures  should  be  taken  to  actively  and  effectively  prevent  the  use  of
information  technologies  and  resources  for  pornographic,  violent  and  terrorist
purposes as well as for criminal activities endangering national security so as to
ensure the healthy development of information and networks.”225
The link between ICTs and international stability and security had been already put forward by the
Bishkek-Moscow conference early in the preparatory process226. While the debate in the 1990s was
mainly framed in economic terms, the WSIS debate included an important discussion on security
issues, and on the role of governments in this area. 
225 Statement by Wang XuDong, Minister of Information Industry, People's Republic of China, 10 December 2003, t ext
available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
226 Final  declaration  of  the  Bishkek-Moscow  Conference,  24  October  2002,  available  at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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The  importance of  sovereignty  was illustrated by  the  importance  of  the  debate  on the  idea of
governmental sovereignty over the country-code top-level domains (CC-tlDs). As we have seen (see
chapter 4), the authority on country-code top-level domains like “.ch” or “.dk” had been given by
the Internet Authority for Names and Numbers (i.e. Jon Postel) to whoever claimed it first,  and
subsequently to whoever claimed it on the basis of some imprecise criteria. As a result, many CC-
tlDs  were  managed  by  university  departments  or  private  organisations.  With  the  growing
importance  of  Internet  domain  names,  the  authority  on  such  domains  became  important  for
governments.  They had  been  trying  to  gain  back  authority  over  the  CC-tlDs  within  the
Governmental Advisory Committee of the ICANN. The issue was not resolved before the WSIS,
and the summit became a forum for the claim of authority over CC-tlDs. The issue was raised by
Western Asian countries and was repeatedly addressed by Saudi Arabia. As van Arx and Hagen
summarize the issue: 
“US.  control  over  the  DNS  may  itself  be  used  as  a  US.  strategic  military
advantage as opposed to the target of a threat. For example, the US. could have
decided not to create a country code for Palestine in view of its apparent support
of  Israel’s  interests  against  Palestinian  aspirations  for  sovereignty.  Or it  could
decide to extend the UN. embargo against Iraq into cyberspace by deleting the
Iraq .iq ccTLD. The more integrated the DNS becomes with “real-world” services,
the more control over such services is ceded to whoever controls the DNS. Of
course, if the DNS is vital to the national security of the United States, then parity
of reasoning suggests that it is vital to every other country as well. Therefore, the
national  security  arguments  that  the  United  States  military  and  governmental
officials have advanced favouring US. control over the DNS apply equally well to
the interests of other nations. To the extent that the control over the root may be a
national security concern to the US., it is also a concern to every other country
with regard, at the very least, to its ccTLD.”(Van Arx & Hagen, 2002)
The  failure  of  these  countries  to  include  the  sovereignty over  CC-tlDs  in  the  final  declaration
evidences the non-dominant character of the sovereingist/developmentalist discourse, but the time
and energy spent on this debate also illustrate the importance of the discourse.
The  claim for  intergovernmental  Internet  governance,  which  emerged in  the  WSIS debate  and
which  is  characteristic  of  contemporary  Internet  governance  debates;  is  more  rooted  in  a
sovereignist discourse than in a Global Public Good discourse. Critiques were aimed at the lack of
influence  of  some  countries  in  the  system  rather  than  at  the  basic  principles  of  the  system.
Therefore, the sovereignist discourse that was completely marginal in the 1990s became central in
the 2000s. Together with the fading away of the cyber-libertarian discourse, this change represent
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the  major  discursive  change  of  the  WSIS.  Since  the  first  phase  of  the  WSIS,  the
sovereignist/developmentalist  discourse  has  become  an  important  counter-hegemonic  discourse
used by a counter-elite to challenge the power of the elite (see figure 7.4 and chapter 9).  
Anti-marketisation discourse and the right to communicate
The  anti-marketisation  discourse  was  marginal  in  the  1990s.  Despite  the  shortcomings  of  the
ICANN  system,  the  evolution  of  the  network  as  a  booming  economic  sector  made  the  non-
commercial roots of the Internet less relevant to the debates. While the UN Commission on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) recalled the lack of evidence regarding the claim that competition
explained growth in the use of ICTs227, the Cuban delegation took over the argument to state that:
“competition is only one out of many ways to drive down prices and to ensure the
ongoing  modernisation  of  networks  and  services.  In  several  cases,  an  active
involvement  of  governments  through  public  investments  and  programmes  of
development, it is of strategic importance. Furthermore, international co-operation
will be necessary to assist developing countries facing special difficulties in the
fulfilment of this objective.”228
As we have seen, only the Cuban delegation criticised the relationship between Internet governance
and the owners of transnational capital. The critique of the existing system was generally based on
the lack of participation of developing countries and Internet users rather than on the ideological
premises of the system229. 
However,  some  countries  and  several  civil  society  organisations  advocated  for  an  information
society based on the human right to communicate rather than on economic development. This claim
was compatible with the anti-marketisation view of Internet governance in the 1990s but stemmed
from  older  debates  in  telecommunication  policy.  The  campaign  for  the  right  to  communicate
represented the most powerful alternative to the dominant discourse in the WSIS. Based on the
ideas of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) and the work of the
227 ”Information and Communication Technology Development Indices”, UNCTAD, Geneva, January 2003, available
at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. The UNCTAD argument is based on (Kiiski and
Pohjola, 2001).
228 Statement by H.E. Mr. Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada, President of the National Assembly of People’s Power of the
Republic of Cuba in the WSIS, Geneva, 11 December 2003, available at  http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last
accessed 8 April 2014. 
229 Statement by  YJ Park, co-coordinator  of the civil society  Internet Governance Caucus  during the Intersessional
meeting  of  the  Preparatory  Committee,  Paris,  18  July  2003;  Venezuelan  proposal  of  topics  for  the  WSIS,  3
December 2002; both texts available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed  8 April 2014.
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McBride  Commission (see  chapter  4  and Frau-Meigs,  2012), the  Communication Rights in  the
Information Society (CRIS) campaign was created in 2001. The CRIS campaign was influential in
the WSIS preparatory process and during the first phase of the WSIS. It helped re-introduce the idea
of a human right to communicate. As a result, the civil society contribution “Shaping Information
Society for Human Needs” (Raboy et al., 2010) offered an alternative vision of the information
society centred around the notions of social justice and human rights (Raboy et al., 2010) . The
discourse on the right to communicate also contributed to the structuring and organising of civil
society participation in the WSIS (Mueller, 2010; Raboy et al., 2010). 
However,  the  shifting  focus  of  the  summit  towards  Internet  governance  undermined the  CRIS
campaign  since  the  civil  society  advocates  specialising  in  Internet  governance  were  far  more
favourable to markets and competition and far more sceptical of the involvement of governments
(Mueller,  2010,  p.  87).  Civil  society  re-organised  around  the  issue  of  Internet  governance  and
moved  away from the  campaign  on the  right  to  communicate  and from the  anti-marketisation
discourse.  The right  to  communicate  campaign had a  limited  influence  on Internet  governance
issues and the repeated efforts by civil society representatives were unsuccessful to make the right
to communicate endorsed by the final documents. 
7.2.2. Elites and counter-elites during the WSIS
The discourses outlined in the previous section were articulated and exploited by actors; they also
shaped their interactions. They represented different perspectives around which elite groups could
reach cohesion and around which counter-elite groups could be organised. In order for the study to
be able to explore the structuration of the field beyond its discursive dimension, it is important to
note  that  it  is  impossible  to  link  a  specific  discourse  to  a  specific  interest  group  like  it  is
conceptualised in a multistakeholder perspective. The following network analysis focuses on the
dialectics of dominant and non-dominant actors in relation with their discourses. 
The multistakeholder perspective tends to establish a relationship between the nature of the actor
(civil society, private sector, state, etc.) and the discourse that is being supported (see for example
Raboy et al.  2010, 32-33; and Mueller 2010). The result  of a pluralist  multistakeholder process
would be the emergence  of  a  consensus that would take  into  account  the specific  needs of  all
stakeholders. As we have argued earlier (see chapter 5), this perspective is unproductive since it
tends to deny the divisions within the stakeholders' groups and to reify the blurry frontiers between
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stakeholder groups. 
In  a  multistakeholder  perspective,  governments  represent  one  stakeholder.  However,  the  major
dissension during the first phase of the WSIS was between developing and developed countries
(Kleinwächter,  2004;  Kummer,  2007) Whereas  Northern  governments  were  satisfied  with  the
ICANN  system  and  the  private  sector  leadership,  Southern  governments  advocated  for  an
intergovernmental  regulation  of  the  Internet.  The  division  between  countries  with  diverging
interests is one of the most enduring feature of international politics and the WSIS came as a new
episode in  a long historical  struggle.  Even  amongst dominant  countries,  an opposition between
European countries and the US existed on the internationalisation of the ICANN system. While not
critical of the market-based regulation, the European Union wanted a more important role in the
ICANN. In the South, divergences appeared between countries  demanding an intergovernmental
organisation and countries accepting an improved ICANN. Emerging countries like Brazil started
position themselves in a middle way between intergovernmentalism and multistakeholderism with
the  idea  of  a participatory  process  leaving  the  overarching authority  to  the  state.  Hence,
governments did not have a shared agenda aiming at more state control or at an increased role for
intergovernmental  organisations.  States'  representatives  were  divided  between supporters  of  the
status quo and supporters of change. 
The only coherent stakeholder group that participated to the WSIS was the private sector. In the
field of Internet governance, the large firms had begun to institutionalise their cooperation in order
to become more influential on the debates in the 1990s. The Global Internet Project was among the
first  attempts  for  the  industry  to  organise  within  the  field  of  Internet  governance.  The  World
Information  and  Technology  Services  Alliance  (WITSA)  was  a  broader  umbrella  organisation
defending business interests. With the WSIS, the lobbying scaled up to the International Chamber of
Commerce that was asked by the WSIS executive secretariat  to  “create  the CCBI as a  vehicle
through which to mobilize and coordinate the involvement of the worldwide business community in
the  processes  leading  to  and  culminating  in  the  Summit”.230 The  CCBI  was  open  to  all
representative of business firms and business associations. Its members included among others: the
Business  and  Industry  Advisory  Committee  to  the  OECD;  the  Global  Business  Dialogue  on
Electronic  Commerce;  the  Global  Information  Infrastructure  Commission;  the  World  Economic
Forum; the World Information Technology and Services Alliance; and the International Publishers
230 CCBI comments on the revised draft declaration of principles and plan of action, 27 October 2003, available at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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Association.  This network of powerful business associations represented a  very powerful actor in
the WSIS. Its numerous documents and interventions were very influential in the final documents.
In spite of the inevitable conflicts of interests within such a diverse constituency, the contributions
of the CCBI show no signs of contradictions or incoherences.  
The private sector was particularly influential in the WSIS since it had a double representation.
Indeed,  the  creation  of  the  CCBI  did  not  prevent  individual  business  representative  to  attend,
usually speaking on behalf of their own firm as well as on behalf of the CCBI (Raboy et al. 2010,
30). This is why some of the CCBI contribution were made by ICC staff while others were made by
representatives of firms like Microsoft and AT&T.  The double representation is the result of a mix
of UN procedure relying on the ICC to represent  business interests and ITU procedures where
individual firms are invited to participate. Moreover, the WSIS counted on the input of institutions
like  the  UN  ICT  TaskForce  and  the  G8  Dot  Force,  where  business  interests  were  already
represented, to progress in the preparatory process. The status of the G8 Dot Force as a “key source
of input” has been described as “curious” by Raboy et al. (2010, 17). It certainly reinforced the
influence of the business elite since the G8 Dot Force had been supportive of their interests  (see
chapter 6). 
Finally,  the  conceptualisation  of  civil  society  also  proved  problematic.  As  we have  seen,  it  is
important to make a difference between generalist civil society organisation fighting for the right to
communicate and Internet governance civil society organisations that were already deeply involved
in the politics of the field231.  Another division in the civil  society category is the inside/outside
debate.  While  some  organisations  were  participating  in  the  WSIS  meetings,  others  organised
alternative events. WE SEIZE! was for example a gathering of activists and artists outside of the
Palexpo complex where the WSIS was taking place. They rejected the notion of an “information
society” in the capitalist system (Raboy et al. 2010, p. 106-107). Some of the alternative events
were dismantled by the Geneva police. The more radical civil society organisations of hackers and
activists did not take part in the summit. For the majority of less radical civil society organisations
who took  part  to  the  summit,  the  inclusion  meant  also  a  kind  of  silencing  since  civil  society
manifestations in the streets are usually more influential in the public opinion. 
Given the pro-market and technocentric vision that dominated the WSIS, civil society organisation
231 As we have seen, the example of GLOCOM, whose representatives were also sitting in the G8 Dot Force, illustrates
the particularities of civil society in Internet governance. The future role of the Internet Governance Caucus could
also be interesting (see chapter 8). 
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faced a dilemma: participation meant some kind of acceptance of the dominant rules,  while no
participation meant the exclusion of alternative ideas.  As a result, civil society organisations were
divided and the achievements of civil society during the WSIS are judged differently by the two
sides. While some commentators praise the achievements of the lobbying campaign and the defence
of the right to communicate, others are critical of the outcome of the first phase of the summit
(Raboy et al. 2010, pp. 122-123). For critics, WSIS offers an illustration of the management of civil
society by the organisers (Mansell, 2012).
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Figure 7.2. Co-occurences network for the statement made during the first phase of the WSIS
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Starting from different theoretical grounds, the following network visualisation (Figure 7.2) offers
an  alternative  to  the  multistakeholder  perspective232.  Based  on  the  co-occurrence  of  the  same
statements  in  the  contribution  of  different  actors,  it  shows  the ideological  and discursive  links
between different stakeholders. The network is based on the data analysed in Discourse Network
Analyser  1.30  (Leifeld,  2012a). If  two  organisations  made  a  statement  pertaining  to  the  same
category within a time-window of 20 days233, an edge is created between them. As a result,  the
actors and documents that agreed on specific issues during a given time period are connected. The
presence of strong links in the network gives an indication on the like-mindedness of some actors
and documents or on the influence that an actor had on another actor or document. The systematic
analysis of all documents referring to Internet governance allows for a comprehensive visualisation
of the debates that reinforces the qualitative content analysis. Social network analysis is used as a
way to avoid  a certain selectivity in the use of the data and the reporting of the results that is
sometimes  entailed  by  qualitative  content  analysis  (Bowen,  2009);  and  to  provide  “alternative
perspectives to increase the credibility of findings” (Murphy and O'Leary, 1994)234. 
The “core” of the network is constituted by the final documents of the Geneva phase of the WSIS:
the declaration of principles and the plan of action. The actors that are closer to the core are the
actors that used the same statement as the final documents within a limited time-frame. They can
thus be described as influential and thus part of the elite. The actors that are on the “periphery” of
the network are the actors whose statements were not included in the final documents. They can be
considered  non-elites or  counter-elites  depending on their  degree of  mobilisation.  As shown in
figure 7.2, the “core” appears to include private sector representatives; institutions like the ITU, the
ICANN and the UN ICT TaskForce; states like France, Sweden and China235. On the other hand,
232 The  figure 7.2 is an adjency network of organisation by organisation (including documents) created in Netdraw
2.123 (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). Nodes represent actors and documents. Their size is based on their
eigenvector centrality measure. The edge thickness is based on the weight of the link between the nodes.  The
weight of the link depends on the number of co-occurences of the statements.
233 A time-window of 20 days was set as a way to limit the number of relations between  institutions : most of the
institutions shared a statement at some point during the almost two years of the first phase of the WSIS. The time-
window allows a clearer visualisation of the mutual influence between institutions. “ Whenever two actors make a
statement within the time window, an edge is created. If the edge has already been present, the edge weight is
increased. If at least one of the statements is made outside of the time window, the link is not established. This
guarantees context sensitivity of the resulting network.” (Leifeld, 2012b)
234 This concern is often expressed by the tenants of “mixed methods”. See for example Tashakkorie and Teddlie
(1998).
235 The differences between the Chinese declarations and the final documents have been described in the previous
sections. However, the location of China close to the “core” might result from a shared concern with cyber-security
issues. The location of some elite actors such as the US, the EU and the Internet Society in a less central position
have different explanations. The US government made its comments early in the process of the WSIS and was not
as vocal as other countries towards the end of the drafting process. However, the US statements all favoured the
status quo (see figure 7.3 and Annex  4). The EU insisted on having Internet governance as a discussion theme
during the WSIS, which make the EU appear in figure 7.4 along with marginalised actors. However, the EU is a
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countries  like  Egypt  and  Venezuela,  most  of  civil  society  organisations  and  intergovernmental
organisations  like  the  UNESCO  are  located  in  the  periphery  of  the  network,  which  provides
evidence of their exclusion from the elite. It is interesting to note that civil society organisations
specialising  in  Internet  governance  are  located  closer  to  the  core  than  generalist  civil  society
organisations.  That  is  the for example case of Consumers International  and GLOCOM. This is
coherent with the claim made by Mueller (2010) that ideological differences existed between these
two types of civil society organisations.  Figure 7.2 illustrates the division of the field of Internet
governance between a power elite and counter-elites rather than the existence of stakeholder groups.
There is no proximity in terms of statements among governments or civil society organisations.
These stakeholder groups are divided between supporters of the status quo and advocates of change.
Some actors are member of a power elite of Internet governance while others are unsuccessfully
contesting elite power. 
If we turn to the “core” of the network, the following visualisation (7.3) presents the statements that
were influential in the final documents and the actors that supported these statements 236. We can find
some  of  the  important  actors  of  the  power  elite  of  the  1990s.  The  US,  Australian  and  some
European governments  are  included,  as  well  as  the  European Union.  It  is  already  the  US and
Australian governments and the European Commission that had participated to the selection of the
first ICANN board members (see chapter 5). The ICANN and the Internet Society are also part of
the “core” of the first phase of the WSIS. The private sector was also represented at the “core” but
not by individual firms like it used to be the case in the 1990s, but by business associations instead.
This illustrates the change both in the nature of actors and in the uses of the technology. As we have
seen in the previous chapter, the Internet had become a key component of the economy. We can
however  see  that  a  Microsoft  representative  served  as  a  spokesperson for  the  CCBI,  which  is
consistent with the role that the firm had acquired in the fields of Internet and telecommunication
governance.  Another  business  association  is  the  association  of  European  Telecommunication
Network  Operators,  which  gathers  the  large  telecommunication  firms  (usually  former  state
monopolies) that operated most of the European networks but also many networks outside Europe,
central element of the power elite network (see figure 7.3) and shared the main statements favouring the status quo
(see fig. 7.3 and Annex 4). Finally, the Internet Society had a more radical position on the exclusion of the ITU and
the preservation of the status quo that was not fully embraced by the WSIS (see fig. 7.3 and Annex 4).
236 The network visualisation of fig. 7.3 is a subset of the visualisation of all actors and statements (not readable and
thus not included) obtained in NetDraw 2.123 (Borgatti et al., 2002). The visualisation 7.2.3 has been obtained by
choosing some statements  that  were common during the discussions and that  were  successful  since they were
included in the final documents. These statements are represented by the blue square nodes. Their size is based on
their eigenvector centrality. Round red nodes represent actors that made the statement or documents that included
the statement during the first phase of the WISIS. They are linked to the statements that they made (or that they
included in the case of documents). Their size is also based on their eigenvector centrality Edges are not weighted. 
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notably in Africa. These operators were already represented in the field in the 1990s by France
Telecom, Deutsche Telekom and British Telecom. Like other business interests, they scaled up their
advocacy efforts  and formed associations  in  order  to  defend their  shared  interests.  Newcomers
compared to the 1990s included the UN ICT TaskForce that had been created in 2000 (see chapter
6), and civil society organisations like GLOCOM and the Internet Governance Caucus (IGC)237. 
237  The Internet  Governance Caucus was formed during the 2nd meeting of the Preparatory Committee.  The co-
founders of the caucus were Y.J Park and Wolfgang Kleinwächter. Both of them had been involved in the ICANN
and especially issues of internationalisation and participation (Mueller, 2010, p. 102). In March 2003, a mailing list
was created and hosted by the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, an association involved with the
counter-elite's efforts to reform the ICANN system. According to Mueller (2010), the Caucus was divided between
those who wanted to open the debate on the ICANN system and those who supported the status quo (like Adam
Peake,  a  GLOCOM and  G8  Dot  Force  member).  Supporters  of  the  status  quo followed  the  Internet  Society
position, who refused any (inter-) governmental involvement in Internet governance issues. Despite the divisions,
the IGC grew continuously during the Geneva phase and became the most active civil society group during the
second phase of the summit (see chapter 8). 
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In terms of statements, the “core” participants clearly embraced a neoliberal discourse. The support
of the ICANN system, which had already been designed mostly along neoliberal lines, echoed the
concern  of  the  “core”  participants  regarding  pro-competitive  regulation,  intellectual  property
protection,  private-sector  leadership,  the  exclusion  of  the  ITU  and  intergovernmentalism  from
Internet governance, and, finally, a strong support of multistakeholder governance.  These elements
are all based on a neoliberal discourse. While the emerging power elite of the 1990s had to find a
consensual discourse that included cyber-libertarian elements, the economic dominant discourse of
the WSIS was a clear translation of neoliberal ideas in the sector of telecommunication and Internet
governance.  As a consequence,  the dominant  actors of the WSIS had the ideological  cohesion,
which is the first element of a power elite. The focus on individuals and their links and circulation
will be treated in the next chapter. The need to internationalise the governance of the network and to
increase participation is the only element that relies on a global public good vision. However, the
wording was chosen in order to exclude references to global public goods and to intergovernmental
regulation.  Cyber-security had acquired a central place on the agenda.  The only real concession
made by the neoliberal advocates to the counter-elites is the acceptance of a debate on Internet
governance in the WSIS. In the context of a much criticised ICANN and a move away from its
limited mandate by several actors, the inclusion of Internet governance issues in the second phase of
the WSIS was the very least that the power elite could do to keep some legitimacy in the field. This
is why the technocentric neoliberal language was accompanied by some articles on the need of
further dialogue on policy-related issues. The separation between the neoliberal and elite-driven
management of critical Internet resources and the more inclusive policy discussion can be described
as a new hegemonic project (see chapter 8).
If we now turn to the periphery of the network (as shown in figure 7.4), we can observe a mix of
civil  society  organisations,  a  number  of  developing  or  emerging  countries  and  some
intergovernmental organisations238. 
Generalist civil society organisations are located in the periphery, notably because one of their main
concern was the right to communicate, which was not included in the final documents239. Some of
238 The network visualisation of fig. 7.4 is a subset of the visualisation of all actors and statements (not readable and
thus not included) obtained in NetDraw 2.123 (Borgatti 2002). The visualisation 7.4 has been obtained by choosing
some statements that were common during the discussions but that were not included in the final documents. These
statements are represented by the blue square nodes. Their size is based on their eigenvector centrality. Round red
nodes represent actors that made the statement or documents that included the statement during the first phase of
the WISIS. They are linked to the statements that they made (or that they included in the case of documents). Their
size is also based on their eigenvector centrality Edges are not weighted. 
239 The lack of centrality in the network visualisation of the right to communicate is due to the focus on Internet
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the  civil  society organisations  are  represented  in  the  two visualisation.  This  is  the  case  of  the
Internet Governance Caucus. This presence in both network reflects the dual nature of the IGC, both
an advocate of the status quo and a critique of the ICANN system. 
The states represented in the periphery can be divided into three categories. First, some of them are
dominant  states  that  expressed  some support  to  one  or  the  other  non-dominant  statement.  For
example, the French Prime Minister advocated for a comprehensive approach to governance that
would not separate technical from policy issues240. Other states were opposing completely what was
seen  as  a  US  hegemony  in  Internet  governance.  These  sovereignist  states  were  for  example
advocating for an intergovernmental governance for the Internet and a state sovereignty over the
country-code top-level  domains. These states were marginalised.  They included delegations like
Cuba, Venezuela and from the League of Arab States. China and Russia shared several concerns
with dominant  actors such as cyber-security  on the  one hand, and were critical  of  the ICANN
system  or  claimed  sovereignty  on  their  CC-tlDs  on  the  other  hand.  They  also  behaved  as
sovereignist states but the issues that they were supporting had a different fate. Finally, some states
can be classified as emerging countries. The term was beginning to be used at the time of the WSIS.
In the  context  of the field of Internet  governance,  some states advocated  for  another  vision of
multistakeholderism, with a more important role for the state. They were not opposed to the ICANN
system but claimed a more important participation in it. These states were mainly Brazil and India. 
Some intergovernmental organisations were also located in the periphery because of their support to
unsuccessful statements. For example, the UNCTAD was critical of the pro-competitive regulation
and the importance given to the self-regulation of the private sector. This is also the case of an
important actor for the participation of non-dominant actors: the UNESCO. The UNESCO started
consulting with civil society organisations in February 2002 in order to prepare the WSIS (Raboy et
al. 2010, 43). During the summit, the UNESCO held positions similar to those of generalist civil
society organisations, including on the right to communicate. The UNESCO, which had been the
centre of the struggle for a New World Order for Information and Communications several decades
before, still proposed a marginalised discourse.  
The statements made by the different peripheral  participants did not form a coherent  discourse.
Elements of the sovereignist discourse could be found, such as the claim of sovereignty over CC-
governance documents. It does not mean that the right to communicate was not a central issue of the WSIS. 
240 See the address by Jean-Pierre Raffarin,  French Prime Minister to the WSIS, 10 December 2003,  available at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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tlDs. Other elements stemmed from the global public good discourse, like the public and global
nature of the Internet. Some peripheral states criticised the neoliberal nature of Internet governance
while others supported it. The peripheral actors did not form an ideologically coherent counter-elite
even if they could unite around some basic principles of enhanced inclusion of non-dominant actors.
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7.2.3. Networks of institutions and discourses: the status of the 
hegemonic discourse
The WSIS presented an opposition between an ideologically coherent power elite defending the
status  quo and  relying  on  a  neoliberal  discourse  on  the  one  hand;  and  a  more  heterogeneous
combination of counter-elite actors criticising the status quo on different grounds and with different
purposes. This opposition is more than an opposition between the South and the North since it
transcended the stakeholder categories. States, intergovernmental organisations, and civil  society
organisations were organised around this dialectical opposition. This situation was precarious since
this opposition was not institutionalised. The power elite was ruling the field of Internet governance
whereas  the  counter-elites were simply excluded from the  governance  system.  In order  for  the
system to continue, some agreement had to be found between the two positions.
The  following  network  visualisation  present  the  most  consensual  statement  in  the  different
discourses241. As we can see, there was some room for manoeuvre to elaborate a new dialogue on a
consensual basis. One of the most consensual statement was the need optimise connectivity and
access. The use of information and communication technologies for development and the spread of
the information society were the main objective behind the organisation of the WSIS. There was a
shared interest to put forward this agenda. As we have seen in the chapter 6, access had become a
crucial issue for dominant actors in the early 2000s. It was also a claim by non-dominant actors to
improve access to ICTs and the Internet. Just like in the 1990s, multistakeholderism was a broadly
accepted  concept.  While  diverging  views  existed  on  the  implementation  of  a  multistakeholder
governance system, very few participants criticised the idea of a participation of all stakeholders in
the  regulation  of  the  information  society.  For  the  power  elite  of  Internet  governance  however,
multistakeholderism was a way to legitimise their power. It had been used to manufacture consent
around the creation of the ICANN and it was used again during the WSIS to defend the existing
system.  As a  matter  of  fact,  the  support  to  the  ICANN in  the  “technical”  management  of  the
network was also a rather consensual claim. Against this background, further dialogue on Internet
governance  was  to  take  the  ICANN  role  for  granted  and  to  work  on  broader  issues  without
questioning the existing system. Another  broadly-shared view was the need for pro-competitive
regulation in the telecommunication sector. After decades of intrusion of neoliberal ideas in the
241 The network visualisation 7.5 is a “principal components” layout of the graph including all statements and all actors
and documents obtained in NetDraw 2.123 (Borgatti et al., 2002). The objective of such a layout is to highlight the
principal nodes of the network (i.e. those with the most links). The elements on the far-left of the network are the
statement shared by the majority of actors. 
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telecommunication  sector,  and  despite  strong  resistance  until  the  1990s  (see  chapter  4),  the
neoliberal  discourse had prevailed  in  the  field.  Almost  all  participants  were thinking about  the
information society in a framework of privatised, liberalised and de-regulated telecommunication
sector.   
Other elements stand out in the network as common statements without reaching the status of the
previously described ones. Among these elements, the need for internationalisation of the Internet
governance system was recalled by many participants and could also be viewed as a consensual
statement. The focus on cyber-security was also common during the first phase of the WSIS. The
role of intergovernmental organisations in this area was beginning to develop and there was a strong
support  to  these  initiatives.  Multilingualism was also a  concern for  many participants  and was
shared both by dominant and non-dominant actors. The inclusion of multilingualism as an objective
for the information society was thus not an issue. Finally, gender equality was mentioned by many
participants.  While a strong consensus existed on the importance of gender equality during the
preparatory committee meetings, no concrete actions were planned and the final declaration was
very weak on the issue of gender equality (Gurumuthy, Jeet Singh, Mundkur, & Swamy, 2006).
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From  the  existing  hegemonic  discourse of  the  field  of  Internet  governance,  the  notion  of
multistakeholderism was clearly reinforced by the first phase of the WSIS. The separation between
technical and political issues was a continuation of a “technical only” regulation, with the creation
of a space for policy-related dialogue. The only element that was not taken over by the WSIS was
Internet exceptionalism. However, since the ICANN system was supported by the WSIS and since
the ITU remained excluded from Internet governance, and since the private character of governance
was  not  rejected,  the  political  consequences  of  Internet  exceptionalism  remained  basically
unchallenged by the WSIS. The creation of the Working Group on Internet Governance opened the
door for further debates about Internet governance and to a possible enhanced politicisation of the
issue, but it was also the creation of a framework that protected the hegemonic discourse of the
field. 
While Internet governance was not supposed to be the centre of the discussions during the WSIS,
the  crisis  of the field and the  weakness of the  ICANN reform imposed the issue to  the  WSIS
participants. The first phase of the WSIS became a continuation of the crisis of the field of Internet
governance. An opposition between supporters of the status quo and advocates of change marked
the debates of the preparatory process. This opposition seemed at some point irreconcilable and the
WSIS conference in Geneva was about to fail to deliver a final declaration and a plan of action
(Kummer, 2007). The decision to create a Working Group on Internet Governance could be seen as
a non-event: the parties agreed to disagree and delegated the difficult negotiations to an  ad hoc
working  group.  However,  a  closer  look  at  the  positions  of  the  participants  and  at  the  final
documents offers another perspective. In spite of the numerous critiques, the bulk of the  doxa of
Internet  governance  was  not  challenged  by  the  first  phase  of  the  WSIS.  The  notions  of
multistakeholderism, private-sector leadership and a purely technical regulation were imposed by
the supporters of the  status quo.  The mandate of the WGIG was to reflect on the policy-related
issues but the support to the ICANN system prevented any substantial transformation of the field.
The  separation  of  technical  and political  issues  meant  that  the  power  elite  formed  around  the
technical  regulation was legitimised  by the WSIS. The negotiations would  continue  on policy-
related issues and on the increased participation of actors like developing countries or civil society
organisations.
The first phase of the WSIS, thus, ended on a consensus that was likely to be able to solve the deep
crisis of the field of Internet governance. The institutionalisation of a policy-related dialogue was
essential to integrate the factors of change outlined in the previous chapter to the field of Internet
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governance. New actors, social and political issues, the changing economic context and the struggle
on the  role  of  the  state  could  not  adapt  a  field  organised  around a  technical  regulation  in  the
ICANN.  The  WSIS  offered  a  political  space  to  discuss  these  issues  without  challenging  the
existence of the ICANN system and of the power elite. In this sense, the creation of the WGIG is a
first symbolic step towards a  more flexible field, with a greater scope of participation, but also
capable of protecting its core institutions and the interests of its power elite.  
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Chapter 8: Elite reconfiguration and hegemonic project 2.0
The Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) was created as a way out of the opposition
between supporters of the status quo and advocates of change. Since the first phase of the World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) had given Internet governance a prominent place on the
agenda, an informed dialogue was needed in order to overcome dissensions before the second phase
of  the  WSIS,  held  in  Tunis  in  November  2005.  The  perception  of  the  WGIG  mandate  was
completely different in the two groups. The power elite saw the WGIG as a tool to inform the
advocates of change on the successes of Internet governance as it existed and on the dangers of
potential changes.  Counter-elites saw the WGIG as the group in charge of the designing of a new
governance  system.  The  WGIG was  thus  a  double-edged sword:  both  a  potential  threat  and a
potential legitimising tool for the existing order. The chapter argues that the WSIS, and especially
the WGIG, resulted in a reconfiguration of the power elite and the differentiation of three different
discourses that still structure the debates on Internet governance in 2013. However, the WSIS did
not drastically changed the regulation system of the network and left  the power elite relatively
unchallenged. Hence, the outcome of the WISIS and the creation of the Internet Governance Forum
(IGF) can be described as a new hegemonic project aimed at the consolidation of the existing order.
The  institutionalisation  of  the  policy  dialogue  on  Internet  governance  in  the  IGF,  the  alliance
between  defenders  of  the  status-quo  and  sovereignists,  and  the  separation  of  “technical
management” from political governance led to a renewed stability in Internet governance after the
crisis of the failed ICANN reform and the first phase of the WSIS. Since the end of the WSIS, the
field of Internet governance has not changed in a significant way. The following chapter thus offers
the  basis  to  understand current  debates  about  Internet  governance.  The  institutions,  actors  and
discourses remained relatively stable. However, like in any field, the order in the field of Internet
governance is  based  on the  evolving relations  between the  power  elite  and counter-elites.  The
concluding  chapter  will  then  present  the  emerging  powers  in  Internet  governance  and  the
perspectives of change. 
8.1. The WGIG process
The Geneva declaration of 2003 called for the creation of a multistakeholder Working Group on
Internet Governance (WGIG). In November 2004, the group was appointed by the UN Secretary-
General. As defined by its chairman, the purpose “was to facilitate the negotiations that [were going
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to] take place in Tunis”242 after the stalemate of the debates on Internet governance during the first
phase of the Summit.  
8.1.1. Setting-up the WGIG
The  creation  of  the  WGIG as  a  consultative  body to  the  UN Secretary-General  allowed  for  a
flexible and autonomous process of member selection and working methods. The WGIG, although
an important body in the preparatory process of the second phase of the WSIS, was outside the
formal WSIS structure and was designed as a multistakeholder dialogue forum.
The WGIG did not start from scratch and was able to build upon two events that took place between
the end of the first phase of the WSIS and the formation of the WGIG: The ITU expert group in
February 2004 and the UN ICT-TaskForce Global Forum on Internet Governance.  Some of the
speakers  in  these  meetings  became  members  of  the  WGIG,  like  Marcus  Kummer,  the  future
executive coordinator of the group, and several key participants from the civil society and private
sector  like  Wolfgang  Kleinwächter,  William  Drake,  Ayesha  Hassan,  Don  McLean,  and  Karen
Banks. Others speakers became important commentators of the work of the WGIG like Izumi Aizu,
Bertrand de la  Chappelle243.  Already, a consensus was beginning to emerge among these future
participants to the WGIG process on the fact that Internet governance was difficult to define and
could not be handled by a single international organisation (Mathiason, 2008, chap. 7). Moreover,
the social capital acquired in the field by these individuals certainly explains their centrality in the
work of the WGIG (see below).
The consultations on the establishment of the WGIG took place in Geneva on 20-21 September
2004. Discussions focused on the scope and working methods of the Working Group, as well as the
selection  of  its  members.  Over  250  participants  attended  the  consultations,  most  of  them
representatives of governments244. The discussions were organized in panels with once again several
future WGIG members as speakers. While some consensual elements were acknowledged by the
chair of the meeting such as the need for balanced representation, multistakeholderism, openness
and  transparency  (Nitin  Desai,  quoted  in  Mathiason,  2008,  chap.  7),  some  oppositions  were
expressed. In line with the debates of the first phase of the summit, diverging views existed on the
242 See the press release by the U.N at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/pi1620.doc.htm, last accessed 8 April
2014.
243 They were members of the Nominating Committee of the civil society members of the WGIG and thus excluded
from the selection. However, They became important commentators during the WGIG process.
244 See http://wgig.org/meeting-september.html, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.
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separation of political and social issues from technical ones, the appraisal of the ICANN system,
and the mandate and composition of the WGIG. 
For  example,  the  working  group  was  seen  by  some  as  “a  steering  committee  rather  than  a
prescriptive body”245, that “should refrain from expanding or interfering with other areas of policy
concerns already addressed  in  reasonable degree”246.  Some participants  advocated  for  a  narrow
definition of Internet governance, generally coupled with a separation of technical and policy issues,
while others advocated for a “holistic definition of Internet governance”247, since “technical issues
have political  implications and political issues have technical implications”248.  Supporters of the
status quo were critical of the very idea of a working group in Internet governance, and some even
refused the notion of Internet governance (Flyverbom, 2011, p. 117). Since there was no way to
avoid the creation of the WGIG, they tried to exclude the existing system from the work of the
WGIG.  Paul  Verhoef,  representative of  the  ICANN,  acknowledged that  “there  [is]  a  void  for
addressing issues that are outside of [ICANN's] responsibility, and [ICANN] is very encouraged to
see  that  there  is  discussion  for  filling  this  void”249.  Both  the  EU  and  the  US representatives
encouraged the WGIG to take the existing system as a starting point and to build upon it rather than
“duplicate the extensive body of work already under way in the global and regional bodies”250. In a
completely different perspective,  representatives of countries like  China and Brazil  called for a
governmental  leadership  in  the  WGIG  since  the  “WSIS  [remained]  first  and  foremost  an
intergovernmental process”251.
The  members of  the  working group were thus  selected  along the  consensual  lines  of  balanced
representation through informal consultations led by Markus Kummer and the WSIS adviser of the
UN Secretary-General, Nitin Desai. They contacted Ayesha Hassan from the International Chamber
of Commerce to select the private sector  representatives and the Internet Governance Caucus to
245 Statement  by  Ayesha  Hassan,  International  Chamber  of  Commerce,  20  September  2004,  available  at
http://wgig.org, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.
246 Statement by Izumi Aizu, Internet Governance TaskForce of Japan, 20 September 2004, available at http://wgig.org,
last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.
247 Statement by  William Drake,  Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, 20 September 2004, available at
http://wgig.org, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.
248 Statement by the Egyptian representative, 20 September 2004, available at http://wgig.org, last accessed through the
Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.
249 Statement by  Paul Verhoef, ICANN, 21 September 2004, available at  http://wgig.org,  last accessed through the
Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.
250 Statements by EU and US representatives, 20 September 2004, available at  http://wgig.org, last accessed through
the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.
251 Statements by  the  Brazilian  representative,  21 September  2004,  see  also  the  statement  by  the  Chinaese
representative on the same day, both available at  http://wgig.org,  last accessed through the Internet Archive on  8
April 2014.
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select  the  civil  society  representatives.  While  the  selection  of  private  sector  members  proved
unproblematic  in  spite  of  the  criteria  to  ensure  balanced  representation,  the  civil  society
nominations took more  efforts  (Flyverbom, 2011, pp.  52–57).  The Internet  Governance Caucus
(IGC) acted as spokesperson of civil society.  As we have seen, the IGC and other civil society
groupings  specialising  in  Internet  governance  had  shown  their  ideological  proximity  with  the
positions of the power elite during the first phase of the summit (see chapter 7).  IGC decided to use
a nominating committee (“NomCom”) approach, that was used for example in the ICANN system.
Flyverbom (2011) describes in details the selection process, where lists of candidates were drafted
and then reduced by several IGC members according to whom was committed to the caucus and
available. The NomCom252 made the final selection from the 35 nominees from civil society and
sent a list of 10 potential members and 8 connectors to other civil society groups, not intended to be
full members of the WGIG253. 9 nominees from the main list were selected by the WGIG secretariat
as well as 2 from the connectors' list to be members of the WGIG. The process and the selection of
several  IGC members  was  a  way for  IGC to  occupy  a  privileged place  amongst  civil  society
representatives (Flyverbom, 2011, p. 59). This was criticised by other groups excluded from the
WSIS, such as the Patent Copyright and Trademark Caucus, whose support to open source and free
software was not represented in the WGIG (Flyverbom, 2011, p. 58). Finally, members representing
governments were chosen by the WGIG secretariat according to UN criteria. 
The final WGIG member list was released on 11 November 2004. It presented several aspects that
gave the WGIG a counter-elite potential. First, governmental representatives represented the largest
stakeholder  group in the  WGIG  members (44%) (Mathiason,  2008)254. Most  governments  were
unhappy with the private-sector leadership in  Internet  governance and the US oversight  on the
ICANN. Governments,  especially from developing countries, had been an important force behind
the ICANN reform and the empowerment of the Governmental Advisory Committee. Moreover, the
US government  preferred to maintain its distance  (Mathiason, 2008).  Members from developing
countries  accounted for almost 60% of the  group  (Mathiason, 2008),  which was uncommon in
previous Internet governance forums. Governments that had advocated for change during the first
252 NomCom  members  included  Bertrand  de  La  Chappelle  (WSIS-online.net),  Adam  Peake  and  Izumi  Aizu
(GLOCOM, IGTF-J and G8 DotForce), Renata Bloem (Conference of NGOs), and Valeria Betancourt (Association
for Progressive Communications). 
253 The list, as well as several e-mail exchanged during the process, can be found at  http://muguet.com/www.wsis-
si.org/wgig.html, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
254 The classification  by  stakeholder  is  always  difficult  because  of  the  blurriness  of  the  notion.  In  response to  a
questionnaire submitted to the members of  the WGIG, 37.5% of the respondents indicated that they were not
affiliated with any of the proposed stakeholder categories (government, civil  society, international organisation,
business sector) (Kalas, 2007, p. 23).
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phase of the WSIS were strongly represented (China, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Iran, Cuba, Russia and
several other developing countries). European countries were also strongly represented. While not
critical  of  the  privatised  governance  system,  they  were  concerned with  US oversight  over  the
ICANN. Several scholars were members of the WGIG. While not directly members of the academic
counter-elite that had been criticising the ICANN system, some influence of the existing critical
literature on these members was a possibility. William Drake had for example advocated for a broad
definition of Internet governance during the consultations on the establishment of the WGIG, which
was a step away from the status-quo. A member of the Association for Progressive Communications
(APC) was also present in the group. APC was an advocate of change and a central element of the
campaign for Communication Rights in the Information Society (see chapter 7 and Mueller, 2010).
Finally,  the  dominant  institutions  such  as  the  Internet  Society,  the  ICANN,  the  IETF  and  the
intellectual property rights holders were less represented than in previous groups that had discussed
Internet governance issues. However, some elements undermined the counter-elite potential of the
WGIG. The following paragraphs present some information about the participants that mitigate the
first impression on the WGIG, that describe the power dynamics at play in the WGIG, and analyse
the process of the WGIG that led to a weak consensus.  
If we take a closer look at the membership of the WGIG, it reflects more an evolution of the field
and of its power elite after the creation of the ICANN than a rupture. While the US government was
not  directly  represented  among the members of the WGIG, the presence of the Deputy Director-
General of the Directorate General Information Society and Media of the European Commission,
together with representatives from the three countries that held the presidency of the Council of the
EU between 2004 and 2005, illustrates the importance acquired by the European Union in Internet
governance.  Since  the  EU had been associated with the  US government  in  the  creation  of  the
ICANN,  and  had  continuously  supported  a  private-sector-led  and  semi-privatised  model  of
governance, the presence of EU members in the WGIG undermined the reformist potential of the
group. Even if  the EU and the US had been arguing on distributional issues related to Internet
governance, the support to the overall model was guaranteed (see chapter 6). 
The  private  sector  was  notably  represented  by  two  powerful  advocates  of  the  status-quo:  the
International Chamber of Commerce and the World Information Technology and Services Alliance
(WITSA). Allen Miller,  one of the representative of WITSA255,  was also responsible for policy
positions and advocacy of the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) that had
255 The other representative of WITSA was Waudo Siganga. 
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been central in the process of creating the ICANN. Several other WGIG members had previous
experiences with the ICANN system. Besides Alejandro Pisanty, who represented the board of the
ICANN, Vittorio Bertola was the chairman of the ICANN At-Large Advisory Committee 256. Avri
Doria had been involved in the IETF, the Internet Research TaskForce, and had been appointed to
the ICANN Generic Names Supporting Organisation257. Raúl Echebarría was in 1999 member of the
Name Council of ICANN on behalf of the Non Commercial Constituency and a founding member
of the Non Commercial Domain Name Holders Constituency of ICANN258. José Alexandre Bicalho,
the Brazilian government representative, had also been representing Brazil  in the Governmental
Advisory Committee of the ICANN after having participated in its creation259.  QiHeng Hu, the
Chinese  delegate,  had  been a  member  of  the  ICANN Committee  on  Internationalised  Domain
Names from 2000 to 2002260. Wolfgang Kleinwächter had has participated in all ICANN Meetings
from 1999 onwards. He was a member of ICANN's Membership Information Task Force, and the
2001-2002 At-Large Steering Committee261.  Olivier Nana Nzépa had also been a member in the
ICANN  At-Large  Committee.  Charles  Sha'ban  was  a  member  of  the  Intellectual  Property
Constituency (IPC) of the ICANN and had been the chair of ICANN's Internationalized Domain
Names (IDN) Working Group. Charles Sha'ban was also a member of the Internet Society and of
the International Trademark Association262.  In total, almost a quarter of the WGIG members had
previous experience with the ICANN. 
Moreover,  several  socialisation groups and events had gathered several  members of  the WGIG
before its formation. Juan Fernandez, the Cuban delegate was a member of the UN ICT TaskForce
together with Lyndall Shope-Mafole, the South African delegate. The latter was also a member of
the  G8  Dot-Force  with  the  Russian  delegate  Mikhail  Yakushev.  Several  WGIG members  like
Alejandro Pisanti, Penh Hwa Ang, William Drake and Wolfgang Kleinwächter had been involved as
speakers,  moderators  or  organisers  in  the  Internet  Society-sponsored  global  INet  conferences
between 2000 and 2004263. The WSIS background material on Internet governance included papers
authored by WGIG members such as Don McLean, Wolfgang Kleinwächter, William Drake, and the
256 Biographical information of the WGIG members available at http://www.wgig.org/docs, last accessed 8 April 2014.
Sometimes the information was completed by other sources like icannwiki.org and linkedin.com profiles.
257 Ibid.
258 Ibid.
259 Ibid. 
260 See http://archive.icann.org/en/committees/idn/, last accessed, 8 April 2014. 
261 Biographical information of the WGIG members available at http://www.wgig.org/docs, last accessed 8 April 2014.
Sometimes the information was completed by other sources like icannwiki.org and linkedin.com profiles.
262 Ibid. 
263 See http://www.internetsociety.org/events/inet-conferences, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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representatives of the Association for Progressive Communications264.  The two preparatory events
on Internet governance related to the preparatory process of the second phase of the WSIS were also
an  opportunity  for  future  WGIG  members  to  meet  and  exchange  views  (Mathiason,  2008).
Participants  to  the  ITU  forum  on  Internet  governance  (26-27  February  2004)  included:  Don
McLean, Vittorio Bertola, Kangsik Cheon, William Drake, Ayesha Hassan, Wolfgang Kleinwächter
and Jovan Kurbalija265. The UN ICT TaskForce global forum on Internet governance, held in New
York on 25-27 March 2004 gathered the following future WGIG members: Nitin Desai, Markus
Kummer,  William  Drake,  Wolfgang  Kleinwächter,  Carlos  Afonso,  Don  McLean  and  Raúl
Echebarría266. 
This overview of previous contact with ICANN and previous socialisation tend to show that some
members, most of them from civil society and private sector, had participated in the work of the
ICANN and knew each other beforehand. This might explain why  the general feeling of WGIG
members,  fuelled  by this  experience, was that  governments  were  “underestimating  the  Internet
community”, showed “profound ignorance […] and profound disrespect for the complexities of the
Internet”,  and seemed less  “accountable  to  their  constituencies”  (Kalas,  2007,  pp.  26–33). The
relatively close ties between some members of the group, scholars, consultants, ICANN participants
and  representatives  of  the  private  sector  certainly  affected  the  working relationship  with  other
participants.
The  WGIG  was  funded  outside  the  WSIS  budget,  and  primarily  by  the  Swiss  Agency  for
Development and  Cooperation. Other contributions came from the French, Dutch, Norwegian and
Japanese  governments267.  Contributions  also  came  from  non-governmental  sources  like  the
Numbers Resource Organisation, the Swiss Education and Research Network (SWITCH) and the
Foundation  for  Multimedia  Communications268.  Interestingly,  after  having  tried  to  oppose  the
creation of a WGIG, the ICANN Board decided to contribute to the WGIG budget to the amount of
USD 100.000. In its decision, the ICANN board acknowledged the participation of several members
of the ICANN community in the WGIG, as well as the importance of the WGIG to an “improved
and better understanding of the Internet”269. For the ICANN board, the threat of a UN takeover of
the Internet through the WGIG seemed to be counterbalanced by the potential benefits of a potential
264 See http://www.itu.int/wsis/background/index.html, last accessed 8 April 2014.
265 See http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/forum/intgov04/agenda.html, last accessed 8 April 2014.
266 See http://www.unicttaskforce.org/sixthmeeting, last accessed through the Internet archive 8 April 2014.
267 While  no  precise  budget  is  available,  a  list  of  contributors  was  posted  on  the  WGIG  website  at
http://wgig.org/funding.html, last accessed through the Internet Archive 8 April 2014. 
268 Ibid.
269 See http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents/resolutions-20dec04-en.htm, last accessed 8 April 2014.
279
legitimisation of the ICANN system by a UN body. 
The WGIG was thus able to  start  its  work by the end of November 2004. During an 8-month
process,  the  group  tried  to  fulfil  its  mandate  and  answer  three  basic  questions  related  to  the
definition of Internet governance, the policy-issues implied by Internet governance, and the future
of Internet governance. The process was a mix of on-line consultations and 4 face-to-face meetings,
partly open to all WSIS participants and partly closed to facilitate negotiations. 
23-25 November 2004 1st WGIG meeting and open-ended
consultations
December 2004-January 2005 Online consultations
14-18 February 2005 2nd WGIG meeting
15-16 February 2005 Open-ended consultations with
governments and all stakeholders
24 February 2005 Presentation of preliminary report to
PrepCom-II
March 2005 Online consultations
18 April 2005 Open-ended consultations with
governments and all stakeholders
19-20 April 2005 3d WGIG meeting
May 2005 Online consultations
14 June 2005 Open-ended consultations with
governments and all stakeholders
15-17 June 2005 4th WGIG meeting (final drafting of
the report)
July 2005 Submission of the report to the UN
Secretary-General
18 July 2005 Presentation of the report to all
stakeholders
19 July 2005 Workshop on Internet governance at
the national level
September 2005: PrepCom 3
November 2005: WSIS Tunis
Table 8.1. WGIG process time-line (source: www.wgig.org)
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8.1.2. Elites and counter-elites in the WGIG
The  WGIG  process  was  widely  followed  beyond  the  working  group.  The  open  consultations
gathered  around 550 individuals  from more  than 250 institutions.  While  many individuals  and
organisations  were  only  able  to  attend  one  or  the  other  meeting,  many  states  and  non-state
organisation followed the work of the WGIG on a regular basis. Figure 8.1 presents an overview of
the participation in the process, with the most  constant participants in the middle of the network
visualisation of the process270. Over 250 statements, proposals and comments were made during the
open sessions, while WGIG members  mentioned about 2 to 3 thousands of e-mails exchanged by
the members in addition to hours of meeting and debates271. Members of the power elite described
in the previous chapter (ICANN, ARIN, Cisco, US delegation, EU commission, IETF, Telefonica,
WITSA, etc.), as well as the less coherent counter-elites described in chapter 7 (Russian Federation,
Brazil, India, Gender Caucus, UNESCO, ITU) were among the most constant participants. They are
located at the centre of the graph and the size of the node representing these organisations is bigger
because of their higher degree of centrality.  Most non-elites participants only attended one or the
other  event.  They are located at  the margins of figure 8.1 and are represented by small  nodes.
Because  of  their  limited  participation,  they  were  less  likely to  influence  the  outcome  of  the
WGIG272.  Based on the data on the participation of actors and on the divisions outlined in the
previous chapter, the WGIG can be conceptualised as involving the power elite and the counter-
elites of Internet governance. 
270 The network visualisation of the WGIG process in figure 8.1 is based on the lists of participants available on the
WSIS website, available at  www.itu.org/wsis, last accessed 8 April 2014. The figure represent the particpation of
institutions in the different meetings and consultations of the working group. Node size is calculated according to
the eigenvector centrality of the node. Data was processed in UCINet and visualised in Netdraw (Borgatti, Everett,
& Freeman, 2002).
271 The WGIG website archive contains over 300 documents including agendas, lists of participants etc. the content of
256 documents was both quantitatively and qualitatively analysed in this study. See www.wgig.org, last accessed 8
April 2014. The amount of a-mails was discussed during the presentation of the WGIG report at the UN office in
Geneva, on 18 July 2005. Transcript available through the Internet archive at www.wgig.org,  last accessed 8 April
2014.
272 Figure 8.1 does not show the names of non-elite actors but they included small-state governments, generalist NGOs 
and individuals.
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Figure 8.1. Participation in the WGIG process
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By the first meeting of the WGIG, no definition of Internet governance had been adopted by the
group. However, four clusters of policy issues had been identified: the equitable distribution of
resources (including issues such as allocation of IP addresses and management of the root servers
system); access for all; stable and secure functioning of the Internet (including issues such as spam
and cybersecurity); multilingualism and content (including intellectual property rights); and other
issues for consideration. Little progress was made during the first meeting towards a consensus.
Supporters of the status-quo continued to refuse the idea of Internet governance:
“It is misleading to use the term ‘Internet Governance’ when the Internet is clearly
not a single entity to govern. It is more useful to refer to ‘Internet Coordination’.
The multiple facets of the Internet require different types of coordination, each
calling  for  specific  competencies  and sensitivities  to  balance  the  needs  of  the
Internet user community globally and locally.”273
273 Intervention by Lynn St. Amour, Internet Society, during the first meeting of the WGIG on 23 November 
2004, available at www.wgig.org, last accessed through the Internet archive, 8 April 2014.
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On a less radical tone, they defended the existing institutions and advocated for a separation of
technical issues, already addressed by the ICANN system, and the policy issues that were still to be
tackled by other organisations.
“That is: ICANN's focus is on how the Internet works, our focus is not on how the
Internet is used. And that focus is not on the entire working of the Internet, but
solely on the Internet's unique identifier system”.274
“There are many, many critical aspects of the Internet that actually work very well
at  present.  As  aspects  of  the  network,  they  seem  to  be  good  candidates  for
inclusion in the definition, but they are not suggested, simply because they present
no visible problem right now.”275
Supporters of change remained very critical about the ICANN system and were insisting on the
need to address specifically the issues of IP addresses assignment, domain name allocation and the
US oversight on the ICANN: 
“In the short term, the responsibilities in the MoU between the US Department of
Commerce and ICANN should be transferred from the Department of Commerce
to the UN Secretary General as a temporary step on the way to building a new
multi-stakeholder  body  that  must  find  broad  based  support  from  all  stake-
holders.”276
“Internet Governance is much more than just the management of domain names
and IP addresses.  Data protection,  spam,  cyber-security,  multilingual  and local
content  are  Internet  governance issues.  Interconnection costs,  the protection of
IPR and the digital divide are also Internet governance issues. In most of these
areas, the main responsibility lies with governments: yet, they lack the means to
coordinate effectively and promptly at the international level”.277
“We should focus on the core activity of the management of Internet resources by
ICANN, in particular top-level domains, which is where important issues remain
274 Comment by Paul Verhoef, ICANN, before the first meeting of the WGIG on 21 September 2004, available at
www.wgig.org, last accessed through the Internet archive, 8 April 2014.
275 Intervention by Paul Wilson, APNIC, during the first meeting of the WGIG on 24 November 2004, available at
www.wgig.org, last accessed through the Internet archive, 8 April 2014.
276 Comment by Karen Banks, Association for Progressive Communications, before the first meeting of the WGIG on
21 September 2004, available at www.wgig.org, last accessed through the Internet archive, 8 April 2014.
277 Comment by Cristiano Berbert, Brazil, before the first meeting of the WGIG on 21 September 2004, available at
www.wgig.org, last accessed through the Internet archive, 8 April 2014.
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unresolved”.278
Between November of 2004 and February of 2005, 21 issue papers were drafted in order to assess
the current  situation on each single issue and to  present  a Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-
Threats (SWOT) analysis279. The papers were commented beyond the working group according to a
specific format or directly during the consultations. On February 14-18, a second meeting of the
WGIG took place, together with a meeting of the preparatory committee of the WSIS. The issue
papers  and  the  comments  that  had  been  submitted  before  the  meeting  were  discussed.  The
discussion  on  the  working  definition  of  Internet  governance  also  began.  While  most  of  the
interventions  repeated  the  arguments  of  the  supporters  of  the  status-quo  on  the  one  side  and
advocates of change on the other side. Some critique of the work of the WGIG appeared from
different actors. First, commentators outside the working group had only two weeks to read the
papers and comment on them, thereby limiting the value of their input280. More substantial critiques
included the lack of consideration of alternative governance system (beyond the status-quo)281, an
“unquestioning acceptance of the technological status quo”282, a lack of objectivity and critical take
on the ICANN283, and repeated critiques on the “anti-copyright bias” of the issue papers284. Besides
the  two opposed  positions  and the  critiques  raised  at  the  WGIG,  most  of  the  comments  were
supportive of the work of the group and tried to feed the group with their perspectives. 
The third meeting of the WGIG was divided into a day of public consultations on April, 18, 2005
and a closed meeting on April, 19-20. The group started to turn the working papers into a draft
report and discussed the definition of Internet governance (McLean, 2005). The crucial question of
the assessment of existing mechanism and the possible creation of new ones. Like in the broader
278 Intervention by Yoshio Utsumi, ITU, during the first meeting of the WGIG on 23 November 2004, available at
www.wgig.org, last accessed through the Internet archive, 8 April 2014.
279 Not all the themes identified by the WGIG were developed into a draft paper. Excluded themes were: Internet
leased  lines,  peering  and  interconnection,  spectrum policy,  national  infrastructure  development,  developmental
aspects,  critical  infrastructure  protection,  electronic  authentication,  applicable  jurisdiction,  cross  border
coordination, freedom of information and media, privacy, and open-source and free software. 
280 See comments by the Free Software Foundation, Fundación Vía Libre, and Karl Auerbach, 14-15 February 2005,
available at  http://www.wgig.org/Comments-Papers.html,  last  accessed through the  Internet  Archive on  8  April
2014.  
281 See comment by Saudi Arabia, 14 February 2005, available at  http://www.wgig.org/Comments-Papers.html, last
accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014. 
282 See comment by Karl Auerbach, 14 February 2005, available at http://www.wgig.org/Comments-Papers.html, last
accessed through the Internet Archive on  8  April 2014. This debate re-opened the question of the necessity of a
single root to make the Internet stable and reliable. However, this debate remained limited to technical experts that
were already involved in the debates of the 1990s like Karl Auerbach, Louis Pouzin or people form the IETF. 
283 See comment by  Milton Mueller  on behalf of the Internet Governance Project, 15 February 2005, available at
http://www.wgig.org/Comments-Papers.html, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014. 
284 See for example  comments by Allen Dixon, International Federation of the Phonographic Industry and Laurence
Djolakian,  Motion  Picture  Association,  16 February  2005,  available  at  http://www.wgig.org/Comments-
Papers.html, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014. 
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field of Internet governance, opinions within the group differed. The idea of a multistakeholder
forum to continue the debate on these issues emerged. A questionnaire was distributed within the
group and beyond by the secretariat  to gather opinions on the institutions in charge of Internet
governance (McLean, 2005)285. 
While the need for a new forum was consensual within the group, the mandate of the forum and its
composition ranged from a non-binding discussion forum, providing “non-directive advice on best
practice, similar [to] the OECD”; to an authoritative policy-making body286. The less consensual
options favoured by certain participants outside the WGIG did not seem to be discussed within the
group.  For  example,  the  management  of  the  Internet  by  the  ITU  or  the  creation  of  a  purely
intergovernmental  body  do  not  appear  in  the  summary  of  responses  to  the  questionnaire.  The
rejection of any changes to the existing mechanisms, as advocated by some members of the Internet
Society and of the private sector does not appear either. This exclusion of alternative models in the
WGIG in spite of the presence of representatives of counter-elites indicates not only the power
dynamics within the group that are difficult to report because of the closed and non-archives nature
of most of the debates, but also the socialisation process in favour of the power elites' views within
the group. 
During the open consultations of the meeting, the idea of creating a forum to discuss Internet issues
was evoked by several WGIG members287. It was strongly supported by civil society representative
from the  Civil  Society  Gender  Caucus and the  Mark2 group288.  The  Indian  representative  also
supported the creation of a forum289.  However,  some participants saw the forum as a  decision-
making  body,  and  the  Indian  delegate  also  added  the  idea  of  an  intergovernmental  body290.
Supporters of an intergovernmental institution included Saudi Arabia, China and even two WGIG
members291.  Syria supported the idea of a coordinating and enhanced role for the ITU292.  While
some  arguments  favoured  innovative  solutions  and  rejected  existing  intergovernmental
organisations drawing upon a discourse of Internet exceptionalism, this discourse was criticised and
285 A summary of the WGIG members' responses to the questionnaire is available at  http://www.wgig.org/docs/IG-
questionnaire-response.pdf, last accessed,  8  April 2014; further comments are available on the WGIG website  at
http://www.wgig.org/Comments-Papers.html, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014. 
286 http://www.wgig.org/docs/IG-questionnaire-response.pdf  ,  last accessed, 8 April 2014.
287 See interventions by William Drake and Wolfgang Kleinwächter during the open consultations. Transcript available 
at http://www.wgig.org/, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014. 
288 Ibid.
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid.
291 Ibid. See in particular the interventions by Lyndall Shope-Mafole and Qiheng Hu. 
292 Ibid.
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the notion of sovereignty was waived by a number of governmental delegations. Moreover, the
special role of the state, even in a multistakeholder context, was reaffirmed not only by supporters
of intergovernmentalism, but also by the European Union293. Finally, the role and evolution of the
Governmental Advisory Committee of the ICANN was also discussed through the questionnaire
and during the consultations. 
The open consultations of the fourth and last  meeting of the WGIG took place before the final
drafting of the report by the WGIG on 14-17 June 2005. The positions and the discussion were very
similar to the ones in the third meeting. Brazil and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
insisted on the creation of a forum. However, Brazil wanted a decision-making body. Only China
and Syria continued to call for the creation of an intergovernmental body. While a strong support of
the status-quo was expressed during the meeting by participants such as ICANN, Internet Society
and the ICC, only some representative of the technical elite opposed the creation of a forum 294 and
considered the openness of existing institutions satisfactory295. The WGIG had a small margin of
manoeuvre as it started its closed retreat session in the Château de Bossey to finalise the report. The
group decided to propose four models for future Internet governance institutions in order to reflect
the diverse opinions expressed within the group and during the consultations (McLean, 2005).   
293 Ibid. 
294 See  interventions  by  Brian  Carpenter,  IETF,  and  Alejandro  Pisanty,  ICANN/WGIG.  Transcript  available  at
http://www.wgig.org/, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014. 
295 Ibid. See intervention by Lynn St-Amour, ISOC. 
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Figure 8.2. Ideological proximity in the WGIG process
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Two network visualisations of the debates help understand the position of the WGIG with regards to
the  broader  field  of  Internet  governance.  Figure  8.2 illustrates  the  ideological  proximity  of  the
institutions  that  participated  in  the  debates  of  the  WGIG  based on their  statements  during  the
process (see the complete data in Annex  4)296.  It shows who was influential in the process.  The
group of blue nodes at the right of the figure represent the institutions supporting status-quo. Their
eigenvector centrality  degree  is  higher  than the  advocates  of  change located on the  left  of  the
network, as evidenced by their bigger size. Moreover, these actor form a closely connected group as
measured by the coloured k-core groups. The WGIG stands between this group and the advocates of
change  at  the  left  of  the  visualisation.  This  social  network  analysis  allows  for  a  quantitative
visualisation of the structural domination of some actors in the process. The power elite supporting
the status-quo made a greater number of comments and repeated the same shared arguments in spite
of  the  diverging  interests  of  its  members.  On  the  other  hand,  the  less  central  position  of  the
advocates of change illustrates the limited number of interventions (nodes are smaller and thus less
central), and the lesser degree of cohesion among them. There is no k-core group for the counter-
elites  but  a  number  of  different  groups.  This  means  that  there  was  no  shared  project  and
argumentation among non-dominant actors. 
296 Figure 8.2 is a visualisation in NetDraw 2.123 (Borgatti, 2002) of a network of the links between institutions based
on shared statements during the WGIG debates produced with Discourse Network Analyzer  1.30 (Leifeld, 2012).
The data comes from the documents and transcripts available on the WGIG website and are based on an inductive
qualitative content analysis.  Each link represent a shared statement between two institutions (nodes). The size of a
node depends on its eigenvector centrality, which can be in this case an indication of a widely-shared statement or
of a repeated statement. The colour of a node is based on its inclusion within a K-core group of more closely
connected nodes. According to this quantitative measure, the WGIG itself would pertain to the closely connected
group of the supporters of the status-quo, together with institutions like the ICANN, the ICC, the Internet Society
and countries like the USA and Australia. 
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Figure  8.3 represents another visualisation of the same data297.  Whereas figure 8.2 illustrates the
structural position of the actors in the negotiation, figure 8.3 shows the type of position that were
advocated by the different actors.  Institutions are represented by red circled nodes and statements
appear as blue squared nodes. The support to the status-quo is the most important category, closely
related  to  the  separation  of  technical  and political  issues  and the  support  to  the  private  sector
leadership. The WGIG stands again in the middle, close to the Internet Governance Caucus and the
Internet Governance TaskForce of Japan. A less-centralised group advocates for a special role for
the state in multistakeholderism, an enhanced role for the ITU or the creation of a policy-making
institution. Categories like the focus on sovereignty and the questioning of the US oversight on the
ICANN also pertain to this loosely-related group.  Once again, this visualisation indicates that the
clear-cut  categories  of  the  first  phase  of  the  WSIS  between  supporters  of  the  status-quo  and
advocates of change were blurred during the WGIG process. The WGIG  process evidenced the
more consensual character of the debates and the emergence of diverging views amongst advocates
of  change.  The  reluctance  of  the  members  of  the  Working  Group to  advocate for  change  is
translated in figure 8.2 by the affiliation of the group within the defenders of the status-quo, While
the group had a reformist potential, the overview of the debates as visualised through social network
analysis shows the structural domination of the power elite and the impossibility for the WGIG to
bring about profound change in the field.
Figure 8.4 represents quantitatively the participation of WGIG members in the WGIG meetings and
consultations298.  Social  Network Analysis  is  here used as a  way to show the unequal nature  of
participation  in  loosely-structured  multistakeholder  processes.  Because  of  the  nature  of  their
arguments, and because of their relationship to other members of the WGIG, some participants were
structurally dominant in the group. Whereas some members were not even present to all meetings
and never spoke in the consultations, others were constant speakers and presented and defended the
ideas included in the draft versions of the report. While no data is available on the closed meetings
where the Chatham House rule prohibited the attribution of a particular idea to an individual, the
297 Figure 8.3 is a visualisation in NetDraw 2.123 (Borgatti, 2002) of a network of the links between institutions and
statements during the WGIG debates  produced with Discourse Network Analyzer  1.30 (Leifeld, 2012). The data
comes from the documents and transcripts available on the WGIG website and are based on an inductive qualitative
content analysis.   Each link represent  an occurrence of a specific statement made by an institution. Node size is
based on the eigenvector centrality measure, which illustrate the centrality of a statement during the debates based
on the number of occurrence and the number of institutions that made the statement. 
298 The figure 8.4 is a subset of the data used in figure 8.1.2 focused on the WGIG members. Red circled nodes are
members  of  the  WGIG (including  chair  and secretariat).  Blue  squared  nodes  are  WGIG meetings.  Node  size
depends on the eigenvector centrality of actors. Edges' width depend on the tie strength. Participation to a meeting
is valued 1 for simple participation, 2 for commentators, 3 for speakers. Visualisation produced in NetDraw 2.123
(Borgatti, 2002).
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open consultations clearly show the leading role of some WGIG members, as illustrated by figure
8.4. The elements outlined in the presentation of the composition of the group are elements that
explain this fact. Individuals with ICANN experience knew more about Internet governance issues
than the governmental delegates. This experience differential is expressed in the questionnaire to the
WGIG members, where governments are described as ignorant (Kalas, 2007). Again, the previous
socialisation of several of the WGIG members that were used to participate in the same events
certainly played a role. The national capital (Bourdieu, 2005) of US nationals or native English
speakers should not be underestimated either. During the presentation of the report, one member of
the group pointed at the lack of translation as “maybe the biggest mistake” since a French-speaking
member needed the assistance of the secretariat to follow the discussions, which certainly limited
the impact of his contribution. The same problem occurred for other non-English speakers299. Raw
power was also used by dominant actors in some occasions. For example, the discussion paper on
intellectual property rights was drafted by a civil-society member, who described himself as critical.
The paper was criticized by representatives of the private sector, and, instead of trying to reach
consensus, the paper was vetoed and could not be published on the website. According to a WGIG
member,  the  “private  sector  member's  dislike  of  the  paper  meant  that  it  was  simply  'canned'”
(quoted  in  Flyverbom,  2011,  pp.  80–81).  On  the  contrary,  an  ideologically-biased  paper  on
privatization of telecommunications drafted by a private sector member was endorsed by the group
in spite of the critiques (Flyverbom, 2011, p. 81). The most vocal members of the working group
contributed to a book edited by William Drake and published by the UN ICT Taskforce (Drake,
2005). Half of the WGIG members contributed, as well  as the chair,  the coordinator and some
members of the secretariat.  One chapter written by the Cuban and the Egyptian representatives
criticized  the  market-driven  management  of  international  Internet  connection  costs  and  its
consequences for developing countries. Two other chapters by the representative of the Internet
Society  of  China  and  the  Saudi  delegate  proposed  intergovernmental  solutions  to  Internet
governance issue. One chapter by a Brazilian civil society representative envisioned a deep reform
and internationalisation of the ICANN. The rest of the book was written by representatives of the
private  sector  and  representatives  of  the  civil  society,  mostly  scholars,  and  none  of  these
contributions advocated for significant change in the field of Internet governance. These authors are
members  of  the  policy  elite  of  Internet  governance  that  has  been  in  charge  of  the  Internet
Governance Forum since its creation (see next section). 
299 See the intervention by Willy Jensen, transcript of the WGIG report presentation, 18 July 2005, afternoon, available
at http://wgig.org/July-scriptafternoon.html, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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The WGIG failed to fulfil the promises of a reformist agenda that many non-dominant actors had
hoped. The composition of the group, the power dynamics within the group and beyond in the field
of  Internet  governance,  turned  the  work  of  the  group  into  a  weak-consensus  building  process
without  any  radical  consequences  for  the  field  of  Internet  governance.  The  principle  of
multistakeholderism was used as a way to give more power to the elites than to the counter-elites.
The  WGIG  illustrate  the  predominance  of  power  dynamics in  multistakeholder  settings.  The
loosely-institutional process of the WGIG, with no translation and consultations taking place only in
Geneva,  favoured  the  experienced  and  powerful  actors.  While  the  frontal  opposition  of  the
defenders of the status-quo and advocates of change was overcome during the WGIG process, it is
certainly more because of the US-China agreement than because of the solutions proposed by the
WGIG (see next section). 
An  interesting  development  triggered  by  the  WGIG  process  is  the  emergence  of  two  distinct
counter-elites  instead  of  the  relatively  unified  group  of  the  first  phase  of  the  Summit.  Some
governments  relied on a sovereignist discourse, as described in chapter 5. They were insisting on
sovereignty and favoured existing intergovernmental organisations such as the ITU, other actors
(civil society organisations and increasingly governments like the Brazilian one) advocated for the
creation of a new institution, including multistakeholder participation, albeit with decision-making
powers. This position can be described as “reformist” and draws upon elements of the sovereignist
discourse, but also from the global public good discourse. This type of discourse acknowledges the
influence of cyber-libertarian ideas in the field of Internet governance and accepts the idea of the
need of new types of multistakeholder institutions to manage the new telecommunication network.
As a Syrian delegate put it:
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“We have heard today three views: status-quo by majority; we have heard people
asking for a forum; and we have heard some people supporting the existing UN
specialized organizations.”300
This perspective contrasts with the view of a debate between ITU and ICANN (Kleinwächter, 2004)
and with the opposition of the first phase of the Summit. It is crucial in order to understand future
developments  in  the  field  of  Internet  governance.  The  division  within  the  counter-elite  was
instrumental for the power elite to find a way out of the politicisation of the WSIS and continues to
affect the field of Internet governance. The report of the WGIG as well as the debates towards the
last meeting of the preparatory committee of the WSIS took into account the two main concerns of
the counter-elites separately. 
8.1.3. From the WGIG report to the Tunis Agenda 
The report  of the WGIG was presented on July,  18,  2005 in the form of a 25-page document,
together with a background report including indications on the diverging opinions within the group
and  comments  from  participants  to  the  WGIG  process.  The  documents  were  structured  in  5
sections: an introduction, a working definition of Internet governance, a section on public policy
issues,  a  section  on stakeholders  and their  role,  and finally  a  section on recommendations  and
proposals for action. 
The first substantial contribution of the WGIG to the field of Internet governance is the working
definition of Internet governance:
“Internet  governance is  the  development and application  by  Governments,  the
private  sector  and civil  society,  in  their  respective  roles,  of  shared  principles,
norms,  rules,  decision-making  procedures,  and  programmes  that  shape  the
evolution and use of the Internet.” (WGIG, 2005, §10)
The influence of political scientists in this definition is revealed by its proximity to the definition of
international regimes by Krasner (1983).  However, the definition acknowledges the role of non-
state actors in international policy-making. The definition encompasses both technical management
and political and social issues. While the definition of Internet governance in the 1990s had been
restricted to a technical management of the network in order to justify the creation of a politically
300 Intervention by a Syrian delgate during the 4th meeting of the WGIG, 14 June 2005, afternoon session, transcript
available at http://www.wgig.org/June-scriptafternoon.html, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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unaccountable institution, the politicisation of the issue and the evolution of the field since the
creation of the ICANN imposed a broad definition of Internet governance. A tripartite governance is
described and intergovernmental organisations are excluded from the definition. The possible role
of the existing specialised intergovernmental organisations like the ITU and other UN bodies is
excluded from the definition of the field. This exclusion corresponds to the prevailing doxa of the
field based notably on the principles of Internet exceptionalism and multistakeholderism.
Thirteen policy issues were identified in the report. Some of the issues to be tackled implied change
in  the  existing  governance  system.  For  example,  the  unilateral  control  by  the  United  States
government over the administration of the root zone files and system was clearly identified as an
important political issue (WGIG, 2005, §15). Some other issues were cautiously evoked, like the
cost of interconnection for developing countries or the balance between intellectual property rights
owners and the rights of users (WGIG, 2005, §16 and §23). However,  the relation of these issues
with the history of the existing system and the identification of the sources of the problem were not
addressed. 
The role of the different stakeholders was described in generic terms, but the balance between them
remained unclear. The role of the private sector was broadly defined, including its contribution to
the drafting of national laws and its participation in national and international policy development
(WGIG, 2005, §31) On the other hand, civil society role was largely outside the decision-making
process, as a link between policy-making and society. Three other categories of stakeholder are
described in §33 and §34, although they were excluded from the definition of Internet governance:
the academic community (“one of [the] main source of inspiration, innovation and creativity”), the
technical community and international organisations and forums. 
The picture offered by the description of the role of stakeholders is consistent with a neoliberal
discourse. Governments are mainly responsible of creating an “enabling environment”, which is
characterised in the Geneva declaration of 2003 as pro-competitive and liberalised.  The private
sector plays an extensive role of “self-regulation” and participate to political decision-making at all
levels. Civil society is considered a counter-power outside the decision-making and a legitimising
body. Finally, intergovernmental organisations are subsidiary instruments with a very limited role.
The specific mention of academic and technical communities is still a reminiscence of the academic
field  of  computer  networking  and  the  special  role  of  the  scientific  and  technical  elite.  This
particularity of the field benefited, in turn, the social science and law scholars that participated in
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the WGIG.
The final part presented proposals of action in 4 clusters of issues. First, the report recommends the
creation of a dialogue forum. Such forum was designed as a non-binding institution that could at
best  make recommendations (WGIG, 2005, §40 and §47). Second,  the issues of global policy-
making  related  to  Internet  governance  and  the  oversight  of  the  technical  management  of  the
network. Since the views diverged within the group and in the field in general, four models were
considered in the report:
- A UN-anchored Global Internet Council (GIC), consisting of representatives of
governments with multistakeholder advisory groups. The GIC would replace the
Governmental  Advisory Committee  (GAC) of  the  ICANN and also enter  in  a
memorandum of understanding with the ICANN to replace the US Department of
Commerce.
- No oversight organisation and a reform of the GAC to enhance its role within the
ICANN.
- An International Internet Council (IIC) tackling policy issues related to Internet
governance and replacing the US government with regards to the oversight of the
ICANN.
- A Global Internet Policy Council (GIPC) as a government-led mechanism for
public  policy  issues,  coupled  with  a  World  ICANN  (WICANN),  an
internationalised ICANN, and a Global Internet Governance Forum (GIGF).
Three of the four models implied the creation of a new institution with decision-making powers.
However, none of the proposed model implied the replacement of the ICANN and the Regional
Internet Registries, and none addressed the issue of standardisation. As a result, the four proposed
models were more conservative than some of the proposals during the WGIG consultations. In this
sense, the WGIG fulfilled a hegemony-building role for the existing system by reducing the scope
of the possibilities in future negotiations. The final recommendations on the policy issues identified
in the second section of the report remained very consensual and did not consider substantial change
either. It should be noted that while none of these proposals represented the claims of the counter-
elites – the most conservative one – the second model, prevailed. The report presented elements of a
weak consensus that was discussed in the third meeting of the WSIS preparatory committee: the
creation of an Internet Governance Forum, and some measure to promote the internationalisation
and  an  enhanced  participation  in  the  current  system.  Other  elements  of  the  consensus  were
discussed outside the WGIG. 
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While the WGIG report  addressed the need for internationalisation of  the ICANN, and for the
creation of a new institution; and recommends the creation of an Internet Governance Forum, it did
not address the concern expressed by many developing countries concerning sovereignty on the
Internet. The sovereignist counter-elite was supported by important actors such as China and the
Arab countries. They advocated for a return to intergovernmental institutions like the ITU in order
to protect their sovereignty over their country-code top-level domain as well as on the national part
of the network. As we have seen, the ITU had been historically linked with the idea of sovereign
countries,  allowed  to  manage  telecommunications  at  a  national  level,  especially  through  a
monopolistic public telecommunication firm. In spite of the participation of the private sector in
technical bodies, the ITU was still an intergovernmental institution and was thus seen as a more
appropriate institution to defend the sovereign rights of governments. The involvement of the ITU
could in this view guarantee the observation of “national sovereign rights of each State to organize
the use of the Internet nationally”301. China was the leading sovereignist government because of the
importance of Chinese Internet users and because of the representation of Chinese interests in the
WGIG through the Internet Society of China: 
“The authorization to the body who is taking care about the core resources of the
Internet should be legally authorized by a multilateral process, by a multilateral
that is – How to say that? – the sovereign states, that is the right of the sovereign
states to select or delegate the right to a body, not – say, ICANN or something like
that, to take care about the strategic resources of the Internet for them.”302
The US government decided to address the sovereignist issue directly since it was not participating
in the WGIG. On June 30, 2005, the US government published a document on “US. Principles on
the Internet's  Domain Name and Addressing System”303.  While two of the four principles were
supporting the status-quo and the ICANN, one was the recognition from the US government of the
right of each country to manage its country-code top-level domain in a sovereign manner. The last
principle was the need for a forum of dialogue on Internet governance issues. As a consequence, the
Chinese government, which acted as the leader of the sovereignist movement, stopped its attacks on
the existing system during the WSIS (Kleinwächter, 2008). As the preparatory process of the second
301 Intervention by the Syria representative during the open consultation of the third meeting of the WGIG on 18 April
2005, available at www.wgig.org, last accessed through the Internet archive 8 April 2014.
302 Intervention by Qiheng Hu, Internet Society of China and WGIG member, during the third meeting of the WGIG on
18 April 2005, available at www.wgig.org, last accessed through the Internet archive 8 April 2014. The arguments
used by the Chinese delegation were similar. 
303 Document published on the U.S National Telecommunications and Information Administration on June, 30, 2005 ; 
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2005/us-principles-internets-domain-name-and-addressing-
system, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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phase of the WSIS entered in its last step  (the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee), the
balance between the power elite and the counter-elites was affected both by the WGIG process and
by the  US government's  actions.  Like  for  the  first phase,  enduring  discussions  about  Internet
governance resulted in the organisation of a second round of negotiations and  PrepCom 3  was
divided into two events. As shown in figure 8.5, China remained silent during the two events of the
third meeting of the WSIS preparatory committee. Other advocates of sovereignism, like Venezuela
and Iran, were isolated in their support of an intergovernmental organisation. Intergovernmentalism
was excluded from Internet governance by definition in the WGIG report, and in the debates by the
silencing of China. 
This situation led to an unprecedented situation, where a proposal by the European Union became
the  most  reformist  option  since  it  advocated  for  an  extensive  internationalisation  of  Internet
governance.  The European Union proposal reiterated its adhesion to principles supported by the
defenders  of  the  status-quo  like  the  improvement  of  current  institutions  rather  than  their
replacement, the need to contribute to the stability of the system, and the separation of policy issues
(tackled  by  governments)  and  day-to-day  technical  management  (carried  out  by  the  existing
institutions)304.  However,  the  tasks  of  the new cooperation  model  encompassed tasks  that were
already dealt with by the existing system:
“The new cooperation model should include the development and application of globally
applicable public policy principles and provide an international government involvement
at the level of principles over the following naming, numbering and addressing-related
matters:
a. Provision for a global allocation system of IP number blocks, which is equitable and
efficient;
b. Procedures for changing the root zone file, specifically for the insertion of new top
level domains in the root system and changes of ccTLD managers;
c. Establishment of contingency plans to ensure the continuity of crucial DNS functions;
d. Establishment  of  an  arbitration  and  dispute  resolution  mechanism  based  on
international law in case of disputes;
e. Rules applicable to DNS system.”305
With the divided and partly co-opted counter-elites marginalised in the meeting, the debate took
place within the power elite and evidenced the  limited cohesion  of the elite. While the European
Union  defended  the  doxa of  the  field,  the  unilateral  oversight  of  the  US  government  was
304 EU/UK proposal  during the PrepCom 3,  Geneva,  28 September  2005,  §63,  available at  www.itu.int/wsis,  last
accessed 8 April 2014.
305 Ibid. §64. 
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problematic  for  European actors.  Moreover,  the  WSIS took place  only  two years  after  the  US
intervention in Iraq and strong transatlantic divisions remained. The US government criticised the
proposal and feared that the unclear boundary between the level of principles and the level of day-
to-day operations might lead to an involvement of governments, specifically European ones, in the
functioning of the ICANN system (Kleinwächter, 2008, p. 22).  While the conflict between the two
fractions  of  the  power  elite  was  not resolved  during  the  PrepCom,  the  rejection  of  the  new
cooperation model and the inclusion of a process towards “enhanced cooperation” in the Tunis
Agenda can be seen as a compromise (see below). 
As the following figure 8.5 shows306, the PrepCom 3 marginalised counter-elites and emphasised
some consensual elements. For example, the support of the WGIG report and above all, the support
of  the  status-quo in the  field  are  the  most  shared  statements.  Relatively consensual  statements
include the internationalisation of the existing system and enhanced participation, the creation of an
Internet Governance Forum, the new principle of sovereignty and the classic doxa principles of pro-
competitiveness of the institutional environment, multistakeholderism, and the separation between
technical management and policy issues. Some remaining issues included  the means to improve
access and connectivity in developing countries. Some insisted on the uneven share of the burden of
the  costs  of  international  connectivity,  while  others  focused on the  need  for  a  pro-competitive
environment  to  ensure  a  more  affordable  telecommunication  system.  Another  issue  was  the
importance of open-source software for development. Some participants argued that open-source
software was essential in the development of the information society, while others refused to favour
a particular model for software development. The inclusion of specific paragraphs on human rights
or the mentioning of concrete elements for a future reform of the ICANN were also debated. Some
consensual  statements  such  as  the  need  for  an  Internet  governance  Forum  included  different
perspectives on the nature and the mandate of such forum. While diverging views remained, the
importance of the argument favouring the status-quo and the predominance of commentators such
as the CCBI, the debates of the PrepCom 3 evidence the failure of the reformist projects. 
306 Figure 8.5 is a network visualisation of the debates during the two meetings of PreCom 3, in Geneva in September
2005  and  in  Tunis  in  November  2005.  Circled red  nodes  represent  actors  and  blue  squared  nodes  represent
statements. Node size is based on the eigenvector centrality measure and illustrate the frequency of a statement and
of the closest statements related to it. Visualisation was based on data treated with Discourse Network  Analyzer
1.30 (Leifeld, 2012) and was realised in NetDraw 2.123 (Borgatti, 2002).
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Against this background, the outcome of the Tunis Summit, the Tunis Agenda, failed to reform the
field of  Internet  governance (WSIS,  2005).  Almost  half  of the Tunis  Agenda was dedicated to
Internet governance (WSIS, 2005, §29 to 82). The Agenda recalled the principles established in
Geneva (see chap.7) and the working definition of Internet governance drafted by the WGIG. While
consistent with the multistakeholder doxa of the field, the Agenda relied on a slightly different list
of  stakeholders,  adding  intergovernmental  organisations  and  international  organisations  to  the
tripartite perspective of the WGIG limited to states, the private sector and civil society. International
organisations was used to refer to private institutions such as the ICANN or the Regional Internet
Registries (WSIS, 2005, §35). The reference to the technical and academic communities within the
various stakeholder groups also made its way from the WGIG report to the Tunis Agenda (WSIS,
2005, §36). The Tunis Agenda recommends concrete steps to improve access and connectivity; for
example through the creation of regional  backbones and Internet exchange points. However, no
particular actor was designated to achieve these goals and the first requirement was the need for a
competitive  environment  rather  than  the  pro-active  effort  demanded  by  developing  countries
(WSIS, 2005, §50).
The  Tunis  Agenda  supported  the  existing  principles  and  institutions  of  the  field  of  Internet
governance. §54 reiterated the importance of private-sector led development of the Internet and of
pro-competitive environments. §55 endorsed the ICANN system and privatised management of the
Internet.  Moreover,  §57 stressed the need to maintain  the stability and security of the Internet,
which was one of the main argument of the supporters of the status-quo (WSIS, 2005). This is why
the  Tunis  Agenda can  be  seen as  an important  step towards  the  hegemony of  the  power elite.
Counter-elites were silenced by the WGIG process and by bilateral arrangements. Moreover, the
UN summit entailed a renewed legitimacy for the existing system and a broader support of non-
elites.
The concerns of sovereignist countries were addressed in §63 that acknowledged the sovereignty of
countries over their country-code top-level domain. Other disagreements were addressed by §65 on
the need to maximise the participation of developing countries and by §67 that appealed for the
creation of a new multistakeholder forum for continuous dialogue on  Internet governance issues.
§77 made clear that such dialogue forum was to be non-binding and with no oversight functions
(WSIS, 2005).
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In spite of a general support to the status-quo, the Tunis Agenda left a door open for deeper reforms
in the field of Internet governance. Three paragraphs, based on the European proposal of a new
cooperation mechanism, entailed possible change in the governance system:
“68.  We  recognize  that  all  governments  should  have  an  equal  role  and
responsibility for international Internet governance and for ensuring the stability,
security  and  continuity  of  the  Internet.  We  also  recognize  the  need  for
development  of  public  policy  by  governments  in  consultation  with  all
stakeholders.
69. We further  recognize  the  need for  enhanced  cooperation  in  the  future,  to
enable  governments,  on  an  equal  footing,  to  carry  out  their  roles  and
responsibilities, in international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet, but
not in the day-to-day technical  and operational  matters, that do not impact  on
international public policy issues.
70. Using relevant international organizations, such cooperation should include
the  development  of  globally-applicable  principles  on  public  policy  issues
associated with the coordination and management of critical Internet resources. In
this  regard,  we  call  upon  the  organizations  responsible  for  essential  tasks
associated  with  the  Internet  to  contribute  to  creating  an  environment  that
facilitates this development of public policy principles.” (WSIS, 2005)
These three paragraphs were later used as the legal basis for a UN-led process towards reform in the
field of Internet governance, mainly under the initiative of emerging powers (see chap. 9). Besides
this breach, the Tunis Agenda was favouring the status-quo more than the Geneva principles. The
evolution from the Geneva process to the Tunis Agenda, through the WGIG and other dialogues, is
a  successful  attempt by the  power  elite  to  maintain its  power.  The separation of  technical  and
political issues that had started in Geneva, was fulfilled in the Tunis Agenda with the exclusion of
“day-to-day technical and operational matters” from public policy issues. While this differentiation
is in fact impossible to make, its existence as a principle in the Tunis Agenda was a victory of the
power  elite  against  politicisation  of  Internet  governance.  The  support  expressed  by  the  Tunis
Agenda to the existing governance system demonstrates the failure of the counter-elite to seriously
challenge  the  ICANN system during  the  WSIS.  The  doxa of  the  field  of  Internet  governance,
relying on multistakeholderism, pro-competitive environment, private-sector leadership and Internet
exceptionalism not only survived the WSIS, but it also permeated the broader field of international
telecommunications, as evidenced by the use of the same vocabulary for Internet governance and
for the Information Society in general in the Tunis Agenda. While principles and institutions were
strengthened and legitimised by the WSIS, the power elite was reconfigured and individual actors
changed. The Internet Governance Forum is one of the most striking example of the rise of a policy-
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oriented specialised elite  rooted in civil society organisations. Its support to the status-quo  in the
field of Internet governance allowed for its integration to the power elite.  
8.2. The Internet Governance Forum as a new hegemonic project
The WSIS was a threat for the existing order in the field of Internet governance. The first phase of
the summit evidenced the division between the power elite and the counter-elites. However, through
the WGIG process and the preparatory process of the Tunis phase, the situation changed and the
power elite was reconfigured.  Still,   the power elite  managed to maintain its domination over the
field.  The  main  outcome  of  the  WSIS  process  for  the  field  of  Internet  governance  was  the
institutionalisation of the power of the civil-society elite and the separation of the technical and
political issues. The situation of the field at the end of the WSIS can be considered as the most
stable configuration in the history of Internet governance since it prefigured and has structured the
debates until now.
8.2.1. Reconfiguration of the power elite and the IGF
The power elite of Internet governance that unified at the end of the 1990s around the creation of
the ICANN had been challenged in the early 2000s. An academic counter-elite had been criticising
the lack of legitimacy and openness of the ICANN, developing countries' governments complained
about their exclusion from Internet governance and hackers saw the ICANN system as a corruption
of the cyber-libertarian ideal (see chapter 6). During the WSIS, these counter-elites were joined by
civil society organisations focusing on broader issues like the right to communicate in their critique
of  the  existing  system.  The  WGIG process  and  its  main  outcome  for  the  field  of  Internet
governance, the Internet Governance Forum, generated a reconfiguration of the power elite, and a
stabilisation of its power at the same time. The new institutional landscape and the new dominant
imaginary of the field allowed for a renewed interchangeability and for an enhanced ideological
cohesion within the power elite.
First,  the  WSIS  process  and  the  creation  of  the  IGF were  instrumental  for  the  co-optation  of
counter-elites. The academic specialised elite became an important part of the civil-society elite that
can be found in key positions at the IGF as well as in several advisory bodies at different levels (see
next section for concrete examples). The former counter-elite of the turn of the millennium was co-
opted by the creation of new institution and by a discourse on multistakeholderism that granted
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them a specific role and a place at the table of future negotiations. An important part of the “civil
society” stakeholder group includes scholars since the WSIS, most of them in the realm of law and
social sciences. The specialised civil-society elite is also involved in the ICANN system through its
most  political  bodies  and  sometimes  serve  in  boards  of  institutions  like  the  Regional  Internet
Registries. With the creation of the IGF and their inclusion in the power elite, the academic counter-
elite softened their critiques of the ICANN system. The IGF, with its organisation in panels with
keynote  speakers  in  the plenary  sessions provides an environment  very similar  to  an academic
conference and allow for an important participation and influence by the former academic counter-
elite. If we look at the literature on Internet governance and to the programs of the various events of
the main scholarly association on the issue, the Global Internet Governance Academic Network, the
studies that are critical of the existing system tend to occupy a more reduced space than it was the
case in the early 2000s, and during the WSIS (see chapter 2 for a literature review). 
As we have seen, the co-optation of the developing countries counter-elite was done in two steps.
The co-optation of sovereignist countries relied on the acceptance of a country's sovereign rights on
its country-code top-level domain. This concession was made by the power elite in exchange of a
support  to  the  ICANN system by sovereignist  countries,  and particularly  China  (Kleinwächter,
2008). Furthermore, ICANN representatives made clear that the Governmental Advisory Committee
of the ICANN would evolve307. Since the WSIS, the attitude of the US Department of Commerce
regarding  its  oversight  of  ICANN  activities  also  evolved.  The  term  of  the  Memorandum  of
Understanding between the ICANN and the Department of Commerce in 2006 was announced as an
important reform. The MoU was replaced by a Joint Project Agreement. While the changes were not
substantial308,  the change of attitude and vocabulary illustrated the efforts by the power elite to
satisfy the  sovereignist  counter-elite.  The  co-optation  of  “reformist”  powers  that  called  for  the
creation of a new institution was made possible through the creation of the IGF. For example, the
second IGF took place in 2007 in Brazil.  The open character of the IGF ensured an increased
visibility of developing countries. Like the academic elite, a strong representation of people from
developing countries and reformist powers like Brazil in the specialised civil-society elite illustrates
the  reconfiguration  of  the  power  elite  that  had  remained  centred  around  the  OECD countries.
Participation  to  the  Multistakeholder  Advisory  Group  of  the  IGF and  to  other  policy-oriented
bodies, even within the ICANN, became more diverse since the WSIS. However, the co-optation of
307 See the address by the President and CEO of ICANN during PrepCom 3, in Tunis on November 14, available at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/pc3/contributions/sca/Resumed/ICANN-A.pdf, last accessed, 8 April 2014.
308 See “ICANN new MoU: Old Wine in a New Bottle”, by Milton Mueller, posted on the Internet Governance Project
blog at  http://www.internetgovernance.org/2006/09/30/icanns-new-mou-old-wine-in-a-new-bottle/, last accessed  8
April 2014.
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the counter-elite of developing countries seems less effective than the co-optation of the academic
elite. The exercise of hegemony is a fine balance between concessions and the maintenance of the
bulk  of  domination  (Gramsci,  1999).  In  this  case,  the  concessions  were  very  limited.  The
acceptance by sovereignist countries of the perpetuation of the ICANN system was only possible
for a limited period of time (Kleinwächter, 2008) and depended on future reforms of the ICANN.
However, the termination of the Memorandum of Understanding between the ICANN and the US
Department  of  Commerce  did  not  give  birth  to  a  more  acceptable  situation  for  sovereignist
countries. Likewise, reformist powers led by some emerging states and civil society organisations
wanted a decision-making body, or at least a dialogue able to produce recommendations. However,
the IGF remained a dialogue and its relation to policy-making was indirect. As such, the Internet
Governance  Forum could  not  embody the  reform advocated  by  reformist  powers.  Despite  this
imperfect  co-optation  of  the  counter-elite  of  developing  countries,  the  power  elite  managed to
silence the counter-elite at the end of the WSIS and undermined its mobilisation efforts for several
years (see chapter 9).    
Second, the creation of the IGF institutionalised some form of resistance while excluding radical
actors. By providing a space outside the ICANN system to discuss Internet governance issues, the
creation of the IGF represented an institutionalisation of some forms of resistance. As Cox (1981)
described it, the institutionalisation of resistance is essential for hegemony. While resistance grew
outside the institutions controlled by the power elite before the WSIS, the IGF constituted a space
for controlled resistance. For example, the IGF became the main space where the possible transfer
of the ICANN control to the “international community” was discussed and the unilateral control of
the  US  government  was  criticised309.  However,  several  factors  have  limited  the  extent  of  the
resistance within the IGF. First, the stakeholder balance rules have made sure that a representative
of  the  ICANN  system  participate  in  each  panel.  Second,  the  socialisation  process  and  the
consensual character of the discussions  have  prevented radical discourses310.  Third, the relatively
limited attendance (usually below 2000) and  awareness have limited the participation to a small
number of organisations, whose work is closely related to Internet governance. These organisations
are generally headed by members of the civil society elite that are for the most part supportive of
the status-quo. However, the non-binding character of the forum and its relative openness favoured
the emergence of critical discourses within the IGF more than within the ICANN system. Thus, the
309 See the chairman's summaries of the IGF annual meetings at www.intgovforum.org, last accessed 8 April 2014.  For
example,  the issue was discussed at length in Rio de Janeiro in 2007. 
310 First-time participants are offered an introductory session where the  functioning of the IGF is presented. Many
young participants are funded by the Internet Society through the ISOC ambassador program.
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IGF can be described as a form of institutionalisation of  hegemony and a taming of resistance,
which is necessary for the power elite to be able to exercise its domination in the field. The most
radical actors had been excluded after the ICANN election of 2000 (see chapter 6). During the
Geneva Summit, hackers and hacktivists  held a parallel event.  In Tunis, many local civil society
organisations were quasi-governmental organisations. In a discussion of civil society's participation
in the WSIS, Ralf Bendrath, from the Heinrich Böll Foundation summarised the problem:   
“Civil society has to avoid being drawn too much into the official process and
resist the temptation to replicate the intergovernmental structures. Otherwise, it
will  end  up  with  a  group  of  professional  NGOs  that  are  recognized  by  the
governments, belong to the international conference and policy jet-set, even might
have some influence here  and there,  but are  more or  less decoupled from the
grassroots work and the more radical positions of the broader social movements.
As a  participant  at  the  Berlin  meeting stated,  'multi-stakeholder  processes  are
enabling and including, but also disciplining'”.311
While the concern expressed by Bendrath refers to governments and intergovernmental structures, it
could also be related to the power of the elite in multistakeholder processes. While some NGOs
become part of the “policy jet-set”, more radical movements are excluded. As a result, the existing
order has sometimes been criticised in the IGF, but never in a radical way or by a large number of
organisations and individuals. The situation of the first phase of the WSIS in Geneva, where a deep
and comprehensive challenging of the ICANN system was supported by a majority of participants
never happened again. This is why the Geneva declaration is still seen as the most radical document
on Internet governance, notably because of the intergovernmental nature of the processes described
in the Geneva declaration. The WGIG and the Tunis Agenda are considered more favourable to the
status-quo312. While no document of similar significance for the field of Internet governance has
been drafted after the WSIS, the tone of the discussions currently exclude the repetition of such a
momentum.
Third, and perhaps more importantly, the Tunis Agenda and the creation of the IGF provided the
311 Ralf Bendrath, “Civil Society processes in WSIS Phase II: Adaptation of working methods started, lessons still to
be  learned”,  posted  on  the  Heinrich  Böll  Foundation  website  on  the  WSIS,  available  at
http://www.worldsummit2003.de/en/web/379.htm, last accessed 8 April 2014. Quoted in (Raboy, Landry, & Shtern,
2010, p. 84). 
312 This reference is present in the Internet Governance Caucus mailing-list discussion, see for example the e-mail by
Wolfgang Kleinwächter  on 19 January 2013, where he states  “If you read carefully the references in  the ITU
documents than they go back to the Geneva 2003 declaration which gives the governments the "only" role to decide
on public policy issues related to the Internet by just "consulting" non-governmental stakeholders. This approach
ignores widely the WGIG report and the Tunis Agenda which goes beyond Geneva and proposed "shared" policy
development and decision making procedures.”
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basis for a broader support to the status-quo. The WSIS was a large and open UN meeting. The
recognition  by  the  WSIS of  the  existing  system of  Internet  governance  was  an  unprecedented
legitimisation of the ICANN system. While the ICANN had been criticised for its lack of legitimacy
because of the process that led to its creation, the WSIS involved all member-states of the ITU, a
number  of  intergovernmental  representatives,  a  large  civil  society  participation  and  an  active
business input mechanism. Moreover, the WSIS process lasted over two years. All of the possible
options and discourses were represented during the WSIS, even if the structural domination of the
power elite and the doxa of the field prevented any substantial change. The ICANN system and the
power elite were strengthened and legitimised by the Summit. While legitimacy had been an issue
for the power elite since the creation of the ICANN and unresolved by the 2002 ICANN reform, the
WSIS generated a positive view of the ICANN. Redeemed from its original sin, the ICANN is now
considered by some people an example of a legitimate institution, more than the WSIS or the ITU
(Take, 2012). The WSIS thus affected the relationship between the power elite and non-elites in the
field. The WSIS gave the institutions of Internet governance more visibility. Instead of a relatively
small but very polarised field, the WSIS gave birth to a larger field with more legitimate institutions
and a with broader base of non-elite actors accepting the existing order as a starting point for further
discussions. Internet users amounted to one billion at the end of the WSIS313, almost 20 thousand
individuals attended the Tunis summit, which main issue was Internet governance. Compared with
the less than 150 million users314 and less than a thousand individuals involved at the time of the
creation of the ICANN, the field of Internet governance had evolved considerably and had become
an important  sub-field of telecommunication governance.  The endorsement by the WSIS of the
existing governance system was thus an important step in the maturation of the field.
Finally, the WSIS process perpetuated and reinforced the institutional fragmentation of the field.
While the creation of an overarching institution tackling all issues related to Internet governance
was supported by some participants, the power elite managed to maintain the fragmentation of the
management  of  the  network.  At  the  eve  of  the  WGIG  process,  the  International  Chamber  of
Commerce had produced a matrix of initiatives related to Internet governance in order to show that
most Internet-related policy issues were already addressed315.  The ICC identified three levels of
initiatives:  initiatives  by  national  governments,  by  intergovernmental  organisations  and  by  the
private sector. According to the ICC, most issues were addressed by private initiatives, ranging from
313 According to the Internet World Statistics, available at  http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm, through the
Internet archive for previous years, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
314 See http://www.allaboutmarketresearch.com/internet.htm, last accessed 8 April 2014.
315 Document available at http://www.wgig.org/docs/icc.pdf, last accessed through the Internet Archive 8 April 2014. 
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formal institutions like the ICANN to commercial negotiations among Internet service providers;
Intergovernmental organisations as diverse as the ITU, the OECD, the WTO, the WIPO, the Council
of Europe and other regional organisations were involved depending on the issue. Moreover, each
issue also relied on a  national legislation.  As repeatedly stated by the ICC representatives,  this
complex matrix was sufficient and more appropriate than “top-down governance”. The WSIS did
little  to  change the  situation.  It  added an Internet  Governance  Forum encompassing all  policy-
related issues and started a process towards enhanced cooperation between all these actors.  The
fragmentation of governance prevented any democratic control of the management of the network.
In spite of the pluralism that such fragmentation could have implied, the power elite was able to
circulate and to act as brokers between the various institutions. The circulation of different elites
between institutions is illustrated in table 8.2. Moreover, the Internet Governance Forum became the
main institution that organised a civil society elite (see next section). The lack of a “one-stop shop”
for Internet governance – as it was sometimes referred to during the WSIS –  multiplied the need for
resources to be able to follow Internet governance issues. It also prevented cross-issue mobilisation,
as witnessed during the first  phase of the WSIS. The institutional fragmentation of the field of
Internet governance has, thus, been instrumental for the power elite to maintain its power. Similarly,
the multiplication of forums and events has strengthen the position of the specialised civil-society
elite that became an important part of the power elite. The rhetorical separation between technical
and political issues is related to the creation of two specialised elites: the managing and the civil-
society elite. However, as the next section shows, the specialisation of fractions of the power elite
does not undermine its cohesion and the two elites are usually able to circulate between different
bodies of the same institutions, and in multistakeholder groups and events. 
8.2.2. Specialised elites in the power elite
The reconfiguration of the power elite resulted from the empowerment of a specialised civil-society
elite,  participating  in  the  increasingly numerous institutions of  the  field.  The  civil-society elite
joined the already existing power elite of technical experts, business representatives and of political
elite individuals working for powerful governments.
The power elite that unified around the project of the ICANN system in the late 1990s participated
in  the  WSIS  through  institutions  like  the  International  Chamber  of  Commerce,  the  World
Information and Telecommunication Service Alliance, the Internet Society, the Internet Engineering
TaskForce,  the  regional  registries,  the  ICANN  and  the  supporting  governments.  Most  of  the
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individuals that represented these institutions during the WSIS have a profile that is similar to the
profile  of  most  Internet  governance  elite  in  the  1990s.  They  have  backgrounds  in  network
engineering  or  intellectual  property  law,  they advised  or  served  as  civil  servants  for  dominant
governments, worked in telecommunication or computer manufacturing firms and held important
positions in the ICANN system.
Table 8.2 presents biographical information of some examples of very active WGIG participants in
order to analyse circulation among the power elite316. It focuses on three type of circulation that are
characteristic of the power elite: the national/transnational, the public/private and the institutional
circulations. 
The circulation between domestic organisations and international activities is a pattern that can be
found for all specialised elites. Earlier affiliation to powerful institutions in their home country is an
asset for individuals that become powerful in a transnational field. The combination of national
capital  – all  of  the  examples shown in the table are  from OECD countries –  and international
experience seems to be a common background of the power elite.
The mix of public-sector and private-sector experience is common to technical and political elites.
The technical-scientific elite often relies on public funding for its research. They are sometimes
affiliated with public universities. Political elite with private sector experience were likely to be
more comfortable in the field of privatised Internet governance than lifetime civil servants. On the
other hand, the business elite does not generally need experience in the public sector.
More important to our definition of a power elite is the circulation between institutions of Internet
governance.  Members  of  the  power  elite  tend  to  represent  their  organisations  in  a  variety  of
Internet-related forums. This is illustrated by the relatively small number of different participants in
conferences, panels, expert groups and decision-making bodies of Internet governance. They also
circulate chronologically between institutions. Most individuals have experience both in the ICANN
system,  and  in  the  WSIS/IGF circles.  Technical  bodies  also  have  more  political  positions  (for
example the board of trustees of the regional Internet Registries) that allow for non-technical elites
to participate in their management. Technical elites are included in political forums based on their
316 Sources  for  the  biographical  information  include  www.netcaucus.org,  www.linkedin.com,  www.wileyrein.com/,
www.icannwiki.com;  www.wikipedia.com,  www.icann.org,  www.vanityfair.com,  www.cs.auckland.ac.nz,
www.internetsociety.org,  www.intgovforum.org,  www.ripe.net,  www.Intgov.net,  www.cyberlaw.harvard.edu,
www.muguet.com,  www.ietf.org,  www.iab.org,  www.wgig.org,  and  Steele  (2007),  Mueller  (2002),  Mathiason
(2008), Drake (2005).
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“hands-on” knowledge of the Internet. As a result, there are no purely technical or purely political
institutions headed by different specialised elites but rather a combination of different specialised
elites in each Internet governance institution. 
Table  8.2  illustrates  the  interchangeability  of  the  elite  as  described  by  Wright  Mills.  A board
member  of  a  “technical”  organisation  such as  the  ICANN can be a  former representative of  a
government during the WSIS that later created an NGO participating to the Internet governance
Forum.  He can then use his  experience  and network to  work for  a  large  transnational  Internet
company. The multiple affiliations of elite members and their circulation among institutions of the
field  of  Internet  governance  are  the  two  elements  of  what  Wright  Mills  described  as  an
interchangeable power elite. 
314
Table 8.2. Elite profiles during the WSIS: specialised elites and circulation317 
317  Author's elaboration from a number of biographical sources on 14 randomly-selected individuals with criteria such
as important participation in the WGIG process, and diversity in terms of geography, gender and type of specialised
elite. The purpose of the table is to highlight certain features that are common to several members of specialised
elites or of the power elite. This method is inspired by critical prosopography. However, it is does not intend to be a
315
comprehensive prosopographical approach.
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The members of the original power elite of Internet governance were joined during the WSIS by
other members with different backgrounds. Some of these new members were originally members
of counter-elites but were satisfied by the evolution of Internet governance and the possibility of
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their increased participation. They can be described as a specialised civil-society elite since they
entered  the  field  of  Internet  governance  through  the  policy  discussions  rather  than  from  the
technical management of the network or its commercial exploitation. Similarly to the political elite
of dominant states in the 1990s, the civil-society elite became involved in an already structured field
and found their place in the institutional framework of the field. However, they differ from the
political elite because they draw upon their expertise and networks to exercise their power on an
individual basis while the political elite relies on national institutions and is more dependent on
institutional  structures  and  more  subject  to  change.  For  example,  the  employees  of  the  US
Department of Commerce change,  the personnel of the European Commission DGXIII as well.
However, these institutions remain important. The same phenomenon is true for the business elite
that circulate among different firms and even sectors.  Political and business elites tend to be have
more stable career paths. Their circulation amongst Internet governance institutions is generally due
to the fact that they represent their organisation in most Internet governance-related forums. This is
why they can be influential at the WSIS, at the IGF, at ICANN, at the ITU and the OECD at the
same  time.  On  the  contrary,  the  civil-society  elite  circulates  over  time  between  forums  and
institutions.  More than the organisations they represent, they remains  influential on an individual
basis. Sometimes, they even represent their own consulting firm or NGO. This is characteristic of
an individualisation of civil society.  It can be argued that such elite already existed to a certain
extent  in  the  1990s  since  some  US-based  civil  liberties  organizations  participated  in  the  early
debates on Internet governance (see chapter 5). However, the WSIS can be seen as the date of birth
of  a  transnational  civil  society of  Internet  governance.  Moreover,  the  fragmentation of  Internet
governance, the multiplication of policy forums and the increased need of experts exacerbated its
importance. Some examples of individual profiles illustrate the composition of this new fraction of
the power elite.
In spite of their different backgrounds and sources of power, members of the specialised technical
elite, lawyers' elite, business elite and civil-society elite gather in several forums like the Internet
Governance  Forum, some bodies of  the  ICANN, OECD and UN working groups and regional
forums.  The  distinction  between  different  specialised  elite  is,  like  in  Wright  Mills'  work,  an
analytical differentiation that prevent arguments about a pre-existing unified elite. It is through the
socialisation in the various forums and through political processes like the WSIS that the different
specialised elite exchange their view and reach consensual agreement on the preservation of their
domination. The frequent meetings of members of the power elite, the discussions about political
processes  contribute  to  maintain  an  ideological  coherence  and  a  shared  political  agenda.  The
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socialisation and exchange of ideas took place for several years mainly within the ICANN and in
the Internet Society.  By the end of the WSIS, the fragmentation of Internet governance offered
many forums for the power elite; some of them were narrow in scope, some of them generic, some
of them were targeting a specialised elite like the technical one, others became broad forums for
dialogue  between  specialised  elites.  Against  this  background,  the  ICANN  was  not  the  central
institution of Internet governance any more, the Internet Governance Forum, in spite of its lack of
decision-making powers, can be seen as the main socialisation platform for the elite. 
8.2.3. The field of Internet governance at the end of the WSIS
The  WSIS is  an  important  stage  in  the  genesis  and institutionalisation  of  the  field  of  Internet
governance. This section provides an overview of the structure of the field at the end of the WSIS,
whose understanding is crucial to analyse current power struggles and the respective positions of
the  power  elite  and  emerging  powers  in  the  field  (see  chapter  9).  First,  the  most  important
institutional change in the field since the creation of the ICANN is the creation of the Internet
Governance Forum. Second, it is interesting to look at the general evolution of the power elite in the
mid-2000s. Finally, I argue that the notion of field is still relevant after the WSIS in spite of the
fragmentation of the field. 
As we have seen,  the Internet  Governance Forum was designed during the WGIG process and
endorsed in the Tunis Agenda. It has been argued here that, much like the ICANN in the 1990s, the
Internet Governance Forum was more a hegemonic project of the power elite than an institution
aiming  at  the  reconciliation  of  the  positions  of  the  power  elite  and  the  counter-elites.  In  this
perspective, the IGF is an attempt by the power elite to address the weaknesses of the ICANN and
to enhance the consensual aspect of its domination by institutionalising the interactions of civil
society.  Seven years  after  its  creation,  it  can be  argued  that  the  IGF has  played  the  role  of  a
hegemonic institution rather than a place for dialogue and experimentation of new ideas. 
The purpose of the IGF was first evidenced by the funding of the organisation. The IGF is funded
by a trust fund, and each year by the host country of the annual meeting. The original contributors
to  the  trust  fund  included  dominant  states,  mostly  European  (Finland,  Switzerland,  United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Japan, Norway and the EU); Internet registries (Nominet UK, SWITCH,
Afilias,  Number  Resource  Organization,  Uninett  Norid,  AuDA,  Verisign,  ccTLD  RU,  Nic.at);
telecommunication operators (Verizon, AT&T); other IT firms and business associations (Siemens,
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CISCO,  Nikkei  DigitalCORE,  CommunityDNS);  consultancy  firms  (Summit  Strategies
International,  MCADE  LLC);  the  Internet  Society  and  the  ICANN318.  Most  of  these  funders
participated in the WSIS as supporters of the status-quo. 
The debates held at the IGF have been consensual. The affiliation of key speakers to the power elite,
the  exclusion  of  most  radical  actors  and  the  tone  of  the  discussions  has  prevented  heterodox
discourses  about  Internet  governance319.  Some  IGF  participants,  both  elite  and  non-elite,  are
beginning to question the model. Kieren McCarthy identified 5 main problems in the functioning of
the IGF:
“1. False rationales and unquestioned assumptions are used to drive decisions and
reinforce the status quo
2.An  over-reliance  on  self-reporting  and  a  total  lack  of  systemic  information
gathering and objective analysis leads to group-think 
3. An  inward  focus  and  constant  but  largely  unconscious  effort  to  remove
effective participation from outsiders stifles innovation
4. An  over-staffed,  voluntary  advisory  group  combined  with  an  under-staffed
executive team means no real operational improvements are possible
5. The lack of either a carrot or a stick in driving change favours repetition over
improvement”320
This  was  summarised  by  one  IGF  participant  as  “navel  gazing”321.  However,  this  perspective
remains marginal and most of the IGF participants are still  enthusiastic about the forum. If the
weaknesses of the IGF as a hegemonic project start to appear after seven years of existence, it has
been a major institutional change that favoured the power elite. As the following table (8.3) shows,
the IGF addressed the main weaknesses of the ICANN as a hegemonic project and helped stabilise
the domination of the power elite. 
318 See http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/funding, last accessed  8 April 2014. Since the extension of the IGF beyond
the original 5-year mandate, new donors include NIC-Mexico, Google, Walt Disney Co., CGI.Br, and Amazon.
Most of the funding is provided by European governments and the European Commission. 
319 This  statement  is  corroborated  by  the  archive  available  at  www.intgovforum.org,  as  well  as  by  the  author's
participation in the preparatory process and the annual meeting of the IGF held in November 2010 in Vilnius. 
320 Kieren  McCarthy,  “Living  in  a  Talk-shop  bubble”, .nxt,  28  February  2013,  available  at  http://news.dot-
nxt.com/2013/02/28/living-talk-shop-bubble, last accessed 8 April 2014.
321 E-mail by Ian Peter to the Internet Governance Caucus mailing-list, 1 March 2013. 
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Hegemonic project 1.0: The ICANN
(1998)
Hegemonic Project 2.0: The IGF
(2005)
Exercise of
domination
-  direct  management  of  critical  Internet
resources
- socialisation of actors, perpetuation of the
field's orthodoxy
Process of elite
unification
-  involvement  of  technical,  business,  law,
and political elite around a shared neoliberal
project (formation of a power elite)
-  socialisation,  networking  within  and
among  'stakeholder  groups'  (perpetuation
and evolution of the power elite)
Consensual
character
-  expertise  and  efficiency,  perspective  of
future openness and transparency
- openness, informal character, no decision-
making
Weaknesses
-  lack  of  legitimacy,  participation  and
transparency  (elitist  character),  limited
'technical' scope
- loss of impetus, by-passing by emerging
powers (see chap.9)
Table 8.3. A comparison of two hegemonic projects in the field of Internet governance
The WSIS marked the reconfiguration of the power elite. As we have seen, some counter-elite were
co-opted in a more inclusive project. Some evolutions of the power elite are worth noting. As we
have seen, the power elite was joined by a civil-society elite coming mostly from universities and
civil society organisations. The main concerns of this new fringe of the elite were social  issues
rather  than technical,  juridical,  or business ones.  The evolution changed to a certain extent  the
composition of the power elite. First, the power elite became more internationalised, since many
Europeans, but also some non-OECD actors were affiliated with the civil-society elite. Second, the
gender balance changed to a limited extent. Women were excluded from the technical elite. They
also tend to be less represented in governmental delegations and in top-level business positions.
Again, the enhanced importance of the civil-society elite increased the number of women in elite
positions in  the field,  while  establishing a  gendered division of  labour322.  The power elite  also
witnessed the enhanced role of larger scale organisations. Rather than individual firms and NGOs,
business associations and networks of NGOs played a more important role. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  power  elite  is  not  an  undifferentiated  block,  there  are  power
differentials and competition among specialised elites. It is only in key moment in the history of the
field that the power elite unite beyond the differences among its fractions and members to defend its
domination over the field. As Wright Mills put it: 
“There is a mutual attraction among those people who 'sit at the same terrace' –
although this often becomes clear to them, as well as to others, only at the point at
322 Decision-making and standardisation bodies are dominated by males from OECD countries while dialogue and
non-binding forums are more geographically and gendered balanced. Some figures can be found in chap. 9.  
321
which they feel the need to draw the line; only when, in their common defence,
they come to understand what they have in common, and so close their ranks
against outsiders” (Wright Mills, 2000, p. 11)
This is why the above argument about a power elite might seem exaggerated with regards to the
day-to-day interactions in the field of Internet governance. However, the unification of the power
elite appeared clearly at the time of the creation of the ICANN as well as during the WSIS. After the
WSIS, power differentials between the technical, business, and part of the political elite on the one
side and the civil-society elite  on the other side re-appeared.  The more open and diverse civil-
society elite does not participate directly in the management of the Internet even if their contribution
in the realm of discourses and ideas is crucial. Against this background, the evolution of the power
elite towards the inclusion of more women, of more individuals from outside OECD countries, of
more individuals affiliated with civil society organisations, of more non-dominant social forces in
general,  must  be put into perspective.  The evolution of the power elite  occurs for a large part
towards the margins of the power elite. Yet, the general defence of the status-quo against counter-
elites during the WSIS has been nuanced in further developments of the field, with a somewhat
more progressive and reformist civil-society elite. 
The  creation  of  the  IGF  and  the  reconfiguration  of  the  civil-society  elite  participated  in  the
extension of the frontiers of the field to include more policy-related issues and to its institutional
fragmentation. Unlike sometimes broader international fields, Internet governance has no central
institution.  The  governance  of  the  network  is  fragmented  and  many  organisations  and  forums
matter. As we have seen in the previous section, the power elite is able to circulate between these
forums and organisations. Some key historical moments allow for the power elite to unite and to
present a coherent discourse and political agenda. Since the WSIS, the fragmentation has prevailed.
However, the  doxa, and more precisely the multistakeholder model, have permeated most of the
institutions  of  the  field,  and  even  some  institutions  created  outside  the  field.  In  spite  of  the
institutional fragmentation, the existence of common stakes, a common power elite, and a common
power struggle within civil society evidences the perpetuation of a transnational field of Internet
governance. 
The main issues at stake during the WSIS, and the main social forces that struggled around these
issues still structure the field of Internet governance. The genesis and reconfiguration of a power
elite of Internet governance in the 1990s and 2000s has been described in the previous chapters.
Since no major politicisation of the field occurred in the last 8 years, the power elite remains. The
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concluding chapter will explore the perspectives of change by focusing on emerging powers within
the field. The two counter-elites identified in this chapter were not satisfied by the outcome of the
WSIS. Thus, the stability of the field was not achieved beyond a short-term relief of the tensions.
Much  like  in  the  aftermaths  of  the  creation  of  the  ICANN,  the  field  of  Internet  governance
witnessed  a  “minimal  hegemony”  (Cafruny  &   Ryner,  2007)  rather  than  the  unchallenged
domination of a power elite over a mass society, as described by Wright Mills (see chap. 5). The
ongoing debates about  the frontiers of the field and between orthodox and heterodox positions
evidence the dynamic character of the field. 
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Chapter 9 : Conclusions. The field of Internet governance after 
the WSIS
The analysis of the history of Internet governance from the a perspective combining international
political sociology  and international political economy allows for two types of conclusions. First,
the research presents a picture of the field of Internet governance informed by its evolution since its
emergence. Against the dominant pluralist account of the history of Internet governance, the thesis
has  shown the  emergence  and  evolution  of  a  power  elite  of  Internet  governance.  Second,  the
research contributes to the literature on globalisation studies with its meso-level and differentiated
account of globalisation dynamics and its focus on powerful actors. The focus on actors avoids the
structuralist tendency of critical approaches and present a dynamic and differentiated approach to
transnational power.  Finally, the research presented in this  thesis helps us to understand current
evolutions in the field of Internet governance, their origins, and some possible futures for the field.
The history of Internet governance as presented in the previous chapters results from a number of
dialectical relationships between for example elites and counter-elites and with neighbouring field.
As a result, the relative stability of the field in the last 10 years cannot be understood as a stable
order but rather as a precarious balance of forces that is likely to change in the coming years. The
analysis  of  the  history  of  Internet  governance  provides  a  different  perspective  on  current
developments in the field. The following sections analyse the status of the main elements outlined
in the theoretical framework in order to describe Internet governance in the period that followed the
WSIS. First, the structure of the field after the WSIS is described as a space of domination of a
transnational  power  elite  and  as  an  expanding  transnational  space  of  interactions.  Second,  the
dynamics of order and change in the field after the WSIS are described as a dynamic relationship
among elites, between elites and non-elites and also between the field of Internet governance and
other fields in the global field of power. Finally, the evolutionary perspective on the field of Internet
governance is used in order to outline possible evolutions from the current situation on Internet
governance, by drawing upon the discourses and coalitions of actors that have emerged in the last
twenty years of Internet governance debates. 
9.1. The structure of the field of Internet governance after the WSIS
The history of the field of Internet governance as presented in this study, can be interpreted in two
ways. First, it can be seen as the emergence of a field, and the emergence of a power elite associated
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to this field. In this case, the different crisis and institutional as well as elite reconfigurations are
steps  towards  a  more  stable  transnational  field.  Or,  it  can  be  viewed  as  a  case-study  of  a
transnational field, which would be inherently weak and unstable because of its transnational nature
(For an introduction to the concept of “weak fields”, see Topalov, 1999; Vauchez, 2008, 2011). This
section argues that  the twenty years of history analysed in this study are best interpreted as the
gradual emergence of a transnational field323. The two main reasons for this interpretation are the
consolidation of a power elite over the years, and the definition of frontiers for the field.
9.1.1. The transnational power elite of Internet governance after the 
WSIS
The power elite of Internet governance emerged in the 1990s. It was last re-configured during the
WSIS in 2005. The power elite is currently constituted of a number of specialised elites, affiliated to
different  institutions  and  relying  on  different  sources  of  power  (or  forms  of  capital).  These
specialised elites  integrated gradually the  power elite,  but  no reconfiguration has  represented a
revolutionary change within the elite. In order to understand the relative stability of the power elite
it is important to map specialised elites and summarise how they unite to form a power elite. While
it is argued here that this process is best understood as a process of power elite consolidation rather
than a history of ad hoc and temporary coalition, the limits of elite power is also discussed.
Mapping specialised elites in the field of Internet Governance 
While Wright Mills identified three main specialised elites that formed the power elite in the post-
WW2  US  society  (military,  business  and  political  elites),  the  present  study  shows  that  the
transnational power elite of Internet governance at the end of the World Summit on the Information
Society includes four specialised elites. These elites are presented in the form of a Venn diagram in
figure 9.1324.
323 The weakness of the field is here understood as a transitory state that presents some similarities with the case of 
emerging colonial states as described by Steinmetz (2008, quoted in Vauchez, 2011). 
324 Venn  diagrams are used for example by Domhoff in order to map specialised elites within the power elite. See
“Who rules America?” available at www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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Figure 9.1. The transnational power elite of Internet governance
Each of the specialised elites can be described in an ideal-typical way as being affiliated to certain
types of institutions; to rely on a specific form of capital as source of power and of legitimacy; and
to have joined the power elite at a precise moment. More detailed illustrations are to be found in
chapter 5 and 8, where examples of individuals pertaining to these specialised elites are described
with prosopographical  elements.  These profiles  are  summarised in  table  9.1.  The circulation of
elites and the multiple-hat phenomenon makes this classification overly simplistic. However, the
description in terms of specialised elites highlights the process of elite unification and avoids any
deterministic perspective on the existence of a single elite (see chapter 3). 
Specialised elite Affiliation Specific form of capital Addition to the powerelite
Technical-scientific elite
Internet Society, IETF,
Regional Internet
Registries, universities
(computer science), etc.
Scientific capital Managed the Internet fromthe start
Business elite
Internet companies,
Telcos, software and
hardware companies, etc.
Financial capital
Involved in the
commercialisation of the
Internet in the early 1990s
Policy elite
Governments,
Intergovernmental
organisations, etc.
Political capital
Debates of the 1990s for
dominant actors (OECD
governments, WIPO, EU,
WTO...)
Civil Society elite
Civil society organisations,
consultancy firms,
universities (social
sciences, law), acting on
their individual capacity,
etc.
Social capital
Debates of the 1990s for
the most established
members (mostly from the
US), WSIS for most recent
members
Table 9.1. Specialised elites in the field of Internet governance
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In  his  farewell  address  to  the  American  people  in  1961,  US President  Dwight  D.  Eisenhower
warned about the possible acquisition of unwarranted influence by the military-industrial complex
(Eisenhower, 1961). This phrase became widely used by elite sociologists, foreign policy analysts
and international relations scholars. But Eisenhower also mentioned another threat to pluralism: the
emerging “scientific-technological elite” that might capture public policy processes.  As we have
seen in chapter 4, the first years of Internet governance epitomised this kind of technocracy. A small
number of computer scientists managed the Internet without much external control. They managed
to remain autonomous from the field of telecommunication and to design institutions such as the
Internet Society and the IETF to govern the early Internet.  The commercialisation of the network
and  the  repeated  political  debates  about  Internet  governance  changed  the  situation  and  other
specialised elites started to play an important role in Internet governance. This process is described
at length in chapter 5. However, the power of the scientific-technological elite remained important
in  Internet  governance.  Technically-oriented  organisations  continue  to  be  key  actors  in  the
management of the network. Organisations such as the Internet Society, the Internet engineering
TaskForce,  the  five  Regional  Internet  Registries,  or  to  a  lesser  extent  the  World  Wide  Web
Consortium are represented in every initiative related to Internet governance and are often leading
such initiatives325. Even though battles around domain names do not have the same impact today
than they had in the 1990s, the ICANN remains at the heart of the Internet governance system. The
ICANN is not exclusively a technical institution  managed by the scientific-technological elite but
the board is still populated with members of this specialised elite. Several technical bodies of the
ICANN such as the Root Server System Advisory Committee, the Security and Stability Committee
or  even the  Domain  Name  Council  are  still  in  the  hands  of  the  scientific-technical  elite.  The
technical-scientific elite originally followed the pattern of a scientific field, with positions in the
field  determined  by  the  accumulation  scientific  capital.  The  evolution  of  the  elite  entailed  a
hybridisation and an increased importance of other forms of capital. However, scientific education,
technical  knowledge  of  the  network,  and  experience  in  technical  operations  related  to
internetworking are still a crucial asset of the technical-scientific elite.  The particular role of the
technical-scientific elite explains why the dominant imaginary of the field in the 1990s contained
not  only  elements  of  the  neoliberal  ideology  but  also  elements  of  cyber-libertarianism  (see
chapter 5).
The business elite  entered the field of Internet governance around the commercialisation of the
325 See for example the Montevideo statement on the future of Internet cooperation, 7 February 2013, available at
www.icann.org, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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network  in  1992.  It  is  not  completely  distinct  from  the  scientific-technological  elite  since
telecommunication  companies  and  Internet  companies  massively  hired  “Internet  pioneers”  to
manage  Internet-related  issues.  The  business  elite  was  very  influential  in  the  creation  of  the
ICANN, especially with companies like IBM and through the Global Internet Project (see chapter
5). While the members of the business elite represent competing firms, they agree on some core
issues  related  to  Internet  governance  such  as  self-regulation,  the  promotion  of  market-led
mechanisms, and the protection of Intellectual Property Rights online. The composition of this elite
changed  over  the  years.  The  business  elite  included  primarily  hardware  manufacturers  and
telecommunication firms in the 1990s. With the growth of online business, Internet companies such
as  PayPal,  Amazon,  Google,  Facebook  and  the  like  now represent  a  driving  force  in  Internet
governance. In spite of the tensions between content-producers and carriers that are evidenced in
conflicts  such  as  the  debate  on  network  neutrality,  a  business  elite  specialising  on  Internet
governance  has  emerged,  notably  through  the  International  Chamber  of  Commerce.  Other
influential  representatives  of  the  business  elite  include  the  World  Information  Technology  and
Service  Alliance,  norms consortia such as the World Wide Web Consortium, and other  ad hoc
coalitions  of  corporate  interests. This  elite  holds  the  financial  capital  that  is  necessary  for  the
Internet economy to thrive.  They used this capital to be influential in several forums such as the
WSIS (see chapter 7 and 8) and more economic forums like the WTO and the OECD. In the years
after  the  WSIS,  the  business  elite  has  become  the  most  visible  elite  in  the  field  of  Internet
governance.  This lead to  a  situation where  a  popular  perception  of  Internet  governance is  that
Google rules the Internet. While the power of the business elite should not be underestimated, it is
only in conjunction to other specialised elites that the business elite is able to create a governance
system that is accepted and reproduced by the majority.
The policy elite includes the most powerful actors of a broad  institutional setting. They are the
representatives  of  governments  and  intergovernmental  organisations  specialising  in  Internet
governance. The policy elite does not include governments as a whole, but only those actors within
governments that are able to act in transnational settings related to Internet governance. This is for
example the case of the US National Telecommunication and Information Administration of the US
Department  of  Commerce,  the  US Federal  Communications  Commission,  the  European
Commission  Directorate  General  for  Communications  Networks,  Contents  and  Technology
(formerly  DG XIII),  and  ministries  of  telecommunications  from  a  number  of  powerful  states.
Intergovernmental organisations such as the OECD, the Council of Europe, WIPO, the WTO and
the ITU are also active in Internet governance and have some staff exclusively affected to the issue.
328
The policy elite rely on political capital,  understood as a form of symbolic capital based on the
credit given to a person or to an organisation in the form of socially recognised power (Bourdieu,
1981). This form of capital is not exclusive to the policy elite since it is by definition necessary to
exercise power. However, this is the form of capital that is specific and most important to these
individuals and organisations that are here defined as belonging to the policy elite. The policy elite
participated in Internet governance at least since the 1990s and was successful in taking the leading
roe in the creation of the ICANN system, as described in chapter 5. The first emergence of the
policy elite was limited to  US organisations, some very specific intergovernmental organisations
that  were  believed  to  be  essential  to  the  functioning of  the  network  and  to  some  European,
Australian and Japanese actors. As we have seen in chapter 6, this geographically-limited elite was
reconfigured in the early 2000s and during the WSIS to include some representatives of emerging
countries and of some generalist intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations326.
In  the  1990s,  only  the  three  specialised  elites  described  above  formed  the  power  elite.  They
designed an institutional base for their power in the field along the lines of a consensual discourse.
This  discourse  relied  heavily  on  neoliberal  premises,  but  it  also  contained  elements  of  cyber-
libertarianism and to a lesser extent of a global public good discourse. Moreover, the power elite
emerged as the result  of the interchangeability of the members of the elite. As analysed in the
following section, elites circulated among different types of institutions over the last years of the
1990s. They were also affiliated to several political, economic and technical institutions at the same
time. However, the consent to their power was limited among non-elites and the ICANN failed as a
hegemonic project.  The field entered into a crisis that led notably to the reconfiguration of the
power elite, to  the creation of new institutions,  and to  the emergence of a renewed hegemonic
imaginary (see below, section 9.2).
The civil society elite was the main beneficiary of the reconfiguration of the power elite during the
WSIS. The civil society elite  was excluded from the debates of the 1990s (see chapter 5).  This is
why the civil society elite can be considered as a counter-elite until the WSIS. The civil society
elite,  organised  around mostly  US-based civil  society organisations and social  science  and law
department and centres was very critical of the ICANN system. As explored in chapter 6, it pushed
for a reform since the early years of the ICANN. The counter-elite was powerful outside the field of
Internet governance, especially through elite  US universities and their connections to members of
the  US power elite. As a result,  it  became the key target  of the successive reforms of Internet
governance in the 2000s. First, the ICANN reform of 2002 opened spaces for the representation of
326 For example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has been invovled since the
mid-2000, when the Internet Governance Forum was also created. 
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the civil society elite within the ICANN. An At-Large Community was created. There are currently
140  local  organizations  in  the  At-Large  community.  An  At-Large  Committee  represent  these
organizations within the ICANN. This is the most important place where the civil society elite is to
be  found in  the  ICANN system. Similarly,  technical  bodies  opened  up to  members  from civil
society. This is for example the case of the Regional Internet Registries boards. After the WSIS, the
creation of the IGF and its numerous related organisations offered a new space for the transnational
civil  society  elites.  For  example,  the  Multistakeholder  Advisory  Committee  of  the  Internet
Governance Forum is an important organisational platform for this elite. Apart from some scholars
from US elite universities, most of the members of the civil society elite do not rely on affiliations
to powerful organisation to exercise their power. Chapter 8 describes the integration of this specific
elite into the power elite.  It should be noted that civil society elite are usually not affiliated with
large generalist NGOs and have a different focus and agenda from generalist NGOs specialising for
example in development and Human Rights. They mostly rely on social capital and scientific capital
acquired mainly in law and social sciences.  They are an essential element of the power elite since
the WSIS. Most of the multistakeholder rhetoric and the claims for representativeness depend on the
inclusion of the civil society elite.
This presentation in terms of specialised elites that is useful to characterise members of the power
elite,  should  not  be  confused  with  the  mainstream  pluralist  vision.  Specialised  elites  do  not
correspond to stakeholder theory for two main reasons. First, specialised elites describe specificities
of dominant actors in the field of Internet governance. They do not imply any type of representation
of  a  possible  constituency or  stakeholder  group (For  a  discussion in  a  different  issue-area,  see
Ruwet, 2010). Stakeholder groups are not useful analytical categories in transnational governance.
There is no  organised “technical community”, or “civil society” with shared interests and visions
that could be represented in  decision-making bodies (see chapter 5). However, at the elite level,
differences can be described with regards to what the sources of power of each specialised elite are
as a way to analyse the unification of the power elite from a priori different elite groups. Second,
there is no pluralism in Internet governance. The existence of a power elite  rules out pluralism.
Stakeholder  groups can only exist  in  a  pluralist  environment,  where they compete  to  influence
policies. However, the present research has evidenced the interchangeability of the members of the
power elite  (important institutions in the field like the ICANN gather  members of all specialised
elites). It has also highlighted the shared ideational elements that constitutes the ideological cement
of a single power elite. 
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The power elite of Internet governance
Wright Mills defines a power elite as "those political, economic, and military circles, which as an
intricate  set  of  overlapping small  but  dominant  groups share decisions  having at  least  national
consequences. Insofar as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them”
(Wright Mills, 2000). The specialised elites of Internet governance form a power elite because they
fulfil the two criteria defined by Wright Mills: interchangeability and ideological cohesion.  These
two criteria have been tested through a number of mixed methods often used in elite sociology.
Interchangeability  has  been tested  through the  analysis  of  affiliation  networks  and  through the
identification of elite profiles from prosopographical elements. Ideological cohesion has been tested
in several key moments in the history of the field through critical discourse analysis and a social
network analysis including statements, individuals and organisations. 
Members  of  the  power  elite  are  interchangeable.  They circulate  from one position  to  another,
regardless of their original affiliation to a certain type of institution and to a certain specialised elite.
For example, a member of the civil society elite represent a civil society organisation based on her
knowledge of freedom of expression, and then acquire technical knowledge of the functioning of
the network and social capital through her participation to committees and panels. She can then sit
at the board of a Regional Internet Registry. Members of the power elite also wear multiple hats
simultaneously. For example, a computer scientist can work in a university, with funding from the
US Department  of  Defence,  while  advising a  transnational  firm on Internet  governance issues.
Chapter 5 and 8 provide a number of example of such elite trajectories in the field at two different
historical moments: during the 1990s and during the WSIS. This interchangeability results form a
certain ideological proximity (see below) but also from a socialisation process. Elite  circulation
goes back to the early days of the field, when a small elite managed technical as well as political
aspects of the field. They were also hired by companies because of their unique knowledge of the
network. However, as the field evolved and grew in size, the principle of elite interchangeability
remained. One difference is that the original specificities of specialised elites are more marked than
during  the  early  days  of  the  field.  Most  members  of  the  power  elite  do  not  have  a  technical
background in computer networking. The process of elite circulation requires an institutional setting
that  allows  socialisation  and  dialogue  between  specialised  elites.  In  this  context,  the  Internet
Governance Forum created after the WSIS plays a crucial role. It became the most important place
for dialogue and elite socialisation. Caucuses and mailing lists during the preparation process are
important steps towards acceptance of new participants, or for the socialisation that is required for
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elite  circulation.  In  the  case  of  the  civil  society  elite,  new  participants  are  often  trained  by
specialised programmes such as  the DiploFoundation programme on Internet  governance327 and
often funded by the Internet Society328. Some of the trainees (or ambassadors as they are called
when funded by the Internet Society) later hold positions of power in the field. Similar processes
exist for the technical-scientific elite329 and, in a somewhat different form, in the policy and business
elites. This process allows for a certain degree of renewal of the elite while maintaining the same
structure and the same individuals at the top of the hierarchy. 
Ideological  cohesion is  a crucial  element  that allows elite  interchangeability and that prevent  a
competition that would endanger the cohesion of the power elite.  As discussed in chapter 5, the
ideological  cement  of  the  power  elite  was  basically  a  neoliberal  understanding  of  Internet
governance as a market-facilitating enterprise. The dominant discourse relied also heavily on the
cyber-libertarian imaginary of  a  digital  frontier  (in  the  US historical  sense of  the  word)  and a
cyberspace  were social  norms had to  be  re-invented.  The  dominant  discourse also made some
concessions to the global public good concept as a way to include non-US actors, and especially the
policy elite affiliated with intergovernmental organisations and European governments. While the
dominant imaginary made elite cohesion possible, it did not fully take into account the increasingly
broad public affected by Internet governance issue. The dominant imaginary and the newly-created
institutional system around the ICANN did not  reach a  hegemonic status.  Non-US elites (both
policy and business) as well as the civil society elites were left aside. This is why the situation
rapidly evolved into a contested hegemony, as described in chapter 6. The WSIS was an opportunity
to re-build a hegemonic imaginary (Jessop, 2006) in order to reconcile the supporters of the status-
quo and the advocates of change. Multistakeholderism came out as a consensual concept around
which elites could unite and that could be acceptable to non-elites. Indeed, multistakeholderism
represent an alternative to intergovernmental governance. It explicitly offers the opportunity to each
specialised elite  to  be represented in  the  institutions  of  the  field.  This is  why the  stakeholders
defined by the Tunis Agenda correspond to the elites already present in the field: the “technical
community” is a category tailored for the technical-scientific elite, governments, civil society, and
the  private  sector  are  usual  stakeholders  (for  example  in  tripartite  negotiations)  but  they  also
327 A good  example  of  this  kind  of  promotion  is  the  selection  process  for  the  IGF  Multistakeholder  Advisory
Committee within DiploFoundation Internet Governance community. See http://www.diplointernetgovernance.org/,
last accessed 8 April 2014.
328 Internet Society's ambassador programme is described at http://www.internetsociety.org/what-we-do/education-and-
leadership-programmes/next-generation-leaders/igf-ambassadors-programme, last accessed 8 April 2014.
329 Newcomers to ICANN meetings are expected to attend special sessions where they are taught about the functioning
of the ICANN system. Tey also particpate in socialisation activities that include parties and even singing (interview
of a first-time particpant to the ICANN meeting in Buenos Aires, November 2013).  
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correspond to specialised elites in the field of Internet governance. The Tunis Agenda also mentions
the specific role of academics (since they represented an important share of the civil society elite)
and of international organisations. Multistakeholderism was also an interesting concept to build up a
hegemonic  discourse  since  it  echoes  claims of  pluralism,  openness  and  democracy.  The  new
hegemonic imaginary organised around the notion of multistakeholderism still included neoliberal
elements  and  allowed  the  reproduction  of  the  existing  order  with  some  marginal  changes.
Multistakeholderism is still the dominant imaginary in the field of Internet governance. It has been
outside the scope of discussions from the end of the WSIS330.  However,  it  has lost some of its
consensual status since it is increasingly debated in non-elite circles. 
While the power elite is able to promote and to benefit from the creation of hegemonic imaginaries,
the  reproduction  of  these  imaginaries  depend  on  a  certain  degree  of  acceptance  by  non-elites.
Challenge can exist outside the power elite and can foment the emergence of counter-elites (see
section 9.3 on emerging powers in Internet governance). The elitist character of Internet governance
can only appear as legitimate if it is  perceived as the result of democratic and pluralist processes.
Wright Mills analysed the case of the post-WWII  US society where formal  democracy ensured
legitimacy to the power elite. In transnational fields, such formal democracy does not exist and the
acceptance of a given order depends on the construction of a complex imaginary. The association of
the Internet with values such as freedom and equality are key elements in this context. However, the
idea of a struggle between a free Internet and censorship in autocratic regimes might have been
undermined by the Snowden revelations (Greenwald & MacAskill, 2013). Likewise, the perception
of equal participation promoted by Internet tools like Twitter does not rely on strong evidence and is
also fragile (Morozov, 2013). Dissensions might also appear within the elite. There is for example a
tension between US and non-US elites on the redistribution of the benefits of the Internet economy.
These tensions are sometimes expressed like in the debate around network neutrality where  US
content producers are opposed to European carriers. These conflicts are usually settled in a way that
protect  elite  cohesion  but  the  multiplication of  these  conflicts  (for  example  on  privacy)  could
threaten the unity of the power elite. 
The  description  of  the  existence  of  a  transnational  power  elite  of  Internet  governance  is  the
description of a constant process of elite unification and hegemony production. It should not be
confused with accounts of a pre-existing unified elite (or transnational capitalist class) ruling the
330 The nature of multistakeholderism as being beyond debates echoes the notion of doxa developed by Bourdieu. The 
term hegemonic imaginary is used in order to insist on the on-going process of hegemony-production that does not 
rule out a return of the debate on multistakeholderism. 
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Internet. However, the history of Internet governance is not the history of pluralist elite competition.
Through processes of elite unification, elements of elite interchangeability and ideological cohesion,
the structural domination of an elite over the field is secured. 
9.1.2. The boundaries of the field
The history of elite reproduction and reconfiguration takes place not within a fixed social space but
within  an  evolving  field  of  social  relations.  Indeed,  the  boundaries  of  the  field  are  not  pre-
determined  and  fixed.  They  are  affected  by  the  relationship  between  one  field  and  other
neighbouring  fields,  and  by  the  changing  stakes,  actors  and  organising  principles  of  the  field.
Chapter 4 is an attempt to construct the genealogy of the field of Internet governance. Contrary to
some conventional accounts on Internet governance as the result of US power or of a structurally
dominant  neoliberal  ideology,  the  genealogy  of  Internet  governance  as  a  field  stresses  the
emergence of an autonomous field of Internet governance from the hybridization of the field of
computer  networking  science  and  telecommunication  regulation.  Practices  have  been  durably
affected by the history of the field and elements of scientific competition are still common practices
in Internet  governance and theoretical-technical  knowledge of  the network is  still  an important
capital. 
While the definition of Internet governance (and thus the stakes associated with it) was limited to
technical issues in the 1990s, the WSIS sanctioned a broader definition that includes political, social
and economic aspects (WGIG, 2005; WSIS, 2005). The new definition entailed the creation of new
institutions such as  the Internet  Governance  Forum, and the  inclusion of  the civil  society elite
within  the  power  elite.  This  definition  has  been  used  since  the  WSIS  by  most  actors,  even
previously reluctant one. The new definition extended the boundaries of the field. The inclusion of
Internet uses in the definition virtually opened the door for an inclusion of a wide variety of content-
related  issues  in  the  field  of  Internet  governance.  However,  the  field  maintained its  coherence
because some issues were already addressed in other fields that remained autonomous from Internet
governance while the field of Internet governance was structured according to the new definition. 
As discussed in chapter 8, the WSIS divided Internet governance in two sub-domains. First,  the
WSIS  acknowledged  the  existence  of  a  “day-to-day”  “technical  operation”  of  the  network,  as
implemented by existing organisations.  The other broad domain was the Internet-related policy
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issues that were to be treated in organisations such as the Internet Governance Forum as well as on
governmental and intergovernmental levels. This division was also a hierarchisation of the issues.
On the one hand, technical issues related to the Critical Internet Resources such as domain names
and IP addresses. These were to be addressed by semi-privatised transnational organisations like the
ICANN. Addressing these issues requires technical knowledge. As a result,  only the top-tier of
Internet governance elite, that has been socialised in elite circles and has acquired scientific capital
can participate. On the other hand, broader issues are more loosely defined. They are addressed by
non-binding organisation such as the IGF or in settings that are not directly influential in the field of
Internet governance (such as the UN General Assembly). Here, a second-tier elite, including most of
civil society elite that is  excluded from the power elite is able to participate. This division echoes
other structures of domination. Participation to the technical operation of the network requires more
resources in terms of financial capital, expertise and knowledge of the English language and of the
technical jargon. It also echoes gendered stereotypes since day-to-day management of the Internet is
also associated with qualities generally attributed to men, such as technical knowledge of computer
networks (Cooper,  2006;  Vekiri  & Chronaki,  2008).  Participation to  non-binding debates  about
broader issues is more open to non-OECD individuals (with some multilingualism implemented for
example in the IGF, and remote participation for people that are not able to physically attend); and
to women (with skills of dialogue and interest in social consequences of technology being easily
associated with female qualities) (Gurumuthy, Jeet Singh, Mundkur, & Swamy, 2006). Figure 9.2.1
shows that  the  representation  of  OECD and non-OECD nationals  in  the  ICANN board  is  not
becoming more equal.  As a result, 76% of the Board members since the creation of the ICANN
were from OECD countries. Moreover, 90% were educated in OECD countries, and 42% in the
US331. In a similar vein, 92% of the members of the secretariat of the IETF, the Internet Engineering
Steering  Group (IESG),  since  its  creation  were  male332.  These  figures  contrast  with  the  yearly
reports  of  the  Internet  Governance  Forum were  geographical  diversity  and  gender  balance  are
explicitly set as objectives for the organisers.
While the main stake during the first decades of the field was the definition of Internet governance
itself,  the  adoption  of  an  all-encompassing  definition  of  Internet  governance  during  the  WSIS
seemed  to  settle  the  issue.  However,  the  definition  remains  vague  on  the  description  of  the
governance system. The respective roles of states and non-state actors is still open to debate. The
331 Exceptions in place of education include 2 members educated in non-OECD European countries (Bulgaria and
Latvia),  one  member  in  Kenya,  two  members  educated  in  India,  and  two more  in  Brazil.  One  Chinese,  one
Australian, one U.S and one German Board member have no information on their place of education. 
332 The name list is available from http://unctad.org/en/Pages/CSTD/WGEC.aspx, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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definition of Internet governance avoids the issue with a long-debated phrase about stakeholders
acting “in their respective roles” (WSIS, 2005). The limit between technical and policy-related issue
is  not  clear  either.  Actors  have  high  stakes  in  the  inclusion  of  specific  issues  into  day-to-day
technical operation or in their exclusion from the core category of the field. As a result, the vague
definition was useful to settle the crisis. It was instrumental for the creation of a new hegemonic
project by the power elite. But it only displaced the stakes of the field from the definition of Internet
governance to the form taken by its implementation. Five years after its creation, the mandate of the
Internet Governance Mandate was extended in 2010 for another five years but improvements were
expected  (UNGA,  2011,  §16). Non-dominant  actors  begin  to  show  some  sign  of  impatience
regarding the lack of decision-making power of the Forum.  Its  model  is  showing some  loss of
impetus. From a maximum of 2100 participants in Rio in 2007, the turnover was around 2000 for
several years and declined down to 1600 in 2012333.  Current debates about Internet governance
consider the creation of new institutions and a reform of the field (see below sect. 9.3). A struggle
takes place in the ICANN related to the role of the Governmental Advisory Committee.  Purely
technical  organisations  are  less  concerned  by  the  debates,  but  the  over-representation  of  the
technical elite in decision-making bodies is sometimes criticised by civil society organisations334.
Overall, the repartition of tasks among the different  institutions of the field; the  participation to
certain groups to one or the other activity; and the balance between actors are debates that still
structure the struggles of the field. In a related manner, the conditions of representativeness and the
process of selection are also at the heart of the debates.
The boundaries of the field determined in terms of actors are difficult to draw. Virtually 40% of the
world population is affected by Internet governance as users of the Internet (ITU, 2013). Arguably,
the  remaining  60 %  of  the  world  population  are  also  affected  by  the  decisions  of  Internet
governance even if they do not benefit form the use of the network. Their exclusion from Internet
access depends to a certain extent on decisions taken in the field of Internet governance. The factor
of being or not affected by the decisions taken in one particular field is thus not a good way to draw
boundaries to the field. If we take only the individuals and organisations participating actively and
expressively to the struggles around the definition and the implementation of Internet governance,
333 One IGC mailing participants criticized “the thorough analysis of text, placements of commas, and meanings which
may be attributed to words in various languages in all of the various WSIS and post WSIS documents [and] the
decade  of  debates  on  the  true  meaning  of  multistakeholderism,  and  also  on  the  true  meaning  of  enhanced
cooperation.  I  fear  we have  all  become very  inwardly  focused.  This  constant  navel  gazing  may lead  to  total
irrelevance of IGF. Good luck to the MAG in moving us onwards from here. I think we have become rather stuck”,
e-mail to the IGC list, 1 March 2013. 
334 See the thread on “All power should be in the hands of the engineers?”, Internet Governance Caucus mailing list, 
November-December 2013. 
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the boundaries of the field are much more clearly defined. This is why this research considers the
field of Internet governance rather than a vaguely defined field of the Internet. The construction of
networks  of  actors  and  intersubjective  relations  like  participation  to  forums  and  authorship  of
documents are innovative methods in order to map out a field. Because of the difficulty to collect
data  on  the  dispositions  of  actors  in  a  transnational  field,  social  network  analysis  seems  an
interesting way to draw the topography of a transnational field. However, because of the limitations
of social network analysis to represent evolution, a historical perspective on the boundaries of the
field  is  necessary.  The number  of  actors  involved in  the field of  Internet  governance probably
amounted to less than 500 in the 1990s (see section 5.2). The data collection for the social network
analysis of chapter 5 are certainly not comprehensive but the repetition of the same names after the
inclusion of a certain number of events and documents tend to show that the number of actors was
probably along these lines. In contrast, the number of participants to the second phase of the WSIS
accounted to almost 20'000 (see chapter 7, figures 7.2 and 7.3). Not all of them were involved in
Internet governance issues, but arguably a good proportion of them became involved during the
WSIS. Moreover, a lot of participants to Internet governance debates were not participating to the
WSIS. This indicates a rapid growth of the field during these years. The growth is partly a case and
partly a consequence of the broadening of the definition of Internet governance. With the stakes
becoming  more  important,  and  the  field  gaining  importance  in  the  global  field  of  power  (see
paragraph  below),  the  number is  probably continuing to  grow steadily.  This  is  why this  study
focuses on elite actors and organisations. While the power elite has also grown over the years,
notably through the inclusion of the civil society elite, it seems that its growth did not follow the
growth of the field itself. A quantitative analysis of the field today could provide an interesting
perspective on this phenomenon but it is outside the scope of the present study. 
The field of Internet governance emerged through a process of autonomisation from other fields
such as the  field of  global  telecommunication regulation  and the field of  computer  networking
science (see chapter 4). The autonomy of the field from the more established and institutionalised
field of telecommunications regulation has been a driving force in the evolution of the field of
Internet governance. In spite of the power of large telecommunication firms and powerful states in
the field of global telecommunications regulation,  the transnational field of Internet governance
remained autonomous. The power of the scientific-technical elite and the specific forms of capital
they were relying on, as well as the importance of a fraction of the business elite involved in content
development, were key to the emergence of the field as it is now. Moreover, the place of the field
within the global field of power has changed. The field of Internet governance has increasingly been
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affected by, and affecting fields such as the global security field or the field of global finance. As a
result, the field of Internet governance gained importance in the global field of power and capital
acquired in  this  particular  field  is  increasingly  valued in  other  fields.  For  example,  Internet
governance experts like Vint Cerf express influential opinions on issues of privacy and freedom of
expression. Cybersecurity experts are becoming more influential in the field of security, notably
through the creation of cybercommands. Debates about tax evasion consider Internet companies as
crucial actors and put the Internet economy at the heart of global cooperation against tax avoidance
(Bowers,  2013;  Bowers  & Wintour,  2013).  In  2011 the  power elite  demanded the  adoption  of
multistakeholder process for the G8 meeting in Deauville335. As a result, Internet governance is no
longer  a marginal field in the global  field of power. Not only has it  gained its autonomy from
neighbouring fields, but it also increasingly affects other fields.
The boundaries of the  field of  Internet  governance are not  fixed,  they  evolve according to  the
changing stakes, and the changing actors of the field. They also evolve in relation to the evolution
of neighbouring fields and to evolutions in the global field of power. For example, national capitals
are evolving over time (Bourdieu, 2005). Individuals and organisations form the so-called emerging
economies have seen their national capital increase in relation to the OECD nationals. This explains
why a number of emerging powers in Internet governance are based in emerging countries (see
below, sect. 9.3).  The analysis of the evolution of a particular field and its particular power elite,
when  coupled with the  analysis of global trends and the evolutions in the global field of power
indicates elements of a  more general understanding of order  and change in  the global political
economy.  Beyond  the  empirical  conclusions  that  help  understand  the  current  state  of  Internet
governance, this study has brought some innovative insights on the contribution of an international
political sociology perspective to critical approaches to international relations.
9.2. Transnational elites, order and change in Internet governance
The specific case of Internet governance is a good illustration of how the analysis of a particular
field  might  help  understand more  general  dynamics.  The field  of  Internet  governance,  and the
different  hegemonic  projects  that  have  emerged  within  the  field,  echo  global  dynamics.  The
institutionalisation of Internet governance in the 1990s epitomises the search for governance models
coherent  with  the  neoliberal  globalisation  process.  The  changes  within  the  field  in  the  2000s
illustrate  the efforts  to  adapt  the  neoliberal  model  to  the emergence of  new powers and to  the
335 See the open letter to Pres. Sarkozy by the Internet Governance Caucus, at http://igcaucus.org/open-letter-president-
sarkozy-eg8-meeting-plan, last accessed 8 April 2014. 
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multiple  crisis affecting the model.  Against this general background, the power elite of Internet
governance adapted its discourse and its projects to propose models that were acceptable to the
public. The analysis of the evolution of the field in this research draws upon an evolutionary reading
of Bourdieu, as advocated notably by French regulationists (Boyer, 2003, 2008; Lordon, 2003). The
dynamics of a field involve three main elements. First, the process of elite unification around a
shared project and the definition of a hegemonic project  acceptable for non-elites is a constant
process of consensus-building. Second, the reconfiguration of elite through the inclusion of new
elements or the exclusion of a fraction of the elite is determined by the dialectical relationship
between elites and counter-elites. Finally, the position of a given transnational field within the field
of power evolves through time. The field of Internet governance is an example of the emergence of
a new issue amidst the core issues of international political economy.
9.2.1. Elite unification and hegemonic projects 
One of the main contribution of this research on the theoretical/methodological level is an analysis
of the production of hegemony focused on actors.  The idea of a process of hegemony production
(Jessop,  2006)  highlights  the  importance  of  the  process  through which  a  given order  becomes
acceptable to the majority. At a global level, ideological elements such as disciplinary neoliberalism
(Gill,  1995)  shape  the  boundaries of  the  various  models  of  governance.  At  the  field-level,  the
production of hegemony requires a translation of global hegemonic imaginaries adapted to field-
specific conditions.  For example, the production of hegemony around the creation of the ICANN
resulted form a dialogue  and a consensus-building  between different dominant discourses in the
field. The globally-dominant neoliberal discourse was the most influential in the institutionalisation
of Internet governance. However, elements of cyber-libertarianism and references to the Internet as
a Global Public Good were also taken into account. The hegemonic discourse that prevailed was not
the result of a consensus-building among all discourses present in the field. It was a process of
selection and adaptation between discourses that were consistent with  global structural dynamics
and ideologically coherent336. Arguments about sovereignty and national security were discarded, as
well as arguments in favour of an Internet governance system aiming at the public interest and
generalised  access  to  knowledge  (see  chapter  5).  The  analysis  of  the  production  of  hegemony
focused on the actors includes two levels. First, a consensus has to be found within the elite  by
building a consensus based on dominant discourses. Second, the elite discourse has to be accepted
by non-elites. These two elements are simultaneous since the production of hegemony is not a one-
336 For a in-depth discussion of selectivity in the production of hegemonic imaginaries, see Sum & Jessop (2013).
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way process from the elite to non-elites but rather a process of dialogue  and trial-and-error that
helps to create a hegemonic project. 
First,  dominant  discourses  in  the  field  were  dominant  because  of  their  compatibility  with the
dominant ideology of the global field of power in the 1990s, but they were also dominant because
they were embodied and delivered by members of the elites of Internet governance337. The cyber-
libertarian  discourse  was  mainly  represented  within  the  technical-scientific  elite  that  held  a
dominant position on the field. The neoliberal discourse was represented both by the business elite
and by US policy elite. Finally, the Global Public Good Discourse was influential because it was
important for the non-US policy elite and also as an element of consensus-building with non-elites.
As such,  the inclusion of Global Public Good discourse elements can be considered to a certain
extent as a concession made by the elite to second-tier elites and non-elites.  Thus,  the hegemonic
discourse that permitted the creation of the ICANN was based on the common ideological elements
that underlay the discourses of the different elites of the field.  Drawing upon similar ideological
premises,  the different specialised elites were able  to find a common ground. As we have seen
elements like private-sector leadership or the protection of intellectual property rights were widely
shared among the elite and constitute the bulk of the hegemonic imaginary of Internet governance in
the 1990s. A further analysis of the dispositions of transnational elites of Internet governance shaped
by their previous histories as well by their socialisation in the field could shed some light on the
fundamental  elements  that  permit  such ideological  cohesion.  The shared  interests  perceived by
different  specialised elites  also  are  undoubtedly an  important  factor  of  consensus. As  a  result,
different  elites  were  able  to  agree  on  a  number  of  principles  that  were  to underlie  Internet
governance.  While  not  sufficient,  the  consensus-building  among  the  elite  is  necessary  for  a
hegemonic project to emerge. The discursive exclusion of an important fraction of the elite makes
hegemony impossible. This situation was illustrated by the attempt by the technical-scientific elite
to build a governance system through the combination of cyber-libertarian elements and elements of
the  Global  Public  Good discourse  (IAHC, 1997a). This  project  failed  to  include the  neoliberal
discourse and thus turned away the business and the US policy elites. This is why the project was
not implemented and was alter replaced by the more neoliberal ICANN project. 
Consensus among the elites is a necessary but insufficient element of hegemony. Consent of non-
337 Although the relationship between dominant actors and dominant discourses resembles a chicken-and-egg problem, 
we can assume that discourses used by dominant actors are necessarily dominant while the contrary is not always 
true. Marginalised actors adopting dominant discourses might improve their position in the field but do certainly not 
become dominant by this simple adoption of a dominant discourse. 
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elites  is  also  necessary.  Hegemony  production  beyond  the  elite  is  the  other  element  of  the
production of hegemony within a field. Whereas the debates of the 1990s were not much affected
by non-elites because of the lack of awareness about Internet governance, non-elites were well-
represented during the WSIS.  Vague references to  participation, transparency, accountability and
openness had been  sufficient  in  the  1990s to  prevent  the  immediate  formation  of  counter-elite
movements.  Thus, the analysis of the WSIS debates  highlights broader consensus-building better.
As we have seen (see especially chap. 7), developing countries governments, NGOs, and a number
of marginalised intergovernmental organisations such as the UNESCO participated in the WSIS.
They were not sharing the dominant vision of Internet governance that had prevailed in the 1990s
based on self-regulation,  market-enabling mechanisms and technically-oriented governance.  The
renewed hegemonic imaginary had not only to be able to make consensus within the elite, but it also
needed to respond to the demands of non-elites. The solution was imagined by a group of experts
where the renewed power elite was represented. First, as we have seen, the definition of Internet
governance was broadened to include  social,  political,  and economic  issues.  These issues were
included  but  remained  separated  from core  issues  related  to  the  technical  management of  the
Internet. This separation protected the power elite from large-scale reconfigurations. Second, new
institutions were created in order to continue the debates on Internet governance.  Third, and most
importantly,  the  hegemonic  imaginary  of  multistakeholderism  emerged.  The  imaginary  of
multistakeholderism  drew  upon  elements  of  the  1990s  such  as  Internet  exceptionalism  (old
governance model are not suited for cyberspace), participation and openness. Multistakeholderism
was consistent with the power elite's rejection of intergovernmentalism but also with the demands
of enhanced  participation from civil  society groups and developing countries. The discourse on
multistakeholderism echoes democratic ideals of pluralism, equality and participation. As a result,
without  touching  the  essential  of  elite  power  in  the  filed  of  Internet  governance,
multistakeholderism became the new hegemonic imaginary. In other words, the renewed imaginary
ensured a  broad acceptance  both among elites and non-elites of  an  elitist  order  in  the field of
Internet governance. 
The  two  historical  moments  analysed  in  this  study  illustrate  two  types  of  situation  in  which
hegemony is produced. First, hegemony can be produced through the tacit and passive consent of a
public that is not aware of the stakes, or not willing to engage into political struggles. This is the
situation defined by Wright Mills as a mass society, where the power of the elite is not challenged
by apathetic masses. The second situation corresponds more to a Gramscian process of hegemony
production, where groups of non-elites actively support an order that benefits the elite. This was
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described by Burawoy at the micro-level of the industry (Burawoy, 1982, 2008). Workers play by
the rules of the game in order to gain some satisfaction, or benefits. By doing so, they reproduce a
capitalist order that unequally redistributes the produced value. At the global level, this process has
been studied by neo-Gramscian Global Political Economy. Tenants of a Cultural Political Economy
particularly insist on the process of hegemony production at the level of ideas (Jessop, 2006; Jessop
& Oosterlynck, 2008; Sum & Jessop, 2013). At the level of a transnational field, the same process
of  hegemony  production  can  be  observed.  Like  in  the  analysis  of  a  given  firm,  the  active
participation of dominated groups in the production of hegemony clearly appears. What might seem
as an imposition by a pre-existing elite or class when we look at the global political economy as a
whole, turns out to be a myriad of processes at the field-level, in which non-elite groups play an
important role, not only in the reproduction of a given order but even in its production in the first
place.
9.2.2. Elite reconfiguration and change
Change  as  well  can  be analysed  at  the  level  of  actors.  The  analysis  of  the  history of  Internet
governance illustrate how the evolution of the composition of the elite, as well as the emergence of
counter-elites can affect the whole structure of a field. As we have seen in chapter 6, one of the key
elements that led to the crisis of Internet governance at the beginning of the 2000s is the failure to
include some powerful groups within the elite. A few years later, some of these counter-elites were
included within the power elite during the WSIS. This was for example the case of the civil society
elite, that included some of the most vocal critics of the existing system. 
Counter-elites are a major factor of change. In the case of the Internet governance field, three main
categories of counter-elites have been described in this study. First,  the scholarly elite  emerged
during the creation of the ICANN. As we have seen in chapter 6, the scholarly elite was based in
prestigious US universities and stemmed mainly from law departments. The scholarly elite was not
dominant in the field of Internet governance but held an important amount of capital in their home
fields.  As a result,  they  were able to position  themselves as a  real  counter-elite in the field of
Internet  governance.  They  criticised  the  ICANN  system  because  of  its  lack  of  participation
mechanisms and legitimacy. They were also very critical  of the process that led to its  creation
(Froomkin, 2000; Kleinwächter, 2002; Mueller, 1999). The scholarly counter-elite was a crucial
actor in the imposition of an ICANN reform. It later participated to the WSIS. This is partly because
of the advocacy of the scholarly elite that the definition of Internet governance was broadened at
this occasion. As a result, many members of the scholarly elite became part of the power elite of
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Internet governance. They were able to use the scientific capital acquired in other fields in order to
become  influential  actors  in  Internet  governance.  Several  authors  of  the  most-quoted  critical
scholarly articles on the ICANN system at the turn of the millennium have now key positions within
the  ICANN system,  as  board  members,  as members of  advisory  councils of  Regional  Internet
Registries, or as a regular participants to ICANN meetings338. The emergence of a powerful counter-
elite fomented change in the field, and a reconfiguration of the elite. The case was different with
another counter-elite. Hackers became important critiques of the ICANN system. They claimed that
it  epitomized the commercialisation of the Internet,  away form their  libertarian ideals. Like the
scholarly elite, the used their hacking skills as capital to enter the field of Internet governance in the
early 2000s. However, the election of a hacker to the board of the ICANN, and several manifestos
were not able to influence the field in any significant way. Hackers were marginalised at least until
the rise of the anonymous movement339. The third counter-elite that can be observed in the field of
Internet governance is the policy elite of developing countries. Developing countries were excluded
form the debates on Internet governance in the 1990s. Through other  institutional settings where
they were more powerful, they managed to gain importance in Internet governance issues. This was
the case of the WSIS, which is described in chapter 8. But this is also the case since the WSIS,
through the process of Enhanced Cooperation.
Figure 9.1. Board members by country of origin (cumulative)
338 For example, Wolfgang Kleinwächter became a member of the ICANN board in 2013. Milton Mueller became a 
member of the board of trustees of the American Regional Internet Registry in 2012.
339 The consequence of the anonymous movement on the field of Internet governance is beyond the scope of this study.
But it seems that the lack of unity of the movement and the blurriness of the objectives of the movement make it
difficult to qualify it as a counter-elite of Internet governance.
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Change not only happens at the expense of the power elite, it can also occur within the elite as an
evolutionary process. We have already seen how the definition of Internet governance changed and
how the power elite changed accordingly to include the civil society elite.  The power elite also
gradually included more women and more individuals form non-OECD countries. However, the
observations seem to indicate that an extension of the elite and the inclusion of formerly non-elite
members with lower levels of capital tend to favour the emergence of a two-tiers power elite. In the
case of Internet governance, the greater role of new elites in institutions like the IGF and on issues
related to non-technical governance contrasts with the continuing exclusion of new elites from core
issues. Despite these differences, the longer-term trend seems to be a certain diversification of the
power elite. This evolution is consistent with a hegemonic project of inclusion of potential counter-
elites. However, the feasibility of a hegemonic reconfiguration of the elite depends on the level of
contradiction of a given order. Minimal hegemony (Cafruny & Ryner, 2007) is likely to generate
resistance and the emergence of counter-elites. In this case, the power of the elite is fragile and its
evolution and extension problematic. In the case of an integral hegemony, the consent to the order is
widely-shared  and the  reproduction and evolution of  the  elite is  likely  to  take place  smoothly.
Recent developments in Internet governance tend to show that the evolution of the elite, and notably
the inclusion of a civil society elite, is currently not perceived as sufficient in civil society circles340.
This tend to indicate that the reproduction of the power elite is problematic and that hegemony
remains minimal in Internet governance. 
9.2.3. Transnational fields and the global field of power
The last contribution of the present study to an international political sociology perspective is the
analysis of how the dynamics of order and change within the field relate to the dynamics of order
and change at the global level. As we have seen in chapter 3, global politics can be described as a
set of semi-autonomous fields  united by a global field of power  (Mérand & Pouliot, 2008).  The
analogy to the field of power described by Bourdieu at the national level (e.g. Bourdieu, 2012)
allows for a conceptualisation of the position of one given field relatively to other fields and of the
evolving exchange rate between forms of capital acquired in different fields. The study of Internet
governance  as  a  field  contributes  to  this  perspective.  The  genealogy  of  the  field  of  Internet
governance explains the importance of a scientific/technical capital that still determine the dominant
340 This affirmation is based on the study of civil society mailing lists specialising in  Internet governance such as
BestBits and the Internet Governance Caucus. 
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position  of  the  technical-scientific  elite.  The  autonomisation  from  the  field  of  international
telecommunication regulation indicates the emergence of Internet governance as an independent
field. It also helps to understand why the rejection of intergovernmentalism as a governance model
and of the ITU as an actor of Internet governance has been so important in the history of the field.
The interconnection between the field of Internet governance and the global economic field during
the  1990s,  and with  the  field of  global  security  in  the  early  2000s has  also  contributed to  the
structuration of Internet governance and to the growing importance of Internet governance as a
global issue. 
Indeed, a dialectical relationship between a particular field and the global field of power can be
analysed.  Change  within  the  field  might  generate  change  in  the  global  field  of  power  while
structural trends in the global field of power affects the specific fields. Internet governance certainly
epitomised the structural trend towards neoliberal models of governance in the 1990s that existed
beyond this particular field. But the growing importance of the idea of multistakeholderism in the
field  of  Internet  governance  has  also  affected  other  fields.  While  multistakeholderism was  not
invented  in  Internet  governance,  Internet  governance  is  one  of  the  leading  fields  where
multistakeholder governance has become part of the hegemonic imaginary. This trend has extended
beyond  the  field  through  actors  and  organisations  that  translated  the  principle  of
multistakeholderism in  other  fields.  For  example,  many organisations  adopt  a  multistakeholder
rhetoric when they deal with Internet governance. This was the case of the eG8, this is also the case
of  the  Council  of  Europe341.  This  model  is  sometimes  repeated  by  these  organisations  for  the
discussion of different topics. 
The global field of power is structured by two logics:  the international competition of national
elites; and the global competition of field elites. Forms of capital include different types of capital
acquired in different fields. They also include national capital as an asset in the struggles entailed by
international  competition.  As a  result,  a  Bourdieusian  perspective  on  International  Relations
addresses  not  only  the  relations  of  individuals  within  a  social  universe,  but  also  the  relations
between these universes. Nations are such universes that are related among themselves and to other
transnational  universes.  Far  from undermining the  importance  of  national  power  and the  state,
Bourdieusian IR can contribute to their re-framing within a more global perspective on power. As
we have seen throughout the study of Internet governance, national capital determines to a certain
extent the position of actors within the field of Internet governance. Moreover, governments are
341 See http://www.coe.int/t/informationsociety/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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themselves important actors in the field. This has historically been the case especially for the US
government and US actors relying on their national capital. However, the role of Australian and
European actors in the creation of the ICANN and the role of China and Chinese actors such as the
Internet society of China during the WSIS should not be underestimated. Moreover, the emergence
of non-US governments in Internet governance is one of the major recent changes in the field. This
is why the following section focuses on the importance of national capital in the emergence of new
actors in the field of Internet governance as a way to address issues usually left to state-centric
approaches. 
Figure 9.2. National and transnational fields and the global field of power
The global field of power is a field where the exchange rate between different forms of capital is
determined. The global field of power is also where a certain form of hierarchisation between fields
takes  place.  In  the  global  field  of  power,  different  forms  of  legitimacy  compete  since  actors'
legitimacy has been built in very different social universes. The global field of power is beyond the
scope of the present study. However, the analysis of Internet governance as a transnational fields
allows us to formulate  some hypothesis on the global  field of power that  could be explored in
further studies. Transnational elites are those groups that exercise power within a transnational field.
They are different, although sometimes intertwined, with national elites. Transnational elites act
within a social space where the stakes and the institutions are transnational. Global elites are those
groups that act primarily in a national or a transnational field. However, they are powerful enough
to be part of the global struggle for power. They participate to the production of a global hegemonic
imaginary. Their “home” field needs to be important enough for their legitimacy to be recognised at
a global level. Based on the study of the history of Internet governance, we can argue that it was not
the case so far that the power elite of Internet governance had enough legitimacy and capital to
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compete for power at  a global level and to  participate to the production of global  imaginaries.
However, with the Internet becoming more important in our daily lives, it is likely that transnational
elites  of  Internet  governance  become  more  influential  at  a  global  level.  The  spread  of  the
multistakeholder imaginary in the field of telecommunications illustrates this potential.
9.3. Current crisis and possible futures for Internet governance
While the limitation of the research to the two historical moments of the ICANN creation and the
WSIS was necessary for methodological reasons, the interest of the research is not only historical.
Anchored in a Coxian tradition, the purpose of the research is to investigate the foundations of the
current order, its contradictions, and the potential for change (Cox, 1981). This section is focused on
emerging  powers  that  could  bring  about  change  in  Internet  governance.  Emerging  powers  are
defined as social forces that are proposing alternative models of governance and that are likely to be
influential in the transnational field of Internet governance. The two elements of the definition are
important. First, emerging power are politically significant only if they are advocating for change.
Emergence  is  primarily  a  political  project.  Supporters  of  the  status-quo are  not  analysed  as
emerging powers. Second, emerging power must hold some capital that is likely to grant them with
power in the field so that they can be described as counter-elites rather than non-elites. This section
focuses  primarily  on  national  capital  (Bourdieu,  2005),  defined  as  the  resources  that  an  actor
(individual or organisation) can mobilise because of the fact that she comes form a given country.
National capital includes language skills, reputational capital of a given country, ability to mobilise
financial capital, etc. Because of the rise of new economies in the global economic field, the value
of some “emerging” national capitals is increasing. This section explores the potential for change
entailed by the increase in national capital of a number of formerly non-dominant actors (firms,
NGOs, governmental actors, individuals, etc.). In order to do so, it first defines the contradictions of
the current Internet governance system and investigates if they can be considered as elements of a
crisis of Internet governance. Second, the possibility of new actors to emerge in the field of Internet
governance thanks to the growth of their national capital is discussed. Finally, the consequences of
such a process of emergence are analysed in terms of possible futures for Internet governance.
9.3.1. Is the WSIS order in crisis?
Ten years after the first phase of the WSIS, the divisions evidenced at the time seem to continue to
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structure the field of Internet governance. First, it seems that the hegemonic project that prevailed
during the second phase of the WSIS produced a minimal hegemony that was not integral enough to
contain the disagreements of non-dominant actors. Second, Internet governance is affected by the
dramatic  increase  in  value  of  some national  capitals  in  the  global  field  of  power.  As a  result,
emerging powers from emerging economies threaten the current order. 
As we have seen in chapter 8, the second phase of the WSIS found a way out of the opposition
between supporter of the status-quo and advocates of change. This hegemonic project was based on
a discursive element:  the multistakeholder imaginary. It was also relying on a dual institutional
element:  the  Internet  governance  forum  and  the  Enhanced  Cooperation  process.  While  the
multistakeholder imaginary remains largely accepted in the field342, the implementation of the dual
institutional element posed some problems. The Internet Governance Forum became rapidly part of
the  Internet  governance ecosystem and participated to  the institutionalisation of  hegemony  (see
chapter  8).  However,  the  Enhanced  Cooperation  process  was  interpreted  very  differently  by
different actors. The Tunis Agenda reads:
“69. We further recognize  the need for enhanced cooperation in the future, to enable
governments,  on  an  equal  footing,  to  carry  out  their  roles  and  responsibilities,  in
international  public  policy  issues  pertaining  to  the  Internet,  but  not  in  the  day-to-day
technical  and  operational  matters,  that  do  not  impact  on  international  public  policy
issues.”  (WSIS, 2005)
The first years of the implementation of the Tunis Agenda were hardly leading to any change in the
governance of  the  Internet.  The ICANN system remained largely  unchallenged even if  the  US
oversight was slightly reformed. The Internet Governance Forum was hailed as an important space
for dialogue but was not able to bring any change in the field. Enhanced cooperation was monitored
by UN-DESA in  the  form of  an  annual  report  based  on the  contributions  of  10  organizations
involved  in  the  governance  of  the  Internet343 where  the  organizations  usually  recalled  their
participation in the IGF as an effort towards enhanced cooperation. 
Developing countries were trying to put forward a more ambitious agenda for enhanced cooperation
342 Critiques about the principle of multistakeholder governance itself remain marginal, even though they are certainly 
increasing. 
343 These  organizations  were:  Internet  Corporation  for  Assigned  Names  and  Numbers  (ICANN),  International
Telecommunication  Union  (ITU),  World  Wide  Web  Consortium  (W3C),  Council  of  Europe,  Internet  Society
(ISOC), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and Number Resource
Organization (NRO), and the Internet Engineering TaskForce (IETF). 
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in the United Nations. In January 2009, a resolution that requested the Secretary-General to submit
to the ECOSOC recommendations on how to implement the process towards enhanced cooperation
was adopted by consensus by the UN General Assembly (UNGA, 2009 A/RES/63/202). 
Following the report of the UN secretary-General,  consultations were convened by UN-DESA in
December 2010 in New York344. During the meeting, India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) made a
joint statement to recall the need for an intergovernmental platform within the UN system in order
to discuss the policy implications of Internet governance in a complementary fashion with the IGF
(IBSA, 2010 §6).  According to the statement, an intergovernmental working group  would decide
whether to create a new platform or use an existing one (IBSA, 2010, §8). In December 2012, the
General Assembly mandated the UNCTAD to create a Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation
(UNGA - General Assembly of the United Nations, 2012). The Working Group started its work in
2013 and is expected to produce a report in 2014. While the power elite of Internet governance is
well-represented in the working Group, the fact that it mainly includes government representatives
from  developing  countries  might  represent  a  threat  to  the  existing  order345.  As  a  result,  the
separation of the  process  of  enhanced cooperation illustrates  the lack of an integral  hegemony.
There are a number of actors involved in the struggle to reform the existing order. Moreover, these
actors seem to have found a forum to express their demands346. This is why the current situation can
be described as a crisis of Internet governance, with counter-elite threatening the existing order.
The  actors  that  are  pushing  for  this  reformist  agenda  are  mainly  actors  from  what  has  been
described as “emerging economies”. In spite of the limitations of the concept, an increase of their
power in the field of  Internet governance over the last few years can be observed. Not only the
Indian, Brazilian, South African, Kenyan, Chinese governments are gaining leverage in the field of
Internet governance, but private-sector and civil society organizations from these countries are also
becoming more influential. This is why emergence is better described as an increase in the value of
a given national capital than as the enhanced material capacities of a state. 
344  Eighty-five written and oral contributions were conveyed in total by Governments, international organizations,
civil society actors and private sector entities. (UNSG, 2011 E/2011/103).
345 See the membership lost at http://unctad.org/Sections/un_cstd/docs/cstd2013d04_Membership.pdf, last accessed 8 
April 2014. 
346 It remains to be seen whether the efforts by the Brazilian government on the ICANN side will be fruitful. The 
Brazil meeting will take place in April 2014. 
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9.3.2. Possible futures for Internet governance
In addition to the current crisis of Internet governance, a number of elements are likely to shape the
future of the field. First, the power elite of Internet governance still holds a position of power in the
field  in  spite  of  the  increasingly  minimal  and  contested  character  of  its  hegemony.  Second,  a
sovereignist  counter-elite  has  a  strong institutional  base  in  intergovernmental  organisations  and
holds a dominant position in fields such as the global security field. In spite of the “free Internet”
discourse,  the power elite  and the sovereignist  counter-elite  share a  concern for  the  continuing
commercialisation of the Internet. Finally, a reformist counter-elite share with the power elite the
democratic rhetoric but it advocates for a deep reform of the field.
Success of the sovereignist
counter-elites
Success of the reformist
counter-elite
Reconfiguration Neoliberal cybersecurityscenario “Free Internet” scenario
Change Sovereignist scenario Participatory democracy?
Table 9.2. Possible futures for Internet governance
1. The first possible scenario is the preservation of the status-quo. Current efforts to reform Internet
governance might end up strengthening the existing system. Just like the WSIS gave a sort of UN-
legitimacy to a private governance model, the Enhanced cooperation process or the talks on ICANN
reform led by Brazil could end up with another confirmation of the existing system with marginal
reforms,  or  to  the creation of  new non-decision-making bodies.  Despite  the  contradictions  that
undermine the stability the current order, the power elite remains discursively and institutionally
strong.  As  we  have  seen,  the  power  elite  is  represented  in  the  Working  Group  on  Enhanced
Cooperation. They were successful at containing the reform proposals by emerging countries in the
last years such as the IBSA project. Likewise, the preparation process of the meeting to be held in
Brazil in 2014 has been to a large extent co-opted by the power elite347, which has been criticised by
civil  society organisations.  After  the World Conference  on International  Telecommunications  in
2012, the power elite of Internet governance reacted to the intergovernmentalist arguments with a
campaign on “free Internet” (Chenou, 2013; Jamart, 2013). The campaign was successful at least
347 See for example the description of the 1Net platform by the Director General of APNIC, available at 
http://www.circleid.com/posts/2013112_what_is_1net_to_me/, last accessed 8 April 2014.
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until  the Snowden revelations  (Chenou, 2013).  While the argument on the necessity to support
Google  and  other  Internet  giants  to  protect  the  Internet  from  autocratic  governments  is  more
difficult to make in the current context, it is possible that a new hegemonic imaginary emerge. This
new hegemonic imaginary could legitimise the power of the elite by drawing upon principles such
as freedom and multistakeholderism. The process of production of a renewed hegemony of the
power elite could then resemble the WSIS process.  
2. Another  possible  scenario  is  the  continuation  of  the  neoliberal  cybersecurity  synthesis  that
emerged towards the end of the WSIS (see chap 5, fig. ). In order to defend the neoliberal model of
Internet governance, the US made an agreement with China before the second phase of the WSIS.
In exchange of a recognition of the existing system by China, the US (followed by the power elite)
accepted a mention to sovereignty on country-code Top-Level Domains (such as .cn) and to the
active role of states in Internet-related policy issues  in the Tunis Agenda (WSIS, 2005).  The deal
illustrated the counter-intuitive compatibility between economic deregulation and securitisation of
the Internet. Indeed, the main argument of the supporters of such an exception to the neoliberal
principle of self-regulation was the need for security. National security, as well as cybersecurity
were  left  out  of  the  self-regulation  and multistakeholder  governance  models and  of  the  IGF
discussions.  The deal epitomises the specific translation in the field of Internet governance of a
“thick” definition of neoliberalism, as a “transnational political project aiming to remake the nexus
of market, state, and citizenship from above” (Wacquant, 2010). More importantly, neoliberalism
entails the articulation of economic deregulation  and of  “an expansive,  intrusive,  and proactive
penal apparatus” (Wacquant, 2010). In the field of Internet governance, the economic deregulation
preceded the securitisation of the Internet. However, since the 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, and
coherently with the national security concerns of sovereignist states, Internet governance gradually
included  the  penal  aspect  of  neoliberalism,  which  justifies  the  exception  to  the  rule  of  “small
government” on security-related issues both at a domestic and at the international level. Depending
on the acceptance by Internet users of massive surveillance programs and of repressive policies
aimed at the protection of national security and of the good functioning of the market, the neoliberal
cybersecurity discourse might shape the future of Internet governance and facilitate the inclusion of
the  sovereignist  counter-elite  into  the  power  elite  of  Internet  governance.  The  emerging
“cybersecurity  metaphysics”  also  entail  an  increased  international  competition  and  the
multiplication of international security crisis potentially leading to cyberwars. 
3. Should the  inclusion of  the  sovereignist  counter-elite  fail,  another  scenario  could be a  deep
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reform of Internet governance along sovereignist lines. The model favoured by some Arab States
and countries like Russia is also supported by a lot of developing states that see the creation of an
intergovernmental organisation, or the inclusion of Internet governance to the ITU mandate as the
only possible reform of Internet governance. The sovereignist project is inspired by the regulation
of telecommunications before their liberalisation and before the advent of the Internet. Until the
1980s, telecommunications were regulated by national governments at the national level and by
intergovernmental agreements at an international level (see chapter 4). The field of international
telecommunication  regulation  was  a  field  were  governments,  and  even  governments  from
developing countries, held influential positions. The balance of power with the private sector was
different from the current situation of the field of Internet governance. Moreover, the one-state one-
vote principles gave the majority to developing countries. As a result, the sovereignist counter-elite
is  willing  to  impose  an  intergovernmentalisation  of  Internet  governance  that  would  include
technical, but also policy-related aspects, and particularly those related to security. The opportunity
for the sovereignist  counter-elite relies in the fact  that  discussions are currently taking place in
intergovernmental settings (UN General Assembly, UNCTAD, ITU). These traditional forums of
international regulation favour governments over private actors, and coalitions among developing
states. However, the counter-elite faces a hegemonic imaginary of Internet governance, and more
globally of the Knowledge-Based Economy that structurally undermines governments' initiatives
and non-market arrangements. Almost twenty years of anti-ITU, self-regulation, multistakeholder
and freedom rhetoric have structured the field of Internet governance.  Only a revolution in the
field's imaginary would make the sovereignist project realistic. On the other hand, the consequences
of  the  Snowden  revelations,  and  the  mistrust  towards  Internet  firms  and  the  Five-Eyes
governments348 is certainly an asset for the sovereignist project.  
4. Finally, an emancipatory project can prevail if the reformist counter-elite is able to federate non-
dominant actors around a project of reform of Internet governance. There is an important number of
actors in the field of Internet governance that are dissatisfied with the current order but that do not
wish to support a sovereignist project. However, the interests and ideas of this counter-elite are
diverse. Emerging powers want to benefit from their newly-acquired national capital: they want a sit
at the table of Internet governance. These emerging actors include governments, private sector and
civil society organisations from  countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa. They can also
include civil  society organisations from OECD countries that are not part of the power elite of
Internet governance. These include mainly generalist civil society organisations involved in, but not
348 United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand
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specialising in, Internet governance. The counter-elite might also benefit from the tensions between
the European Union and the US on issue such as privacy and network neutrality. Since a return to
intergovernmentalism seems to be incompatible with the demands of these actors, a new conception
of  multistakeholderism as  participatory democracy  could  be  an  option.  Also,  multistakeholder
governance  might include  more  than  just  issues  of  representation.  A renewed  multistakeholder
governance  for  the  Internet  could put  at  the  top  of  the  agenda  the  politics  of  redistribution
(Gurumurthy  & Gurumurthy,  2008).  Instead  of  the  question  of  who  should  be  represented  in
multistakeholder settings, the question becomes a question of who should be targeted by Internet
governance policies.  In  a  redistributive  framework,  these  targeted  groups would  mainly  be  the
marginalised groups that do not have access to the network, and who do not have a say on how it is
governed. Such a change in the focus of the framing of multistakeholderism could foment a deep
reform of the field of Internet governance directed towards a better inclusion of non-elites in the
governance of the Internet.
Two possible futures for Internet governance entail the reconfiguration of the power elite to include
discursive elements and members of two emerging counter-elites. Two other possible future entail a
more profound reform of Internet governance, either in a sovereignist direction, or in a reformist
direction.  In all  cases,  Internet  governance seems to be at  a  crossroads  (Radu, Chenou, Weber,
2013). In this context of crisis and instability, the international political sociology approach outlined
in this book is certainly a good method to explore current development of Internet governance as
another evolution of the field and a possible reconfiguration of its elite.
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ANNEX 3. From statements to categories: discourse analysis of the 
documents of the 1990s
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D
ocum
ent
G
TLD
-M
oU
Version
D
ate
August 1996
August 1996
D
raft Postel
D
raft Ym
bk
D
raft D
enninger
D
raft M
asek
D
raft Postel
IAH
C
 draft
January 1996
January 1996
19 D
ecem
ber 1996
Principles
open and com
petitive m
arketplace
open, free-m
arket com
petition
open, free-m
arket com
petition
open, free-m
arket com
petition
registrar com
petition
TLD
 space is a a public ressource and subject to the pu-
blic trust
D
N
S is an international ressource
representation of the stakeholders
operational stability of the D
N
S
openness, stability
dom
ain nam
es are not intended to reflect tradem
arks, 
copyrights or any other rights
fairness, protection of IP
tim
ely results
Type of new
 institution
creation of perm
anent bureaucracy is not desired
It is desirable to keep the IA
N
A and IE
TF from
 becom
ing 
involved in operational and contractual aspects of the 
TLD
 registries.
ad hoc iTLD
 group ; There w
ill be no institution of m
ultiple 
registries per iTLD
 in 1996 by the ad hoc com
m
ittee. R
e-
gistry operators are encouraged to m
ake such arange
-
m
ents on their ow
n initiative ;
no new
 institution (but a w
orking group)
G
TLD
 adm
inistration and m
anagem
ent w
ill com
prise m
ul-
tiple com
peting registrars, globally dispersed, under a 
C
ouncil of R
egistrars (C
O
R
E) established by a M
em
o-
randum
 of U
nderstanding (C
O
R
E-M
O
U
).
IAH
C
 delagates stew
ardship for the set of gTLD
s to the 
C
ouncil of registrars (C
O
R
E).
Im
portant rôle for the IAH
C
 itself.
IAN
A + ad-hoc w
orking group (seven m
em
bers : 3 IA
N
A
, 
2 IETF and 2 ISO
C
)
C
ooperation betw
een com
peting registries [is] specifically 
not assum
ed in this proposal, and is consdered to be an 
operational aspect of a registry best determ
ined, and co-
ordiantees, by contractual agreem
ents betw
een private 
interests.
IAN
A + ad-hoc w
orking group (seven m
em
bers : 3 IA
N
A, 
2 IETF and 2 ISO
C
)
IAN
A + ad-hoc w
orking group (seven m
em
bers : 3 IA
N
A, 
2 IETF and 2 ISO
C
)
C
O
R
E
 w
ill be a not-for-profit association, funded through 
m
em
ber fees, on a cost-recovery basis
C
om
petences of the new
 institution
C
O
R
E provides first-level oversight and coordination 
am
ong those registrars, ensuring consistent service by 
registrars and fairness am
on them
. The details of its m
a-
nagem
ent w
ill be determ
ined by C
O
R
E board of trustess. 
C
O
R
E w
ill develop procedures for handling disputes 
am
ong R
egistrars and/or other signatories preferably by 
binding arbitration.
C
reation of any future gTLD
s is under tha aegis and poli-
cy coordination of the C
O
R
E.
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D
ocum
ent
G
TLD
-M
oU
Version
D
ate
August 1996
August 1996
D
raft Postel
D
raft Ym
bk
D
raft D
enninger
D
raft M
asek
D
raft Postel
IAH
C
 draft
January 1996
January 1996
19 D
ecem
ber 1996
C
om
petences
ofthe
new
institution
C
ore w
ill m
ake available public reports and statistics avai-
lable about registration activities during fixed reporting 
periods.
Status of the new
 intitution
C
ore w
ill be a not-for-profit association, funded through 
m
em
ber fees, on a cost-recovery basis
R
epresentation / Participation
150 new
 iTLD
s allocated to as m
any as 50 new
 regis-
tries, w
ith no m
ore than 2/3 in the sam
e country
In order to ensure equitable international participation 
am
ong registrars, IA
H
C
 has determ
ined that a fixed 
num
ber of R
egistrar w
ill be initially allocated to each of 
the six (6) ITU
 designated geographical w
orld zones.
The selection of registries in a region w
ill be a lottery 
am
ong qualified participants. 
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D
ocum
ent
G
TLD
-M
oU
Version
D
ate
August 1996
August 1996
D
raft Postel
D
raft Ym
bk
D
raft D
enninger
D
raft M
asek
D
raft Postel
IAH
C
 draft
January 1996
January 1996
19 D
ecem
ber 1996
-
B
oard com
position
O
therbodies
ofthe
new
insitution
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D
ocum
ent
G
TLD
-M
oU
Version
D
ate
August 1996
August 1996
D
raft Postel
D
raft Ym
bk
D
raft D
enninger
D
raft M
asek
D
raft Postel
IAH
C
 draft
January 1996
January 1996
19 D
ecem
ber 1996
N
ew
 gTLD
s
O
ther bodies of the new
 insitution
C
om
petitive functions
tw
o types of charter are provided, com
m
ercial and public 
service, w
ith the understanding that fees from
 com
m
er-
cial registry charters cross-subsidize low
 fees from
 public 
service efforts.
com
peting registries
com
peting registries
gTLD
 adm
inistration and m
anagem
ent w
ill com
prise m
ul-
tiple com
peting registrars, globally dispersed, under a 
C
ouncil of R
egistrars (C
O
R
E) established by a M
em
o-
randum
 of U
nderstanding (C
O
R
E-M
O
U
).
If a new
 iTLD
 is proposed, then it is assum
ed to allow
 
chartering of m
ultiple registries unless exclusive registra-
tion charter is specified in the application. R
equest for 
exclusive registration m
ust be w
ell m
otivated and w
ell 
justified.
a registry m
ay have m
ultiple registrars. A registrar m
ay 
be authorized for m
ultiple registries
som
e argue that TLD
s, like all global variables, should be 
few
 and created w
ith great care.
Therefore w
e suggest that one of the early public service 
proposal that should be seriously considered w
ould be 
one w
hich proposes a shared iTLD
 w
hich w
ould have 
very open creation of sub-registries ; thereby conducting  
the 1,000 experim
ent one level dow
n.
150 iTLD
s, 50 registries
150 iTLD
s, 50 registries
IA
H
C
 has decided to create further gTLD
s as a m
eans of 
increasing the level of com
petitive supply and access to 
the gTLD
 space for the global Internet com
m
unity. (…
) 
Therefore, IAH
C
 w
ill develop an initially conservative ap-
proach to the num
ber of additional gTLD
s, through the 
initial expansion in the first annual round to a total of ten 
gTLD
s. This entails the creation of seven new
 gTLD
s.
Status of existing gTLD
s /N
SI
m
ultiple regitries for the C
O
M
 zone, and registries for 
new
 iTLD
s w
ill be created
IAH
C
 recom
ends that all existing gTLD
S be shared in the 
sam
e fashion.
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D
ocum
ent
G
TLD
-M
oU
Version
D
ate
August 1996
August 1996
D
raft Postel
D
raft Ym
bk
D
raft D
enninger
D
raft M
asek
D
raft Postel
IAH
C
 draft
January 1996
January 1996
19 D
ecem
ber 1996
Transition
Tradem
ark issues
dom
ain nam
es are not intended to reflect tradem
arks, 
copyrights or any other rights
dom
ain nam
es are not intended to reflect tradem
arks, 
copyrights or any other rights
It is desirable that a dom
ain nam
e application include suf-
ficient inform
ation regarding the applicant and the appli-
cant's intended use of the dom
ain nam
e to ensure appli-
cant accountability and to ensure that sufficient inform
a-
tion is available to enable tradem
ark ow
ners to assess 
the need for a challenge to the proposed SLD
 dom
ain.
It is recognized that tradem
ark ow
ners have a legitim
ate 
interest, under national tradem
ark law, in policing against 
infringrem
ent, and that SLD
s are capablée of infringing 
tradem
ark rights.
[current] approach is incinsistent w
ith basic tenets of tra-
dem
ark law
s and principles of equity and fair play.
The appeals process does not apply to dispues over IPR
 
on nam
es (tradem
ark, service m
ark, copyright). These 
disputes are best left to arbitration or the courts ;
IAH
C
 strongly believes all gTLD
 registries and ISO
 coun-
try code registries should, therefore, publish applications 
for SLD
s, for a period of sixty (60) days prior to assigning 
the requested SLD
 to the applicant.
To ensure im
m
ediate availability of som
er dom
ain nam
es, 
it is recom
m
ended that gTLD
 registries offer « random
 
alphanum
eric » dom
ain nam
es w
hich require no w
aiting 
period.
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D
ocum
ent
Version
D
ate
Principles
Type of new
 institution
C
om
petences of the new
 institution
G
TLD
-M
oU
IAH
C
 final report
G
TLD
-M
oU
1 July 1997
2 July 1997
global nature
W
hite Paper
Fram
ew
ork for e-com
m
erce
R
FC
 on Internet dom
ain nam
es
G
reen paper
4 February 1997
28 February 1997
30 January 1998
ensure com
petition
com
petition
com
petition
TLD
 space is a a public ressource and subject to the pu-
blic trust
TLD
 space is a a public ressource and subject to the pu-
blic trust
public and private sector cooperation
public policy issue
private sector should lead
private sector lead
private coordination
N
on-regulatory policy fram
ew
ork
Self-regulatory and m
arket-oriented approach
Bottom
-up governance and decentralized nature of the 
Internet
 bottom
-up coordination
globally dispersed registrars
global distribution of registrars
electronic com
m
erce should be facilitated on a global ba
-
sis
representation of users and « international input »
representation of the stakeholders
m
inim
al governm
ent involvem
ent or intervention
openness, robustness, efficiency and fairness
stability
Pre-litigation resolution of potential IP-related disputes
Alphanum
eric stream
 can be used only by the ow
ner of 
dem
onstrable IP rights
predictable and sim
ple legal environm
ent, protect IP and 
facilitate dispute resolution
prom
pt and fair resolution of conflicts (including IP-rela-
ted conflicts)
quick adoption of the process
G
TLD
 adm
inistration and m
anagem
ent w
ill com
prise m
ul-
tiple com
peting registrars, globally dispersed, under a 
C
ouncil of R
egistrars (C
O
R
E) established by a M
em
o-
randum
 of U
nderstanding (C
O
R
E-M
O
U
).
IA
H
C
 delagates stew
ardship for the set of gTLD
s to the 
C
ouncil of registrars (C
O
R
E).
+ PO
C
The self-regulatory fram
ew
ork under this M
oU
 shall 
consist of :
- the D
epository of the gTLD
-M
oU
- a gTLD
 Policy Advisory Body (PAB)
- a gTLD
 Policy O
versight C
om
m
ittee (PO
C
)
- a C
ouncil of R
egistrar (C
O
R
E)
- Adm
inistrative D
om
ain N
am
e C
hallenge Panels (AC
Ps)
G
overnance of the dom
ain nam
e system
 (D
N
S
) rraises 
other im
portant issues unrelated to intellectual property ; 
The Adm
inistration supports private efforts to address In-
ternet governance issues including those related to do
-
m
ain nam
es and has form
ed an interagency w
orking 
group under the leadership of the D
epartm
ent of com
-
m
erce to study D
N
S issues ; Te w
orking group w
ill review
 
various D
N
S
 proposals, consulting w
ith private sector, 
consum
er ; professional, congressional and state go-
vernm
ent and international groups. The group w
ill consi-
der, in light of public input, (1) w
hat contribution govern-
m
ent m
ight m
ake, if any, to the developm
ent of a global 
com
petitive, m
arket-based system
 to register Internet 
dom
ain nam
es, and (2) how
 best to foster bottom
-up go
-
vernance of the Internet.
overall policy guidance and control of the TLD
s and the 
Internet root server system
 should be vested in a single 
organization that is representative of Internet users
gTLD
 D
N
S Policy O
versight C
om
ittee (P
O
C
) com
prising 
m
em
bers nam
ed by IS
O
C
 (2), IAN
A (2),IAB
 (2), IN
TA (1), 
W
IPO
 (1), ITU
 (1) and C
O
R
E (1), depository (1, ex offi-
cio)
private, not-for-profit corporation
Stew
ardship of the gTLD
 space is assigned to the gTLD
 
D
N
S Policy O
versight C
om
m
ittee (PO
C
)
The rôle of the Policy Advisory Board is to m
ake recom
-
m
endations to the Policy O
versight C
om
m
ittee regarding 
general policy m
atters relating to gTLD
s and the D
N
S 
and to advise the Policy O
versight C
om
m
ittee w
ith res-
pect to am
endm
ents to this M
oU
 and the C
O
R
E-M
oU
allocation of num
ber blocks to R
IR
s for the assignem
ent 
of Internet addresses
C
hanges to policy can be initiated by PO
C
 and enable 
upon the agreem
ent of ISO
C
 and IAN
A
, w
ith the review
 
of PAB and C
O
R
E. 
A com
m
ittee w
ill be establlished to conduct oversight of 
C
O
R
E and C
O
R
E-gTLD
s and to set policies for C
O
R
E 
and its R
egistrars consistent w
ith this M
oU
, to be com
pri-
sed of individuals and experts w
ho are recognized as col-
lectively know
ledgeable and expert in the related issues 
in order to provide the necessary policy oversight func-
tions.
The PO
C
 m
ay from
 tim
e to tim
e :
i. change the num
ber of gTLD
s and approve nam
es of 
new
 gTLD
s ;
ii.change the num
ber of R
egistrars, provided that appro
-
priate global geographic distribution of R
egistrars shall be 
preserved ;
Iii. E
stablish new
 term
s and conditions for applications by 
entities desiring to becom
e registrars, including, am
ong 
others, provisions for C
O
R
E
 to establish and collect fees 
for its registration and any other services it m
ay perform
 
in such am
ounts as it m
ay from
 tim
e to tim
e determ
ine ;
iv.recom
m
end to the PAB am
m
enm
ents to this M
oU
, in-
cluding but not lim
ited to, changes in the com
position of 
the PO
C
 ;
v. follow
ig consultation w
ith the PA
B and C
O
R
E, rem
ove 
registrars w
ho do not operate consistently w
ith the requi-
rem
ents of this M
oU
 and the C
O
R
E-M
oU
oversee the operation of an authoritative root server sys-
tem
C
O
R
E w
ill be responsible for providing com
m
on services 
am
ong the registrars, in particular operating a shared 
data base repository for the gTLD
 registries.
C
O
R
E
 shall establish and enforce requirem
ents that 
each registrar operate in all respects consistently w
ith the 
provision of this M
oU
, the C
O
R
E
 M
oU
 and decisions of 
the PO
C
Each C
O
R
E
-gTLD
 R
egistrar m
ay assign second level 
dom
ains in any gTLD
, described or created under the 
provisions of this M
oU
 and the C
O
R
E-M
oU
, on a fair.use, 
first-com
e, first-served basis.
determ
ine the circum
stances under w
hich new
 TLD
s are 
added to the root system
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D
ocum
ent
Version
D
ate
C
om
petences
ofthe
new
institution
Status of the new
 intitution
R
epresentation / Participation
G
TLD
-M
oU
IAH
C
 final report
G
TLD
-M
oU
1 July 1997
2 July 1997
W
hite Paper
Fram
ew
ork for e-com
m
erce
R
FC
 on Internet dom
ain nam
es
G
reen paper
4 February 1997
28 February 1997
30 January 1998
a gTLD
 D
N
S
 P
olicy Advisory Board (PAB
) is form
ed from
 
gTLD
-signatories, to obtain public and private sector 
consultation and review
 of PO
C
 and C
O
R
E activities.
Adm
inistrative D
om
ain N
am
e C
hallenge P
anels (AC
Ps) 
w
ill be established to adm
inister the policy [that protects 
IP related issue regardind SLD
s]
coordinate the developm
ent of other technical protocols 
param
eters as needed to m
aintain universal connectivity 
of the Internet
C
O
R
E w
ill operate as a Sw
iss non-profit organization.
C
O
R
E w
ill operate as a Sw
iss association (art. 60-79 of 
the Sw
iss C
ivil C
ode).
U
.S headquartered, incorporated under U
:S law
 as a not-
for-profit organization
U
p to 28 entities w
ill be selected as registrars. The selec-
tion w
ill use a regional quota m
echanism
, w
hereby up to 
four (4) qualified applicants w
ill be selected from
 each of 
seven (7) global regions. The regional structure used is 
defined by the W
orld Trade O
rganization.
board of directors form
 around the w
orld
participation of key stakeholders
represents the interests of IP registries, dom
ain nam
e re-
gistries, dom
ain nam
e registrars, the technical com
m
uni-
ty, and Internet users (com
m
ercial, not-for-profit, and in-
dividuals)
O
fficials of governem
ents or intergovernm
ental organiza-
tions should not serve on the board of the new
 corpora
-
tion
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D
ocum
ent
Version
D
ate
B
oard com
position
O
therbodies
ofthe
new
insitution
G
TLD
-M
oU
IAH
C
 final report
G
TLD
-M
oU
1 July 1997
2 July 1997
W
hite Paper
Fram
ew
ork for e-com
m
erce
R
FC
 on Internet dom
ain nam
es
G
reen paper
4 February 1997
28 February 1997
30 January 1998
gTLD
 D
N
S Policy O
versight C
om
ittee (P
O
C
) com
prising 
m
em
bers nam
ed by IS
O
C
 (2), IAN
A (2),IAB
 (2), IN
TA (1), 
W
IPO
 (1), ITU
 (1) and C
O
R
E (1), depository (1, ex offi-
cio)
IAN
A 2
ISO
C
 2
R
epresentative of the D
epository of this M
oU
 1
IAB 1
C
O
R
E 2
ITU
 1
W
IPO
 1
IN
TA 1
Interim
 PO
C
 (iPO
C
) shall consist of the regular (non ex-
officio) m
em
bers oif the IAH
C
15 m
em
ber-board : 3 directors (AR
IN
, A
PN
IC
 and R
IPE
), 
2 IAB (technical com
m
unity), 2 designated by a m
em
ber-
ship association representing dom
ain nam
e registries 
and registrars, 7 designated by a m
em
bership associa-
tion representing Internet users (at least one not-for-profit 
and one end users, and the rest m
ay be com
m
ercial 
users), 1 C
EO
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D
ocum
ent
Version
D
ate
N
ew
 gTLD
s
O
ther bodies of the new
 insitution
C
om
petitive functions
Status of existing gTLD
s /N
SI
G
TLD
-M
oU
IAH
C
 final report
G
TLD
-M
oU
1 July 1997
2 July 1997
W
hite Paper
Fram
ew
ork for e-com
m
erce
R
FC
 on Internet dom
ain nam
es
G
reen paper
4 February 1997
28 February 1997
30 January 1998
gTLD
 adm
inistration and m
anagem
ent w
ill com
prise m
ul-
tiple com
peting registrars, globally dispersed, under a 
C
ouncil of R
egistrars (C
O
R
E) established by a M
em
o-
randum
 of U
nderstanding (C
O
R
E-M
O
U
).
dom
ain nam
es and TLD
 registries should becom
e com
-
petitive and m
arket-driven
each registry be lim
ited to a single top-level dom
ain
Therefore, IAH
C
 w
ill develop an initially conservative ap-
proach to the num
ber of additional gTLD
s, through the 
initial expansion in the first annual round to a total of ten 
gTLD
s. This entails the creation of seven new
 gTLD
s.
an additional set of gTLD
s beyond the extant « .com
 », 
« .org » and « .net » gTLD
s in the D
N
S
 shall be created 
by iPO
C
expansion of TLD
s at a deliberate and controlled pace : 
up to five
It is intended that all existing gTLD
s eventually be sha-
red.
Pending the expiration or appropriate am
endm
ent to the 
cooperative agreem
ent under w
hich the « .com
 », 
« .org » and « .net » gTLD
s are presently adm
inistered, 
the « .com
 », « .org » and « .net » gTLD
s shall not be 
subject to the provisions of this M
oU
.
Likew
ise, until « .com
 », « .org » and « .net » gTLD
s are 
subject to the provisions of this M
oU
, the registrar w
hich 
adm
inister those gTLD
s shall not be considered to be a 
gTLD
 R
egistrar for the purposes of this M
oU
.
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D
ocum
ent
Version
D
ate
Transition
Tradem
ark issues
G
TLD
-M
oU
IAH
C
 final report
G
TLD
-M
oU
1 July 1997
2 July 1997
W
hite Paper
Fram
ew
ork for e-com
m
erce
R
FC
 on Internet dom
ain nam
es
G
reen paper
4 February 1997
28 February 1997
30 January 1998
C
O
R
E-M
oU
 (A
ppendix C
)
Intent to use the dom
ain nam
e : applicant affirm
s that he, 
she or it has a bona fide intent to use the dom
ain nam
e 
publicly w
ithin 60 days of registration, and to continue 
such use in the foreseeable future.
It m
ay be possible to create a contractually based self-
regulatory regim
e that deals w
ith potential conflicts bet-
w
een dom
ain nam
e usage and tradem
ark law
s on a glo
-
bal basis w
ithout the need to litigate. […
]
Accordingly, the U
nited S
tate sw
ill support efforts already 
underw
ay to create dom
estic and international fora for 
discussion of Internet-related tradem
ark issues. The Ad-
m
inistration also plans to seek public input on the resolu-
tion of tradem
ark disputes in the context of dom
ain 
nam
es.
dom
ain databases, on-line dispute resolution m
echa
-
nism
s
It is recognized that tradem
ark ow
ners have a legitim
ate 
interest, under national tradem
ark law
, in policing against 
infringrem
ent, and that SLD
s are capablée of infringing 
tradem
ark rights.
C
O
R
E-M
oU
 (A
ppendix C
)
Purpose of use of the dom
ain nam
e : applicant intend to 
use the dom
ain nam
e for the follow
ing purpose
com
m
ents needed on TM
 clearance system
s and juris-
diction issues
[current] approach is incinsistent w
ith basic tenets of tra-
dem
ark law
s and principles of equity and fair play.
C
O
R
E-M
oU
 (A
ppendix C
)
R
eason for requesting the dom
ain nam
e : applicant re
-
quests this dom
ain nam
e for the follow
ing reason (check 
one) :
- conform
s to applicant's nam
e or variation thereof
- conform
s the applicant's tradem
ark or variation thereof
- other (provide expanation)
w
e stop short of proposals that could significantly lim
it the 
flexibility of the Internet, such as w
aiting periods or not al-
low
ing any new
 TLD
the IA
H
C
 believes that a sixty (60) day pre-registration 
period w
ould be beneficial to all stakeholders. A 60 day 
pre-registration publication period should operate to en
-
courage early pre-litigation resolution of potential dis-
putes, to provide a dom
ain nam
e holder a stronger de
-
fense against a subsequent challenge by a tradem
ark 
ow
ner and to m
inim
ize registry involvem
ent in litigation. 
H
ow
ever, in response to public com
m
ent received, and 
upon further considerations, the IAH
C
 has determ
ined 
that this 60 day period should be voluntary, at the choice 
of the applicant, or at the choice of any registrar that 
chooses to im
plem
ent a 60 day pre-registration period for 
all SLD
s it registers.
C
ore-M
oU
 (Appendix C
) 
Applicant requests the 60-day w
aiting period.
W
e also do not propose to establish a m
onolithic TM
 dis-
pute resolution process at this tim
e, registries responsible 
for TM
 protection beyond the m
inim
um
 procedures
the IA
H
C
 also recognizes that C
O
R
E registrars are not 
the appropriate entities to enforce this policy. The policy 
is to be enforced, rather, by m
eans of Adm
inistrative D
o-
m
ain N
am
e C
hallenge Panels. These panels do not sub
-
stitute for national or regional sovereign courts ; they 
have authority over the dom
ain nam
es only, not the par-
ties. U
nlike courts, how
ever, the challenge panels w
ould 
have the ability to exclude certain nam
es, such as w
orld-
w
ide fam
ous tradem
arks, from
 all the C
O
R
E gTLD
s.
[…
] the relevant tradem
ark authority in that country 
create a tradem
ark-specific sub-dom
ain w
ithin the IS
O
 
3166 country code top-level-dom
ain.
[…
] an appropriate international tradem
ark adm
inistration 
organization, such as W
IPO
, the responsibility for the 
creation of an international tradem
ark-related dom
ain 
nam
e space, under the international subdom
ain 
« .tm
.int »
C
O
R
E-M
oU
 (A
ppendix C
)
AC
P + W
IPO
 O
nline E
xpedited A
dm
inistration R
ule 5if 
m
ediqtion does not succeed w
ithin 30 days)
The IAH
C
 believes that the establishm
ent of tradem
ark-
specific dom
ain nam
es is desirable, for exam
ple to allow
 
for voluntary registration of such nam
es by tradem
ark 
ow
ners w
ho are precluded, by the first-com
e first-served 
nature of current gTLD
 registration, form
 otherw
ise obtai-
ning such dom
ain nam
es, or w
ho otherw
ise choose to 
obtain a tradem
ark-specific dom
ain nam
e. Such a trade-
m
ark-specific dom
ain space w
ould provide an assurance 
that the dom
ain nam
e reflects valid tradem
ark right.
m
inim
um
 procedures : sufficent ow
ner and contact infor-
m
ation, certification statem
ent, searchable database w
ith 
sim
ple easy to use standardized and accessible search 
interface, updated ow
nerhip, contact and use inform
ation, 
alternative dispute resolution of dom
ain nam
e conflicts
This M
oU
 shall enter into force from
 the date that it has 
been signed by both the IAN
A and the ISO
C
.
U
.S governm
ent w
ill im
plem
ent som
e changes (new
 
gTLD
s) etc. (PR
EC
ISER
)
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D
ocum
ent
Version
D
ate
Principles
Type of new
 institution
C
om
petences of the new
 institution
5 June 1998
17 July 1998
4 August 1998
24 August 1998
W
hite
Paper
IC
A
N
N
 bylaw
s
W
hite paper
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 1
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 2
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 3
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 4
17 Septem
ber 1998
com
petition
private coordination
 bottom
-up coordination
representation of stakeholders
stability
M
aintaining the stability of the Internet by :
M
aintaining the stability of the Internet by :
pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening 
the burden of  governm
ent in providing for the operatoinal 
stability of the Internet infrastructure by
private, not-for-profit corporation, the U
.S continues to be-
lieve, as do m
ost com
m
entors, that neither national go-
vernem
ents nor intergovernem
ental organizations acting 
as representatives of gobvernem
ents should participate 
in the m
anagem
ent of Internet nam
es and addresses.
(i) coordinating the assignem
ent of Internet technical pa-
ram
eters as needed to m
aintain universal connectivity on 
the Internet
(i) coordinating the assignem
ent of Internet technical pa-
ram
eters as needed to m
aintain universal connectivity on 
the Internet
(i) coordinating the assignem
ent of Internet technical pa-
ram
eters as needed to m
aintain universal connectivity on 
the Internet
allocation of num
ber blocks to R
IR
s for the assignem
ent 
of Internet addresses
(ii) m
anaging and perform
ing the functions related to the 
coordination of Internet address space
(ii) m
anaging and perform
ing the functions related to the 
coordination of Internet address space
(ii) perform
ing and overseeing functions related to the 
coordination of the Internet protocol address space
oversee the operation of an authoritative root server sys-
tem
(iii) m
anaging and perform
ing functions related to the co
-
ordination of the Internet dom
ain nam
e system
, including 
overseeing policies for determ
ining the circum
stances 
under w
hich new
 top-level dom
ains are added to the root 
system
(iii) m
anaging and perform
ing functions related to the co
-
ordination of the Internet dom
ain nam
e system
, including 
overseeing policies for determ
ining the circum
stances 
under w
hich new
 top-level dom
ains are added to the root 
system
(iii) perform
ing and overseeing functions related to the 
coordination of the the functions related to the coordina
-
tion of the Internet dom
ain nam
e space, including the de
-
velopm
ent of policies for determ
ining circum
stances un-
der w
hich new
 TLD
 are added to the D
N
S root sw
stem
determ
ine the circum
stances under w
hich new
 TLD
s are 
added to the root system
(iv) overseeing operation of the authorative Internet root 
server system
(iv) overseeing operation of the authorative Internet root 
server system
(iv) overseeing operation of the authorative Internet root 
server system
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D
ocum
ent
Version
D
ate
C
om
petences
ofthe
new
institution
Status of the new
 intitution
R
epresentation / Participation
5 June 1998
17 July 1998
4 August 1998
24 August 1998
W
hite
Paper
IC
A
N
N
 bylaw
s
W
hite paper
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 1
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 2
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 3
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 4
17 Septem
ber 1998
coordinate the assignem
ent of other technical param
e-
ters as needed to m
aintain universal connectivity of the 
Internet (recognition of the rôle of the IETF)
(v) engaging in any other law
ful activity in furtherance of 
item
s (i) throufh (iv)
(v) engaging in any other law
ful activity in furtherance of 
item
s (i) throufh (iv)
(v) engaging in any other law
ful activity in furtherance of 
item
s (i) throufh (iv)
(vi) engaging in other law
ful act or activity for w
hich a 
corporation m
ay be organized under the N
onprofit P
ublic 
Benefit C
orporation Law.
(vi) engaging in other law
ful act or activity for w
hich a 
corporation m
ay be organized under the N
onprofit P
ublic 
Benefit C
orporation Law.
the U
.S governem
ent w
ill not provide full antitrust im
m
u-
nity to the new
 corporation
A C
alifornia N
onprofit Public Benefit C
orporation
A C
alifornia N
onprofit Public Benefit C
orporation
A C
alifornia N
onprofit Public Benefit C
orporation
no m
ore than one-half of the total num
ber of all D
irectors 
serving at a given tim
e shall be from
 any one region
no m
ore than one-half of the total num
ber of At Large D
i-
rectors serving at a given tim
e shall be residents from
 
any one geographic region.
no m
ore than one-half of the total num
ber of At Large D
i-
rectors serving at a given tim
e shall be residents from
 
any one geographic region.
M
em
bership :
This article is reserved for use should the corporation 
elect to have m
em
bers in the future.
N
om
inate candidates [to the board] should represent the 
broad and diverse interests of the Internet com
m
unity, in-
cluding but not lim
ited to, address registries, protocol and 
dom
ain nam
e registries, dom
ain nam
e registrars, the 
technical com
m
unity, Internet users, and geographic di-
versity.
N
o elected or appointed official of a national governm
ent 
or a m
ultinational entity (other than m
ultinational entities 
w
ith exclusively scientific or technical m
issions° establi-
shed by treaty or other agreem
ent betw
een national go
-
vernm
ents m
ay serve as a D
irector. A
s used herein, the 
term
 « official » m
eans a person (i) w
ho is elected by citi-
zens of a nation or (ii) w
ho is em
ployed by such govern-
m
ent or m
ultinational entity and w
hose prim
ary function 
w
ith such governm
ent or entity is to develop or influence 
governm
ental or public policies.
N
o official of a national governm
ent or a m
ultinational en
-
tity established by treaty or other agreem
ent betw
een na-
tional governm
ents m
ay serve as a D
irector.
 As used herein, the term
 « official » m
eans a person (i) 
w
ho is elected by citizens of a nation or (ii) w
ho is em
-
ployed by such governm
ent or m
ultinational entity and 
w
hose prim
ary function w
ith such governm
ent or entity is 
to develop or influence governm
ental or public policies.
The S
upporting O
rganizations shall serve as advisory 
bodies to the Board […
] There shall at least be the follo-
w
ing Supporting O
rganizations : 
(a) The Address Supporting O
rganization shall be com
-
posed of representatives from
 regional Internet address 
registries and other entities or individuals w
ith legitim
ate 
interests in these issues
(b) The D
om
ain N
am
e Supporting O
rganization shall be 
com
posed of representatives from
 nam
e registries and 
registrars of generic/global and country-code top-level 
dom
ains
(c) The Protocol Supporting O
rganization shall be com
-
posed of representatives from
  Internet protocol organiza-
tions
(d) The Industry/U
ser Supporting organization shall be 
com
posed of representatives of organizations that re-
present Internet users.
Each supporting organization shall (i) select the Board 
m
em
bers to be nom
inated by the supporting organization 
through a process determ
ined by the supporting organi-
zation and ratified by the Board, and (ii) notify the board 
and the secretary of the C
orporation in w
riting of those 
selections at least 30 days prior to the date on w
hich the 
Board votes on such nom
inee(s). The Board shall elect 
as D
irectors the persons properly nom
inated by the Sup-
porting organization.
At Large m
em
bers other than those serving on the Initial 
Board shall be elected by a process, w
hich shall include 
soliciting nom
inations from
 Internet users and industry 
participants organizations representing such and due 
consideration of such nom
inees, to be determ
ined by a 
m
ajority vote of all At Large m
em
bers of the initial Board, 
follow
ing solicitation of input from
 all interested parties 
and consideration of all suggestions. 
Each supporting organization shall (i) select the Board 
m
em
bers to be nom
inated by the supporting organization 
through a process determ
ined by the supporting organi-
zation and ratified by the B
oard, and (ii) notify the board 
and the secretary of the C
orporation in w
riting of those 
selections at least 30 days prior to the date on w
hich the 
Board votes on such nom
inee(s). The B
oard shall elect 
as D
irectors the persons properly nom
inated by the Sup-
porting organization.
At Large m
em
bers other than those serving on the Initial 
Board shall be elected by a process, w
hich shall include 
soliciting nom
inations from
 Internet users and industry 
participants organizations representing such and due 
consideration of such nom
inees, to be determ
ined by a 
m
ajority vote of all A
t Large m
em
bers of the initial Board, 
follow
ing solicitation of input from
 all interested parties 
and consideration of all suggestions. 
Transparency :
The corporation and its subordinate entities shall operate 
to the m
axim
um
 extent possible in an open and transpa
-
rent m
anner. The B
oard shall publish, at least annualy, a 
report […
] M
inutes of Board, Supporting O
rganization, 
C
ouncil and C
om
m
ittee m
eetings shall be m
ade publicly 
available.
Transparency :
The corporation and its subordinate entities shall operate 
to the m
axim
um
 extent possible in an open and transpa
-
rent m
anner and consistent w
ith procedures designed to 
ensure fairness.
The Board shall publish, at least annualy, a report […
] all 
m
inutes of Board, Supporting O
rganization, (and any 
council thereof) l and C
om
m
ittees m
eetings shall be 
m
ade publicly available.
The Board shall adopt policies and procedures through 
w
hich a party affected by an action of the Board can seek 
reconsideration of any board action.
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ocum
ent
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D
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B
oard com
position
O
therbodies
ofthe
new
insitution
5 June 1998
17 July 1998
4 August 1998
24 August 1998
W
hite
Paper
IC
A
N
N
 bylaw
s
W
hite paper
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 1
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 2
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 3
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 4
17 Septem
ber 1998
Interim
 board consisting of individuals representing the 
functional and geographic diversity of the Internet com
-
m
unity. The Interim
 board w
ould likely need access to le-
gal counsel w
ith expertise in corporate law, com
petition 
law, IP law, and em
erging Internet law. Interim
 board es-
tablishing a system
 for electing a Board of D
irectors for 
the new
 corporation that insures that the new
 xorpora
-
tion's Board of D
irectors reflects the geographical and 
functional diversity of the Internet, and is sufficiently 
flexible to perm
it evolution to reflect changes in the 
constituency of Internet stakeholders. N
om
inations to the 
Board of D
irectors should preserve as m
uch as possible 
the tradition of bottom
-up governance
The initial board of directors shall consist of no few
er 
than five and no m
ore than 15 directors. […
] E
ach borad 
after the initial board shall be com
prised as follow
s :
3 directors nom
inated by the Address supporting O
rgani-
zation
3 directors nom
inated by the D
om
ain N
am
e Supporting 
O
rganization
3 directors nom
inated by the Protocol Supporting O
rgani-
zation
6 directors nom
inated by hte Internet Industry/U
ser Sup-
porting O
rganization
The initial Board shall consist of nine At large m
em
bers. 
[…
]
The authorized num
ber of directors shall be no less than 
nine and no m
ore than nineteen.
3 directors nom
inated by the Address supporting O
rgani-
zation
3 directors nom
inated by the D
om
ain N
am
e Supporting 
O
rganization
3 directors nom
inated by the Protocol Supporting O
rgani-
zation. 
N
ine At large directors, selected pursuant to a process to 
be established by a m
ajority vote of all the At Large 
Board m
em
bers of the Initial Board.
The person w
ho shall be, from
 tim
e to tim
e, the President 
of the corporation.
The initial Board shall consist of nine At large m
em
bers. 
[…
], the president (w
hen qppointed) and those directors 
that have been nom
inated in accordance w
ith these by
-
law
s.
The authorized num
ber of directors shall be no less than 
nine and no m
ore than nineteen.
3 directors nom
inated by the Address supporting O
rgani-
zation
3 directors nom
inated by the D
om
ain N
am
e Supporting 
O
rganization
3 directors nom
inated by the Protocol Supporting O
rgani-
zation. 
N
ine At large directors, selected pursuant to a process to 
be established by a m
ajority vote of all the A
t Large 
Board m
em
bers of the Initial Board.
The person w
ho shall be, from
 tim
e to tim
e, the President 
of the corporation.
The S
upporting O
rganizations shall serve as advisory 
bodies to the Board […
] There shall at least be the follo-
w
ing Supporting O
rganizations : 
(a) The Address Supporting O
rganization shall be com
-
posed of representatives from
 regional Internet address 
registries and other entities or individuals w
ith legitim
ate 
interests in these issues
(b) The D
om
ain N
am
e Supporting O
rganization shall be 
com
posed of representatives from
 nam
e registries and 
registrars of generic/global and country-code top-level 
dom
ains
(c) The Protocol Supporting O
rganization shall be com
-
posed of representatives from
  Internet protocol organiza-
tions
(d) The Industry/U
ser Supporting organization shall be 
com
posed of representatives of organizations that re-
present Internet users.
The supporting organizationsshall serve as advisory
bodies to the Board and shallhave
such
pow
er and 
duties asm
ay be
prescribed by the Board and these
bylaw
s. […
] A Supporting O
rganization m
ay not 
have obligations to any other entity inconsistent w
ith 
its duties to the Corporation. […
] Each supporting 
O
rganization shall be responsible for nom
inating di-
rectors for election to those seats on the Bard desig-
nated to be filled by aech Supporting O
rganization.
The Supporting organizations shall be delegated the 
prim
ary responsibility for developing and recom
end-
ing policies and procedures regarding those m
atters 
w
ithin their individual scope (as defined by the 
Board in its recognition of each such Supporting O
r-
ganization).
There shall be at least the follow
ing Supporting O
r-
ganizations :
(i) The A
ddress Supporting O
rganization shall be 
com
posed of representatives from
 regional Internet 
registries and any entities w
ith legitim
ate interests in 
these issues […
] shall create an A
ddress Council to 
m
ake recom
m
endations to the Board regading the 
operation assignem
ent and m
anagem
ent of Internet 
addresses and related subjects.
(ii)The D
om
ain N
am
e Supporting O
rganization shall 
be com
posed of representatives from
  registries and 
registrars of TLD
s, businesses and any entities that 
are users of the Internet and any other entities w
ith 
legitim
ate interests in these issues […
] shall create a 
N
am
es C
ouncil to m
ake recom
m
endations regading 
TLD
s including the operation, assignem
ent and 
m
anagem
ent of the D
N
S and other related subjects.
(iii)The Protocol Supporting O
rganization shall be 
com
posed of representatives from
 Internet protocol 
organizations and any other entities w
ith legitim
ate 
interests in these issues […
] shall create a Protocol 
Council to m
ake recom
m
endations regading the op-
eration, assignem
ent and m
anagem
ent of protocol
param
eter, such as port num
bers, entreprise num
-
bers, other technical param
eters and related subjects.
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D
ocum
ent
Version
D
ate
N
ew
 gTLD
s
O
ther bodies of the new
 insitution
C
om
petitive functions
Status of existing gTLD
s /N
SI
5 June 1998
17 July 1998
4 August 1998
24 August 1998
W
hite
Paper
IC
A
N
N
 bylaw
s
W
hite paper
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 1
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 2
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 3
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 4
17 Septem
ber 1998
The B
oard m
ay establish one or m
ore com
m
ittees. 
C
om
m
ittees are of tw
o kinds : those having legal authori-
ty to act for the C
orporation, know
n as C
om
m
ittees of the 
Board, and those that do not have that authority, know
n 
as advisory com
m
itteees.
The Board m
ay establish one or m
ore com
m
ittees. 
C
om
m
ittees are of tw
o kinds : those having legal author-
ity to act for the C
orporation, know
n as C
om
m
ittees of 
the B
oard, and those that do not have that authority, 
know
n as advisory com
m
itteees.
There shall be at least the follow
ing Advisory C
om
m
it-
tees :
(a) There shall be a G
overnm
ental Advisory C
om
m
ittee. 
M
em
bers of the G
AC
 shall be representatives of national 
governm
ents, m
ultinational governm
antal organizations 
and treaty organizations, each of w
hich m
ay appoint one 
representative to the C
om
m
ittee. The G
AC
 should con
-
sider and provide advice on the activities of the C
orpora-
tion as they relate to concerns of governm
ents, particu-
larly m
atters w
here there m
ay be an interaction betw
een 
the C
orporation's policies and various law
s, and interna
-
tional agreem
ents. The m
em
bers of the G
A
C
 should also 
provide a liason function betw
een their governm
ents or 
m
ultinational governm
ental organization and the C
orpora
-
tion.
(b) There shall be a D
N
S R
oot Server System
 Advisory 
C
om
m
ittee. The R
oot Server System
 Advisory C
om
m
it-
tee should exam
ine and advise on the security aspects of 
the root nam
e server system
. Further, the R
SS
A
C
 should 
review
 the num
ber location, and distribution of root nam
e 
servers considering the total system
 perform
ance, ro-
bustness, and reliability.
registrars should com
pete but the issue of registries 
com
petition should be left for further consideration and fi-
nal action by the new
 corporation. The U
.S governm
ent is 
of the view
, how
ever, that com
petitive system
s generally 
result in greater innovation, consum
er choice, and satis-
faction in the long run. 
The corporation shall not act as a D
N
S registry or regis-
trar or IP address registry in com
petition w
ith entities af-
fected by the policies of the corporation.
The corporation shall not act as a D
N
S registry or regis-
trar or IP address registry in com
petition w
ith entities af-
fected by the policies of the corporation.
w
e agree w
ith the m
any com
m
enters w
ho said that the 
new
 corporation w
ould be the m
ost appropriate body to 
m
ake these decisions based on global input. Accordingly, 
as supported by the preponderence of com
m
ents, the 
U
.S governem
ent w
ill not im
plem
ent new
 gTLD
s at this 
tim
e.
expansion of TLD
s at a deliberate and controlled pace
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ocum
ent
Version
D
ate
Transition
Tradem
ark issues
5 June 1998
17 July 1998
4 August 1998
24 August 1998
W
hite
Paper
IC
A
N
N
 bylaw
s
W
hite paper
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 1
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 2
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 3
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 4
17 Septem
ber 1998
the U
.S
 governem
ent w
ill seek international support to 
call upon the W
IPO
 to intiate a balanced and transparent 
process, w
hich includes the participation of TM
 holders 
and m
em
bers of the Internet com
m
unity w
ho are not TM
 
holders (…
)
(…
) to develop recom
m
endations for a uniform
 approach 
to resolving TM
/dom
ain nam
e disputes ; recom
end a 
process for protecting fam
ous TM
 in the gTLD
s and eva-
luate the effects of adding new
 gTLD
s and related dis-
pute resolution procedures on TM
 and IP holders.
dom
ain nam
e registrants pay registration fees at the tim
e 
of registration or renew
al and agree to subm
it infringing 
dom
ain nam
es to the authority of a court of law
 in the ju-
risdiction in w
hich the registry, registry database, regis-
trar, or the « A » root server are located.
R
egistrant w
ould agree to subm
it to and be bound by al-
ternative dispute resolution system
s for cases of cyberpi-
racy or cybersquatting.
R
egistrants w
ould agree to abide by processes that ex-
clude, either pro-actively or retroactively, certain fam
ous 
TM
 from
 being used as dom
ain nam
es except by the de
-
signated TM
 holder.
N
othing in the dom
ain nam
e registration agreem
ent or in 
the operation of the new
 corporation should lim
it the 
rights that can be asserted by a dom
ain nam
e registrant 
or TM
 ow
ner under national law
s.
435
D
ocum
ent
Version
D
ate
Principles
Type of new
 institution
C
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 institution
IC
A
N
N
 M
oU
 
IC
AN
N
 M
oU
IC
AN
N
  
IC
A
N
N
bylaw
s
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 5
IC
AN
N
 adopted bylaw
s
Iteration 6
R
evised IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s
28 Septem
ber 1998
6 N
ovem
ber 1998
23 N
ovem
ber 1998
25 N
ovem
ber 1998
com
petition
private sector m
anagem
ent
 bottom
-up coordination
representation of users, solicit both dom
estic and interna-
tional im
put
stability
pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening 
the burden of  governm
ent in providing for the operatoinal 
stability of the Internet infrastructure by
pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening 
the burden of  governm
ent in providing for the operatoinal 
stability of the Internet infrastructure by
pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening 
the burden of  governm
ent in providing for the operatoinal 
stability of the Internet infrastructure by
(i) coordinating the assignem
ent of Internet technical pa-
ram
eters as needed to m
aintain universal connectivity on 
the Internet
(i) coordinating the assignem
ent of Internet technical pa-
ram
eters as needed to m
aintain universal connectivity on 
the Internet
(i) coordinating the assignem
ent of Internet technical pa-
ram
eters as needed to m
aintain universal connectivity on 
the Internet
(i) coordinating the assignem
ent of Internet technical pa-
ram
eters as needed to m
aintain universal connectivity on 
the Internet
(ii) perform
ing and overseeing functions related to the 
coordination of the Internet protocol address space
(ii) perform
ing and overseeing functions related to the 
coordination of the Internet protocol address space
(ii) perform
ing and overseeing functions related to the 
coordination of the Internet protocol address space
(ii) perform
ing and overseeing functions related to the 
coordination of the Internet protocol address space
(iii) perform
ing and overseeing functions related to the 
coordination of the the functions related to the coordina
-
tion of the Internet dom
ain nam
e space, including the de
-
velopm
ent of policies for determ
ining circum
stances un-
der w
hich new
 TLD
 are added to the D
N
S root sw
stem
(iii) perform
ing and overseeing functions related to the 
coordination of the the functions related to the coordina
-
tion of the Internet dom
ain nam
e space, including the de
-
velopm
ent of policies for determ
ining circum
stances un-
der w
hich new
 TLD
 are added to the D
N
S root sw
stem
(iii) perform
ing and overseeing functions related to the 
coordination of the the functions related to the coordina
-
tion of the Internet dom
ain nam
e space, including the de
-
velopm
ent of policies for determ
ining circum
stances un-
der w
hich new
 TLD
 are added to the D
N
S root sw
stem
(iii) perform
ing and overseeing functions related to the 
coordination of the the functions related to the coordina
-
tion of the Internet dom
ain nam
e space, including the de
-
velopm
ent of policies for determ
ining circum
stances un-
der w
hich new
 TLD
 are added to the D
N
S root sw
stem
(iv) overseeing operation of the authorative Internet root 
server system
(iv) overseeing operation of the authorative Internet root 
server system
(iv) overseeing operation of the authorative Internet root 
server system
(iv) overseeing operation of the authorative Internet root 
server system
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N
N
 M
oU
 
IC
AN
N
 M
oU
IC
A
N
N
bylaw
s
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 5
IC
AN
N
 adopted bylaw
s
Iteration 6
R
evised IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s
28 Septem
ber 1998
6 N
ovem
ber 1998
23 N
ovem
ber 1998
25 N
ovem
ber 1998
(v) engaging in any other law
ful activity in furtherance of 
item
s (i) throufh (iv)
(v) engaging in any other law
ful activity in furtherance of 
item
s (i) throufh (iv)
(v) engaging in any other law
ful activity in furtherance of 
item
s (i) throufh (iv)
(v) engaging in any other law
ful activity in furtherance of 
item
s (i) throufh (iv)
A C
alifornia N
onprofit Public Benefit C
orporation
A C
alifornia N
onprofit Public Benefit C
orporation
A C
alifornia N
onprofit Public Benefit C
orporation
no m
ore than one-half of the total num
ber of At Large D
i-
rectors serving at a given tim
e shall be residents from
 
any one geographic region and no m
ore than tw
o of the 
directors nom
inated by each S
upporting O
rganization 
shall be residents of any one geographic region.
no m
ore than one-half of the total num
ber of At Large D
i-
rectors serving at a given tim
e shall be residents from
 
any one geographic region and no m
ore than tw
o of the 
directors nom
inated by each S
upporting O
rganization 
shall be residents of any one geographic region.
To the extent practicable, regular m
eetings should be 
held in different locations aroud the w
orld on a regular 
basis.
(1)at least one citizen of a country located i each of the 
gographic regions […
] shall serve on the B
oard (other 
than the initial Board) at all tim
es
(2) no m
ore than one-half of the total num
ber of A
t Large 
directors serving at any given tim
e shall be citizens of 
countries located in any one geographic region
(3) no m
ore than one-half of the total num
ber of D
irec-
tors, in the aggregate, elected after nom
ination by the 
Supporting O
rganizations shall be citizens of countries 
located in any one geographic region. […
]
This section shall be revised fro, tim
e to tim
e (but at least 
ecery three years) to determ
ine w
hether any change is 
appropriate, taking account of the evolution of the Inter-
net.[...]
To the extent practicable, regular m
eetings should be 
held in different locations aroud the w
orld on a regular 
basis.
M
em
bership :
This article is reserved for use should the corporation 
elect to have m
em
bers in the future.
M
em
bership :
This article is reserved for use w
hen the corporation has 
m
em
bers.
M
em
bership :
This article is reserved for use w
hen the corporation has 
m
em
bers.
N
o official of a national governm
ent or a m
ultinational en
-
tity established by treaty or other agreem
ent betw
een na
-
tional governm
ents m
ay serve as a D
irector.
 As used herein, the term
 « official » m
eans a person (i) 
w
ho is elected by citizens of a nation or (ii) w
ho is em
-
ployed by such governm
ent or m
ultinational entity and 
w
hose prim
ary function w
ith such governm
ent or entity is 
to develop or influence governm
ental or public policies.
N
o official of a national governm
ent or a m
ultinational en
-
tity established by treaty or other agreem
ent betw
een na-
tional governm
ents m
ay serve as a D
irector.
 As used herein, the term
 « official » m
eans a person (i) 
w
ho holds an elective governm
ental office (ii) w
ho is em
-
ployed by such governm
ent or m
ultinational entity and 
w
hose prim
ary function w
ith such governm
ent or entity is 
to develop or influence governm
ental or public policies.
N
o official of a national governm
ent or a m
ultinational en
-
tity established by treaty or other agreem
ent betw
een na-
tional governm
ents m
ay serve as a D
irector.
 As used herein, the term
 « official » m
eans a person (i) 
w
ho holds an elective governm
ental office (ii) w
ho is em
-
ployed by such governm
ent or m
ultinational entity and 
w
hose prim
ary function w
ith such governm
ent or entity is 
to develop or influence governm
ental or public policies.
Transparency :
The corporation and its subordinate entities shall operate 
to the m
axim
um
 extent possible in an open and transpa
-
rent m
anner and consistent w
ith procedures designed to 
ensure fairness.
The B
oard shall publish, at least annualy, a report […
] all 
m
inutes of B
oard, S
upporting O
rganization, (and any 
council thereof) l and C
om
m
ittees m
eetings shall be 
m
ade publicly available.
The Board shall adopt policies and procedures through 
w
hich a party affected by an action of the B
oard can seek 
reconsideration of any board action.
Transparency :
The corporation and its subordinate entities shall operate 
to the m
axim
um
 extent possible in an open and transpa
-
rent m
anner and consistent w
ith procedures designed to 
ensure fairness.
[…
] all m
inutes of Board, Supporting O
rganization, (and 
any council thereof) l and C
om
m
ittees m
eetings shall be 
m
ade publicly available.
The Board shall adopt policies and procedures through 
w
hich a party affected by an action of the C
orporation 
can seek reconsideration of any board action.
Transparency :
The corporation and its subordinate entities shall operate 
to the m
axim
um
 extent possible in an open and transpa
-
rent m
anner and consistent w
ith procedures designed to 
ensure fairness.
The Board shall publish, at least annualy, a report […
] all 
m
inutes of Board, Supporting O
rganization, (and any 
council thereof) l and C
om
m
ittees m
eetings shall be 
m
ade publicly available.
Any person affected by an action of the C
orporation m
ay 
request review
 or reconsideration of that action by the 
Board. The B
oard shall adopt policies and procedures 
governing such review
 or reconsideration.
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D
ocum
ent
Version
D
ate
B
oard com
position
O
therbodies
ofthe
new
insitution
IC
A
N
N
 M
oU
 
IC
AN
N
 M
oU
IC
A
N
N
bylaw
s
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 5
IC
AN
N
 adopted bylaw
s
Iteration 6
R
evised IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s
28 Septem
ber 1998
6 N
ovem
ber 1998
23 N
ovem
ber 1998
25 N
ovem
ber 1998
The initial Board shall consist of nine At large m
em
bers. 
[…
], the president (w
hen qppointed) and those directors 
that have been nom
inated in accordance w
ith these by-
law
s.
The authorized num
ber of directors shall be no less than 
nine and no m
ore than nineteen.
3 directors nom
inated by the Address supporting O
rgani-
zation
3 directors nom
inated by the D
om
ain N
am
e Supporting 
O
rganization
3 directors nom
inated by the Protocol Supporting O
rgani-
zation. 
N
ine At large directors, selected pursuant to a process to 
be established by a m
ajority vote of all the At Large 
Board m
em
bers of the Initial Board.
The person w
ho shall be, from
 tim
e to tim
e, the P
resident 
of the corporation.
The initial Board shall consist of nine At large m
em
bers. 
[…
], the president (w
hen qppointed) and those directors 
that have been nom
inated in accordance w
ith these by
-
law
s.
The authorized num
ber of directors shall be no less than 
nine and no m
ore than nineteen.
3 directors nom
inated by the Address supporting O
rgani-
zation
3 directors nom
inated by the D
om
ain N
am
e Supporting 
O
rganization
3 directors nom
inated by the Protocol Supporting O
rgani-
zation. 
N
ine At large directors, selected pursuant to a process to 
be established by a m
ajority vote of all the A
t Large 
Board m
em
bers of the Initial Board.
The person w
ho shall be, from
 tim
e to tim
e, the President 
of the corporation.
The supporting organizations shall serve as advisory bod-
ies to the B
oard and shall have such pow
er and duties as 
m
ay be prescribed by the Board and these bylaw
s. […
] A 
Supporting O
rganization m
ay not have obligations to any 
other entity inconsistent w
ith its duties to the C
orporation. 
[…
] E
ach supporting O
rganization shall be responsible 
for nom
inating directors for election to those seats on the 
Bard designated to be filled by aech Supporting O
rgani-
zation.
The Supporting organizations shall be delegated the pri-
m
ary responsibility for developing and recom
ending poli-
cies and procedures regarding those m
atters w
ithin their 
individual scope (as defined by the Board in its recogni-
tion of each such Supporting O
rganization).
There shall be at least the follow
ing Supporting O
rganiza
-
tions :
(i) The Address Supporting O
rganization shall be com
-
posed of representatives from
 regional Internet registries 
and any entities w
ith legitim
ate interests in these issues 
[…
] shall create an Address C
ouncil to m
ake recom
m
en-
dations to the B
oard regading the operation assignem
ent 
and m
anagem
ent of Internet addresses and related sub
-
jects.
(ii)The D
om
ain N
am
e Supporting O
rganization shall be 
com
posed of representatives from
  registries and regis-
trars of TLD
s, businesses and any entities that are users 
of the Internet and any other entities w
ith legitim
ate inter-
ests in these issues […
] shall create a N
am
es C
ouncil to 
m
ake recom
m
endations regading TLD
s including the op
-
eration, assignem
ent and m
anagem
ent of the D
N
S and 
other related subjects.
(iii)The Protocol Supporting O
rganization shall be com
-
posed of representatives from
 Internet protocol organiza-
tions and any other entities w
ith legitim
ate interests in 
these issues […
] shall create a P
rotocol C
ouncil to m
ake 
recom
m
endations regading the operation, assignem
ent 
and m
anagem
ent of protocol param
eter, such as port 
num
bers, entreprise num
bers, other technical param
eters 
and related subjects.
The supporting organizations shall serve as advisory bod-
ies to the Board and shall have such pow
er and duties as 
m
ay be prescribed by the Board and these bylaw
s. […
] A 
Supporting O
rganization m
ay not have obligations to any 
other entity inconsistent w
ith its duties to the C
orporation. 
[…
] E
ach supporting O
rganization shall be responsible 
for nom
inating directors for election to those seats on the 
Bard designated to be filled by aech Supporting O
rgani-
zation.
The Supporting organizations shall be delegated the pri-
m
ary responsibility for developing and recom
ending poli-
cies and procedures regarding those m
atters w
ithin their 
individual scope (as defined by the Board in its recogni-
tion of each such Supporting O
rganization).
There shall be at least the follow
ing Supporting O
rganiza
-
tions :
(i) The Address Supporting O
rganization shall be com
-
posed of representatives from
 regional Internet registries 
and any entities w
ith legitim
ate interests in these issues 
[…
] shall create an Address C
ouncil to m
ake recom
m
en-
dations to the B
oard regading the operation assignem
ent 
and m
anagem
ent of Internet addresses and related sub
-
jects.
(ii)The D
om
ain N
am
e Supporting O
rganization shall be 
com
posed of representatives from
  registries and regis-
trars of TLD
s, businesses and any entities that are users 
of the Internet and any other entities w
ith legitim
ate inter-
ests in these issues […
] shall create a N
am
es C
ouncil to 
m
ake recom
m
endations regading TLD
s including the op
-
eration, assignem
ent and m
anagem
ent of the D
N
S
 and 
other related subjects.
(iii)The Protocol Supporting O
rganization shall be com
-
posed of representatives from
 Internet protocol organiza-
tions and any other entities w
ith legitim
ate interests in 
these issues […
] shall create a Protocol C
ouncil to m
ake 
recom
m
endations regading the operation, assignem
ent 
and m
anagem
ent of protocol param
eter, such as port 
num
bers, entreprise num
bers, other technical param
eters 
and related subjects.
The supporting organizations shall serve as advisory bod-
ies to the Board and shall have such pow
er and duties as 
m
ay be prescribed by the B
oard and these bylaw
s. […
] A 
Supporting O
rganization m
ay not have obligations to any 
other entity inconsistent w
ith its duties to the C
orporation. 
[…
] Each supporting O
rganization shall be responsible 
for nom
inating directors for election to those seats on the 
Bard designated to be filled by aech Supporting O
rgani-
zation.
The Supporting organizations shall be delegated the pri-
m
ary responsibility for developing and recom
ending poli-
cies and procedures regarding those m
atters w
ithin their 
individual scope (as defined by the Board in its recogni-
tion of each such Supporting O
rganization).
There shall be at least the follow
ing Supporting O
rganiza
-
tions :
(i) The Address Supporting O
rganization shall be com
-
posed of representatives from
 regional Internet registries 
and any entities w
ith legitim
ate interests in these issues 
[…
] shall create an Address C
ouncil to m
ake recom
m
en-
dations to the Board regading the operation assignem
ent 
and m
anagem
ent of Internet addresses and related sub
-
jects.
(ii)The D
om
ain N
am
e S
upporting O
rganization shall be 
com
posed of representatives from
  registries and regis-
trars of TLD
s, businesses and any entities that are users 
of the Internet and any other entities w
ith legitim
ate inter-
ests in these issues […
] shall create a N
am
es C
ouncil to 
m
ake recom
m
endations regading TLD
s including the op
-
eration, assignem
ent and m
anagem
ent of the D
N
S
 and 
other related subjects.
(iii)The Protocol Supporting O
rganization shall be com
-
posed of representatives from
 Internet protocol organiza-
tions and any other entities w
ith legitim
ate interests in 
these issues […
] shall create a Protocol C
ouncil to m
ake 
recom
m
endations regading the operation, assignem
ent 
and m
anagem
ent of protocol param
eter, such as port 
num
bers, entreprise num
bers, other technical param
eters 
and related subjects.
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D
ocum
ent
Version
D
ate
N
ew
 gTLD
s
O
ther bodies of the new
 insitution
C
om
petitive functions
Status of existing gTLD
s /N
SI
IC
A
N
N
 M
oU
 
IC
AN
N
 M
oU
IC
A
N
N
bylaw
s
IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s proposal (IAN
A)
Iteration 5
IC
AN
N
 adopted bylaw
s
Iteration 6
R
evised IC
AN
N
 bylaw
s
28 Septem
ber 1998
6 N
ovem
ber 1998
23 N
ovem
ber 1998
25 N
ovem
ber 1998
The Board m
ay establish one or m
ore com
m
ittees. 
C
om
m
ittees are of tw
o kinds : those having legal author-
ity to act for the C
orporation, know
n as C
om
m
ittees of 
the B
oard, and those that do not have that authority, 
know
n as advisory com
m
itteees.
There shall be at least the follow
ing Advisory C
om
m
it-
tees :
(a) There shall be a G
overnm
ental Advisory C
om
m
ittee. 
M
em
bers of the G
AC
 shall be representatives of national 
governm
ents, m
ultinational governm
antal organizations 
and treaty organizations, each of w
hich m
ay appoint one 
representative to the C
om
m
ittee. The G
AC
 should con
-
sider and provide advice on the activities of the C
orpora-
tion as they relate to concerns of governm
ents, particu-
larly m
atters w
here there m
ay be an interaction betw
een 
the C
orporation's policies and various law
s, and interna-
tional agreem
ents. The m
em
bers of the G
AC
 should also 
provide a liason function betw
een their governm
ents or 
m
ultinational governm
ental organization and the C
orpora
-
tion.
(b) There shall be a D
N
S R
oot Server System
 A
dvisory 
C
om
m
ittee. The R
oot Server System
 Advisory C
om
m
it-
tee should exam
ine and advise on the security aspects of 
the root nam
e server system
. Further, the R
SSA
C
 should 
review
 the num
ber location, and distribution of root nam
e 
servers considering the total system
 perform
ance, ro-
bustness, and reliability.
The Board m
ay establish one or m
ore com
m
ittees. 
C
om
m
ittees are of tw
o kinds : those having legal author-
ity to act for the C
orporation, know
n as C
om
m
ittees of 
the B
oard, and those that do not have that authority, 
know
n as advisory com
m
itteees.
There shall be at least the follow
ing Advisory C
om
m
it-
tees :
(a) There shall be a G
overnm
ental Advisory C
om
m
ittee. 
M
em
bers of the G
AC
 shall be representatives of national 
governm
ents, m
ultinational governm
antal organizations 
and treaty organizations, each of w
hich m
ay appoint one 
representative to the C
om
m
ittee. The G
AC
 should con
-
sider and provide advice on the activities of the C
orpora-
tion as they relate to concerns of governm
ents, particu-
larly m
atters w
here there m
ay be an interaction betw
een 
the C
orporation's policies and various law
s, and interna
-
tional agreem
ents. The m
em
bers of the G
A
C
 should also 
provide a liason function betw
een their governm
ents or 
m
ultinational governm
ental organization and the C
orpora
-
tion.
(b) There shall be a D
N
S R
oot Server System
 Advisory 
C
om
m
ittee. The R
oot Server System
 Advisory C
om
m
it-
tee should exam
ine and advise on the security aspects of 
the root nam
e server system
. Further, the R
S
SA
C
 should 
review
 the num
ber location, and distribution of root nam
e 
servers considering the total system
 perform
ance, ro-
bustness, and reliability.
©
 U
ntil such tim
e as the process for the election of At 
Large directors shall be approved […
] there shall be an 
Advisory C
om
m
ittee on M
em
bership. The m
em
bers of 
the A
C
M
 shall consist of certain D
irectors selected by the 
Board as w
ell as other persons appointed by the Board. 
The C
hairm
an of the A
C
M
 shall be appointed by the 
Board and shall be a director. The responsibility of the 
AC
M
 shall be to advise the Board on the creation of the 
m
em
bership structure …
The Board m
ay establish one or m
ore com
m
ittees. 
C
om
m
ittees are of tw
o kinds : those having legal author-
ity to act for the C
orporation, know
n as C
om
m
ittees of 
the B
oard, and those that do not have that authority, 
know
n as advisory com
m
itteees.
There shall be at least the follow
ing Advisory C
om
m
it-
tees :
(a) There shall be a G
overnm
ental Advisory C
om
m
ittee. 
M
em
bers of the G
AC
 shall be representatives of national 
governm
ents, m
ultinational governm
antal organizations 
and treaty organizations, each of w
hich m
ay appoint one 
representative to the C
om
m
ittee. The G
AC
 should con
-
sider and provide advice on the activities of the C
orpora-
tion as they relate to concerns of governm
ents, particu-
larly m
atters w
here there m
ay be an interaction betw
een 
the C
orporation's policies and various law
s, and interna
-
tional agreem
ents. The m
em
bers of the G
A
C
 should also 
provide a liason function betw
een their governm
ents or 
m
ultinational governm
ental organization and the C
orpora
-
tion.
(b) There shall be a D
N
S R
oot Server System
 Advisory 
C
om
m
ittee. The R
oot Server System
 Advisory C
om
m
it-
tee should exam
ine and advise on the security aspects of 
the root nam
e server system
. Further, the R
SSA
C
 should 
review
 the num
ber location, and distribution of root nam
e 
servers considering the total system
 perform
ance, ro-
bustness, and reliability.
©
 U
ntil such tim
e as the process for the election of At 
Large directors shall be approved […
] there shall be an 
Advisory C
om
m
ittee on M
em
bership. The m
em
bers of 
the AC
M
 shall consist of certain D
irectors selected by the 
Board as w
ell as other persons appointed by the Board. 
The C
hairm
an of the AC
M
 shall be appointed by the 
Board and shall be a director. The responsibility of the 
AC
M
 shall be to advise the Board on the creation of the 
m
em
bership structure […
]
(d) U
ntil such tim
e as the B
oard adopts procedures for 
independent review
 […
] there shall be an Advisory C
om
-
m
ittee on Independent R
eview. The m
em
bers of the 
AC
O
IR
 shall consist of certain directors selected by the 
Board as w
ell as other persons appointed by the Board. 
[…
] The responsibility of the AC
O
IR
 shall be to advise the 
Board on the creation of the independent review
 process 
…
The corporation shall not act as a D
N
S registry or regis-
trar or IP address registry in com
petition w
ith entities af-
fected by the policies of the corporation.
The C
orporation shall not apply its standards, policies, 
procedures or practices inequitably or single out any par-
ticular party for disparate treatm
ent.
.The corporation shall not act as a D
N
S registry or regis-
trar or IP address registry in com
petition w
ith entities af-
fected by the policies of the corporation.
The C
orporation shall not apply its standards, policies, 
procedures or practices inequitably or single out any par-
ticular party for disparate treatm
ent unless justified by 
substantial and reasonnable cause, such as the prom
o
-
tion of effective com
petition.
.The corporation shall not act as a D
N
S registry or regis-
trar or IP address registry in com
petition w
ith entities af-
fected by the policies of the corporation.
The C
orporation shall not apply its standards, policies, 
procedures or practices inequitably or single out any par-
ticular party for disparate treatm
ent unless justified by 
substantial and reasonnable cause, such as the prom
o
-
tion of effective com
petition.
The corporation shall not act as a D
N
S registry or regis-
trar or IP address registry
IC
AN
N
 agrees to […
] collaborate on the design, deve
-
lopm
ent and testing a plan for creating a process that w
ill 
consider the possible expansion of gTLD
s. 
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ocum
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D
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IC
A
N
N
 M
oU
 
IC
AN
N
 M
oU
IC
A
N
N
bylaw
s
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AN
N
 bylaw
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A)
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N
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R
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AN
N
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ber 1998
6 N
ovem
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23 N
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ber 1998
25 N
ovem
ber 1998
IC
AN
N
 agrees to […
] collaborate on the design, deve
-
lopm
ent and testing a plan for creating a process that w
ill 
consider the possible expansion of gTLD
s. The designed 
process should consider and take into account the follo-
w
ing : […
]
R
ecom
m
endqtions regqrding tradem
ark/dom
ain nam
e 
policies set forth in the Statem
ent of Policy ; recom
-
m
endqtions m
ade by the W
IPO
 concerning :
(1) the developm
ent of q uniform
 qpproqch to resolving 
tradem
ark/dom
ain nam
e disputes involving cyberpiracy ;
(2) a process for protecting fam
ous tradem
arks in the ge-
neric top level dom
qins ;
(3) the effects of qdding new
 gTLD
s and related dispute 
resolution procedures on tradem
ark and intellectual pro-
perty holders ;
and recom
m
endations m
ade by other independent orga
-
nizations concerning tradem
m
ark/dom
ain nam
e issues.
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ANNEX 4. Statements on Internet governance during the WGIG 
Process
441
date
person
organization
category
text
12.09.04
Adam
	  Peake
IGC
balanced	  representation
Governm
ents,	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  civil	  society	  w
ill	  be	  represented	  by	  an	  equal	  num
ber	  of	  m
em
bers:	  a	  W
GIG	  of	  betw
een	  19	  and	  32	  m
em
bers
12.09.04
Adam
	  Peake
IGC
expertise
W
om
en	  and	  m
en	  w
ith	  a	  high	  level	  of	  experience	  in	  international	  ICT	  policy	  m
aking	  and	  the	  issues	  the	  W
GIG	  w
ill	  address,	  com
prised	  of:
12.09.04
Adam
	  Peake
IGC
M
Sism
M
em
bership	  of	  the	  w
orking	  group	  m
ust	  be	  balanced	  betw
een	  participants	  from
	  governm
ents,	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  civil	  society,	  not	  favoring	  one	  group	  over	  any	  other
12.09.04
Adam
	  Peake
IGC
O
IG	  exclusion
In	  addition,	  a	  lim
ited	  num
ber	  of	  participants	  from
	  Intergovernm
ental	  and	  International	  O
rganizations	  and	  forum
s	  should	  be	  invited	  to	  join	  the	  w
orking	  group	  as	  observers.
12.09.04
Adam
	  Peake
IGC
separation	  technical/political
public	  policy	  issues	  involved
12.09.04
Adam
	  Peake
IGC
transparency
Ex	  Parte	  reporting	  procedures,	  public	  archives	  and	  translation	  of	  m
aterials
13.09.04
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
should	  refrain	  from
	  expanding	  or	  interfering	  w
ith	  other	  areas	  of	  policy	  concerns	  already	  addressed	  in	  reasonable	  degree.
13.09.04
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
transparency
Be	  Transparent
20.09.04
W
illiam
	  Drake
CPSR
broad	  definition	  of	  IG
Begin	  from
	  a	  holistic	  understanding	  of	  Internet	  governance
20.09.04
Arturo	  Delgado
Venezuela
discussion	  beyond	  W
G
Reunión	  Presencial:	  evaluarà¡	  y	  aprobarà¡	  el	  docum
ento	  presentado	  por	  el	  Pequeà±o	  Com
ité.	  Esta	  reunión	  se	  puede	  realizar	  en	  el	  m
arco	  de	  la	  Segunda	  PrepCom
.
20.09.04
M
ichael	  Rem
m
ert
Council	  of	  Europe
enhance	  cybersecurity
Cybercrim
e
20.09.04
Ayesha	  Hassan
ICC
expand	  participation
t	  bodies	  and	  expanding	  opportunities	  for	  participation	  in	  them
	  to	  prom
ote	  global	  and	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  representation.
20.09.04
M
ark	  Esseboom
EU
governm
ental	  leadership	  in	  W
GIG
not	  less	  than	  half	  of	  the	  total	  num
ber	  of	  participants	  should	  be	  governm
ental	  and	  intergovernm
ental	  representatives,	  w
hile	  the	  rem
aining	  balance	  should	  cater	  for	  sufficient	  
representation	  by	  the	  U
N
,	  its	  agencies	  and	  other	  international	  organizations,	  Civil	  Society	  representatives,	  and	  the	  private	  sector.
20.09.04
M
asaaki	  Sakam
aki
Japan
governm
ental	  leadership	  in	  W
GIG
half	  of	  w
hom
	  should	  com
e	  from
	  the	  governm
ent	  (including	  intergovernm
ental	  organizations)	  and	  the	  rest	  from
	  other	  stakeholders	  (including	  the	  business	  sector,	  international	  
organizations	  and	  civil	  society).
20.09.04
Steinar	  Lindberg
N
orw
ay
Im
prove	  GAC
The	  GAC	  cannot	  continue	  to	  have	  a	  m
ere	  counseling	  role	  to	  the	  ICAN
N
20.09.04
Alejandro	  Pisanty
U
N
AM
Internet	  exceptionalism
The	  uniqueness	  and	  novelty	  of	  the	  Internet,	  the	  diversity	  of	  degrees	  of	  spread	  of	  technology,	  literacy,	  and	  w
ealth	  across	  and	  w
ithin	  nations	  and	  regions,	  and	  the	  w
ide	  variety	  of	  
cultures	  including	  the	  specific	  cultures	  of	  legal	  and	  judicial	  system
s,	  individualistic	  vs.	  collectivist	  W
eltanschauungen,	  etc.,	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  som
e	  original	  and	  unique	  form
s	  of	  
organization,	  and	  to	  strong	  resistances	  to	  som
e	  of	  them
.
20.09.04
Benoit	  Tabaka
FDI
Internet	  exceptionalism
t	  espace	  ne	  fonctionne	  pas	  com
m
e	  le	  m
onde	  auquel	  nous	  som
m
es	  habitués	  :	  il	  entretient	  un	  rapport	  au	  tem
ps	  et	  à	  	  l'espace	  différent.	  I
20.09.04
Benoit	  Tabaka
FDI
Internet	  exceptionalism
	  com
plexité	  du	  réseau	  pose	  en	  effet	  un	  défi	  aux	  m
écanism
es	  traditionnels	  de	  régulation	  qui	  donnaient	  un	  rà´le	  privilégié	  à	  	  la	  réglem
entation	  publique.	  Désorm
ais,	  les	  
procédures	  d'élaboration	  de	  la	  norm
e	  sem
blent	  devoir	  s'ouvrir	  à	  	  une	  plus	  large	  concertation,	  voire	  à	  	  une	  négociation.	  P
20.09.04
Elizabeth	  Longw
orth
U
N
ESCO
Internet	  exceptionalism
inform
ation	  that	  m
akes	  it	  an	  inherently	  dem
ocratic	  and	  em
pow
ering	  force.
20.09.04
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
Internet	  exceptionalism
Group	  should	  consider	  how
	  the	  im
plications	  of	  clear	  agreem
ents	  on	  definitions,	  facts	  and	  norm
s	  could	  best	  be	  reflected	  in	  international	  agreem
ents	  tha	  t	  could	  take	  into	  account	  
the	  unique	  characteristics	  of	  the	  Internet.
20.09.04
Ayesha	  Hassan
ICC
lim
ited	  role	  for	  the	  W
GIG
The	  Secretary	  General's	  w
orking	  group	  should	  convene	  as	  a	  steering	  com
m
ittee	  rather	  than	  a	  prescriptive	  body:
20.09.04
Ayesha	  Hassan
ICC
M
Sism
m
aking	  this	  w
orking	  group	  a	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  body.
20.09.04
Benoit	  Tabaka
FDI
M
Sism
s	  les	  acteurs	  concernés	  par	  le	  développem
ent	  de	  l'Internet	  et	  ses	  usages	  ont	  un	  droit	  légitim
e	  à	  	  participer	  à	  	  la	  définition	  des	  règles	  qui	  les	  régissent	  :	  
20.09.04
Hans	  Falk	  Hoffm
ann
CERN
M
Sism
including	  all	  stakeholders,
20.09.04
M
akane	  Faye
U
N
ECA
M
Sism
m
ulti	  stakeholder	  partnership
20.09.04
Raym
ond	  Plzak
ARIN
/N
RO
M
Sism
but	  also	  stakeholders	  w
ho	  have	  participated	  or	  w
ill	  participate	  in	  the	  developm
ent	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  internet.
20.09.04
Richard	  Beaird
U
SA
M
Sism
Recognizing	  the	  roles	  of	  all	  stakeholders:
20.09.04
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
M
ultilingualism
O
n	  the	  w
orking	  m
ethod,	  only	  one	  special	  elem
ent	  I'd	  like	  to	  call	  upon	  your	  attention,	  w
hich	  is	  a	  language.
20.09.04
Joseph	  Sarr
CR	  Dakar
M
ultilingualism
Diversité	  linguistique
20.09.04
Alexander	  Kushtuev
Russia
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
20.09.04
Bertrand	  de	  la	  Chappelle
W
SIS-­‐O
nline
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
20.09.04
Christian	  W
ichard
W
IPO
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
20.09.04
Desiree	  M
iloshevic
Aflilias
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
20.09.04
Fatim
ata	  Seye	  Silla
W
SIS	  Gender	  Caucus
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
20.09.04
Khaled	  Fattal
M
IN
C
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V)
20.09.04
M
ahiddine	  O
uhadj
Algeria
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
20.09.04
M
iguel	  Alcaine
El	  Salvador
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
20.09.04
Peim
an	  Seadat
Iran
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
20.09.04
Sam
	  Paltridge
O
ECD
n/a
O
ECD	  activities	  related	  to	  Internet	  Public	  Policy	  Issues
20.09.04
Sarbuland	  Khan
U
N
ICTTF
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
20.09.04
Shaukat	  U
m
er
Pakistan
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
20.09.04
Stuart	  Goold
CECI
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
20.09.04
Trevor	  Clarke
Barbados
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
20.09.04
Zhao	  Houlin
ITU
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V)
20.09.04
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
narrow
	  definition	  of	  IG
By	  staying	  close	  to	  a	  technical	  conception,	  this	  definition	  of	  the	  Internet	  m
akes	  it	  possible	  to	  draw
	  clearer	  boundaries	  around	  Internet	  governance.
20.09.04
Ayesha	  Hassan
ICC
no	  rigid	  definition	  of	  IG
Second,	  w
e	  feel	  that	  insisting	  that	  the	  W
orking	  Group	  agree	  to	  a	  rigid	  definition	  before	  discussion	  of	  som
e	  issues	  could	  potentially	  a	  priori	  lim
it	  the	  discussion	  of	  key	  topics	  or	  
unnecessarily	  dictate	  an	  agenda	  of	  topics	  for	  the	  W
G	  that	  is	  broader	  than	  can	  be	  effectively	  addressed	  to	  help	  W
SIS	  2005	  progress	  this	  m
atter.
20.09.04
Benoit	  Tabaka
FDI
no	  separation	  technical/political
	  GTGI	  m
is	  en	  place	  par	  le	  secrétariat	  de	  l'O
rganisation	  des	  N
ations	  U
nies	  doit	  donc	  dépasser	  la	  sim
ple	  réflexion	  portant	  sur	  une	  éventuelle	  réform
e	  ou	  refonte	  de	  l'ICAN
N
.	  A	  
défaut,	  il	  opérerait	  qu'un	  travail	  partiel	  et	  lim
ité.	  	  
442
20.09.04
Phet	  Sayo
U
N
DP-­‐ADPIP
no	  separation	  technical/political
Internet	  Governance	  is	  an	  ill-­‐defined	  term
,	  but	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  m
ean	  the	  collection	  of	  all	  activities	  and	  responsibilities	  relating	  to	  the	  developm
ent	  and	  use	  of	  the	  Internet.	  This	  
includes	  not	  only	  the	  responsibilities	  and	  activities	  of	  those	  organisations	  listed	  above,	  but	  also	  the	  Internet-­‐related	  activities	  of	  Governm
ents	  in	  general,	  national	  and	  
international	  law
	  enforcem
ent	  agencies,	  Developm
ent	  Agencies,	  and	  others.
20.09.04
Tarek	  Kam
el
Egypt
no	  separation	  technical/political
Also	  there	  is	  an	  initial	  understanding,	  that	  Internet	  governance	  and	  resource	  m
anagem
ent	  issues	  have	  intertw
ined	  technical	  and	  policy	  dim
ensions	  -­‐	  Technical	  issues	  have	  
political	  im
plications	  and	  Political	  issues	  have	  technical	  im
plications	  â€“	  and	  it's	  hard	  to	  draw
	  the	  line.
20.09.04
Benoit	  Tabaka
FDI
O
IG	  exclusion
personnalités	  désignées	  par	  les	  acteurs	  Â«Â	  entités	  économ
iquesÂ	  Â»	  accrédités	  pour	  le	  SM
SIÂ	  :	  8	  personnalités	  désignées	  par	  les	  acteurs	  Â«Â	  Société	  civileÂ	  Â»	  accrédités	  pour	  
le	  SM
SIÂ	  :	  8	  personnalités	  désignées	  par	  les	  Gouvernem
ents	  m
em
bres	  de	  l'U
nion	  internationale	  des	  télécom
m
unicationsÂ	  :	  U
20.09.04
Arturo	  Delgado
Venezuela
O
ptim
ize	  connectivity	  and	  access
m
asificación	  y	  dem
ocratización	  del	  acceso
20.09.04
Ayesha	  Hassan
ICC
Private	  sector	  leadership
.	  Approaches	  w
hich	  allow
	  m
arket	  players	  and	  self-­‐regulation	  to	  respond	  dynam
ically	  and	  effectively	  to	  address	  m
arket	  needs	  w
ith	  governm
ent	  creating	  enabling	  environm
ents	  
w
ith	  intervention	  only	  to	  address	  m
arket	  failures:
20.09.04
Elizabeth	  Longw
orth
U
N
ESCO
Private	  sector	  leadership
M
odifications	  m
ust	  not	  result	  in	  the	  global	  Internet	  Governance	  system
	  becom
ing	  subjected	  to	  governm
ental	  control,	  nor	  should	  they	  facilitate	  or	  perm
it	  censorship:
20.09.04
Hans	  Falk	  Hoffm
ann
CERN
Private	  sector	  leadership
the	  private	  sector	  have	  dealt	  m
ostly	  w
ell	  w
ith	  the	  com
plex	  issues	  and	  should	  continue	  their	  w
ork,	  how
ever	  com
plem
ented	  w
ith	  the	  above	  high	  level	  international	  supporting	  
actions.
20.09.04
M
asaaki	  Sakam
aki
Japan
Private	  sector	  leadership
the	  flexible	  and	  generative	  environm
ent	  that	  has	  been	  created	  m
ainly	  led	  by	  the	  private	  sector,
20.09.04
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
Private	  sector	  leadership
he	  netw
orks	  interconnected	  through	  the	  Internet	  protocols	  are	  ow
ned	  and	  operated	  by	  autonom
ous	  organizations,	  m
ostly	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  M
ost	  of	  the	  investm
ent	  is	  sm
all	  
scale	  and	  private.	  Services	  and	  interconnection	  are	  coordinated	  prim
arily	  on	  a	  m
arket,	  contractual	  basis.
20.09.04
Richard	  Beaird
U
SA
Private	  sector	  leadership
Supporting	  continued	  private	  sector	  leadership:
20.09.04
Tarek	  Kam
el
Egypt
Private	  sector	  leadership
he	  Internet	  should	  continue	  its	  grow
th	  as	  prom
oted	  by	  the	  Industry,	  but	  m
atters	  of	  public	  policy	  should	  also	  have	  m
ore	  international	  coordination	  and	  governm
ent	  involvem
ent.
20.09.04
Hans	  Falk	  Hoffm
ann
CERN
Pro-­‐com
petitive	  regulation
International	  tenders	  in	  a	  de-­‐regulated	  environm
ent	  and	  a	  m
axim
um
	  of	  local	  effort	  w
ill	  provide	  for	  the	  best	  value	  for	  m
oney.
20.09.04
M
asaaki	  Sakam
aki
Japan
Pro-­‐com
petitive	  regulation
w
hich	  has	  been	  alm
ost	  standard	  thanks	  to	  the	  vigorous	  com
petition	  at	  this	  field.
20.09.04
Richard	  Beaird
U
SA
Pro-­‐com
petitive	  regulation
Prom
oting	  an	  enabling	  environm
ent	  through	  effective	  and	  efficient	  com
petition:
20.09.04
Faryel	  Beji
IEEE/ISO
C
separation	  technical/political
In	  identifying	  the	  public	  policy	  issues	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  Internet	  Governance:
20.09.04
Hans	  Falk	  Hoffm
ann
CERN
separation	  technical/political
M
ore	  technical	  item
s	  such	  as	  nam
e	  spaces,	  protocols,	  architecture,	  etc	  need	  am
ple	  opportunities	  for	  adaptation	  to	  the	  rapid	  pace	  of	  new
	  developm
ents	  and	  prior	  testing	  before	  
im
plem
entation.
20.09.04
Lynn	  St.Am
our
ISO
C
separation	  technical/political
ISO
C	  encourages	  W
GIG	  in	  its	  input	  to	  the	  W
SIS	  to	  prioritize	  those	  areas	  that	  are	  less	  developed	  and	  are	  crucially	  im
portant	  to	  the	  net's	  deploym
ent.
20.09.04
M
ark	  Esseboom
EU
separation	  technical/political
The	  W
GIG	  should	  firstly	  concentrate	  on	  these	  issues.
20.09.04
W
olfgang	  Kleinw
aechter
Aarhus	  U
niversity
separation	  technical/political
Basic	  Internet	  Governance"	  (BIG)	  on	  the	  low
er	  level	  includes	  drafting	  Internet	  Protocols	  and	  allocating	  IP	  Addresses.	  O
n	  the	  higher	  level	  it	  includes	  prim
arily	  the	  m
anagem
ent	  of	  
the	  Dom
ain	  N
am
e	  System
	  (DN
S)	  w
ith	  all	  its	  com
ponents	  like	  Root	  Servers,	  TLDs,	  W
hois,	  N
am
es	  Transfer,	  iDN
s,	  Dispute	  Resolution	  etc.	  Basic	  Internet	  Governance	  deals	  m
ainly	  
w
ith	  enabling	  services.	  It	  is	  rather	  neutral,	  political	  and	  econom
ic	  interests	  are	  m
ore	  indirectly	  involved	  and	  it	  represents	  no	  real	  "content".	  It	  enables	  users	  to	  provide	  value	  -­‐	  
from
	  eCom
m
erce	  to	  eGovernm
ent.
20.09.04
Benoit	  Tabaka
FDI
states	  as	  observers
anm
oins,	  en	  raison	  de	  cette	  fonction	  particulière,	  il	  est	  nécessaire	  dans	  cette	  phase	  de	  préparation	  de	  la	  norm
e,	  de	  réserver	  aux	  Etats	  une	  place	  particulière	  dès	  lors	  que	  ce	  
seront	  eux	  qui	  in	  fine	  décideront	  de	  celle-­‐ci.	  Il	  paraà®t	  souhaitable	  qu'ils	  siègent	  au	  sein	  du	  GTGI	  en	  qualité	  d'observateur,	  participant	  au	  débat	  m
ais	  ne	  prenant	  pas	  part	  
officiellem
ent	  à	  	  un	  éventuel	  vote	  afin	  de	  pouvoir	  garder	  toute	  latitude	  dans	  leur	  prise	  de	  décision	  ultérieure.	  	  
20.09.04
Ayesha	  Hassan
ICC
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
Business	  w
orldw
ide	  strongly	  believes	  that	  these	  expert	  bodies	  should	  continue	  to	  be	  the	  focal	  points	  for	  further	  substantive	  discussions	  at	  the	  international	  level	  on	  issues	  w
ithin	  
their	  sphere	  of	  expertise	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  duplication,	  and	  to	  continue	  to	  build	  upon	  the	  successes	  of	  the	  Internet,	  and	  these	  bodies	  should	  evolve	  to	  address	  existing	  and	  new
	  
challenges,	  and	  extend	  the	  benefits	  to	  all	  people	  around	  the	  w
orld.
20.09.04
Ayesha	  Hassan
ICC
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
not	  re-­‐open	  the	  policy	  debates	  of	  yesterday:
20.09.04
Elizabeth	  Longw
orth
U
N
ESCO
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
M
odifications	  to	  ICAN
N
	  or	  new
	  m
echanism
s	  should	  not	  inhibit	  interoperability,	  cause	  instability,	  nor	  should	  they	  slow
	  dow
n	  the	  continued	  technical	  developm
ent	  of	  the	  
Internet:	  and	  â€¢	  Any	  global	  Internet	  m
anagem
ent	  system
	  or	  m
echanism
	  m
ust	  be	  technically	  com
petent,	  transparent	  and	  non-­‐partisan.
20.09.04
Hans	  Falk	  Hoffm
ann
CERN
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
The	  present	  governing	  entities	  and
20.09.04
Lynn	  St.Am
our
ISO
C
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
And,	  today's	  Internet	  bodies
20.09.04
M
ark	  Esseboom
EU
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
The	  starting	  point	  for	  w
ork	  in	  the	  W
GIG	  is	  the	  present	  structure	  of	  the	  Internet	  Governance.	  W
e	  need	  to	  build	  on	  this	  structure	  in	  order	  to	  reinforce	  the	  stability	  and	  grow
th	  
potential	  of	  the	  internet.
20.09.04
Pavan	  Duggal
Cyberlaw
s.net
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
Internet	  Law
	  and	  policy	  issues	  should	  not	  take	  U
-­‐turn	  for	  the	  w
orse.
20.09.04
Raym
ond	  Plzak
ARIN
/N
RO
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
The	  RIRs	  through	  the	  N
RO
	  fully	  support	  the	  ICAN
N
	  m
odel.
20.09.04
Richard	  Beaird
U
SA
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
The	  U
nited	  States	  believes	  that	  efforts	  should	  be	  m
ade	  to	  enhance	  existing	  synergies	  and	  not	  duplicate	  the	  extensive	  body	  of	  w
ork	  already	  underw
ay	  in	  the	  global	  and	  regional	  
bodies.
20.09.04
M
asaaki	  Sakam
aki
Japan
transparency
To	  ensure	  the	  com
prehensiveness	  and	  transparency	  of	  the	  discussion.
20.09.04
Raym
ond	  Plzak
ARIN
/N
RO
transparency
In	  regards	  to	  the	  W
orking	  Group,	  the	  N
RO
	  believes	  that	  it	  should	  be	  transparent,
20.09.04
M
ark	  Esseboom
EU
W
GIG	  should	  focus	  on	  technical	  m
anagem
ent These	  issues,	  w
hilst	  not	  of	  lesser	  im
portance,	  are	  already	  dealt	  w
ith	  to	  som
e	  extent	  by	  existing	  inter-­‐governm
ental	  fora.	  As	  a	  rule,	  the	  W
GIG	  should	  therefore	  not	  deal	  w
ith	  
issues	  that	  are	  already	  dealt	  w
ith	  satisfactorily	  at	  the	  global	  level.
21.09.04
Jeanette	  Hofm
ann
IGC
balanced	  representation
Governm
ents,	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  civil	  society	  w
ould	  be	  represented	  by	  an	  equal	  num
ber	  of	  m
em
bers.
21.09.04
Joseph	  Sarr
CR	  Dakar
balanced	  representation
N
ous	  considérons	  qu'une	  participation	  égale	  des	  gouvernem
ents,	  du	  secteur	  privé	  et	  de	  la	  société	  civile	  sem
ble	  raisonnable.
21.09.04
Vittorio	  Bertola
ICAN
N
-­‐ALAC
balanced	  representation
All	  three	  m
ain	  stakeholder	  groups	  (governm
ents,	  private	  sector	  and	  civil	  society)	  should	  offer	  the	  sam
e	  num
ber	  of	  m
em
bers.
21.09.04
Q
iheng	  Hu
China
broad	  definition	  of	  IG
As	  far	  as	  w
e	  are	  concerned,	  it	  is	  a	  better	  approach	  to	  define	  Internet	  governance	  in	  a	  broad	  com
prehension
443
21.09.04
Cristiano	  Berbert
Brazil
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
Brazil	  therefore	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  intergovernm
ental	  forum
,	  a	  m
eeting	  place	  w
here	  governm
ents	  could	  discuss	  Internet-­‐related	  issues.	  The	  objective	  is	  not	  to	  
substitute	  or	  duplicate	  any	  existing	  organization	  or	  entity,	  but	  rather	  to	  fill	  a	  gap	  by	  providing	  countries	  w
ith	  the	  opportunity	  to	  express	  their	  opinions	  and	  to	  coordinate	  w
ith	  
each	  other.
21.09.04
Q
iheng	  Hu
China
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
so	  w
e	  should	  em
phasize	  that	  governm
ents	  and	  inter-­‐governm
ental	  organizations	  play	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  Internet	  governance.
21.09.04
M
icahel	  Tiger
Canada
expertise
The	  appointees	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  neutral	  and,	  m
ost	  im
portantly,	  as	  know
ledgeable	  persons.
21.09.04
Cristiano	  Berbert
Brazil
governm
ental	  leadership	  in	  W
GIG
N
evertheless,	  the	  level	  of	  governm
ental	  representation	  in	  Internet	  governance	  rem
ains	  thoroughly	  insufficient.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  accept	  that	  governm
ents	  should	  be	  lim
ited	  to	  a	  
m
ere	  advisory	  role	  in	  regard	  to	  decisions	  w
ith	  clear	  public	  policy	  im
plications.
21.09.04
Cristiano	  Berbert
Brazil
governm
ental	  leadership	  in	  W
GIG
The	  W
SIS	  rem
ains	  first	  and	  forem
ost	  an	  intergovernam
ental	  process.
21.09.04
Q
iheng	  Hu
China
governm
ental	  leadership	  in	  W
GIG
The	  change	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  Internet	  dem
ands	  the	  involvem
ent	  of	  governm
ents	  into	  the	  Internet	  governance.
21.09.04
Cristiano	  Berbert
Brazil
ICAN
N
	  critique
U
nfortunately,	  ICAN
N
	  has	  so	  far	  been	  unable	  to	  overcom
e	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  w
as	  constituted	  w
ithout	  prior	  consultation	  to	  other	  governm
ents.
21.09.04
Karen	  Banks
APC
ICAN
N
	  critique
reate	  an	  independent,	  distributed	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  body	  w
hich	  could	  eventually	  replace	  ICAN
N
	  and	  perhaps	  play	  a	  m
onitoring	  and	  co-­‐ordinating	  role	  w
ith	  respect	  to	  a	  broader	  
internet	  governance	  fram
ew
ork	  as	  described	  below
,	  though	  not	  necessarily	  having	  sole	  responsibility	  for	  all	  tasks
21.09.04
Q
iheng	  Hu
China
ICAN
N
	  critique
the	  sim
ple	  self-­‐governance	  m
echanism
	  is	  not	  enough	  any	  m
ore.
21.09.04
W
olfgang	  Kleinw
aechter
Aarhus	  U
niversity
Internet	  as	  a	  global	  public	  resource
The	  Internet	  is	  a	  global	  public	  resource,
21.09.04
W
olfgang	  Kleinw
aechter
Aarhus	  U
niversity
Internet	  exceptionalism
To	  be	  frank,	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  w
ould	  not	  be	  helpful	  if	  w
e	  start	  our	  discussion	  w
ith	  issues	  like	  "leadership",	  "control"	  or	  "new
	  organisations".	  This	  is	  "old	  thinking"	  and	  w
ould	  lead	  us	  
back	  into	  the	  past.	  The	  Internet	  is	  about	  the	  future.	  W
e	  have	  to	  look	  forw
ard.	  W
e	  need	  innovative	  creations.	  The	  Internet	  is	  a	  netw
ork	  of	  netw
orks.	  W
e	  have	  m
any	  layers	  and	  
m
any	  (rather	  different)	  players.	  And	  it	  is	  grow
ing.	  N
either	  new
	  "hierarchies"	  nor	  new
	  "buerocracies"	  w
ill	  be	  helpful.	  W
hat	  w
e	  need	  is	  a	  m
uch	  better	  collaboration	  am
ong	  all	  the	  
old	  and	  new
	  em
erging	  netw
orks	  so	  that	  the	  Internet	  as	  a	  w
hole	  can	  deliver	  its	  value	  to	  the	  real	  people:	  The	  providers	  and	  users	  of	  services	  on	  the	  ground.
21.09.04
Paul	  Verhoef
ICAN
N
lim
ited	  role	  for	  the	  W
GIG
ICAN
N
	  finds	  that	  there	  is	  a	  void	  for	  addressing	  issues	  that	  are	  outside	  of	  its	  responsibility,	  and	  is	  very	  encouraged	  to	  see	  that	  there	  is	  discussion	  for	  filling	  this	  void.
21.09.04
Cristiano	  Berbert
Brazil
M
Sism
open	  to	  the	  participation	  of	  all	  stakeholders	  and	  subject	  to	  the	  control	  of	  society	  at	  large.	  Brazil	  continues	  to	  abide	  by	  these	  principles.	  O
ur	  challenge	  now
	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  
W
GIG	  w
ill	  ensure	  the	  balanced	  participation	  of	  all	  stakeholders	  w
hilst	  respecting	  the	  overarching	  need	  for	  dem
ocracy,	  transparency	  and	  m
ultilateral	  decision-­‐m
aking.
21.09.04
Elchin	  Aliyev
Azrena
M
Sism
All	  stakeholders	  from
	  governm
ent,	  public	  and	  private	  sectors	  from
	  different	  countries	  provide	  their	  vision	  in	  organizing	  effective	  w
ork	  of	  W
GIG	  based	  on	  dem
ocracy,	  
transparency	  and	  openness.
21.09.04
Tim
	  Shand
Youth	  Caucus
M
Sism
he	  W
GIG	  m
ust	  have	  a	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder,	  m
ulti-­‐disciplinary	  m
em
bership	  and	  conduct	  an	  inclusive	  consultation	  process.
21.09.04
Anthony	  Hill
South	  Centre
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
21.09.04
JM
	  N
ogueira	  Viana
Brazil
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
21.09.04
Jovan	  Kurbalija
Diplo	  Foundation
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
21.09.04
M
anuel	  Barrera
Chile
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
21.09.04
M
arcelo	  Valle-­‐Fonrouge
Argentina
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
21.09.04
O
livier	  N
ana	  N
zepa
U
N
Iversité	  Yaounde
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
21.09.04
O
scar	  Leon	  Gonzalez
Cuba
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
21.09.04
Patrice	  Lyons
CN
RI
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
21.09.04
Robert	  Kram
er
Com
pTIA
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
21.09.04
Roberto	  Zachm
ann
ILO
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
21.09.04
Saha	  Debabrata
India
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
21.09.04
Sam
i	  Al-­‐Basheer
Saudi	  Arabia
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
21.09.04
Veni	  M
arkow
ski
ISO
C	  Bulgaria
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
21.09.04
Bhojendranath	  Ashok	  Redhakisson
M
auritius
no	  rigid	  definition	  of	  IG
Instead	  of	  expecting	  that	  the	  w
orking	  group	  w
ill	  develop	  a	  w
orking	  definition	  of	  internet	  governance	  w
ithin	  the	  tim
e	  fram
e	  and	  under	  the	  constraints	  earlier	  raised,	  w
e	  suggest	  
that	  agreem
ent	  is	  reached	  on	  w
hat	  are	  the	  elem
ents	  w
hich	  best	  reflect,	  for	  the	  tim
e	  being	  ,the	  notion	  of	  internet	  governance.	  can	  then	  articulate	  the	  process	  w
hich	  the	  w
orking	  
group	  w
ill	  adopt	  around	  this	  notion.	  It	  w
ill	  then	  enable	  a	  classification	  exercise	  as	  to	  w
hich	  m
atter	  can	  be	  addressed	  by	  specialists,	  ones	  by	  governm
ents	  and	  other	  stakeholders.
21.09.04
Vittorio	  Bertola
ICAN
N
-­‐ALAC
no	  rigid	  definition	  of	  IG
W
e	  think	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  "Internet	  Governance"	  cannot	  be	  defined	  once	  for	  ever,
21.09.04
Cristiano	  Berbert
Brazil
no	  separation	  technical/political
Internet	  Governance	  is	  m
uch	  m
ore	  than	  just	  the	  m
anagem
ent	  of	  dom
ain	  nam
es	  and	  IP	  addresses.	  Data	  protection,	  spam
,	  cyber-­‐security,	  m
ultilingual	  and	  local	  content	  are	  
Internet	  governance	  issues.	  Interconnection	  costs,	  the	  protection	  of	  IPR	  and	  the	  digital	  divide	  are	  also	  Internet	  governance	  issues.	  In	  m
ost	  of	  these	  areas,	  the	  m
ain	  responsibility	  
lies	  w
ith	  governm
ents:	  yet,	  they	  lack	  the	  m
eans	  to	  coordinate	  effectively	  and	  prom
ptly	  at	  the	  international	  level.
21.09.04
Karen	  Banks
APC
no	  separation	  technical/political
develop	  an	  internet	  governance	  fram
ew
ork	  that	  fully	  identifies	  the	  scope	  of	  internet	  policy	  issues	  and	  a	  m
ethod	  of	  allocating	  responsibility	  for	  such	  policies	  in	  the	  com
plex	  w
eb	  
of	  institutions,	  w
hich	  are	  currently	  involved	  in	  m
anaging	  the	  internet
21.09.04
M
icahel	  Tiger
Canada
separation	  technical/political
e	  public	  policy	  issues	  relevant	  to	  Internet	  governance	  be	  identifie
21.09.04
Paul	  Verhoef
ICAN
N
separation	  technical/political
That	  is:	  ICAN
N
's	  focus	  is	  on	  how
	  the	  Internet	  w
orks,	  our	  focus	  is	  not	  on	  how
	  the	  Internet	  is	  used.	  And	  that	  focus	  is	  not	  on	  the	  entire	  w
orking	  of	  the	  Internet,	  but	  solely	  on	  the	  
Internet's	  unique	  identifier	  system
.
21.09.04
W
olfgang	  Kleinw
aechter
Aarhus	  U
niversity
technological	  determ
inism
Such	  a	  governance	  structure	  w
ould	  reflect	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  the	  technical	  architecture	  of	  the	  Internet:
21.09.04
Tim
	  Shand
Youth	  Caucus
transparency
Aside	  from
	  having	  closed-­‐door	  m
eetings,	  the	  W
GIG	  m
ust	  ensure	  it	  utilizes	  open	  consultations,	  both	  online	  and	  physical,	  to	  harness	  the	  know
ledge	  and	  expertise	  of	  a	  w
ider	  range	  
of	  interested	  parties.	  Taking	  into	  account	  cost	  considerations,	  the	  W
GIG	  m
ust	  w
ork	  to	  organize	  regional,	  sub-­‐regional,	  them
atic	  and	  sectoral	  m
eetings	  and	  consultations.
21.09.04
Karen	  Banks
APC
U
N
	  oversight	  of	  the	  ICAN
N
In	  the	  short	  term
,	  the	  responsibilities	  in	  the	  M
oU
	  betw
een	  the	  U
S	  Departm
ent	  of	  Com
m
erce	  and	  ICAN
N
	  should	  be	  transferred	  from
	  the	  Departm
ent	  of	  Com
m
erce	  to	  the	  U
N
	  
Secretary	  General	  as	  a	  tem
porary	  step	  on	  the	  w
ay	  to	  building	  a	  new
	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  body	  that	  m
ust	  find	  broad	  based	  support	  from
	  all	  stake-­‐holders.
19.11.04
Talal	  Abu-­‐Ghazaleh
TAGI
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
This	  m
ay	  be	  achieved	  through	  the	  establishm
ent	  of	  a	  Perm
anent	  Internet	  Forum
	  w
here	  all	  stakeholders	  can	  continuously	  provide	  input	  in	  a	  transparent	  and	  inclusive	  setting.
444
19.11.04
Talal	  Abu-­‐Ghazaleh
TAGI
non-­‐binding	  insitutions	  only
The	  proposed	  m
echanism
	  can	  serve	  the	  objective	  of	  beneficial	  governance	  only	  if	  operated	  on	  principles	  of	  non-­‐binding	  soft-­‐law
	  cooperation	  of	  a	  netw
ork	  of	  governance	  bodies.
23.11.04
Jovan	  Kurbalija
Diplo	  Foundation
broad	  definition	  of	  IG
Yet	  a	  broader	  theoretical	  fram
ew
ork	  is	  lacking,	  especially	  w
hen	  it	  com
es	  to	  the	  international	  aspects	  of	  Internet	  Governance.
23.11.04
Anthony	  Hill
South	  Centre
expand	  participation
In	  each	  of	  these	  activities,	  the	  full	  involvem
ent	  of	  developing	  country	  governm
ents	  and	  their	  business,	  professional	  and	  non-­‐governm
ental	  organisations	  m
ust	  be	  ensured.
23.11.04
Don	  M
cLean
M
acLean	  Consulting
expand	  participation
im
provem
ents	  to	  the	  institutional	  structures	  and	  w
orking	  m
ethods	  of	  intergovernm
ental	  or	  other	  international	  organizations	  that	  are	  already	  dealing	  w
ith	  Internet	  governance	  
issues,	  to	  bring	  them
	  up	  to	  the	  governance	  standards	  set	  out	  in	  the	  W
SIS	  Declaration
23.11.04
Isabel	  Padilla
Dom
inican	  Republic
expand	  participation
redefinición	  de	  las	  estructuras	  de	  los	  organism
os	  adm
inistrativos	  ya	  existentes	  para	  hacer	  sus	  procesos	  m
à¡s	  abiertos	  y	  representativos,
23.11.04
J.A.	  N
ovaes	  Bicalho
Brazil
expand	  participation
om
e	  changes	  need	  to	  be	  m
ade	  to	  perm
it	  m
ore	  participation	  of	  all	  groups	  of	  stakeholders,	  including	  governm
ents,	  from
	  all	  regions	  and	  states,	  m
ainly	  in	  that	  issues	  that	  involve	  
Global	  coordination	  capabilities	  like	  SPAM
,	  Se
23.11.04
Anthony	  Hill
South	  Centre
ICAN
N
	  critique
W
GIG	  should	  be	  kept	  inform
ed	  and	  developing	  countries	  should	  be	  associated	  w
ith	  the	  transition	  to	  the	  'international,	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder'	  body	  that	  w
ill	  replace	  the	  existing	  
ICAN
N
	  structure.
23.11.04
Lynn	  St.Am
our
ISO
C
IG	  cannot	  exist
It	  is	  m
isleading	  to	  use	  the	  term
	  Â‘Internet	  GovernanceÂ’	  w
hen	  the	  Internet	  is	  clearly	  not	  a	  single	  entity	  to	  govern.	  It	  is	  m
ore	  useful	  to	  refer	  to	  Â‘Internet	  CoordinationÂ’.	  The	  
m
ultiple	  facets	  of	  the	  Internet	  require	  different	  types	  of	  coordination,	  each	  calling	  for	  specific	  com
petencies	  and	  sensitivities	  to	  balance	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  Internet	  user	  
com
m
unity	  globally	  and	  locally.
23.11.04
Elizabeth	  Longw
orth
U
N
ESCO
Internet	  as	  a	  global	  public	  resource
Internet	  as	  a	  global	  com
m
on	  good
23.11.04
Isabel	  Padilla
Dom
inican	  Republic
Internet	  as	  a	  global	  public	  resource
Internet	  es	  un	  bien	  pàºblico	  global,
23.11.04
Ang	  Peng	  Hw
a
N
anyang	  Tech	  U
niversity
Internet	  regulation	  is	  possible
That	  is,	  they	  w
ork	  less	  through	  punishm
ent	  than	  through	  the	  threat	  of	  punishm
ent.	  Does	  it	  w
ork	  on	  the	  internet?	  The	  evidence	  suggests	  it	  does.
23.11.04
J.A.	  N
ovaes	  Bicalho
Brazil
lim
ited	  role	  for	  the	  W
GIG
All	  these	  issues	  need	  som
e	  developm
ent	  perspective	  on	  capacity	  building,	  but	  these	  issues	  should	  be	  left	  out	  of	  the	  discussion	  about	  IG,	  otherw
ise	  this	  discussion	  w
ill	  have	  to	  
incorporate	  all	  the	  W
SIS	  debate.
23.11.04
Yoshio	  U
tsum
i
ITU
lim
ited	  role	  for	  the	  W
GIG
Instead,	  w
e	  should	  focus	  on	  the	  core	  activity	  of	  the	  m
anagem
ent	  of	  Internet	  resources	  by	  ICAN
N
,	  in	  particular	  top-­‐level	  dom
ains,	  w
hich	  is	  w
here	  im
portant	  issues	  rem
ain	  
unresolved.
23.11.04
Anthony	  Hill
South	  Centre
M
ultilateral	  takeover	  of	  IG	  is	  a	  m
yth
The	  m
yth	  that	  developing	  countries	  are	  seeking	  to	  control	  the	  Internet	  through	  the	  traditional	  m
ultilateral	  organisations	  m
ust	  be	  rem
oved	  as	  the	  red	  herring	  it	  is.	  Based	  on	  the	  
definitions/hypotheses,	  policy	  analyses	  and	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  key	  Internet-­‐actors,	  the	  special	  responsibility	  of	  governm
ents	  w
orking	  w
ith	  
the	  stakeholders	  in	  defining	  a	  regim
e	  or	  regim
es	  for	  the	  Internet	  that	  m
axim
ises	  the	  strengths	  of	  all	  non-­‐State	  participants,	  should	  be	  agreed.
23.11.04
Daniel	  Karrenberg
ISO
C
n/a
Ctrl-­‐V
23.11.04
Yoshio	  U
tsum
i
ITU
narrow
	  definition	  of	  IG
he	  W
orking	  Group,	  therefore,	  should	  strive	  to	  interpret	  the	  term
	  "Internet	  governance"	  in	  its	  m
ost	  narrow
	  context.
23.11.04
John	  Klensin
ISO
C
no	  internationalized	  dom
ain	  nam
es
This	  m
em
o	  suggests	  that	  actually	  creating	  such	  nam
es	  in	  the	  DN
S	  is	  undesirable	  from
	  both	  a	  user-­‐interface	  and	  DN
S	  m
anagem
ent	  standpoint.
23.11.04
J.A.	  N
ovaes	  Bicalho
Brazil
no	  separation	  technical/political
Even	  the	  m
ore	  technical	  issues	  have	  som
e	  policy	  aspects	  that	  w
ill	  need	  som
e	  decision	  m
echanism
	  w
here	  all	  the	  stakeholders	  should	  be	  able	  to	  participate.
23.11.04
Isabel	  Padilla
Dom
inican	  Republic
separation	  technical/political
Cuestiones	  de	  Polà-­‐tica	  Pàºblica	  pertinentes	  para	  el	  Gobierno	  de	  Internet
23.11.04
Thom
as	  Dale
Australia
separation	  technical/political
Som
e	  of	  the	  m
ost	  pressing	  issues	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  Internet	  governance	  â€“	  security,	  fraud,	  privacy,	  com
m
ercial	  usage	  of	  content	  and	  applications,	  liability	  â€“	  have	  evolved	  
over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  tim
e	  as	  issues	  for	  treatm
ent	  under	  national	  (and,	  gradually	  and	  im
perfectly,	  international)	  legal	  and	  policy	  regim
es.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  Internet	  m
akes	  
international	  cooperation	  particularly	  im
portant,	  but	  the	  core	  issues	  rem
ain	  the	  sam
e.
23.11.04
Anthony	  Hill
South	  Centre
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
The	  responsibility	  of	  the	  governm
ent,	  especially	  w
ithin	  its	  jurisdiction	  as	  guarantor	  of	  the	  State,	  can	  not	  be	  com
prom
ised	  by	  private	  discretionary	  action	  affecting	  public	  w
elfare.
23.11.04
J.A.	  N
ovaes	  Bicalho
Brazil
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
ith	  these	  thoughts	  I	  w
ant	  to	  invite	  you	  to	  know
	  the	  Internet	  Governance	  m
odel	  im
plem
ented	  in	  Brazil,	  w
here	  an	  Internet	  Steering	  Com
m
ittee,	  com
posed	  by	  all	  the	  sectors,	  
including	  the	  governm
ent,	  w
ork	  together	  to	  prom
ote	  the	  developm
ent	  of	  the	  Internet	  on	  benefit	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  people.
23.11.04
Syria
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
Such	  governance	  shall	  be	  exercised	  prim
arily	  by	  States	  acting	  as	  national	  sovereigns.	  For	  issues	  requiring	  international	  collaboration	  and	  coordination,	  states	  should	  collaborate	  
via	  intergovernm
ental	  organizations,	  assisted	  by	  the	  private	  sector,	  civil	  society	  and	  end-­‐users.
23.11.04
ITU
-­‐TSB
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
Governance	  consists	  of	  the	  collective	  rules,	  procedures,	  processes,	  and	  related	  program
s	  that	  shape	  social	  actors'	  shared	  expectations,	  practices,	  and	  interactions	  and	  result	  in	  
practices	  and	  operations	  that	  are	  consistent	  w
ith	  the	  sovereign	  rights	  of	  states	  and	  the	  social	  and	  m
arket	  interests	  of	  end-­‐users	  and	  operators.	  It	  includes	  agreem
ents	  about	  
standards,	  policies,	  rules,	  and	  enforcem
ent	  and	  dispute	  resolution	  procedures.
23.11.04
Don	  M
cLean
M
acLean	  Consulting
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
o	  help	  set	  priorities,	  as	  part	  of	  this	  analysis	  a	  distinction	  could	  be	  m
ade	  betw
een	  issues	  that	  are	  being	  satisfactorily	  dealt	  w
ith	  in	  existing	  international	  fora,	  and	  those	  that	  should	  
be	  addressed	  as	  a	  m
atter	  of	  urgent	  priority	  but	  currently	  do	  not	  have	  a	  hom
e.
23.11.04
Lynn	  St.Am
our
ISO
C
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
W
e	  urge	  W
GIG	  to	  avoid	  plans	  to	  create	  new
	  organizations	  to	  control	  Internet	  standards,	  to	  allocate	  dom
ain	  nam
es	  and	  IP	  addresses,	  set	  prices	  and	  policies	  for	  international	  
Internet	  connections	  and	  peering,	  or	  to	  control	  w
hat	  kind	  of	  content	  and	  applications	  are	  delivered	  over	  the	  Internet.
23.11.04
Lynn	  St.Am
our
ISO
C
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
These	  organisations	  are	  a	  m
eeting	  point	  for	  bottom
-­‐up,	  consensual,	  industrial	  self-­‐regulation	  by	  the	  groups	  and	  individuals	  that	  use	  their	  services	  and	  resources.
23.11.04
Thom
as	  Dale
Australia
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
There	  are	  som
e	  aspects	  of	  Internet	  deploym
ent,	  such	  as	  voice	  over	  Internet	  protocol,	  EN
U
M
	  and	  IPv6,	  w
hich	  raise	  im
portant	  policy	  issues	  such	  as	  investm
ent	  in	  new
	  
infrastructure	  and	  appropriate	  charging	  and	  settlem
ent	  regim
es.	  How
ever,	  these	  appear	  to	  be	  being	  appropriately	  dealt	  w
ith	  through	  existing	  institutional	  arrangem
ents	  
including	  the	  ITU
,	  ICAN
N
	  and	  IETF,	  and	  through	  com
m
ercial	  processes.
24.11.04
Ronda	  Hauben
Colum
bia	  U
niversity
expand	  participation
ut	  w
ill	  there	  be	  a	  m
eans	  of	  w
elcom
ing	  the	  online	  com
m
unity,	  the	  com
m
unity	  of	  netizens	  into	  the	  W
SIS	  process?	  W
ill	  there	  be	  a	  convergence	  of	  netizen	  participation	  and	  
defense	  of	  the	  public	  essence	  of	  the	  Internet	  strong	  enough	  for	  the	  results	  of	  the	  Tunis	  sum
m
it	  to	  be	  significant?
24.11.04
Patrice	  Lyons
CN
RI
no	  rigid	  definition	  of	  IG
Again,	  it	  m
ay	  be	  asked,	  w
hy	  this	  nuance	  is	  im
portant.	  Instead	  of	  trying	  to	  "fix"	  the	  Internet	  at	  a	  m
om
ent	  in	  tim
e	  w
ith	  a	  definition	  that	  does	  not	  anticipate	  the	  integration	  of	  
certain	  advanced	  and/or	  rapidly	  evolving	  technologies,	  a	  better	  approach	  w
ould	  seem
	  to	  be	  to	  broaden	  the	  definition	  as	  proposed	  herein	  so	  as	  to	  recognize	  the	  need	  for	  
flexibility	  in	  im
plem
entation	  for	  the	  future.
24.11.04
Paul	  W
ilson
APN
IC
separation	  technical/political
All	  of	  these	  are	  undeniably	  aspects	  of	  the	  Internet,	  but	  presenting	  no	  problem
s,	  they	  are	  largely	  invisible	  to	  this	  process	  and	  therefore	  not	  proposed	  for	  inclusion	  in	  the	  w
ork	  of	  
the	  W
GIG.
445
24.11.04
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
How
ever,	  w
e	  strongly	  believe	  that	  the	  conditions	  required	  for	  address	  m
anagem
ent	  as	  m
entioned	  above	  should	  not	  be	  constrained	  or	  lim
ited	  by	  the	  interests	  of	  national	  
sovereignties,	  but	  they	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  the	  functions	  of	  Internet	  to	  be	  used	  am
ong	  all	  the	  people	  of	  the	  w
orld	  for	  their	  distribution	  of	  inform
ation	  and	  
com
m
unication.
24.11.04
Paul	  W
ilson
APN
IC
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
There	  are	  m
any,	  m
any	  critical	  aspects	  of	  the	  Internet	  that	  actually	  w
ork	  very	  w
ell	  at	  present.	  As	  aspects	  of	  the	  netw
ork,	  they	  seem
	  to	  be	  good	  candidates	  for	  inclusion	  in	  the	  
definition,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  suggested,	  sim
ply	  because	  they	  present	  no	  visible	  problem
	  right	  now
.	  Exam
ples	  m
ay	  be:
11.02.05
Q
iheng	  Hu
China
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
W
GIG's	  m
ission	  is	  to	  prom
ote	  the	  equal	  participation	  rights	  of	  all	  the	  sovereign	  governm
ents	  in	  the	  decision-­‐m
aking	  process	  regarding	  the	  Internet	  public	  policies.
11.02.05
Q
iheng	  Hu
China
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
W
GIG	  should	  give	  the	  m
atter	  further	  through,	  focusing	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  how
	  to	  establish	  a	  coordination	  platform
/m
echanism
	  on	  public	  policy	  m
atters	  under	  the	  U
N
	  fram
ew
ork,	  
w
hich	  is	  broadly	  participated	  (by	  all	  sovereign	  governm
ents),	  authoritative,	  legitim
ate,	  and	  transparent.
11.02.05
Q
iheng	  Hu
China
sovereignty
The	  adm
inistration	  of	  such	  resources	  is	  an	  im
portant	  international	  public	  policy	  issue	  that	  involves	  the	  public	  interests,	  sovereign	  rights	  of	  each	  country.
13.02.05
W
GIG
braod	  definition	  of	  m
ultilateralism
O
ne	  com
m
enter	  disagreed	  that	  the	  RSSAC	  and	  IETF	  w
ere	  m
ultilateral	  in	  its	  broadest	  sense.	  According	  to	  the	  online	  version	  of	  the	  O
xford	  Dictionary,	  the	  m
ost	  com
m
on	  definition	  
of	  "m
ultilateral"	  is	  ,"Involving	  three	  or	  m
ore	  governm
ents,	  organizations,	  etc.,	  esp.	  as	  parties	  to	  an	  agreem
ent,	  sum
m
it,	  etc."	  Thus,	  since	  there	  appear	  to	  be	  no	  prohibitions	  to	  
governm
ent	  representatives	  participating	  in	  the	  RSSAC	  and	  the	  IETF,	  both	  organizations	  w
ould	  fall	  under	  this	  definition.
13.02.05
Beatriz	  Busaniche
Via	  Libre
expand	  participation
Tw
o	  challenges	  rem
ain,	  how
ever,	  the	  level	  of	  participation	  by	  developing	  countries	  and	  the	  fragm
ented	  nature	  of	  decision	  m
aking	  by	  different	  stakeholders	  in	  different	  entities.
13.02.05
W
GIG
expand	  participation
he	  failure	  to	  fully	  engage	  consum
ers	  and	  users,	  at	  the	  national	  and	  international	  levels:	  ï‚·∙ï€	  	  the	  failure	  to	  successfully	  include	  m
any	  developing	  countries	  in	  the	  developm
ent	  of	  
overall	  e-­‐com
m
erce	  governance	  initiatives,	  as	  w
ell	  as	  in	  action	  on	  m
any	  of	  the	  specific	  issues	  that	  fall	  under	  the	  general	  um
brella.
13.02.05
W
GIG
expand	  participation
The	  need	  to	  com
plete	  a	  full	  internationalization	  of	  ICAN
N
,	  w
ith	  an	  increase	  of	  the	  internal	  diversity	  in	  term
s	  of	  spoken	  languages,	  global	  participation,	  variety	  of	  participating	  
stakeholders	  and	  organizations,	  and	  involvem
ent	  of	  the	  general	  public.
13.02.05
W
GIG
expand	  participation
How
ever,	  it	  is	  not	  evident	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  civil	  society	  are	  as	  yet	  adequately	  represented	  at	  either	  governance	  level.	  In	  addition,	  developing	  country	  stakeholders	  from
	  
governm
ent,	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  civil	  society	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  effectively	  engaged.
13.02.05
W
GIG
Im
prove	  public/private	  balance	  in	  IG
How
ever,	  the	  balance	  betw
een	  the	  private	  and	  public	  involvem
ent,	  as	  w
ell	  as	  that	  betw
een	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  private	  sector,
13.02.05
Beatriz	  Busaniche
Via	  Libre
Internet	  users	  are	  stakeholders
This	  paraggraph	  flagrantly	  om
its	  internet	  users	  as	  relevant	  stakeholders.	  Individual	  users	  are	  vital	  to	  the	  Internet,	  and	  they	  ought	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  such.
13.02.05
Beatriz	  Busaniche
Via	  Libre
IPR	  critique
There	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  intellectual	  property	  theft.	  Som
e	  people	  incorrectly	  use	  this	  term
	  to	  refer	  to	  different	  kinds	  of	  infringem
ent	  (not	  theft)	  on	  certain	  state-­‐granted	  
m
onopolies	  such	  as	  copyrights,	  tradem
arks,	  patents,	  geographical	  denom
inations	  and	  others.
13.02.05
Beatriz	  Busaniche
Via	  Libre
IPR	  critique
the	  w
ord	  piracy	  describes	  an	  act	  of	  violence	  at	  high	  seas,	  and	  has	  m
eant	  this	  since	  before	  there	  w
as	  electricity,	  let	  alone	  com
puters.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  term
	  is	  probably	  being	  
used	  in	  a	  colloquial	  sense	  that	  draw
s	  an	  odd	  parallel	  betw
een	  copyright	  infringem
ent	  and	  piracy.
13.02.05
Georg	  Greve
FSF
IPR	  critique
Since	  the	  term
	  is	  so	  am
biguous,	  using	  the	  term
	  \Intellectual	  Property	  or	  \Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  tends	  to	  bring	  about	  m
isleading	  and	  am
biguous	  results.
13.02.05
W
GIG
liberalisation	  does	  not	  provide	  universal	  access It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  has	  a	  vital	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  ICTs	  and	  that	  the	  rem
oval	  of	  restrictions	  in	  term
s	  of	  provision	  of	  specific	  services	  w
ill	  support	  the	  
provision	  of	  affordable	  access	  to	  telecom
m
unications.	  How
ever,	  this	  argum
ent	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  com
plete	  picture.
13.02.05
W
GIG
M
ultilingualism
Issue	  Paper	  on	  the	  M
ultilingualization	  of	  Internet	  N
am
ing	  System
13.02.05
Kam
el	  Tarek
Egypt
no	  separation	  technical/political
This	  paragraph	  sounds	  as	  if	  there	  is	  som
e	  technical	  lim
itation	  on	  the	  use	  of	  m
ultilingual	  characters	  for	  TLDs,	  w
hich	  is	  rather	  a	  policy	  issue	  that	  involves	  introduction	  of	  new
	  TLDs.
13.02.05
W
GIG
non-­‐binding	  insitutions	  only
There	  is	  probably	  a	  need	  to	  indicate	  som
e	  kind	  of	  best	  practice	  as	  opposed	  to	  hard	  law
.	  Such	  best	  practices	  w
ould	  crystallize	  into	  a	  form
	  of	  regulation.	  It	  w
ould	  m
ake	  it	  easier	  for	  
content	  providers	  to	  operate.
13.02.05
W
GIG
Privacy	  as	  a	  hum
an	  right
The	  first	  paradigm
	  treats	  privacy	  as	  a	  hum
an	  right,
13.02.05
Georg	  Greve
FSF
Problem
	  of	  m
onopolies
These	  are	  good	  indications	  that	  the	  W
GIG	  best	  only	  concern	  itself	  w
ith	  the	  speciÂ¯ˉc	  issues	  of	  lim
ited	  m
onopolies	  that	  aÂ®ect	  the	  internet	  and	  its	  governance,	  such	  as	  prevention	  
of	  softw
are	  patents.
13.02.05
W
GIG
Pro-­‐com
petitive	  regulation
This	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  Internet	  connectivity.	  Today	  in	  m
any	  countries,	  high	  telecom
m
unications	  prices	  are	  constraining	  the	  Internet	  m
arket.	  The	  constrained	  m
arket,	  in	  
turn,	  m
akes	  it	  econom
ically	  unfeasible	  for	  Tier	  1	  Internet	  Service	  Providers	  (ISPs)	  to	  establish	  an	  Internet	  Access	  Point	  (IAP)	  in	  the	  country	  leading	  to	  even	  higher	  costs	  for	  the	  
country's	  ISPs	  to	  reach	  the	  nearest	  IAP	  outside	  the	  country.
13.02.05
Beatriz	  Busaniche
Via	  Libre
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
How
ever,	  other	  countries	  and	  stakeholders	  think	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  should	  be	  tem
pered	  w
ith	  adequate	  respect	  for	  the	  public	  interest,	  as	  defined	  by	  law
s,	  
governm
ents	  and	  citizens.	  It	  m
ust	  be	  ensured	  that	  efforts	  to	  survey	  the	  Internet	  and	  com
bat	  cybercrim
e	  are	  not	  bound	  to	  the	  private	  interests	  of	  specific	  groups	  or	  countries,	  
but	  contem
plate	  the	  rights	  of	  all	  peoples	  and	  of	  the	  global	  com
m
unity	  of	  individual	  Internet	  users.
13.02.05
W
GIG
support	  of	  the	  single	  root
Thus,	  an	  open	  issue	  in	  the	  past	  has	  been	  w
hether	  the	  existence	  of	  alternative	  root	  server	  system
s	  should	  be	  encouraged,	  accepted,	  subject	  to	  regulation,	  or	  allow
ed	  at	  all.	  At	  
present,	  this	  discussion	  has	  been	  m
uted	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  single	  root.
13.02.05
W
GIG
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
Its	  success	  in	  the	  dom
ain	  nam
es	  vs.	  tradem
arks	  can	  be	  the	  basis	  to	  be	  a	  test	  case,	  or	  have	  sim
ilar	  dispute	  resolution	  m
echanism
s	  that	  m
ay	  be	  used	  for	  other	  im
portant	  issues	  
faced	  by	  the	  Internet	  users,	  like	  Spam
.
13.02.05
W
GIG
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
Collectively,	  it	  m
ight	  be	  argued	  that	  they	  m
eet	  the	  criteria	  of	  being	  m
ultilateral	  and	  em
bodying	  a	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  approach.
13.02.05
W
GIG
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
The	  ICAN
N
	  system
	  of	  private-­‐public	  partnerships	  has	  so	  far	  been	  inclusive	  and	  flexible.	  This	  innovative	  flexibility	  is	  im
portant	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Internet	  and	  its	  applications	  
have	  evolved	  so	  rapidly.	  It	  is	  a	  w
ell	  tested	  system
	  that	  has	  evolved	  over	  the	  last	  35	  years	  of	  developm
ent	  of	  the	  Internet	  itself.	  The	  overall	  partnership	  seem
	  to	  be	  w
ell	  aw
are	  of	  
the	  inherently	  global	  characteristics	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  the	  overriding	  need	  for	  global	  interoperability	  (both	  horizontally	  betw
een	  netw
orks	  and	  vertically	  betw
een	  netw
orks	  and	  
applications),	  and	  for	  security	  and	  stability	  of	  the	  entire	  Internet.	  Another	  advantage	  is	  that	  the	  partnership	  is	  built	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  each	  partner	  in	  their	  respective	  areas,	  and	  
allow
s	  for	  all	  those	  interested	  in	  the	  various	  activities	  associated	  w
ith	  the	  developm
ent	  of	  the	  standards	  and	  the	  relevant	  technical	  policies	  to	  be	  involved.	  The	  RIR	  System
	  is	  also	  
a	  successful	  self-­‐regulation	  m
odel.
13.02.05
W
GIG
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
There	  is	  a	  great	  opportunity	  to	  correct	  those	  aspects	  of	  the	  current	  system
	  that	  could	  be	  necessary	  to	  change,	  preserving	  the	  m
ost	  im
portant	  aspects	  of	  the	  ICAN
N
	  m
odel	  and	  
taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  huge	  am
ount	  of	  energy	  and	  w
ork	  dedicated	  by	  thousands	  of	  people	  from
	  different	  countries,	  cultures	  and	  sectors,	  including	  a	  lot	  of	  governm
ental	  
representatives,	  to	  create	  a	  system
	  for	  coordinating	  m
any	  technical	  issues	  regarding	  Internet	  functioning.
13.02.05
W
GIG
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
Taking	  into	  account	  that	  ICAN
N
	  is	  a	  private	  non-­‐profit	  corporation,	  its	  openness	  provides	  for	  a	  reasonably	  dem
ocratic	  organization.
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13.02.05
W
GIG
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
The	  m
ain	  strengths	  of	  the	  present	  regulatory	  system
	  are	  the	  incentive	  for	  the	  creation	  and	  developm
ent	  of	  new
	  industries	  based	  on	  intellectual	  production.	  These	  strengths	  
ensure	  a	  reliable	  environm
ent	  for	  investm
ent	  in	  such	  enterprises,	  and	  creating	  w
ealth	  and	  job	  places	  in	  those	  countries	  w
here	  intellectual	  industries	  represent	  a	  significant	  part	  
of	  the	  GDP.
13.02.05
W
GIG
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
The	  process	  leading	  to	  the	  decision	  to	  transition	  m
any	  Internet	  m
anagem
ent	  functions,	  including	  adm
inistration	  of	  the	  root	  server	  system
,	  to	  ICAN
N
	  w
as	  open,	  transparent	  and	  
consultative.
13.02.05
W
GIG
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
W
ith	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  view
s	  of	  som
e	  governm
ental	  actors	  and	  possibly	  civil	  society	  actors	  involvem
ent	  in	  ICAN
N
,	  the	  above	  figures	  seem
	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  organizations	  
involved	  w
ith	  the	  current	  adm
inistration	  of	  the	  root	  server	  system
	  are	  adequate	  w
ith	  respect	  to	  the	  Principles	  outlined	  in	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Principles.
13.02.05
W
GIG
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
There	  is	  at	  present	  no	  unified	  global	  system
	  to	  control	  spam
,	  although	  international	  cooperative	  action	  has	  begun	  am
ong	  governm
ents	  on	  a	  bilateral	  and	  m
ultilateral	  basis,	  and,	  
separately,	  am
ong	  netw
ork	  operators	  and	  active	  Internet	  users.	  At	  present,	  these	  activities	  are	  largely	  lim
ited	  to	  the	  richest	  developed	  countries,	  m
any	  of	  w
hich	  have	  spam
	  
control	  legislation	  and	  enforcem
ent	  m
echanism
s	  in	  place.	  This	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  situation	  of	  strength	  since	  these	  countries	  account	  for	  w
ell	  over	  half	  the	  spam
	  produced	  in	  
the	  w
orld	  today.
13.02.05
W
GIG
transparency
Even	  though	  the	  ICAN
N
	  process	  is	  international	  and	  m
ultilateral,	  it	  lacks	  transparency	  as	  regards	  issues	  such	  as	  budgets	  and	  spending	  w
ithin	  ICAN
N
.	  The	  lack	  of	  transparency	  also	  
m
eans	  that	  there	  is	  less	  accountability.	  Also,	  the	  inform
al	  culture	  of	  the	  ICAN
N
	  com
m
unity	  and	  the	  need	  to	  cope	  w
ith	  the	  speed	  of	  Internet	  changes	  som
etim
es	  m
ake	  it	  hard	  for	  
som
e	  stakeholders	  to	  participate	  or	  to	  understand	  w
hat	  is	  happening:	  m
ore	  care	  could	  be	  taken	  in	  m
aking	  agendas	  and	  schedules	  reliable	  and	  know
n	  w
ell	  in	  advance.
13.02.05
W
GIG
U
N
	  oversight	  of	  the	  ICAN
N
As	  an	  alternative,	  they	  feel	  that	  som
e	  intergovernm
ental	  organization	  under	  the	  fram
ew
ork	  of	  the	  U
nited	  N
ations	  should	  have	  final	  authority.
13.02.05
Beatriz	  Busaniche
Via	  Libre
W
GIG	  critique
As	  a	  com
m
ent	  on	  the	  process	  for	  accepting	  com
m
ents	  to	  W
GIG	  papers,	  w
e	  m
ust	  point	  out	  that	  just	  tw
o	  w
eeks	  to	  review
	  a	  large	  num
ber	  of	  papers	  that	  w
ere	  w
ritten	  over	  a	  
period	  of	  several	  m
onths	  are	  just	  not	  realistic.
13.02.05
Georg	  Greve
FSF
W
GIG	  critique
w
e	  feel	  that	  given	  the	  am
ount	  of	  papers	  by	  the	  U
N
	  W
GIG	  and	  the	  theoretical	  need	  to	  com
m
ent	  on	  alm
ost	  all	  of	  them
,	  the	  tim
e	  given	  w
as	  unrealistically	  insufficient.
13.02.05
Georg	  Greve
FSF
W
GIG	  critique
W
e	  Â¯ˉnd	  it	  deeply	  objectionable	  that	  a	  W
orking	  Group	  on	  Internet	  Governance	  (W
GIG)	  apparently	  considers	  the	  U
nited	  N
ations	  U
niversal	  Declaration	  on	  Hum
an	  Rights	  (U
DHR)	  
negotiable.	  Hum
an	  Rights	  are	  inalienable	  and	  cannot	  be	  subjected	  to	  being	  \balanced	  w
ith	  the	  interest	  of	  m
onopoly	  holders.
14.02.05
Saha	  Debabrata
India
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
e	  are	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  internet	  should	  be	  governed	  by	  an	  inter-­‐governm
ental,	  m
ultilateral,	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  international	  body.
14.02.05
Ayesha	  Hassan
ICC
critique	  of	  privacy
N
ot	  all	  stakeholders	  see	  privacy	  as	  a	  hum
an	  right.
14.02.05
Sam
i	  Al-­‐Basheer
Saudi	  Arabia
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
For	  exam
ple	  the	  possible	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
.
14.02.05
Gus	  Hosein
CS	  privacy	  caucus
exclusion	  of	  CS	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed
W
e	  believe	  it	  is	  im
portant	  to	  note	  that	  som
e	  forum
s	  are	  open	  to	  all	  stakeholders	  in	  a	  m
anner	  of	  equal	  participation,	  w
hile	  som
e	  forum
s	  are	  relatively	  closed.	  M
ost	  of	  the	  forum
s	  
that	  have	  discussed	  cybersecurity	  in	  detail	  are	  relatively	  closed.
14.02.05
Adam
	  Peake
IGC
expand	  participation
W
e	  w
ould	  like	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  extent	  of	  participation	  from
	  the	  developing	  parts	  of	  the	  w
orld	  in	  the	  various	  Internet	  governance	  m
echanism
s	  is	  still	  far	  from
	  sufficient.	  This	  
is	  especially	  true	  for	  civil	  society	  actors.	  W
e	  w
ould	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  W
GIG	  m
ake	  appropriate	  recom
m
endation	  to	  ensure	  the	  effective	  participation	  of	  ALL	  stakeholder	  
groups	  from
	  developing	  countries.
14.02.05
Sam
i	  Al-­‐Basheer
Saudi	  Arabia
ICAN
N
	  critique
The	  paper	  does	  not	  give	  a	  fully	  balanced	  view
	  of	  the	  current	  situation.	  Rather,	  it	  tends	  to	  portray	  it	  as	  being	  the	  ideal	  m
odel.
14.02.05
Saha	  Debabrata
India
Im
prove	  GAC
lim
ited	  influence	  of	  Governm
ents	  of	  various	  countries	  in	  ICAN
N
	  and	  in	  particular	  w
ith	  the	  purely	  advisory	  role	  of	  GAC.
14.02.05
Saha	  Debabrata
India
Internationalise	  the	  root	  server	  system
Regional	  dispersion	  of	  root	  DN
S	  w
ill	  reduce	  the	  in	  fructuous	  international	  traffic
14.02.05
Thoralf	  Stenvold
N
orw
ay
Internet	  as	  a	  global	  public	  resource
In	  m
any	  w
ays,	  it	  m
ay	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  internet	  has	  becom
e	  a	  global	  public	  good,	  and	  that	  the	  task	  ahead	  for	  this	  w
orking	  group	  is	  a	  pioneering	  exercise	  in	  global	  governance.
14.02.05
Valeria	  D'Losta
Singapore
lim
ited	  role	  for	  the	  W
GIG
ingapore's	  view
	  is	  that	  tw
o	  sets	  of	  issues,	  nam
ely	  Internet	  Infrastructure	  Governance	  and	  Internet	  U
se	  issues	  should	  be	  the	  priority	  for	  future	  w
ork
14.02.05
Saha	  Debabrata
India
M
ultilingualism
W
e	  feel	  IDN
	  requires	  a	  com
prehensive	  policy,	  standard,	  regulation	  m
echanism
	  to	  be	  evolved	  at	  intergovernm
ental	  level.
14.02.05
Ayesha	  Hassan
ICC
no	  coordination	  of	  stradardisation	  bodies
Efforts	  like	  the	  one	  contem
plated	  to	  create	  a	  central	  governing	  regim
e,	  w
ill	  im
pede	  technical	  innovation,	  stifle	  com
petition,	  and	  w
ill	  be	  severely	  challenged	  to	  rem
ain	  abreast	  of	  
m
arket/industry	  needs	  and	  technical	  developm
ents.
14.02.05
Gus	  Hosein
CS	  privacy	  caucus
Privacy	  as	  a	  hum
an	  right
Privacy	  is	  an	  essential	  hum
an	  right,
14.02.05
Ayesha	  Hassan
ICC
Private	  sector	  leadership
The	  im
portant	  role	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  plays	  in	  bringing	  ICTs	  to	  the	  w
orld	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  used	  as	  tools	  for	  econom
ic	  and	  social	  developm
ent	  should	  be	  included	  m
ore	  
clearly	  in	  this	  paper.
14.02.05
Thoralf	  Stenvold
N
orw
ay
Private	  sector	  leadership
A	  dynam
ic	  and	  private	  sector	  led	  developm
ent	  of	  the	  internet,	  based	  on	  sound	  m
arket	  econom
y	  policies.
14.02.05
Saha	  Debabrata
India
sovereignty
that	  are	  consistent	  w
ith	  the	  sovereign	  rights	  of	  states
14.02.05
Saha	  Debabrata
India
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
O
bviously	  it	  is	  im
portant	  that	  governm
ent	  should	  play	  an	  im
portant	  role	  at	  the	  policy	  level	  in	  the	  registration	  of	  TLDs.
14.02.05
Saha	  Debabrata
India
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
Based	  on	  our	  discussion	  w
ith	  the	  different	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  country,	  w
e	  clearly	  feel	  that	  Governm
ents	  should	  play	  an	  appropriate	  role	  in	  Internet	  Governance	  at	  N
ational	  and	  
international	  Level,	  w
hile	  leaving	  operational	  issues	  â€“	  in	  particular	  those	  issues	  w
ith	  com
m
ercial	  im
plication	  to	  private	  sector.
14.02.05
Ayesha	  Hassan
ICC
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
W
e	  support	  the	  approach	  that	  the	  existing	  system
	  should	  be	  im
proved	  rather	  than	  replaced.
14.02.05
Valeria	  D'Losta
Singapore
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
Singapore	  is	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  ICAN
N
	  has	  been	  a	  sound	  public-­‐private	  sector	  collaborative	  effort	  in	  m
any	  respects.
14.02.05
Sam
i	  Al-­‐Basheer
Saudi	  Arabia
W
GIG	  critique
Alternative	  governance	  m
echanism
s	  for	  root	  servers	  system
s	  w
ere	  not	  considered.
15.02.05
Karl	  Auerbach
Cavebaer.com
critique	  of	  the	  single	  root
A	  better	  title	  w
ould	  m
ake	  the	  final	  w
ord	  of	  the	  title	  a	  plural.	  O
perational	  experience	  has	  show
n	  that	  there	  can	  be	  m
ore	  than	  one	  DN
S	  root.	  There	  have	  been	  statem
ents	  by	  the	  
IAB	  and	  ICAN
N
	  to	  the	  contrary	  but	  those	  statem
ents	  seem
	  m
ore	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  yearning	  for	  a	  single	  catholic	  nam
e	  space	  rather	  than	  a	  w
ell-­‐articulated	  technical	  proof.	  (And,	  
if	  it	  w
ere	  true	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  other	  DN
S	  system
s	  could	  harm
	  the	  net	  then	  w
ould	  that	  not	  indicate	  a	  vulnerability	  and	  w
eakness	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  repaired?)
15.02.05
Louis	  Pouzin
EU
rolinc
critique	  of	  the	  single	  root
The	  top	  of	  the	  hierarchy	  is	  know
n	  as	  the	  "root"	  and	  the	  set	  of	  internationally	  distributed	  root	  servers	  m
irror	  the	  root	  and	  provide	  redundancy	  and	  robustness	  to	  the	  dom
ain	  
nam
e	  system
.	  N
ow
here	  is	  it	  stated	  that	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  the	  top	  root	  is	  just	  one	  technical	  (or	  political)	  decision.	  The	  GSM
	  also	  resolves	  nam
es	  into	  netw
ork	  num
bers	  w
ithout	  
a	  top	  root.	  Handling	  m
obile	  users	  is	  an	  order	  of	  m
agnitude	  m
ore	  com
plex	  than	  in	  the	  internet.
15.02.05
Bill	  M
anning
EP.N
ET
discussion	  beyond	  W
G
It	  seem
s	  reasonable	  and	  prudent	  to	  consider	  a	  broader	  outreach	  to	  governm
ents	  and	  other	  stakeholders	  â€“	  giving	  them
	  the	  chance	  to	  be	  inform
ed	  on	  the	  current	  state	  of	  
affairs.
15.02.05
Shahid	  Akhtar
U
N
DP-­‐ADPIP
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
As	  w
e	  m
ove	  tow
ards	  N
ext	  Generation	  N
etw
orks,	  som
e	  considered	  that	  traditional	  Internet	  organizations	  such	  as	  ICAN
N
	  w
ill	  becom
e	  less	  im
portant	  than	  intergovernm
ental	  
bodies	  such	  as	  the	  ITU
	  w
here	  standards	  for	  these	  netw
orks	  are	  developed	  and	  the	  m
ajor
447
15.02.05
Suresh	  Ram
asubram
anian
APCAU
CE
Im
plem
ent	  an	  anti-­‐spam
	  policy
nd	  a	  viable	  definition	  or	  plan	  of	  action	  on	  spam
	  is	  sadly	  absent.
15.02.05
Du	  Yuejin
Internet	  Society	  of	  China
Im
prove	  GAC
Secondly,	  reinforce	  cooperation	  of	  governm
ents	  on	  m
anagem
ent	  of	  Internet	  nam
es	  and	  num
bers	  resources.
15.02.05
Du	  Yuejin
Internet	  Society	  of	  China
Internationalise	  the	  root	  server	  system
Firstly,	  internationalise	  m
anagem
ent	  of	  Internet	  nam
es	  and	  num
bers	  resources.
15.02.05
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
Internet	  users	  are	  stakeholders
The	  role	  of	  individuals	  and	  end	  users	  w
ithin	  ICAN
N
15.02.05
Julia	  Hahn
IVF
IPR	  protection
The	  draft	  issue	  paper	  does	  not	  provide	  an	  accurate	  picture	  of	  the	  current	  situation	  and	  w
e	  strongly	  regret	  its	  apparent	  anti-­‐copyright	  bias	  (including	  a	  disproportionate	  focus	  on	  
criticism
s	  of	  the	  IPR	  system
	  and	  an	  inaccurate	  im
plication	  that	  diverse	  voices	  and	  the	  public	  interest	  have	  not	  been	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  developm
ent	  of	  that	  system
).
15.02.05
Rob	  Borthw
ick
Vodafone
lim
ited	  role	  for	  the	  W
GIG
The	  list	  of	  issues	  w
hich	  appear	  in	  the	  Inventory	  of	  public	  Policy	  issues	  and	  Priorities	  is	  very	  broad	  in	  scope	  and	  risks	  distracting	  policy	  m
aker	  attention	  aw
ay	  from
	  key	  topics	  
w
here	  this	  initiative	  should	  focus	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  value.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  Vodafone	  how
	  the	  m
any	  issues	  have	  actually	  been	  (or	  are	  to	  be)	  prioritized	  in	  the	  policy	  form
ation	  
process.
15.02.05
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
M
ultilingualism
Internationalized	  dom
ain	  nam
es
15.02.05
Jam
es	  Seng
IETF
Private	  sector	  leadership
M
ore	  often,	  industry	  self-­‐regulation	  is	  far	  m
ore	  cost	  effective	  then	  governm
ent	  intervention.
15.02.05
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
question	  the	  U
S	  oversight	  of	  ICAN
N
Role	  of	  the	  U
S	  Governm
ent	  in	  supervising	  ICAN
N
15.02.05
FIAPF
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
This	  seem
s	  to	  be	  a	  case	  of	  selective	  am
nesia:	  in	  effect,	  the	  W
IPO
	  treaties	  negotiated	  over	  several	  decades	  took	  a	  long	  tim
e	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  concern	  of	  W
IPO
	  and	  
M
em
ber	  states	  to	  ensure	  that	  international	  treaties	  w
ould	  build	  in	  the	  necessary	  balance	  betw
een	  the	  need	  to	  incentivise	  creators	  of	  content,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  
ensure	  access	  to	  IP	  w
orks	  on	  fair	  term
s	  by	  citizens,	  on	  the	  other.
15.02.05
Karl	  Auerbach
Cavebaer.com
W
GIG	  critique
I	  w
ish	  there	  had	  been	  m
ore	  tim
e	  to	  digest	  them
	  betw
een	  the	  date	  of	  their	  publication	  and	  the	  date	  that	  com
m
ents	  are	  due.
15.02.05
Karl	  Auerbach
Cavebaer.com
W
GIG	  critique
U
nquestioning	  acceptance	  of	  the	  technological	  status	  quo	  as	  if	  it	  w
ere	  a	  lim
itation	  of	  w
hat	  could	  be	  in	  the	  future.
15.02.05
Karl	  Auerbach
Cavebaer.com
W
GIG	  critique
O
n	  a	  broader	  scale	  the	  papers	  suffer	  from
	  a	  m
ore	  foundational	  w
eakness	  â€“	  they	  do	  not	  adequately	  articulate	  underlying	  principles	  and	  assum
ptions.
15.02.05
Louis	  Pouzin
EU
rolinc
W
GIG	  critique
The	  shocking	  unbalance	  betw
een	  v4	  addresses	  allocated	  to	  U
SA	  organizations	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  w
orld	  is	  not	  even	  acknow
ledged.
15.02.05
Louis	  Pouzin
EU
rolinc
W
GIG	  critique
The	  docum
ent	  is	  rich	  in	  ICAN
N
	  rhetorics	  and	  m
ute	  on	  basic	  issues	  such	  as:	  -­‐	  the	  justification	  for	  a	  unique	  authoritative	  root	  controlled	  by	  the	  U
SA:	  -­‐	  the	  use	  of	  the	  DN
S	  to	  
m
onitor	  and	  potentially	  alter	  user	  traffic:	  -­‐	  the	  ability	  to	  shut	  off	  a	  ccTLD:	  -­‐	  the	  existence	  of	  autonom
ous	  internets.
15.02.05
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
W
GIG	  critique
W
hile	  I	  appreciate	  the	  effort	  put	  into	  it,	  it	  appears	  to	  this	  reader	  that	  the	  key	  policy	  and	  institutional	  controversies	  have	  not	  been	  identified,	  nor	  have	  the	  m
erits	  of	  the	  different	  
ideas	  been	  discussed.	  Instead,	  the	  paper	  concentrates	  on	  fairly	  basic	  descriptive	  m
aterial.	  Such	  m
aterial	  is	  available	  in	  m
uch	  better	  form
	  from
	  existing	  reports	  and	  books.	  W
hat	  
the	  W
GIG	  needs	  to	  present	  is	  a	  m
uch	  m
ore	  focused	  discussion	  of	  the	  key	  points	  of	  controversy	  and	  proposals	  for	  change.
15.02.05
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
W
GIG	  critique
W
hatever	  the	  m
erits	  or	  dem
erits	  of	  ICAN
N
	  (and	  I	  am
	  favourable	  to	  m
any	  aspects	  of	  ICAN
N
),	  I	  w
ould	  urge	  the	  W
GIG	  to	  achieve	  m
ore	  objectivity	  and	  judgm
ent	  in	  its	  discussion.	  
Phrases	  such	  as	  "bottom
	  up,"	  "broad	  representation,"	  "public-­‐private	  partnership"	  m
ay	  represent	  ICAN
N
's	  view
	  of	  itself	  but	  m
ay	  be	  contested	  by	  others.	  U
nless	  the	  W
GIG	  has	  
carefully	  considered	  this	  issue	  and	  really	  considers	  ICAN
N
	  a	  nearly	  perfect	  m
odel	  of	  bottom
	  up	  governance,	  I	  w
ould	  urge	  it	  to	  use	  m
ore	  circum
spect	  language	  in	  its	  description.
16.02.05
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
critique	  of	  the	  single	  root
n	  attem
pt	  to	  ban	  com
peting	  DN
S	  roots	  m
ight	  also	  outlaw
	  self-­‐provision	  of	  root	  nam
ing	  service.	  N
or	  w
ould	  it	  be	  w
ise	  to	  attem
pt	  to	  prohibit	  efforts	  to	  bypass	  DN
S	  altogether	  w
ith	  
a	  radical	  new
	  nam
ing	  or	  addressing	  technology.	  If	  a	  critical	  m
ass	  of	  the	  w
orld's	  internet	  users	  decide	  to	  m
igrate	  to	  a	  radical	  new
	  system
,	  they	  should	  be	  allow
ed	  to	  do	  so.
16.02.05
Tan	  Tin	  W
ee
N
ational	  U
niversity	  of	  Singapore
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
For	  exam
ple,	  even	  ITU
-­‐T	  has	  volunteered	  to	  play	  such	  a	  coordinating	  role.	  Such	  coordination	  bodies	  derive	  their	  legitim
acy	  not	  by	  fiat	  but	  by	  com
m
unity	  support	  and	  
recognition.
16.02.05
U
N
ESCO
	  -­‐	  IFPAP
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
The	  International	  Telecom
m
unication	  U
nion	  seem
s	  to	  be	  the	  m
ost	  suitable	  body	  to	  develop	  the	  appropriate	  technical	  regulation	  for	  the	  Internet.
16.02.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
exclusion	  of	  CS	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed
Civil	  society	  w
ill	  act	  as	  an	  effective	  counter	  force	  against	  dom
inant	  com
m
ercial	  interest,	  or	  the	  danger	  of	  excessive	  and	  top-­‐dow
n	  interventions	  of	  governm
ent	  to	  achieve	  m
ore	  
harm
onious	  and	  effective	  coordination	  and	  cooperation	  as	  a	  w
hole.
16.02.05
Sophia	  Huyer
W
om
en	  in	  Global	  Science	  and	  Technology
gender	  issues	  m
ust	  be	  addressed
This	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  representation	  of	  w
om
en's	  concerns	  in	  a	  substantive	  w
ay	  in	  m
ost	  of	  the	  docum
ents.
16.02.05
JFC	  M
ortin
IntLN
ET
ICAN
N
	  critique
I	  am
	  involved	  in	  international	  nam
ing	  since	  1978	  I	  supervised	  from
	  1980	  to1985.	  It	  is	  only	  recently	  I	  discovered	  that	  som
eone	  (ICAN
N
)	  claim
ed	  rights	  on	  m
y	  ow
n	  nam
e,	  m
y	  
im
agination	  and	  m
y	  culture	  and	  asked	  m
e	  $	  25.000	  to	  only	  discuss	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  TLD.
16.02.05
Y.J	  Park
IGC
ICAN
N
	  critique
I	  hope	  W
GIG	  can	  present	  m
ore	  specific	  coordination	  m
echanism
	  or	  governance	  m
echanism
	  of	  global	  ccTLDs	  in	  a	  tim
ely	  m
anner	  before	  the	  current	  M
em
orandum
	  of	  
U
nderstanding	  betw
een	  ICAN
N
	  and	  U
S	  governm
ent	  is	  expired.
16.02.05
JFC	  M
ortin
IntLN
ET
IG	  cannot	  exist
There	  is	  no	  Internet	  Governance	  as	  such.
16.02.05
U
N
ESCO
	  -­‐	  IFPAP
Internet	  as	  a	  global	  public	  resource
Recognizing	  the	  Internet	  as	  a	  global	  public	  good,
16.02.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
Internet	  users	  are	  stakeholders
I	  hope	  W
GIG	  w
ill	  take	  m
ore	  serious	  look	  at	  the	  role	  of	  users	  and	  citizens	  in	  this	  new
	  and	  exciting	  challenge	  of	  finding	  the	  right	  balance	  for	  new
	  global	  governance	  m
echanism
s.
16.02.05
Shiro	  Harada
Tokyo	  U
niversity
Internet	  users	  are	  stakeholders
Those	  standards	  that	  seem
	  to	  be	  the	  best	  for	  producers	  m
ay	  not	  be	  so	  good	  for	  their	  users	  including	  governm
ents,	  enterprises	  and	  consum
ers.	  It	  m
ay	  lead	  to	  m
istakes	  and	  
problem
s.	  Even	  in	  these	  cases,	  it	  is	  not	  alw
ays	  allow
ed	  to	  change	  the	  published	  standards,	  in	  the	  nam
e	  of	  stability	  of	  standards.
16.02.05
Chris	  Zielinski
IAIA
IPR	  critique
Differences	  in	  extent	  m
aking	  Internet	  copying	  different	  from
	  form
er	  acts	  of	  piracy,	  hence	  a	  different	  environm
ent
16.02.05
Allen	  Dixon
IFPI
IPR	  protection
As	  a	  general	  point,	  w
e	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  issue	  paper	  provides	  an	  accurate	  picture	  of	  the	  current	  situation	  and	  strongly	  regret	  its	  apparent	  anti-­‐copyright	  bias	  (including	  a	  
disproportionate	  focus	  on	  criticism
s	  of	  the	  IPR	  system
	  and	  an	  inaccurate	  im
plication	  that	  diverse	  voices	  and	  the	  public	  interest	  have	  not	  been	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  
developm
ent	  of	  that	  system
).	  W
e	  also	  regret	  that	  the	  issue	  paper	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  international	  IPR	  fram
ew
ork	  developed	  and	  agreed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  W
orld	  
Intellectual	  Property	  O
rganization	  (W
IPO
),	  including	  the	  tw
o	  1996	  Internet	  Treaties	  and	  m
akes	  no	  attem
pt	  to	  inventory	  its	  positive	  effects	  on	  cultural	  and	  econom
ic	  
developm
ent.
16.02.05
Laurence	  Djolakian
M
PA
IPR	  protection
As	  a	  general	  point,	  w
e	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  issue	  paper	  provides	  an	  accurate	  picture	  of	  the	  current	  situation	  and	  strongly	  regret	  its	  apparent	  anti-­‐copyright	  bias	  (including	  a	  
disproportionate	  focus	  on	  criticism
s	  of	  the	  IPR	  system
	  and	  an	  inaccurate	  im
plication	  that	  diverse	  voices	  and	  the	  public	  interest	  have	  not	  been	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  
developm
ent	  of	  that	  system
).
16.02.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
M
Sism
I	  feel	  W
GIG	  is	  exercising	  m
uch	  m
ore	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  approach,	  inclusive	  to	  both	  the	  civil	  society	  and	  our	  friends	  from
	  the	  developing	  countries	  participation,	  thanks	  to	  the	  U
N
	  
and	  its	  m
em
ber	  states	  w
ho	  agreed	  this	  very	  innovative	  fram
ew
ork.
16.02.05
Abdulaziz	  Al-­‐Zom
an
SaudiN
IC
M
ultilingualism
M
ultilingualization	  of	  Internet	  nam
ing	  system
s
16.02.05
M
oham
ed	  Sharil	  Tarm
izi
ICAN
N
-­‐GAC
M
ultilingualism
W
ith	  regard	  to	  the	  latter,	  the	  GAC	  has	  consistently	  urged	  ICAN
N
	  to	  both	  support	  and	  further	  advance	  the	  realization	  of	  internationalized	  dom
ain	  nam
es.
448
16.02.05
U
N
ESCO
	  -­‐	  IFPAP
no	  separation	  technical/political
ay	  special	  attention	  for	  researching	  the	  social	  im
pact	  of	  the	  Internet	  Governance	  issues.
16.02.05
Philip	  M
ason
Australia
Pro-­‐com
petitive	  regulation
The	  im
portance	  and	  efficacy	  of	  open	  m
arket	  arrangem
ents	  and	  com
petition	  in	  delivering	  infrastructure	  and	  service	  outcom
es	  and	  ongoing	  innovation.
16.02.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
support	  of	  the	  single	  root
The	  fourth	  paragraph	  of	  page	  4	  does	  not	  fully	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  alternative	  root	  server	  system
s,	  but	  they	  are	  crucial	  threat	  to	  the	  interoperability	  of	  the	  Internet,	  hence	  
should	  never	  be	  allow
ed.	  This	  paragraph	  should	  be	  rew
ritten	  in	  this	  regard.
16.02.05
Anthony	  Holm
es
ETN
O
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
ETN
O
	  believes	  that	  the	  current	  system
	  based	  on	  RIRs,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ICAN
N
	  and	  in	  accordance	  w
ith	  ICAN
N
	  principles	  of	  transparency,	  bottom
-­‐up	  approach	  and	  geographic	  
representation,	  m
ust	  be	  m
aintained
16.02.05
Axel	  Paw
lik
N
RO
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
It	  is	  im
portant	  to	  note	  here	  that	  the	  current	  Regional	  Internet	  Registry	  (RIR)	  system
	  is	  a	  successful	  m
odel	  of	  industry	  self-­‐regulation	  that	  predates	  the	  establishm
ent	  of	  ICAN
N
	  by	  
m
ore	  than	  seven	  years	  and	  has	  developed	  independently	  from
	  ICAN
N
.
16.02.05
Bill	  Darte
ARIN
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
criticism
	  of	  the	  perspective	  offered	  in	  that	  docum
ent	  is	  the	  inference	  that	  there	  is	  too	  little	  outreach	  to	  get	  substantive	  involvem
ent	  from
	  stakeholders	  w
ith	  the	  current	  
ICAN
N
/RIRs	  m
odel	  of	  IP	  address	  adm
inistration.
16.02.05
Bill	  Darte
ARIN
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
M
y	  Com
m
ent:	  W
hat	  w
eakness	  exists?	  The	  adm
inistration	  and	  policy	  m
aking	  in	  this	  area	  is	  open	  to	  all.	  W
hat	  balance	  beyond	  equitable	  access	  and	  participation	  do	  you	  w
ish?
16.02.05
Bill	  Darte
ARIN
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
M
y	  Com
m
ent:	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  there	  is	  technical	  coordination	  to	  ensure	  effective	  and	  sustained	  operation	  of	  the	  Internet,	  som
e	  entity	  m
ust	  coordinate.
16.02.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
O
n	  the	  one	  hand	  ICAN
N
	  has	  been	  far	  m
ore	  open	  to	  direct	  user	  participation	  than	  m
any	  existing	  international,	  intergovernm
ental	  or	  private-­‐sector	  led	  bodies	  from
	  the	  very	  
beginning.	  I	  m
ean	  ITU
	  or	  IETF.	  It	  offers	  a	  very	  good	  m
odel	  for	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  participation.	  It	  also	  offers	  som
e	  good	  lessons	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  user	  
participation	  m
echanism
s.	  I	  w
ould	  not	  to	  consum
e	  too	  m
uch	  details	  of	  w
hat	  happened	  around	  ICAN
N
.
16.02.05
Philip	  M
ason
Australia
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
Recognise	  that	  existing	  arrangem
ents	  that	  are	  w
orking	  effectively	  should	  continue,	  acknow
ledging	  that	  existing	  organisations	  m
ust	  be	  w
illing	  to	  continue	  to	  im
prove	  their	  
governance	  arrangem
ents	  (accountability	  and	  transparency	  are	  both	  im
portant).
16.02.05
Allen	  Dixon
IFPI
W
GIG	  critique
It	  is	  finally	  very	  regrettable	  that	  the	  draft	  w
hich	  is	  intended	  to	  present	  the	  current	  situation	  for	  IPRs	  in	  the	  digital	  environm
ent	  does	  not	  refer	  properly	  to	  digital	  piracy	  and	  its	  
negative	  im
pact	  on	  the	  content	  sector,	  consum
ers	  and	  society	  as	  a	  w
hole.
16.02.05
Jam
es	  Seng
IETF
W
GIG	  critique
I	  am
	  curious	  how
	  the	  20	  topics	  are	  chosen?	  W
hat	  process	  w
as	  used	  to	  determ
ined	  this	  20	  topic	  and	  how
	  w
ould	  these	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  original	  goal	  of	  'developed	  a	  w
orking	  
definition	  of	  Internet	  Governance'?	  (w
hich	  incidently,	  do	  not	  have	  a	  w
orking	  draft)
23.02.05
Hans	  Falk	  Hoffm
ann
IGC
expand	  participation
The	  stakeholders	  present	  during	  this	  W
SIS	  process	  have	  been,	  in	  the	  m
ain,	  econom
ically	  privileged	  and	  predom
inately	  m
ale.	  W
e	  w
ould	  like	  the	  W
GIG	  to	  m
ake	  appropriate	  
recom
m
endations	  to	  ensure	  the	  effective	  participation	  of	  ALL	  people	  from
	  all	  regions	  of	  the	  w
orld.
23.02.05
Rikke	  Frank	  Joergensen
HR	  caucus
Internet	  as	  a	  global	  public	  resource
O
ne	  of	  the	  results	  of	  the	  W
orld	  Sum
m
it	  of	  the	  Inform
ation	  Society	  in	  Geneva	  w
as	  a	  grow
ing	  acceptance	  of	  the	  Internet	  as	  a	  global	  com
m
ons.
23.02.05
Hans	  Falk	  Hoffm
ann
IGC
Internet	  users	  are	  stakeholders
decisions	  by	  individual	  users
23.02.05
Q
usai	  Al-­‐Shatti
CS	  privacy	  and	  security	  groupPrivacy	  as	  a	  hum
an	  right
Privacy	  is	  an	  essential	  hum
an	  right
23.02.05
Hans	  Falk	  Hoffm
ann
IGC
question	  the	  U
S	  oversight	  of	  ICAN
N
U
nilateral	  control	  of	  the	  root	  zone	  file	  and	  its	  effects	  for	  the	  nam
e	  space	  The	  crucial	  role	  of	  technical	  standards	  in	  the	  preservation	  of	  an	  interoperable	  global	  Internet
23.02.05
Rikke	  Frank	  Joergensen
HR	  caucus
question	  the	  U
S	  oversight	  of	  ICAN
N
In	  addition,	  the	  current	  forum
	  for	  dom
ain	  nam
e	  m
anagem
ent	  is	  a	  private	  party,	  dom
inated	  by	  a	  lim
ited	  num
ber	  of	  countries	  and	  based	  on	  a	  contract	  w
ith	  a	  single	  governm
ent.
23.02.05
Hans	  Falk	  Hoffm
ann
IGC
W
GIG	  critique
W
hile	  w
e	  support	  W
GIG's	  efforts	  to	  establish	  consensus	  on	  various	  issues,	  the	  report	  should	  go	  beyond	  consensual	  m
atters	  and	  find	  w
ays	  to	  reflect	  diversity.
24.02.05
Houlin	  Zhao
ITU
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
As	  a	  specialized	  agency	  of	  the	  U
N
	  dealing	  w
ith	  telecom
m
unications	  and	  therefore	  m
ore	  broadly,	  ICT	  issues,	  ITU
	  is	  very	  w
ell	  positioned	  and	  w
illing	  to	  w
ork	  w
ith	  others	  to	  consider	  
the	  m
any	  technical	  and	  policy	  aspects	  of	  Internet	  governance	  issues.
24.02.05
M
ogens	  Schm
idt
U
N
ESCO
expand	  participation
N
ecessary	  changes	  in	  Internet	  governance	  m
echanism
s	  to	  enhance	  inclusiveness	  should	  be	  contributing	  to	  enable	  greater	  use	  of	  the	  Internet	  in	  the	  developing	  countries	  and	  by	  
citizens	  w
ith	  diverse	  linguistic	  and	  cultural	  backgrounds	  and	  should	  not	  jeopardize	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  Internet.
24.02.05
Sha	  Zukang
China
ICAN
N
	  critique
M
y	  delegation	  is	  of	  the	  view
,	  that,	  it	  is	  of	  crucial	  im
portance	  to	  conduct	  research	  on	  establishing	  a	  m
ultilateral	  governance	  m
echanism
	  that	  is	  m
ore	  rational	  and	  just	  and	  m
ore	  
conducive	  to	  the	  internet	  developm
ent	  in	  a	  direction	  of	  stable,	  secure	  and	  responsible	  functioning	  and	  m
ore	  conducive	  to	  the	  continuous	  technological	  innovation.
24.02.05
Thoralf	  Stenvold
N
orw
ay
Internet	  as	  a	  global	  public	  resource
In	  m
any	  w
ays,	  it	  m
ay	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  internet	  has	  becom
e	  a	  global	  public	  good,	  and	  that	  the	  task	  ahead	  for	  this	  w
orking	  group	  is	  a	  pioneering	  exercise	  in	  global	  governance.
24.02.05
Bill	  Graham
Canada
lim
ited	  role	  for	  the	  W
GIG
Canada	  is	  pleased	  to	  see	  the	  W
orking	  Group	  on	  Internet	  Governance	  sticking	  closely	  to	  the	  term
s	  of	  reference
24.02.05
Barbados
O
ptim
ize	  connectivity	  and	  access
W
e	  strongly	  believe	  therefore	  that	  attention	  should	  be	  given	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  internet	  access	  and	  use	  so	  that	  all	  countries,	  and	  not	  just	  a	  lim
ited	  num
ber	  of	  countries,	  can	  receive	  
the	  benefits	  of	  com
petitive	  rates.
24.02.05
Thoralf	  Stenvold
N
orw
ay
Private	  sector	  leadership
A	  dynam
ic	  and	  private	  sector	  led	  developm
ent	  of	  the	  internet,	  based	  on	  sound	  m
arket	  econom
y	  policies.
24.02.05
Sha	  Zukang
China
Problem
	  of	  m
onopolies
The	  situation	  in	  w
hich	  Internet	  governance	  is	  m
onopolized	  by	  one	  state,	  one	  cooperation	  or	  a	  handful	  of	  private	  organizations,	  and	  w
hile	  fully	  recognizing	  such	  governance	  has	  
played	  its	  historical	  role,	  it	  neither	  facilitates	  further	  grow
th	  of	  the	  Internet,	  nor	  fully	  em
bodies	  the	  principle	  of	  equity	  and	  full	  representation.
24.02.05
Bulgaria
separation	  technical/political
W
hat	  ICAN
N
	  does	  is	  only	  a	  very	  sm
all,	  technical	  portion	  of	  the	  coordination	  in	  the	  addressing	  and	  protocol	  param
eter	  areas	  as	  w
ell	  as	  those	  for	  DN
S	  (including	  root	  servers).
24.02.05
Sha	  Zukang
China
sovereignty
Since	  the	  responsibility	  for	  Internet-­‐related	  public	  policy	  issues	  lies	  w
ith	  the	  sovereign	  States,	  governm
ents	  should	  play	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  the	  decision-­‐m
aking	  process.
24.02.05
Bulgaria
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
And	  therefore	  before	  starting	  to	  argue	  the	  question	  about	  ICAN
N
	  and	  the	  current	  status	  quo,	  w
e	  m
ust	  be	  sure	  about	  w
hat	  w
ill	  happen	  after	  it's	  changed
24.02.05
M
arilyn	  Cade
ICC
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
And,	  as	  an	  overall	  point,	  CCBI	  recom
m
ends	  that	  the	  W
orking	  Group	  adopt	  an	  "evolutionary"	  rather	  than	  a	  "revolutionary"	  approach	  in	  any	  recom
m
endations	  that	  they	  m
ay	  
ultim
ately	  m
ake.
24.02.05
Council	  of	  the	  EU
W
GIG	  should	  focus	  on	  technical	  m
anagem
ent The	  organisation	  and	  adm
inistration	  of	  nam
ing	  and	  num
bering,	  including	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  root	  server	  system
:	  The	  internationalisation	  of	  Internet	  Governance,	  taking	  into	  
account	  public	  interest	  concerns	  and	  participation	  of	  developing	  countries	  in	  the	  governance	  structures:	  The	  stability,	  dependability	  and	  robustness	  of	  the	  Internet,	  including	  the	  
im
pact	  of	  spam
.
25.02.05
Lynn	  St.Am
our
ISO
C
IG	  cannot	  exist
ISO
C	  w
ould	  also	  encourage	  W
GIG	  to	  exam
ine	  the	  collaborative	  Internet	  m
odel	  and	  evaluate	  w
hether	  a	  term
	  other	  than	  Internet	  Governance	  w
ould	  be	  m
ore	  accurate	  and	  
potentially	  less	  m
isleading.
449
31.03.05
Klaus	  Grew
lich
U
N
ICTTF
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
ch	  an	  open,	  global,	  and	  inclusive	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  platform
	  should	  becom
e	  not	  only	  a	  high	  level	  "think	  tank"	  for	  cross-­‐sectoral	  policy	  debate.	  The	  platform
	  should	  in	  addition	  to	  
its	  role	  as	  a	  think	  tank	  becom
e	  an	  innovative	  w
ay	  for	  fostering	  and	  m
onitoring	  progress	  on	  governance	  objectives	  of	  com
m
on	  interest	  and	  concern,	  -­‐	  prom
oting	  a	  people-­‐
centred	  and	  developm
ent-­‐oriented	  inform
ation	  society	  at	  international	  policy	  level.	  The	  envisaged	  entity	  should	  not	  be	  established	  as	  quasi-­‐international	  organisation	  and	  only	  
be	  supported	  by	  light	  and	  flexible	  but	  w
ell	  equipped	  unit,	  building	  on	  existing	  organisations,	  netw
orks	  and	  processes.	  It	  should	  not	  have	  prescriptive	  tasks	  but	  it	  could	  issue	  
recom
m
endations.	  The	  entity	  could	  identify	  suitable	  institutions/organisations	  to	  deal	  w
ith	  the	  respective	  issues	  that	  are	  related	  to	  Internet	  governance.	  It	  could	  possibly	  even	  
recom
m
end	  assignm
ent	  of	  roles	  to	  various	  stakeholders	  ensuring	  as	  w
ide	  participation	  as	  possible.	  It	  could	  collect	  and	  m
ake	  available	  know
ledge	  and	  identify	  existing	  gaps	  but	  
also	  best	  practices.	  Possibly	  the	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  entity	  m
ight	  even	  label	  sources	  of	  excellence.	  	  
05.04.05
W
GIG
Pro-­‐com
petitive	  regulation
Policies	  and	  regulations	  favouring	  privatization,	  liberalization	  and	  com
petition	  have	  progressively	  extended	  these	  conditions	  to	  other	  regions,	  and	  helped	  support	  the	  grow
th	  of	  
the	  Internet	  on	  a	  w
orld-­‐w
ide	  basis
08.04.05
W
GIG
IPR	  critique
O
n	  this	  view
,	  w
hile	  appearing	  to	  m
aintain	  a	  carefully-­‐achieved	  balance	  betw
een	  the	  rights	  of	  creators	  and	  the	  rights	  of	  users	  to	  the	  greatest	  overall	  benefit	  of	  all,	  the	  application	  
of	  existing	  rules	  in	  the	  new
	  context	  of	  the	  global	  inform
ation	  society	  m
ay	  inadvertently	  disadvantage	  both	  sides	  of	  this	  equation	  â€“	  i.e.	  dam
age	  the	  interests	  of	  creators,	  
because	  of	  the	  cost	  and	  difficulty	  of	  enforcing	  traditional-­‐style	  IPR,	  and	  at	  the	  sam
e	  tim
e	  dam
age	  the	  interests	  of	  users,	  particularly	  in	  developing	  countries,	  because	  access	  
rem
ains	  largely	  unaffordable	  in	  term
s	  both	  of	  the	  direct	  costs	  of	  com
plying	  w
ith	  IPR,	  and	  the	  indirect	  costs	  of	  not	  respecting	  them
.
11.04.05
Tim
	  M
cGinnis
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
The	  general	  process	  of	  the	  Allocation	  and	  Assignm
ent	  of	  IP	  addresses	  is	  rather	  transparent	  in	  that	  address	  blocks	  are	  listed	  in	  public	  RIR	  W
HO
IS	  Databases.	  Allocation	  and	  
assignm
ent	  policies	  are	  m
ade	  in	  an	  open,	  m
ultistakehoder,	  dem
ocratic	  w
ay.	  IP	  addresses	  are	  allocated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  confidential	  requests	  for	  docum
ented	  needs	  m
ade	  by	  
m
em
bers	  to	  the	  RIRs.	  There	  are	  no	  lim
itations	  on	  m
em
bership	  of	  RIRs.
15.04.05
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
ICAN
N
	  critique
A	  slow
,	  highly	  restrictive,	  conservative	  approach	  of	  the	  sort	  w
e	  can	  expect	  from
	  the	  current	  ICAN
N
	  system
	  disadvantages	  new
	  players	  outside	  the	  W
est	  relative	  to	  established,	  
dom
inant	  players	  today.	  The	  report	  should	  take	  note	  of	  specific	  procedures	  that	  have	  been	  proposed	  to	  facilitate	  new
	  TLD	  introduction,	  including	  the	  O
ECD	  report,	  m
y	  ow
n	  co-­‐
authored	  report,	  and	  other	  reports	  by	  econom
ists	  calling	  for	  auctions	  of	  new
	  TLDs.
15.04.05
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
ICAN
N
	  critique
The	  user-­‐based	  elections	  have	  been	  replaced	  by	  m
echanism
s	  of	  self-­‐selection	  that	  privilege	  vested	  interests	  and	  m
ake	  it	  difficult	  if	  not	  im
possible	  for	  change-­‐agents	  to	  get	  on	  
the	  Board.	  It	  is	  also	  unrealistic	  to	  expect	  the	  broad	  Internet	  user	  com
m
unity	  to	  invest	  the	  tim
e	  and	  resources	  required	  to	  build	  and	  sustain	  ICAN
N
's	  elaborate	  input	  and	  policy	  
developm
ent	  m
echanism
s.	  Just	  give	  them
	  a	  vote.
15.04.05
Jens	  Bam
m
el
IPA
IPR	  protection
IPA	  urges	  you	  to	  review
	  the	  current	  draft	  docum
ent	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  com
m
ents	  received	  from
	  the	  rightsholder	  com
m
unity	  and	  to	  create	  a	  docum
ent	  that	  truly	  reflects	  a	  
consensus	  betw
een	  the	  different	  stakeholders.
15.04.05
W
IPO
IPR	  protection
"In	  the	  area	  of	  copyright,	  in	  addition	  to	  dealing	  w
ith	  significant	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  m
anagem
ent	  of	  IPR	  in	  the	  Internet	  w
orld,	  there	  are	  also	  profound	  questions	  about	  w
hether	  
the	  greatest	  overall	  econom
ic	  and	  social	  benefit	  w
ill	  be	  achieved	  by	  extending,	  w
ithout	  m
ore,	  the	  IPR	  rules	  developed	  for	  the	  off-­‐line	  w
orld	  into	  the	  very	  different	  'space'	  
created	  by	  the	  Internet.	  Sim
ilarly,	  it	  is	  not	  yet	  clear	  to	  w
hat	  extent	  m
odifications	  in	  the	  w
ay	  that	  IP	  rights	  have	  traditionally	  been	  exercised	  m
ay	  be	  appropriate	  or	  necessary	  in	  
order	  to	  m
axim
ize	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  'global	  inform
ation	  society'."
15.04.05
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
M
Sism
Static,	  backw
ard-­‐	  looking	  assertions	  of	  national	  sovereignty	  w
ill	  not	  get	  us	  anyw
her
15.04.05
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
Private	  sector	  leadership
his	  is	  precisely	  the	  sort	  of	  governm
ental	  interference	  w
ith	  the	  technical	  adm
inistration	  of	  the	  dom
ain	  nam
e	  system
	  that	  m
any	  in	  the	  Internet	  com
m
unity	  fear.	  It	  is	  an	  exam
ple	  of	  
w
hy	  m
any	  people	  supported,	  and	  continue	  to	  support,	  exclusion	  of	  national	  governm
ents	  from
	  a	  governance	  role	  in	  DN
S.	  If	  governm
ents	  w
ant	  to	  present	  them
selves	  as	  
"representing	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  people"	  then	  they	  need	  to	  cease	  reaching	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  pow
er.	  W
hen	  they	  act	  in	  such	  a	  fashion,	  they	  indicate	  that	  they	  are	  not	  
representatives	  of	  the	  general	  public,	  but	  just	  another	  special	  interest	  seeking	  advantage	  from
	  governance	  of	  the	  dom
ain	  nam
e	  system
.
15.04.05
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
Problem
	  of	  m
onopolies
is	  an	  obvious	  fallacy	  to	  equate	  "governance	  by	  a	  private	  sector	  corporation"	  w
ith	  "governance	  by	  the	  m
arket,"	  particularly	  w
hen	  the	  corporation	  doing	  the	  governance	  has	  an	  
unbreakable	  m
onopoly	  on	  entry	  into	  the	  business.	  I	  hope	  in	  their	  future	  com
m
ents	  the	  ICC	  w
ill	  think	  m
ore	  deeply	  about	  how
	  m
arkets	  w
ork,	  and	  how
	  different	  governance	  
arrangem
ents	  do	  or	  do	  not	  facilitate	  end	  user	  choice.
15.04.05
Geoff	  Huston
APN
IC
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Internet,	  addressing	  lies	  at	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  the	  netw
ork.	  W
ithout	  a	  fram
ew
ork	  of	  stable,	  unique	  and	  ubiquitous	  addresses	  there	  is	  no	  single	  cohesive	  netw
ork.	  
W
ithout	  a	  continuing	  stable	  supply	  of	  addresses	  further	  grow
th	  of	  the	  netw
ork	  sim
ply	  cannot	  be	  sustained.	  W
ithout	  absolute	  confidence	  in	  the	  continuing	  stability	  in	  this	  supply	  
chain	  the	  com
m
unications	  industry	  w
ill	  inevitably	  be	  forced	  to	  look	  elsew
here	  for	  a	  suitable	  technology	  platform
	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  netw
orked	  data	  com
m
unications.	  If	  the	  
industry	  is	  pushed	  into	  such	  an	  uncom
fortable	  position	  of	  turning	  its	  attention	  elsew
here	  sim
ply	  because	  the	  Internet	  is	  incapable	  of	  operating	  its	  infrastructure	  in	  a	  stable	  and	  
cost	  effective	  m
anner,	  this	  w
ould	  be	  a	  m
ost	  unfortunate	  unintended	  outcom
e	  for	  the	  Internet	  and	  its	  billions	  of	  current	  and	  future	  users	  of	  this	  uniquely	  valuable	  com
m
on	  
resource.
15.04.05
M
ilton	  M
ueller
IGP
U
N
	  oversight	  of	  the	  ICAN
N
IGP	  has	  also	  asserted	  that	  once	  proper	  inter-­‐governm
ental	  oversight	  is	  established,	  ICAN
N
's	  GAC	  should	  be	  abolished.
15.04.05
Jens	  Bam
m
el
IPA
W
GIG	  critique
W
e	  rem
ain	  extrem
ely	  concerned	  by	  the	  approach	  to	  IPRs	  seem
ingly	  adopted	  by	  the	  W
GIG	  as	  the	  latest	  draft	  w
orking	  paper	  on	  IPR	  brings	  only	  lim
ited	  progress	  vis-­‐à	  -­‐vis	  the	  
previous	  issue	  paper	  issued	  in	  February.	  W
e	  regret	  that	  m
ost	  of	  the	  com
m
ents	  w
e	  had	  sent	  in	  February	  w
ere	  not	  taken	  into	  account.	  M
ay	  w
e	  kindly	  rem
ind	  you	  that	  these	  
com
m
ents	  w
ere	  shared	  by	  a	  great	  num
ber	  of	  organisations.
18.04.05
Don	  M
cLean
W
GIG
broad	  definition	  of	  IG
SO
	  I	  THIN
K	  W
E	  ARE	  W
O
RKIN
G	  O
U
R	  W
AY	  TO
W
ARDS	  A	  BRO
AD	  DEFIN
ITIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  SCO
PE	  O
F	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  AN
D	  THE	  SO
RTS	  O
F	  M
ECHAN
ISM
S	  THAT	  W
O
U
LD	  CO
M
E	  
IN
TO
	  PLAY.
18.04.05
Anita	  Gurum
urthy
CS	  Gender	  Caucus
creation	  of	  a	  policy-­‐m
aking	  institution
All	  issues	  of	  Internet	  Governance	  m
ust	  essentially	  be	  decided	  at	  the	  level	  of	  this	  new
	  body.
18.04.05
India
creation	  of	  a	  policy-­‐m
aking	  institution
W
e	  envisage	  the	  follow
ing	  functions	  should	  com
e	  under	  the	  oversight	  of	  the	  new
	  body.	  i.	  Fram
ing	  collective	  rules,	  procedures,	  processes,	  and	  related	  program
s	  that	  
incorporates	  all	  stake	  holder's	  expectations,	  practices	  &
	  interactions	  resulting	  in	  practices	  and	  operations	  that	  are	  consistent	  w
ith	  the	  sovereign	  rights	  of	  states	  and	  the	  social	  
and	  m
arket	  interests	  of	  end-­‐users	  and	  operators	  Including	  international	  agreem
ents	  about	  standards,	  policies,	  rules,	  and	  enforcem
ent	  and	  dispute	  resolution	  procedures.
18.04.05
Anita	  Gurum
urthy
CS	  Gender	  Caucus
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
here	  "is	  no	  existing	  forum
	  in	  w
hich	  the	  global	  com
m
unity	  as	  a	  w
hole	  can	  address	  broad	  public	  policy	  issues	  or	  em
erging	  issues	  that	  are	  cross-­‐cutting	  or	  m
ultidim
ensional	  and	  
affect	  m
ore	  than	  one	  institution".	  Internet	  Governance	  has	  becom
e	  too	  im
portant	  a	  global	  issue,	  affecting	  practically	  everyone	  in	  im
portant	  w
ays,	  and	  its	  governance	  cannot	  
sim
ply	  rem
ain	  distributed	  am
ong	  only	  'technical	  organizations'	  despite	  their	  claim
s	  of	  legitim
acy	  and	  representativeness.	  W
hile	  these	  organizations	  m
ay	  continue	  to	  have	  
im
portant	  activities	  to	  m
anage,	  an	  appropriate	  global	  public	  organization,	  w
ith	  sufficient	  access	  to	  and	  equal	  representation	  of	  all	  people,	  com
m
unities	  and	  groups,	  including	  
w
om
en,	  m
ust	  take	  up	  the	  overall	  Internet	  Governance	  function.
450
18.04.05
Ian	  Peter
M
ark	  2
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
Is	  there	  need	  for	  an	  additional	  arrangem
ent	  or	  body?	  YES	  If	  the	  answ
er	  to	  question	  1	  is	  yes:	  2.	  W
hat	  functions	  should	  it	  exercise?	  (a)	  Create	  a	  space	  for	  a	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  
discussion	  forum
?	  YES	  (b)	  Give	  policy	  direction?	  YES	  (c)	  Any	  other	  function?	  Possibly	  provide	  high	  level	  policy	  for	  root	  zone	  edit	  function	  to	  replace	  current	  unilateral	  control	  b	  y	  
U
S	  governm
ent.
18.04.05
ICC
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
N
onetheless,	  there	  m
ay	  be	  a	  "need"	  for	  a	  "forum
	  function"	  that	  could	  offer	  a	  discussion	  body	  so	  that	  the	  public	  policy	  issues	  and	  concerns	  of	  any	  stakeholder	  can	  be	  heard,	  
discussed	  openly,	  and	  responded	  to	  as	  appropriate	  by	  the	  responsible	  entity	  or	  entities.	  Thus,	  ICC	  m
em
bers	  have	  responded	  w
ith	  a	  conditional	  'yes'	  to	  the	  need	  for	  a	  discussion	  
forum
	  function.	  This	  m
ay	  not	  require	  an	  additional	  body.
18.04.05
India
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
YES
18.04.05
W
illiam
	  Drake
W
GIG
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
I	  W
O
N
DER	  IF	  W
E	  CAN
	  HEAR	  FRO
M
	  THO
SE	  DELEGATES	  HO
W
	  THAT	  ARRAN
GEM
EN
T	  W
O
U
LD	  PRO
M
O
TE	  THE	  CAPACITY	  O
F	  THE	  PRIVATE	  SECTO
R	  AN
D	  CIVIL	  SO
CIETY	  IN
	  THE	  GLO
BAL	  
SO
U
TH	  TO
	  EN
GAGE	  EFFECTIVELY	  IN
	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  DECISIO
N
-­‐M
AKIN
G	  RELATIVE	  TO
	  AN
O
THER	  PO
SSIBLE	  CO
N
FIGU
RATIO
N
	  IN
	  W
HICH	  IT	  IS	  N
O
T	  GRO
U
N
DED	  IN
	  AN
	  
IN
TERGO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  FRAM
EW
O
RK,	  PER	  SE,	  BU
T,	  RATHER,	  A	  TRU
LY	  TRIPARTITE	  AN
D	  M
U
LTISTAKEHO
LDER	  M
ECHAN
ISM
.
18.04.05
W
olfgang	  Kleinw
aechter
W
GIG
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
BU
T	  IF	  IT	  CO
M
ES	  TO
,	  LET'S	  SAY,	  BRO
ADER	  ISSU
ES,	  THEN
	  YO
U
	  HAVE	  N
O
	  N
EED	  FO
R	  A	  DECISIO
N
-­‐M
AKIN
G	  CAPACITY	  BU
T	  THEN
	  YO
U
	  HAVE	  TO
	  HAVE	  A	  BRO
AD	  BO
DY	  W
ITHO
U
T	  AN
Y	  
DECISIO
N
-­‐M
AKIN
G	  CAPACITY	  W
HICH	  HAS	  AN
	  O
VERVIEW
.	  AN
D	  I	  CO
U
LD	  IM
AGIN
E	  THAT	  AT	  THE	  EN
D	  O
F	  THE	  DAY	  W
E	  HAVE	  SO
M
ETHIN
G	  LIKE	  A	  BRO
AD	  M
U
LTISTAKEHO
LDER	  
BO
DY,	  I	  PERSO
N
ALLY	  CALL	  IT	  THE	  U
N
ITED	  N
ATIO
N
S	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  CO
M
M
U
N
ICATIO
N
	  GRO
U
P,	  W
HICH	  W
O
U
LD	  HAVE	  THE	  O
VERVIEW
	  ABO
U
T	  ALL	  THE	  50-­‐PLU
S	  ISSU
ES
18.04.05
Saudi	  Arabia
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
I	  HO
PE	  THAT	  THIS	  TASK	  W
ILL	  BE	  TAKEN
	  U
P	  BY	  AN
	  IN
TERN
ATIO
N
AL	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
	  RATHER	  THAN
	  A	  PRIVATE	  CO
M
PAN
Y.
18.04.05
India
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
W
E	  REITERATE	  THE	  N
EED	  TO
	  EVO
LVE	  AN
	  O
VERARCHIN
G	  M
ECHAN
ISM
	  W
HICH	  W
ILL	  AT	  O
N
CE	  BE	  IN
CLU
SIVE,	  TRAN
SPAREN
T,	  DEM
O
CRATIC	  AN
D	  ACCO
U
N
TABLE.	  SU
CH	  A	  
M
ECHAN
ISM
	  W
ILL	  N
EED	  TO
	  BE	  M
U
LTISTAKEHO
LDER,	  M
U
LTILATERAL,	  AN
D	  IN
TERGO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  IN
	  ITS	  CHARACTER	  AN
D	  W
O
RKIN
G.	  SU
CH	  A	  M
ECHAN
ISM
	  ALO
N
E	  CAN
	  IM
PART	  
IN
TERN
ET	  THE	  CREDIBILITY	  O
F	  TAKIN
G	  IN
TO
	  ACCO
U
N
T	  ALL	  THE	  STAKEHO
LDERS'	  CO
N
CERN
S.
18.04.05
Lyndall	  Shope-­‐M
afole
W
GIG
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
BU
T	  I	  THIN
K	  THAT	  FO
R	  IT	  TO
	  BE	  LEGITIM
ATE,	  IT	  HAS	  TO
	  BE	  RO
O
TED	  IN
	  SO
M
E	  IN
TERGO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  M
ECHAN
ISM
.
18.04.05
China
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
TO
	  THIS	  EN
D,	  CHIN
A	  PRO
PO
SES	  AN
	  IN
TERGO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
	  U
N
DER	  THE	  U
.N
.	  FRAM
EW
O
RK	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  EN
TRU
STED	  TO
	  M
AKE	  IN
TERN
ET	  RESO
U
RCES	  
M
AN
AGEM
EN
T	  PO
LICIES	  AN
D	  AU
THO
RIZE	  CO
N
CRETE	  PO
LICY	  IM
PLEM
EN
TATIO
N
	  TO
	  VARIO
U
S	  O
PERATIO
N
	  BO
DIES.
18.04.05
India
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
AN
D	  THEREFO
RE	  W
E	  SHO
U
LD	  N
O
T	  FEAR	  THE	  RO
LE	  O
F	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  AT	  THE	  M
U
LTILATERAL	  LEVEL	  IN
	  THESE	  ISSU
ES,	  BECAU
SE	  THEY	  W
ILL	  N
O
T	  BE	  ADDRESSIN
G	  IT	  O
N
	  A	  DAY-­‐TO
-­‐
DAY	  BASIS:	  THEY	  W
O
U
LD	  BE	  ADDRESSIN
G	  IT	  EXCEPTIO
N
ALLY,	  O
N
LY	  IF	  THE	  ISSU
E	  FAILS	  TO
	  BE	  RESO
LVED	  AT	  THE	  TECHN
ICAL	  LEVEL,	  W
HICH,	  AGAIN
,	  W
O
U
LD	  FU
N
CTIO
N
	  W
ITHIN
	  
THE	  O
VERALL	  FRAM
EW
O
RK,	  PERHAPS,	  O
F	  AN
	  IN
TERGO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  BO
DY.
18.04.05
Q
iheng	  Hu
W
GIG
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
THE	  AU
THO
RIZATIO
N
	  TO
	  THE	  BO
DY	  W
HO
	  IS	  TAKIN
G	  CARE	  ABO
U
T	  THE	  CO
RE	  RESO
U
RCES	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  LEGALLY	  AU
THO
RIZED	  BY	  A	  M
U
LTILATERAL	  PRO
CESS,	  BY	  
A	  M
U
LTILATERAL	  THAT	  IS	  -­‐-­‐	  HO
W
	  TO
	  SAY	  THAT?	  -­‐-­‐	  THE	  SO
VEREIGN
	  STATES,	  THAT	  IS	  THE	  RIGHT	  O
F	  THE	  SO
VEREIGN
	  STATES	  TO
	  SELECT	  O
R	  TO
	  DELEGATE	  THE	  RIGHT	  TO
	  A	  BO
DY,	  
N
O
T	  -­‐-­‐	  SAY,	  ICAN
N
	  O
R	  SO
M
ETHIN
G	  LIKE	  THAT,	  TO
	  TAKE	  CARE	  ABO
U
T	  THE	  STRATEGIC	  RESO
U
RCES	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  FO
R	  THEM
.
18.04.05
Saudi	  Arabia
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
The	  role	  of	  policy	  developm
ent	  and	  oversight	  should	  be	  internationalised	  under	  an	  intergovernm
ental	  body	  w
ith	  involvem
ent	  of	  other	  stakeholders..
18.04.05
India
critique	  of	  Internet	  exceptionalism
SO
	  IN
	  SHO
RT,	  M
R.	  CHAIRM
AN
,	  W
HAT	  W
E	  ARE	  SAYIN
G	  IS	  THAT	  THERE	  IS	  N
O
THIN
G	  U
N
IQ
U
ELY	  DIFFEREN
T	  ABO
U
T	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  THAT	  DICTATES	  A	  CO
M
PLETELY	  DIFFEREN
T	  
O
VERSIGHT	  M
ECHAN
ISM
	  AT	  THE	  GLO
BAL	  LEVEL	  CO
M
PARED	  TO
	  VARIO
U
S	  O
THER	  FIELDS	  O
F	  HU
M
AN
	  ACTIVITY,	  AN
D	  THEREFO
RE	  IT	  IS	  SO
M
EHO
W
	  N
O
T	  A	  SATISFACTO
RY	  
ARGU
M
EN
T	  TO
	  M
AKE	  THAT	  LEAVE	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  ALO
N
E,	  THAT	  IT	  CAN
	  BE	  M
AN
AGED	  BY	  THE	  PRIVATE	  SECTO
R	  ACTIN
G	  W
ITH	  A	  SO
RT	  O
F	  LO
O
SE	  SU
PERVISIO
N
	  O
F	  O
N
E	  CO
U
N
TRY	  
AN
D	  THAT	  THE	  REST	  O
F	  THE	  W
O
RLD,	  THE	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  O
F	  O
THER	  CO
U
N
TRIES	  N
EED	  N
O
T	  BE	  DIRECTLY	  IN
VO
LVED	  IN
	  THE	  FIN
AL	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET.
18.04.05
India
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
W
E	  THIN
K	  THE	  ITU
,	  W
ITH	  ITS	  EXISTIN
G	  M
ECHAN
ISM
S	  W
HICH	  IN
VO
LVE	  THE	  PRIVATE	  SECTO
R,	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  M
O
RE	  THAN
	  ADEQ
U
ATE	  TO
	  ADDRESS	  THAT	  -­‐-­‐	  THO
SE	  REQ
U
IREM
EN
TS.
18.04.05
Syria
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
M
O
ST	  O
F	  THE	  ISSU
ES	  W
E'RE	  DEALIN
G	  W
ITH	  FALL	  U
N
DER	  TELECO
M
M
U
N
ICATIO
N
S.
18.04.05
Lyndall	  Shope-­‐M
afole
W
GIG
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
IF	  YO
U
	  TALK	  ABO
U
T	  THE	  IN
TERGO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  STRU
CTU
RES,	  M
AYBE	  TALK	  ABO
U
T	  THE	  ITU
,	  W
HICH	  I	  THIN
K	  I	  KN
O
W
	  FAIRLY	  W
ELL,	  IT	  HAS	  N
O
T	  BEEN
	  ABLE	  TO
	  LIVE	  U
P	  TO
	  THE	  
EXPECTATIO
N
S	  O
F	  THE	  ICT	  CO
M
M
U
N
ITY	  AS	  A	  W
HO
LE	  W
ITH	  RESPECT	  TO
	  ITS	  REFO
RM
,	  W
ITH	  RESPECT	  TO
	  THE	  ISSU
ES	  THAT	  IT	  DEALS	  W
ITH,	  W
ITH	  RESPECT	  TO
	  THE	  SPEED	  W
ITH	  
W
HICH	  IT	  TAKES	  DECISIO
N
,	  ET	  CETERA.
18.04.05
Syria
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
ITU
,	  U
N
ESCO
	  and	  W
IPO
	  w
ill	  cover	  all	  issues.
18.04.05
Syria
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
Yes,	  ITU
,	  as	  a	  coordinator.
18.04.05
M
arilyn	  Cade
ICC
expand	  participation
THE	  ADEQ
U
ACY	  O
F	  EACH	  O
F	  THO
SE	  EN
TITIES	  IN
	  FU
LLY	  M
EETIN
G	  THE	  N
EED	  FO
R	  TRAN
SPAREN
CY,	  BRO
AD	  PARTICIPATIO
N
	  IN
	  THE	  O
THER	  PRIN
CIPLES	  THAT	  W
E	  ALL	  BELIEVE	  IN
	  O
F	  
CO
U
RSE	  IS	  N
O
T	  U
P	  TO
	  W
HAT	  W
E	  W
AN
T	  IT	  TO
	  BE,	  AN
D	  THAT	  SHO
U
LD	  N
O
T	  BE	  A	  SU
RPRISE.
18.04.05
M
arilyn	  Cade
ICC
expand	  participation
BU
T	  THEY	  DO
	  ACTU
ALLY	  EXTEN
D	  THE	  PARTICIPATIO
N
	  M
O
RE	  BRO
ADLY	  O
F	  THE	  STAKEHO
LDERS	  IN
	  THE	  PO
LICY-­‐M
AKIN
G	  IN
	  THE	  GN
SO
.
18.04.05
Anita	  Gurum
urthy
CS	  Gender	  Caucus
gender	  issues	  m
ust	  be	  addressed
interests	  of	  groups	  like	  w
om
en	  (U
N
IFEM
)	  so	  that	  Internet	  Governance	  is	  m
anaged	  not	  only	  form
	  a	  governm
ental	  and	  m
arket	  interest	  point	  of	  view
	  but	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  people,	  
including	  the	  right	  to	  developm
ent,	  the	  plurality	  of	  cultures	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  interest	  of	  disadvantaged	  sections	  including	  w
om
e
18.04.05
Syria
ICAN
N
	  critique
W
E	  ARE	  N
O
T	  IN
	  FAVO
R	  O
F	  THE	  CU
RREN
T	  STATE	  O
F	  THIN
GS,	  AN
D	  AS	  I	  SAID	  EARLIER,	  PRO
PO
SALS	  HAVE	  BEEN
	  M
ADE.	  THERE	  W
ILL	  SO
O
N
	  BE	  A	  M
EETIN
G	  TO
	  DEAL	  W
ITH	  THE	  
DEFIN
ITIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  AN
D	  A	  PRO
PO
SAL	  W
ILL	  BE	  PU
T	  FO
RW
ARD.
18.04.05
ICC
Im
prove	  GAC
Perhaps,	  w
ith	  som
e	  strengthening	  of	  the	  GAC's	  m
andate/m
ission/scope,	  w
ithin	  the	  ICAN
N
	  structure,	  and	  im
proved	  m
em
ber	  participation,	  it	  could	  perform
	  a	  m
ore	  robust	  audit	  
role	  w
ithin	  ICAN
N
	  decision-­‐m
aking	  processes.
18.04.05
India
Internationalise	  the	  root	  server	  system
Currently	  there	  are	  thirteen	  root	  servers,	  out	  of	  w
hich	  ten	  are	  located	  in	  U
SA,	  tw
o	  in	  Europe	  and	  one	  in	  Japan.	  This	  m
ay	  not	  be	  the	  optim
al	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  utilization	  of	  
internet	  resources	  including	  the	  Dom
ain	  N
am
e	  resolution.	  To	  obviate	  these	  shortcom
ings,	  it	  is	  strongly	  recom
m
ended	  that	  root	  servers	  should	  be	  placed	  region	  w
ise	  rather	  than	  
concentrated	  in	  one	  region.	  Regional	  dispersion	  of	  root	  DN
S	  w
ill	  reduce	  the	  in	  fructuous	  international	  traffic	  International	  Dom
ain	  N
am
e	  (IDN
,	  M
ulti-­‐lingual	  Dom
ain	  N
am
e)
18.04.05
EU
Internationalise	  the	  root	  server	  system
AM
O
N
G	  THESE,	  THE	  Q
U
ESTIO
N
	  O
F	  IN
TERN
ATIO
N
ALIZATIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  M
AN
AGEM
EN
T	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET'S	  CO
RE	  RESO
U
RCES:	  N
AM
ELY	  THE	  DO
M
AIN
	  N
AM
ES	  SYSTEM
S,	  IP	  
ADDRESSES,	  AN
D	  THE	  RO
O
T	  SERVER	  SYSTEM
,	  APPEARS	  AS	  O
N
E	  O
F	  THE	  M
AIN
	  ISSU
ES	  IN
	  THIS	  DEBATE.
18.04.05
India
Internationalise	  the	  root	  server	  system
THE	  IN
TERN
ATIO
N
ALIZED	  DO
M
AIN
	  N
AM
E.
451
18.04.05
N
itin	  Desai
W
GIG
Internet	  exceptionalism
I	  THIN
K	  W
E	  SHO
U
LD	  ALSO
	  RECO
GN
IZE	  HERE	  SO
M
ETHIN
G	  W
HICH	  W
AS	  M
EN
TIO
N
ED,	  THE	  FACT	  THAT	  IN
	  THE	  CASE	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET,	  W
E	  ARE	  LO
O
KIN
G	  AT	  A	  CASE	  W
HICH	  IS	  A	  
LITTLE	  DIFFEREN
T	  FRO
M
	  SO
M
E	  O
F	  THE	  O
THER	  CASES	  THAT	  W
E	  HAVE	  BEEN
	  TALKIN
G	  ABO
U
T.	  M
O
ST	  O
F	  THE	  TIM
E	  W
HEN
	  W
E	  TALK	  O
F	  IN
TERN
ATIO
N
AL	  M
AN
AGEM
EN
T,	  W
E	  
REALLY	  ARE	  TALKIN
G	  ABO
U
T	  CO
O
RDIN
ATIN
G	  N
ATIO
N
AL	  M
AN
AGEM
EN
T.	  M
O
ST	  O
F	  THE	  TIM
E	  W
HAT	  W
E	  ARE	  TALKIN
G	  O
F	  IS	  THAT	  IT'S	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  AT	  THE	  N
ATIO
N
AL	  LEVEL	  
W
HO
	  REALLY	  DO
	  THE	  LEGISLATIO
N
	  AN
D	  THE	  M
AN
AGEM
EN
T,	  EVEN
	  O
F	  TELECO
M
.	  TELECO
M
	  REGU
LATIO
N
	  IS	  BASICALLY	  A	  N
ATIO
N
AL	  ACTIVITY.	  AN
D	  W
HAT	  W
E	  DO
	  AT	  THE	  
IN
TERN
ATIO
N
AL	  LEVEL	  IS	  CO
O
RDIN
ATIN
G	  W
HAT	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  ARE	  GO
IN
G	  TO
	  DO
	  AT	  THE	  N
ATIO
N
AL	  LEVEL.
18.04.05
Alejandro	  Pisanty
W
GIG
Internet	  exceptionalism
THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  PO
SES	  A	  Q
U
ITE	  DIFFEREN
T	  CHALLEN
GE	  IN
	  THAT	  IT	  DO
ES	  N
O
T	  -­‐-­‐	  IT	  CAN
N
O
T	  BE	  REDU
CED	  TO
	  TELECO
M
M
U
N
ICATIO
N
S.	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  IS	  N
O
T	  PO
IN
T-­‐TO
-­‐PO
IN
T.	  IT'S	  
N
O
T	  BRO
ADCAST.	  IT	  THEREFO
RE	  M
O
VES	  IN
	  A	  REGIM
E	  THAT	  IS	  DIFFEREN
T	  FRO
M
	  THE	  TW
O
	  PREVIO
U
S	  O
N
ES
18.04.05
Jovan	  Kurbalija
W
GIG
Internet	  exceptionalism
AN
D	  THE	  CLASSICAL	  APPRO
ACH	  O
R	  GO
O
D,	  N
O
T	  BAD,	  U
S	  AN
D	  THEM
,	  U
SU
ALLY	  CAN
N
O
T	  BE	  APPLIED	  IN
	  THE	  FIELD	  O
F	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE.
18.04.05
Laurence	  Djolakian
M
PA
IPR	  protection
W
e	  w
ould	  like	  to	  stress	  again	  that	  W
IPO
,	  the	  specialized	  agency	  w
ithin	  the	  U
N
,	  is	  the	  appropriate	  body	  to	  engage	  in	  further	  debates	  on	  IPRs.	  W
e	  strongly	  disagree	  w
ith	  the	  
criticism
s	  pertaining	  to	  the	  outreach,	  the	  decision-­‐m
aking	  process	  or	  even	  the	  m
andate	  of	  this	  organization.	  W
IPO
	  is	  responsible	  on	  IPRs	  because	  it	  has	  the	  necessary	  expertise	  
to	  deal	  w
ith	  the	  issue.	  It	  also	  has	  the	  necessary	  outreach	  capacity.	  It	  involves	  m
any	  non-­‐governm
ental	  actors.	  It	  has	  been	  w
orking	  in	  particular	  to	  assist	  developing	  countries	  on	  
developm
ent	  issues	  related	  to	  IPRs.	  Furtherm
ore,	  although	  the	  draft	  w
orking	  paper	  constantly	  refers	  to	  IPRs	  in	  the	  digital	  environm
ent,	  it	  fails	  to	  underline	  the	  essential	  
character	  and	  positive	  effects	  of	  the	  1996	  W
IPO
	  Treaties	  w
hich	  crucially	  contribute	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  appropriate	  international	  fram
ew
ork	  for	  the	  protection	  and	  distribution	  
of	  w
orks	  in	  the	  digital	  environm
ent.
18.04.05
Daniel	  Karrenberg
RIPE
lim
ited	  role	  for	  the	  W
GIG
W
GIG	  m
em
bers	  should	  consider	  handing	  back	  part	  of	  the	  m
andate.	  I	  do	  not	  know
	  enough	  about	  the	  W
SIS	  to	  suggest	  w
hich	  areas	  the	  group	  should	  fo-­‐	  cus	  on:	  surely	  those	  m
ore	  
intim
ately	  in-­‐	  volved	  w
ith	  the	  W
SIS	  w
ill	  be	  able	  to	  m
ake	  helpful	  suggestions.
18.04.05
Saudi	  Arabia
lim
ited	  role	  for	  the	  W
GIG
M
R.	  CHAIRM
AN
,	  DESPITE	  THE	  IM
PO
RTAN
CE	  O
F	  THE	  W
O
RK	  CARRIED	  O
U
T	  BY	  THE	  TEAM
	  AN
D	  THE	  GRO
U
P	  IN
	  RECEN
T	  PHASES	  W
E	  KN
O
W
	  THAT	  THE	  U
PCO
M
IN
G	  PHASE	  IS	  THE	  
M
O
ST	  IM
PO
RTAN
T.	  AN
D	  SO
	  W
E	  HO
PE	  THAT	  THE	  W
O
RKIN
G	  GRO
U
P	  W
ILL	  FO
CU
S	  ITS	  EFFO
RTS	  O
N
	  THE	  M
O
ST	  IM
PO
RTAN
T	  ISSU
ES,	  IN
CLU
DIN
G	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  RATHER	  
THAN
	  SU
PERFLU
O
U
S	  DETAILS	  W
HICH	  CO
U
LD	  BE	  O
F	  LITTLE	  HELP	  IN
	  THIS	  PHASE.
18.04.05
India
M
ultilingualism
W
e	  are	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  for	  the	  citizens	  to	  access	  inform
ation	  through	  ubiquitous	  w
ay	  through	  internet,	  dom
ain	  nam
e	  in	  Rom
an	  script	  is	  a	  big	  im
pedim
ent	  and	  w
e	  therefore	  
feel	  a	  strong	  need	  for	  the	  M
ultilingual	  Dom
ain	  N
am
e	  registration.
18.04.05
Pierre	  O
uedraogo
O
IF
M
ultilingualism
THE	  Q
U
ESTIO
N
	  O
F	  M
U
LTILIN
GU
ALISM
	  IS	  VERY	  IM
PO
RTAN
T	  FO
R	  U
S,	  FO
R	  FRAN
CO
PHO
N
IE,	  AN
D	  W
E	  SU
PPO
RT	  THIS	  AN
D	  W
E	  CO
M
M
EN
D	  THE	  VARIO
U
S	  DELEGATIO
N
S	  W
HO
	  HAVE	  
SPO
KEN
	  TO
	  CO
N
CU
R	  W
ITH	  U
S.
18.04.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
n/a
GTF-­‐J	  (Internet	  Governance	  Task	  Force	  of	  Japan)
18.04.05
U
N
DP-­‐ADPIP
n/a
The	  regional	  survey	  on	  Internet	  governance	  is	  part	  of	  U
N
DP	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  Developm
ent	  Inform
ation	  Program
m
e's	  (U
N
DP-­‐APDIP)	  efforts	  to	  carry	  out	  an	  O
pen	  Regional	  Dialogue	  on	  
Internet	  Governance	  (O
RDIG)
18.04.05
Lyndall	  Shope-­‐M
afole
W
GIG
no	  separation	  technical/political
BU
T	  TO
	  SAY	  THAT,	  REALLY,	  THE	  FO
CU
S	  AN
D	  THE	  M
AIN
	  REASO
N
	  FO
R	  THE	  ESTABLISHM
EN
T	  O
F	  THIS	  GRO
U
P	  AN
D	  FO
R	  ASKIN
G	  THE	  SECRETARY-­‐GEN
ERAL	  O
F	  THE	  U
.N
.	  TO
	  
ESTABLISH	  THIS	  GRO
U
P	  IS	  BECAU
SE	  THE	  ISSU
E	  IS	  N
O
T	  TECHN
ICAL.	  I	  THIN
K	  THE	  ISSU
E	  IS	  PO
LITICAL.
18.04.05
Bertrand	  de	  la	  Chappelle
W
SIS-­‐O
nline
no	  special	  role	  for	  the	  state
STILL,	  IF	  N
ATIO
N
AL	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  HAVE	  THE	  EXCLU
SIVE	  RESPO
N
SIBILITY	  O
F	  DEFIN
IN
G	  THE	  N
ATIO
N
AL	  PU
BLIC	  IN
TEREST,	  N
ATIO
N
AL	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  ARE	  N
O
T	  PARTICU
LARLY,	  IN
	  
THE	  PRESEN
T	  STAGE	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ATIO
N
AL	  IN
STITU
TIO
N
S,	  ACCO
U
N
TABLE	  TO
	  CITIZEN
S	  O
F	  O
THER	  CO
U
N
TRIES.
18.04.05
ICC
non-­‐binding	  insitutions	  only
A	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  forum
	  could	  put	  forth	  sum
m
aries	  from
	  the	  discussions	  to	  assist	  either	  particular	  organizations	  or	  fora	  in	  taking	  the	  issue	  to	  the	  next	  level.	  This	  m
ay	  give	  
policy	  direction,	  though	  it	  w
ould	  not	  have	  decision-­‐m
aking	  authority	  or	  operational	  responsibility.
18.04.05
ICC
O
IG	  exclusion
N
o.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  GAC	  needs	  to	  be	  revisited	  and	  perhaps	  a	  reform
ed	  GAC	  could	  provide	  the	  necessary	  diversification	  of	  governm
ental	  input	  to	  ICAN
N
	  as	  detailed	  in	  response	  to	  
question	  3
18.04.05
ICC
Private	  sector	  leadership
How
ever,	  w
e	  have	  seen	  that	  industry	  self-­‐regulation	  is	  often	  as	  effective	  and	  incorporates	  incentives	  to	  deal	  w
ith	  new
	  challenges	  on	  a	  going-­‐	  forw
ard	  basis.	  It	  w
ould	  therefore	  be	  
w
orth	  adding	  a	  discussion	  of	  how
	  other	  m
echanism
s	  than	  treaties	  im
pact	  behaviour.	  For	  instance,	  if	  com
panies	  choose	  not	  to	  abide	  by	  com
m
only-­‐accepted	  standards	  they	  could	  
very	  w
ell	  lose	  m
arket	  share.	  If	  they	  ignore	  generally-­‐accepted	  business	  practices	  they	  risk	  loud	  and	  sustained	  criticism
	  from
	  trade	  organizations,	  N
GO
s,	  the	  Internet	  technical	  
com
m
unity,	  and	  others-­‐-­‐w
hich	  could	  affect	  the	  com
pany's	  reputation	  and	  even	  hurt	  its	  share	  price	  and	  the	  w
illingness	  of	  custom
ers	  and	  partners	  to	  w
ork	  w
ith	  them
.
18.04.05
China
Problem
	  of	  m
onopolies
CHIN
A	  BELIEVES	  THE	  CU
RREN
T	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  SITU
ATIO
N
	  IS	  DO
M
IN
ATED	  BY	  THE	  PRIVATE	  SECTO
R	  AN
D	  A	  SIN
GLE	  CO
U
N
TRY.
18.04.05
O
ECD
Pro-­‐com
petitive	  regulation
Private	  sector	  com
petition	  and	  innovation	  enabled	  by	  liberalising	  m
arkets
18.04.05
Ian	  Peter
M
ark	  2
question	  the	  U
S	  oversight	  of	  ICAN
N
There	  is	  an	  urgent	  need	  for	  a	  body	  to	  undertake	  the	  function	  of	  control	  of	  root	  zone	  policy	  to	  replace	  the	  current	  system
	  of	  unilateral	  control.
18.04.05
India
question	  the	  U
S	  oversight	  of	  ICAN
N
W
e	  understand	  that	  the	  M
oU
	  is	  to	  expire	  in	  Septem
ber	  2006.	  ICAN
N
's	  incorporation	  in	  the	  U
SA	  im
plicitly	  m
eans	  it	  w
ill	  alw
ays	  be	  subject	  to	  U
SA	  law
.	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  this	  shall	  
introduce	  an	  asym
m
etric	  role	  of	  the	  U
SA	  Governm
ent	  vis	  a	  vis	  other	  governm
ents.	  Today	  ICAN
N
	  is	  the	  only	  visible	  body	  w
hich	  exercises	  any	  kind	  of	  oversight	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
internet	  w
ith	  a	  few
	  supporting	  organisation	  being	  responsible	  for	  som
e	  of	  its	  critical	  com
ponents	  â€“	  such	  as	  voluntary	  root	  servers,	  regional	  Internet	  Address	  Registries,	  the	  
Dom
ain	  N
am
e	  registries.	  M
ost	  of	  them
	  have	  contractual	  relations	  w
ith	  ICAN
N
.	  At	  the	  international	  level,	  there	  is	  no	  single	  international	  (Inter-­‐governm
ent	  or	  private)	  
organisation	  that	  coordinates	  all	  the	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  Internet	  and	  IP	  based	  Services.
18.04.05
India
question	  the	  U
S	  oversight	  of	  ICAN
N
AN
D	  W
E	  SEE	  THAT	  THERE	  ARE	  REFEREN
CES	  IN
	  THAT	  TO
	  U
.S.	  GO
VERN
M
EN
T	  ATTITU
DES.	  AN
D	  W
E	  U
N
DERSTAN
D	  THAT	  IF	  THE	  Q
U
ESTIO
N
	  O
F	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  IS	  TO
	  BE	  
ADDRESSED	  SATISFACTO
RILY,	  W
E	  W
O
U
LD	  N
EED	  TO
	  HAVE	  THE	  U
.S.	  GO
VERN
M
EN
T	  CLEARLY	  SIGN
	  O
N
	  TO
	  THAT	  PRO
CESS.	  BU
T	  W
E	  ARE	  AT	  THIS	  PO
IN
T	  O
F	  TIM
E	  EM
BARKED	  IN
	  
THAT	  PRO
CESS	  O
F	  TRYIN
G	  TO
	  BRO
ADEN
	  THE	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  RO
LE	  W
HICH	  CU
RREN
TLY	  IS	  EXERCISED	  BY	  O
N
LY	  O
N
E	  GO
VERN
M
EN
T.
18.04.05
W
olfgang	  Kleinw
aechter
W
GIG
question	  the	  U
S	  oversight	  of	  ICAN
N
AN
D	  IT	  M
EAN
S	  BO
TH	  M
O
DIFICATIO
N
S,	  DELETIO
N
S,	  AN
D	  ADDITIO
N
S	  TO
	  THE	  ZO
N
E	  FILE.	  THIS	  IS	  REGU
LATED	  IN
	  A	  BILATERAL	  AGREEM
EN
T	  BETW
EEN
	  ICAN
N
	  AN
D	  THE	  
DEPARTM
EN
T	  O
F	  CO
M
M
ERCE	  SO
	  FAR.	  AN
D	  I	  THIN
K	  W
E	  HAVE	  IDEN
TIFIED	  THIS	  AS	  A	  PRO
BLEM
ATIC	  ISSU
E.
18.04.05
W
olfgang	  Kleinw
aechter
W
GIG
separation	  technical/political
AN
D	  IT'S	  REALLY,	  YO
U
	  KN
O
W
	  -­‐-­‐	  THESE	  ARE	  REALLY	  EXCEPTIO
N
AL	  CASES	  -­‐-­‐	  W
HERE	  A	  PU
BLIC-­‐PO
LICY	  ELEM
EN
T	  IS	  IN
VO
LVED.
18.04.05
W
olfgang	  Kleinw
aechter
W
GIG
separation	  technical/political
N
O
RM
ALLY	  W
HEN
	  W
E	  DISCU
SS	  THIS,	  W
E	  TALK	  ABO
U
T	  THE	  CO
N
TRO
L	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET.	  BU
T	  IT'S	  -­‐-­‐	  IF	  YO
U
	  GO
	  DEEPER	  IN
TO
	  THE	  ISSU
E,	  YO
U
	  DISCO
VER	  IT'S	  N
O
T	  A	  Q
U
ESTIO
N
	  O
F	  
CO
N
TRO
L:	  IT'S	  A	  Q
U
ESTIO
N
	  O
F	  PRO
TECTIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET,	  SO
	  THAT	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  CAN
	  FU
N
CTIO
N
	  IN
	  A	  PRO
PER	  W
AY.	  AN
D	  SO
	  FAR,	  IT	  W
O
U
LD	  BE	  PRO
BABLY	  HELPFU
L	  TO
	  
TU
RN
	  THIS,	  YO
U
	  KN
O
W
,	  TERM
IN
O
LO
GY	  FRO
M
	  CO
N
TRO
L	  TO
	  PRO
TECTIO
N
.
18.04.05
Q
iheng	  Hu
W
GIG
separation	  technical/political
I	  W
AN
T	  TO
	  ADD	  THAT	  THE	  95%
	  O
F	  THIS	  THIN
G	  IS	  TECHN
ICAL	  AN
D	  PRO
CEDU
RAL,	  RO
U
TIN
E	  THIN
GS,	  W
HICH	  THE	  AU
THO
RITIES	  O
F	  THE	  SO
VEREIGN
	  STATES	  O
R	  THE	  M
AJO
R	  
STAKEHO
LDERS	  M
AY	  N
O
T	  N
EED	  TO
	  IN
TERFERE	  IN
TO
	  THE	  THIN
GS,	  THE	  DETAILS.
452
18.04.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
separation	  technical/political
BU
T	  W
E	  BELIEVE	  THAT	  M
AKIN
G	  CLEAR	  DISTIN
CTIO
N
	  BETW
EEN
	  W
HAT	  REALLY	  CO
N
STITU
TES	  PU
BLIC	  PO
LICY	  ISSU
ES	  AN
D	  W
HAT	  CAN
	  BE	  IDEN
TIFIED	  AS	  TECHN
ICAL	  M
ATTERS	  W
ILL	  
BEN
EFIT	  THE	  W
HO
LE	  DEBATE	  W
E	  ARE	  TASKED.
18.04.05
Saudi	  Arabia
sovereignty
W
E	  HO
PE	  THAT	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  W
ILL	  PLAY	  AN
	  APPRO
PRIATE	  RO
LE	  IN
	  TERM
S	  O
F	  DEVELO
PIN
G	  PO
LICIES	  RELATED	  TO
	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE.
18.04.05
China
sovereignty
W
E	  BELIEVE	  THAT	  THE	  PO
LICY-­‐M
AKIN
G	  SHO
U
LD	  N
O
T	  SU
RPASS	  IN
TERN
ATIO
N
AL	  LAW
	  AN
D	  N
ATIO
N
AL	  SO
VEREIGN
TY,	  AS	  PO
IN
TED	  O
U
T	  IN
	  ARTICLE	  49	  O
F	  THE	  DECLARATIO
N
	  O
F	  
PRIN
CIPLES.
18.04.05
Saudi	  Arabia
sovereignty
Based	  on	  the	  W
SIS	  principles,	  public	  policy	  authority	  for	  internet	  related	  issues	  is	  the	  sovereign	  right	  of	  states.
18.04.05
Syria
sovereignty
W
ork	  on	  all	  these	  international	  public	  issues	  shall	  observe	  national	  sovereign	  rights	  of	  each	  State	  to	  organize	  the	  use	  f	  the	  Internet	  nationally.
18.04.05
EU
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
THE	  E.U
.	  BELIEVES	  THAT	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  DO
	  HAVE	  A	  SPECIFIC	  M
ISSIO
N
	  AN
D	  RESPO
N
SIBILITY	  VIS-­‐A-­‐VIS	  THEIR	  CITIZEN
S	  AN
D	  THEIR	  RO
LE	  W
ITHIN
	  THIS	  N
EW
	  CO
RPO
RATIO
N
	  
M
O
DEL	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  M
AIN
LY	  FO
CU
SED	  O
N
	  ISSU
ES	  O
F	  PU
BLIC	  PO
LICY	  EXCLU
DIN
G	  AN
Y	  IN
VO
LVEM
EN
T	  IN
	  THE	  DAY-­‐TO
-­‐DAY	  O
PERATIO
N
S.
18.04.05
India
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
O
VERALL,	  W
E	  THIN
K	  THAT	  FO
R	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  TO
	  HAVE	  A	  TRU
LY	  LEGITIM
ATE	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  STRU
CTU
RE,	  IT	  M
U
ST	  IN
VO
LVE	  ALL	  STAKEHO
LDERS,	  IN
CLU
DIN
G,	  AN
D	  IN
	  
PARTICU
LAR,	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS.	  SO
	  W
E	  M
U
ST	  BEAR	  THIS	  IN
	  M
IN
D	  W
HEN
	  THE	  W
O
RKIN
G	  GRO
U
P	  CO
N
TIN
U
ES	  W
ITH	  ITS	  VERY	  IM
PO
RTAN
T	  TASK.
18.04.05
Syria
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
W
E'VE	  N
O
T	  ASKED	  FO
R	  AN
	  IN
TERGO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
.	  W
E	  REFERRED	  TO
	  PAST	  EXPERIEN
CE.	  W
E	  HAVE	  THE	  EXAM
PLE	  O
F	  THE	  ITU
.	  THE	  ITU
	  IS	  O
PEN
	  TO
	  ALL	  
PARTICIPAN
TS.
18.04.05
India
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  AN
D	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  ALO
N
E	  CAN
	  CLAIM
	  TO
	  SPEAK	  O
N
	  BEHALF	  O
F	  THE	  PU
BLIC.	  ESPECIALLY	  IN
	  DEM
O
CRATIC	  SO
CIETIES,	  W
HERE	  A	  PU
BLIC	  CO
N
CERN
	  IS	  
IN
VO
LVED,	  THE	  GO
VERN
M
EN
T	  CAN
	  LEGITIM
ATELY	  CLAIM
	  TO
	  ACT	  AN
D	  SPEAK	  O
N
	  BEHALF	  O
F	  THE	  PU
BLIC.	  SO
	  W
HILE	  W
E	  SEE	  THE	  GO
VERN
AN
CE,	  THE	  LARGER	  GO
VERN
AN
CE,	  AS	  
O
N
E	  THAT	  IN
VO
LVES	  A	  W
HO
LE	  SET	  O
F	  ACTO
RS,	  ALL	  O
F	  W
HO
M
	  HAVE	  A	  REAL	  LEGITIM
ATE	  STAKE	  IN
	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET,	  THERE	  W
O
U
LD	  BE	  ISSU
ES	  THAT	  W
O
U
LD	  HAVE	  TO
	  BE	  DECIDED	  
CO
LLECTIVELY	  BY	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS.
18.04.05
Lyndall	  Shope-­‐M
afole
W
GIG
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
O
N
	  THE	  O
N
E	  HAN
D,	  YO
U
	  HAVE	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  THAT	  ARE	  ELECTED	  THAT	  HAVE	  PU
BLIC	  ACCO
U
N
TABILITY	  IN
	  THEIR	  CO
U
N
TRIES.
18.04.05
China
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
THE	  SO
-­‐CALLED	  TRILATERALISM
	  HAS	  N
O
	  FO
U
N
DATIO
N
	  IN
	  THE	  REPO
RT,	  SIN
CE	  IT	  DEVIATES	  THE	  PRIN
CIPLE	  FRO
M
	  ARTICLE	  49,	  M
IXIN
G	  THE	  RO
LES	  O
F	  ALL	  THE	  STAKEHO
LDERS,	  
DEN
YIN
G	  THE	  DU
E	  RESPO
N
SIBILITY	  AN
D	  RO
LE	  O
F	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  IN
	  IN
TERN
ET	  PO
LICY-­‐M
AKIN
G.
18.04.05
India
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
AN
D	  THE	  GO
VERN
M
EN
T	  ALO
N
E	  CAN
	  SPEAK	  O
N
	  -­‐-­‐	  IN
	  THE	  N
AM
E	  O
F	  THE	  PU
BLIC.
18.04.05
Yuxiao	  Li
Internet	  Society	  of	  China
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
But	  w
ithout	  the	  governm
ent's	  attendance,	  legislation	  and	  policy	  support,	  w
e	  cannot	  solve	  spam
	  problem
	  com
pletely.	  W
e	  can	  get	  a	  conclusion	  from
	  anti-­‐spam
	  practice	  in	  the	  
w
orld	  that	  it	  is	  an	  integrated	  solution	  including	  legislation,	  m
anagem
ent,	  technology,	  self-­‐discipline	  and	  international	  cooperation	  to	  deal	  w
ith	  spam
.
18.04.05
Alejandro	  Pisanty
W
GIG
support	  of	  the	  single	  root
THESE	  LEAD	  TO
	  PO
SSIBLE	  CO
N
FLICTS,	  BECAU
SE	  DIFFEREN
T	  N
AM
ES	  CO
U
LD	  BE	  GIVEN
	  IN
	  -­‐-­‐	  THE	  SAM
E	  N
AM
E	  CO
U
LD	  BE	  GIVEN
	  IN
	  DIFFEREN
T	  RO
O
TS	  AN
D	  PO
IN
T	  TO
	  DIFFEREN
T	  
RESO
U
RCES.	  AN
D	  THIS,	  IN
	  THE	  EN
D,	  CAN
	  BECO
M
E	  EXTREM
ELY	  PRO
BLEM
ATIC.
18.04.05
Paul	  W
ilson
APN
IC
support	  of	  the	  single	  root
O
f	  particular	  im
portance	  is	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  single	  com
m
on	  addressing	  and	  routing	  schem
e,	  w
hich	  allow
s	  new
	  netw
orks	  to	  connect	  into	  the	  Internet	  and	  im
m
ediately	  share	  
traffic	  w
ith	  all	  others.	  It	  m
ust	  be	  understood,	  how
ever,	  that	  this	  essential	  characteristic	  is	  not	  an	  assured	  outcom
e	  of	  the	  Internet	  itself:	  rather	  it	  is	  the	  result	  of	  adm
inistrative	  
and	  operational	  system
s	  that	  w
ork	  specifically	  to	  preserve	  it.
18.04.05
Daniel	  Karrenberg
RIPE
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
The	  W
GIG	  fails	  to	  recognise	  that	  the	  m
ost	  im
portant	  elem
ents	  of	  this	  process	  are	  the	  regional	  policy	  fora	  and	  not	  the	  relatively	  sm
all	  parts	  that	  ensure	  global	  co-­‐ordination:	  
consequently	  it	  fails	  to	  recognise	  that	  these	  processes	  are	  com
pletely	  open	  for	  governm
ents	  and	  civil	  society	  to	  participate	  and	  that	  they	  alw
ays	  have	  been	  open	  for	  anyone	  w
ith	  
a	  genuine	  interest	  in	  the	  m
atter.	  The	  com
m
ent	  period	  is	  too	  short	  to	  enum
erate	  all	  instances	  of	  descriptions	  of	  the	  status-­‐quo	  that	  are	  fac-­‐	  tually	  w
rong	  or	  blatantly	  ignore	  
w
idely	  available	  data	  in	  favour	  of	  hear-­‐say	  and	  rum
ours.
18.04.05
Ian	  Peter
M
ark	  2
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
Rather	  than	  a	  replacem
ent	  for	  existing	  structures,	  w
e	  w
ould	  see	  this	  as	  an	  overlay	  in	  relationship	  to	  existing	  organisations.
18.04.05
ICC
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
There	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  existing	  organizations	  addressing	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Internet	  w
hich	  are	  responsive	  to	  its	  dynam
ic	  needs	  and	  its	  applications.	  All	  
institutions	  need	  to	  constantly	  seek	  to	  im
prove,	  and	  those	  associated	  w
ith	  the	  Internet	  are	  no	  exception.	  Each	  has	  processes	  in	  place	  tow
ard	  this	  objective.	  The	  Internet	  w
as	  
designed	  to	  be	  m
anaged/coordinated	  in	  a	  decentralized	  fashion	  w
ithout	  any	  need	  for	  "centralized"	  control.	  Certainly,	  it	  has	  w
orked	  that	  w
ay	  for	  m
any	  years	  and	  today	  is	  the	  
foundation	  of	  m
any	  business	  m
odels	  in	  the	  com
m
ercial	  w
orld.	  The	  W
GIG	  has	  recognized	  and	  ICC	  m
em
bers	  agree	  the	  Internet	  itself	  has	  been	  functioning	  w
ell.	  Given	  its	  history	  
and	  its	  stability	  to	  date,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  a	  "need"	  for	  an	  additional	  arrangem
ent	  or	  body.
18.04.05
ICC
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
ICC	  questions	  the	  need	  for	  any	  new
	  oversight	  function.	  W
hile	  som
e	  of	  the	  existing	  m
echanism
s/organizations	  that	  deal	  w
ith	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  Internet	  could	  be	  im
proved	  in	  
line	  w
ith	  the	  Geneva	  principles,	  oversight	  of	  them
	  is	  not	  needed,	  rather	  discussion	  and	  inform
ation	  exchange	  betw
een	  and	  am
ong	  these	  organizations	  should	  be	  prom
oted.
18.04.05
ICC
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
At	  the	  bottom
	  of	  page	  5,	  the	  first	  sentence	  about	  ICAN
N
	  should	  not	  be	  a	  negative	  criticism
	  that	  ICAN
N
	  is	  not	  consistent	  w
ith	  the	  idea	  of	  national	  sovereignty.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  w
hich	  
W
SIS	  criteria	  regarding	  national	  sovereignty	  ICAN
N
	  contradicts.	  An	  opening	  sentence	  that	  acknow
ledges	  that	  ICAN
N
	  represents	  a	  new
	  and	  successful	  attem
pt	  to	  quickly	  develop	  
an	  open,	  global	  self-­‐regulatory	  m
echanism
	  for	  coordinating	  som
e	  of	  the	  key	  technical	  issues	  that	  m
ust	  be	  addressed	  to	  ensure	  the	  sm
ooth	  functioning	  of	  the	  Internet.	  It	  
attem
pts	  to	  do	  this	  in	  a	  w
ay	  that	  m
axim
izes	  flexibility	  and	  fosters	  innovation.	  should	  be	  included.
18.04.05
O
ECD
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
The	  technological	  developm
ent	  and	  adm
inistration	  of	  the	  Internet	  is	  involved	  in	  ensuring	  that	  the	  netw
ork	  is	  interoperable,	  functional,	  stable,	  secure,	  efficient,	  as	  w
ell	  as	  
scalable	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  N
o	  single	  person,	  organisation	  or	  country	  m
anages	  the	  Internet.	  Instead,	  the	  Internet's	  technological	  m
anagem
ent	  is	  handled	  by	  m
any	  entities	  w
hich	  
w
ork	  w
ithin	  a	  coordinated	  and	  overall	  open	  fram
ew
ork.	  Today,	  the	  Internet	  enables	  new
	  com
petition	  w
hich	  w
as	  previously	  im
possible	  due	  to	  the	  lim
ited	  resources	  of	  other	  
com
m
unications	  m
edia	  or	  to	  the	  w
ay	  they	  w
ere	  m
anaged.	  Indeed,	  convergence	  entails	  a	  need	  to	  rethink	  and	  adapt	  regulatory	  fram
ew
orks.
18.04.05
EU
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
IT	  SHO
U
LD	  N
O
T	  REPLACE	  EXISTIN
G	  M
ECHAN
ISM
	  O
R	  IN
STITU
TIO
N
S,	  BU
T	  SHO
U
LD	  BU
ILD	  O
N
	  THE	  EXISTIN
G	  STRU
CTU
RES	  O
F	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE,	  W
ITH	  A	  SPECIAL	  EM
PHASIS	  
O
N
	  THE	  CO
M
PLEM
EN
TARITY	  BETW
EEN
	  ALL	  THE	  ACTO
RS	  IN
	  THIS	  PRO
CESS.	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS,	  AN
D,	  RECO
GN
IZIN
G	  THE	  IM
PO
RTAN
CE	  O
F	  N
ATIO
N
AL	  RESPO
N
SIBILITIES	  AN
D	  RO
LES.	  
SECO
N
D	  THE	  N
EW
	  PU
BLIC/PRIVATE	  CO
O
PERATIO
N
	  M
O
DEL,	  SHO
U
LD	  CO
N
TRIBU
TE	  TO
	  THE	  SU
STAIN
ABLE	  STABILITY	  AN
D	  RO
BU
STN
ESS	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  BY	  ADDRESSIN
G	  
APPRO
PRIATELY	  PU
BLIC	  PO
LICY	  ISSU
ES	  RELATED	  TO
	  KEY	  ELEM
EN
TS	  O
F	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE.
18.04.05
U
SA
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
I	  W
O
U
LD	  JU
ST	  SAY	  TO
	  EVERYO
N
E	  THAT	  THIS	  M
AY	  BE	  THE	  SITU
ATIO
N
	  N
O
W
	  BECAU
SE	  IT'S	  THE	  W
AY	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  DEVELO
PED	  IN
	  THE	  PAST.	  AN
D	  IT	  IS	  A	  M
ATTER	  O
F	  HISTO
RY	  
RATHER	  THAN
	  DU
E	  TO
	  AN
Y	  KIN
D	  O
F	  CO
N
SPIRACY.
18.04.05
M
arilyn	  Cade
ICC
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
AN
D	  I	  ALSO
	  N
O
TE	  THE	  IM
PO
RTAN
CE	  O
F,	  AT	  THIS	  STAGE,	  O
U
R	  HO
N
ESTLY	  AN
D	  FACTU
ALLY	  CO
N
SIDERIN
G	  THE	  ADEQ
U
ACY	  O
F	  THE	  PRESEN
T	  M
ECHAN
ISM
S	  THAT	  TO
DAY	  ARE	  
IDEN
TIFIED	  AS	  BEIN
G	  IN
VO
LVED	  IN
	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE.
453
18.04.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
W
E	  BELIEVE	  THE	  FACT	  IS	  THAT	  THE	  O
PEN
	  PO
LICY	  FO
RU
M
	  HO
STED	  BY	  RIRS	  ARE	  ALL	  O
PEN
	  TO
	  AN
YO
N
E	  IN
TERESTED	  IN
	  THE	  PO
LICY	  DEVELO
PM
EN
T	  FO
R	  IP	  ADDRESS	  
M
AN
AGEM
EN
T.
18.04.05
Theresa	  Sw
inehart
ICAN
N
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
W
E	  FIN
D	  THAT	  THE	  RECO
M
M
EN
DATIO
N
S	  PU
T	  FO
RW
ARD	  IN
	  PARTICU
LAR	  O
N
	  THE	  PAPER	  O
N
	  DO
M
AIN
	  N
AM
E	  M
AN
AGEM
EN
T	  ARE	  ACTU
ALLY	  VERY	  CO
N
SISTEN
T	  W
ITH	  SO
M
E	  O
F	  
THE	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
'S	  CU
RREN
T	  EVO
LU
TIO
N
	  AN
D	  SO
M
E	  O
F	  THAT	  THIN
KIN
G	  CAN
	  BE	  FO
U
N
D	  IN
	  ICAN
N
'S	  STRATEGIC	  PLAN
,	  W
HICH	  IN
CLU
DES	  SO
M
E	  CO
M
M
U
N
ITY	  IN
PU
T,	  AN
D	  IN
	  
O
U
R	  W
O
RK	  TO
W
ARDS	  THE	  CO
M
PLETIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  M
O
U
	  W
ITH	  THE	  U
.S.	  DEPARTM
EN
T	  O
F	  CO
M
M
ERCE,	  THE	  LATEST	  REPO
RT	  O
N
	  THE	  CO
M
PLETIO
N
	  O
F	  THAT	  PRO
GRESS	  CAN
	  BE	  
FO
U
N
D	  O
N
	  ICAN
N
'S	  W
EB	  SITE.
18.04.05
M
irjam
	  Kuhne
ISO
C
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
W
E	  ARE	  CO
N
CERN
ED,	  THO
U
GH,	  THAT	  M
AN
Y	  O
F	  W
GIG'S	  PREM
ISES	  SEEM
	  TO
	  START	  W
ITH	  AN
	  ASSU
M
PTIO
N
	  THAT	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  N
EEDS	  HIERARCHICAL	  TO
P-­‐DO
W
N
	  
GO
VERN
AN
CE	  M
O
DEL	  IM
PLYIN
G	  O
N
E	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
	  AN
D	  THEREBY	  IGN
O
RIN
G	  THE	  DECEN
TRALIZED	  STRU
CTU
RE	  O
N
	  W
HICH	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  W
AS	  SO
	  SU
CCESSFU
LLY	  BU
ILT.	  N
O
T	  
O
N
LY	  DO
ES	  THIS	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  HIERARCHY	  M
O
DEL	  AS	  IT	  W
AS	  CALLED	  IN
	  SO
M
E	  O
F	  THE	  PAPERS	  PREVEN
T	  AN
	  ACCU
RATE	  U
N
DERSTAN
DIN
G	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET'S	  IN
FRASTRU
CTU
RE	  
AN
D	  ITS	  DEVELO
PM
EN
T	  AN
D	  FO
RCIN
G	  KEY	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S	  TO
	  BE	  CLASSED	  IN
	  PRESCRIBED	  CATEGO
RIES	  THAT	  DO
	  N
O
T	  FIT	  W
ITH	  THE	  REALITY	  O
F	  THEIR	  ACTIO
N
S	  O
R	  THEIR	  RO
LE	  
IN
	  DEVELO
PIN
G	  AN
D	  SU
PPO
RTIN
G	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET,	  BU
T	  IT	  ALSO
	  W
ILL	  VERY	  LIKELY	  LEAD	  TO
	  CO
N
CLU
SIO
N
S	  THAT	  W
ILL	  HARM
	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET'S	  DEVELO
PM
EN
T	  AN
D	  GRO
W
TH.	  THE	  
IN
TERN
ET	  SO
CIETY	  BELIEVES	  THAT	  THE	  BEST	  W
AY	  TO
	  SU
PPO
RT	  THE	  W
SIS	  PLAN
	  O
F	  ACTIO
N
	  AN
D	  THE	  M
ILLEN
N
IU
M
	  DEVELO
PM
EN
T	  GO
ALS	  AN
D	  TO
	  EXTEN
D	  THE	  REACH	  O
F	  THE	  
IN
TERN
ET	  IS	  TO
	  BU
ILD	  O
N
	  THO
SE	  ASPECTS	  THAT	  HAVE	  W
O
RKED	  W
ELL:	  N
AM
ELY,	  THE	  LO
N
G	  ESTABLISHED	  O
PEN
,	  DISTRIBU
TED,	  AN
D	  CO
N
SEN
SU
S-­‐BASED	  PRO
CESSES	  AN
D	  M
AN
Y	  
REGIO
N
AL	  FO
RU
M
S	  FO
R	  THE	  DEVELO
PM
EN
T	  AN
D	  ADM
IN
ISTRATIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  IN
FRASTRU
CTU
RE.
18.04.05
Sw
itzerland
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
SW
ITZERLAN
D,	  FO
R	  ITS	  PART,	  AS	  YO
U
	  KN
O
W
,	  HAS	  ALW
AYS	  PREFERRED	  TO
	  REFER	  TO
	  W
HAT	  ALREADY	  EXISTS	  W
HEN
EVER	  THIS	  IS	  PO
SSIBLE.
18.04.05
O
scar	  Robles
N
IC-­‐M
exico
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
This	  paragraph	  is,	  in	  the	  best	  scenario,	  inconsistent	  in	  itself.	  Governm
ents	  do	  have	  their	  sovereign	  right	  to	  determ
ine	  public	  policy.	  ccN
SO
	  policy	  developm
ent	  process	  takes	  this	  
into	  account.
18.04.05
Paul	  W
ilson
APN
IC
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
he	  great	  danger	  of	  an	  explosion	  in	  routing	  table	  sizes,	  particularly	  if	  allocation	  m
echanism
s	  are	  introduced	  w
hich	  conflict	  w
ith	  today's	  m
easures	  for	  the	  control	  of	  table	  sizes.	  The	  
ITU
	  proposal	  for	  national	  allocations
18.04.05
Anita	  Gurum
urthy
CS	  Gender	  Caucus
U
N
	  oversight	  of	  the	  ICAN
N
It	  should	  be	  responsible	  to	  the	  U
N
	  General	  Assem
bly	  through	  the	  U
N
	  Secretary	  General	  Have	  oversight	  responsibility	  for	  fair	  distribution	  of	  Internet	  resources.
18.04.05
Daniel	  Karrenberg
RIPE
W
GIG	  critique
The	  recently	  published	  w
ork	  of	  the	  W
GIG	  is	  very	  disappointing	  and	  does	  not	  create	  confidence	  that	  the	  group	  w
ill	  produce	  helpful	  results	  according	  to	  its	  m
andate.	  U
nless	  the	  
group	  focusses	  on	  achievable	  results	  it	  w
ill	  fail.
18.04.05
Daniel	  Karrenberg
RIPE
W
GIG	  critique
M
aking	  recom
m
endations	  w
ithout	  giving	  a	  rationale	  and	  proposing	  processes	  w
ithout	  a	  description	  of	  their	  goals	  does	  not	  indi-­‐	  cate	  that	  recom
m
endations	  are	  the	  result	  of	  a	  
rational	  discourse	  w
ithin	  W
GIG	  and	  m
uch	  less	  a	  consensus	  am
ong	  W
GIG	  m
em
bers.	  This	  does	  not	  m
ake	  the	  w
ork	  very	  useful	  as	  a	  basis	  developing	  agree-­‐	  m
ent	  am
ong	  the	  m
uch	  
larger	  and	  m
ore	  diverse	  group	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  W
SIS.	  W
GIG	  Should	  Focus
18.04.05
India
W
GIG	  critique
To	  sum
	  up	  the	  paper	  presents	  the	  w
hole	  gam
bit	  of	  governance	  in	  an	  academ
ic	  m
anner	  to	  educate	  all	  the	  readers	  about	  the	  various	  options	  and	  their	  relative	  suitability	  to	  m
eet	  
the	  W
SIS	  criteria.	  How
ever,	  no	  specific	  conclusion	  or	  recom
m
endation	  has	  been	  presented	  to	  m
ove	  forw
ard.	  .
18.04.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
W
GIG	  critique
W
e	  w
ould	  like	  to	  state	  how
ever,	  that	  the	  tim
e	  allocated	  for	  us	  to	  prepare	  our	  com
m
ent	  is	  far	  less	  than	  one	  can	  reasonably	  afford.	  W
e	  understand	  that	  the	  W
GIG	  m
em
bers	  
devoted	  a	  lot	  of	  tim
e	  w
ithin	  a	  short	  period,	  sacrificing	  your	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  w
orks.	  But	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  global	  consensus,	  especially	  for	  m
ulti-­‐lingual	  actors,	  w
e	  like	  to	  request	  to	  
have	  m
inim
um
	  of	  three	  to	  four	  w
eeks	  from
	  the	  publications	  of	  the	  papers	  for	  the	  com
m
ent	  period.
18.04.05
Laurence	  Djolakian
M
PA
W
GIG	  critique
W
e	  rem
ain	  extrem
ely	  concerned	  by	  the	  approach	  to	  IPRs	  seem
ingly	  adopted	  by	  the	  W
GIG	  as	  this	  latest	  draft	  "w
orking	  paper"	  reflects	  only	  very	  partially,	  if	  at	  all,	  any	  
im
provem
ent	  com
pared	  to	  the	  "issue	  paper"	  posted	  in	  February.	  W
e	  regret	  that	  m
ost	  of	  the	  com
m
ents	  w
e	  provided	  in	  February	  w
ere	  not	  taken	  into	  consideration,	  although	  
these	  com
m
ents	  w
ere	  shared	  by	  a	  large	  pool	  of	  organizations.	  In	  our	  view
,	  the	  draft	  w
orking	  paper	  still	  includes	  disproportionately	  negative	  com
m
ents	  of	  the	  current	  IPR	  system
	  
reflecting	  an	  anti-­‐copyright	  bias,	  and	  fails	  to	  reflect	  the	  current	  situation	  accurately.	  In	  particular:
18.04.05
Yoshio	  U
tsum
i
ITU
W
GIG	  critique
SO
	  THE	  W
O
RKIN
G	  DEFIN
ITIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  IS	  N
O
T	  AN
	  ACADEM
IC	  W
O
RKIN
G	  DEFIN
ITIO
N
,	  BU
T	  TO
	  FACILITATE	  THE	  DISCU
SSIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  PREPCO
M
.
18.04.05
Syria
W
GIG	  critique
AN
D	  AS	  A	  DEVELO
PIN
G	  CO
U
N
TRY,	  IT'S	  VERY	  DIFFICU
LT	  FO
R	  U
S	  TO
	  STU
DY	  DO
CU
M
EN
TS	  IN
	  SU
CH	  A	  SHO
RT	  PERIO
D.
18.04.05
IPA
W
GIG	  critique
GEN
ERALLY	  SPEAKIN
G,	  W
E	  DO
	  N
O
T	  BELIEVE	  THAT	  THE	  LATEST	  W
O
RKIN
G	  PAPER	  O
N
	  IPR	  PRO
VIDES	  AN
	  ACCU
RATE	  PICTU
RE	  O
F	  THE	  CU
RREN
T	  SITU
ATIO
N
,	  AN
D	  VERY	  M
U
CH	  
REGRET	  ITS	  APPAREN
T	  AN
TI-­‐CO
PYRIGHT	  BIAS.
18.04.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
W
GIG	  critique
FIRST,	  I	  HAVE	  A	  Q
U
ESTIO
N
.	  W
AS	  THERE	  AN
Y	  DISCU
SSIO
N
	  IN
	  THE	  W
GIG	  ABO
U
T	  THE	  O
PEN
	  AN
D/O
R	  FREE	  SO
FTW
ARE	  IN
	  RELATIO
N
	  TO
	  THE	  U
SE	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET?	  BECAU
SE	  
THERE'S	  N
O
	  M
EN
TIO
N
	  ABO
U
T	  THEM
	  AT	  ALL	  IN
	  THIS	  PAPER,
18.04.05
IFFP
W
GIG	  critique
JU
ST	  O
N
E	  M
O
RE	  THIN
G.	  I	  ALSO
	  THIN
K	  IT'S	  VERY	  SU
RPRISIN
G	  TO
	  SEE	  N
O
	  REFEREN
CE	  TO
	  THE	  ESSEN
TIAL	  PRO
BLEM
	  O
F	  PIRACY,	  W
HICH	  EN
DAN
GERS	  THE	  CO
N
TEN
T	  SECTO
R.	  I	  
HAVEN
'T	  SEEN
	  AN
Y	  ATTEM
PTS	  TO
	  AN
ALYZE	  THIS	  IN
	  THE	  PAPERS,	  AN
D	  W
E	  W
O
U
LD	  HAVE	  LIKED	  TO
	  SEE	  THAT	  AS	  W
ELL.
18.04.05
Australia
W
GIG	  critique
THIS	  LEADS	  TO
	  A	  SECO
N
D	  Q
U
ESTIO
N
,	  I	  SU
PPO
SE,	  W
HICH	  I'D	  LIKE	  TO
	  RAISE,	  W
HICH	  IS	  I	  HAVE	  A	  SEN
SE	  IN
	  W
HICH	  PARTICU
LARLY	  THE	  PAPERS	  AS	  W
E	  M
O
VE	  AW
AY	  FRO
M
	  THE	  
M
O
ST	  CO
N
TEN
TIO
U
S	  AN
D	  CEN
TRAL	  ISSU
E	  THAT	  W
E	  HAVE,	  THAT'S	  W
HERE	  W
E	  FIN
D	  THE	  PAPERS	  ARE	  STRU
GGLIN
G	  M
O
RE	  AN
D	  M
O
RE	  TO
	  DEVELO
P	  A	  M
O
RE	  DETAILED	  AN
ALYSIS.
18.04.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
W
GIG	  critique
BU
T	  W
E'D	  LIKE	  TO
	  STATE,	  HO
W
EVER,	  THAT	  THE	  TIM
E	  ALLO
CATED	  FO
R	  U
S	  TO
	  PREPARE	  O
U
R	  CO
M
M
EN
T	  IS	  FAR	  LESS	  THAN
	  W
E	  CAN
	  REASO
N
ABLY	  AFFO
RD.
18.04.05
Syria
W
GIG	  critique
IF	  SO
M
EO
N
E	  AS	  CO
M
PETEN
T	  AS	  THE	  DELEGATE	  FRO
M
	  JAPAN
	  N
EEDS	  SEVERAL	  W
EEKS	  TO
	  CO
M
M
EN
T	  O
N
	  ALL	  THESE	  DO
CU
M
EN
TS,	  W
HAT	  CAN
	  W
E	  SAY	  AS	  REGARDS	  TO
	  THE	  
DEVELO
PIN
G	  CO
U
N
TRIES	  W
HO
	  M
IGHT	  BE	  O
VERW
HELM
ED	  BY	  ALL	  O
F	  THIS	  U
SEFU
L	  IN
FO
RM
ATIO
N
?
18.04.05
Syria
W
GIG	  critique
W
E	  HAVEN
'T	  EVEN
	  SERIO
U
SLY	  STARTED	  DEFIN
IN
G	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  AN
D	  W
E'RE	  ALREADY	  GO
IN
G	  IN
TO
	  W
HAT	  TYPE	  O
F	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  SET	  U
P.	  I	  THIN
K	  THIS	  
IS	  TO
TALLY	  O
U
T	  O
F	  LIN
E.
18.04.05
M
irjam
	  Kuhne
ISO
C
W
GIG	  critique
U
N
FO
RTU
N
ATELY,	  AN
	  IN
O
RDIN
ATE	  AM
O
U
N
T	  O
F	  TIM
E	  HAS	  BEEN
	  SPEN
T	  FO
CU
SIN
G	  O
N
	  REVIEW
IN
G	  CU
RREN
T	  STRU
CTU
RES,	  THO
SE	  THAT	  BRO
U
GHT	  U
S	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  AN
D	  ITS	  
RAPID,	  STABLE	  GRO
W
TH,	  RATHER	  THAN
	  LO
O
KIN
G	  FO
RW
ARD	  TO
	  THE	  PO
TEN
TIAL	  BEN
EFITS	  O
F	  EXTEN
DED	  CO
O
PERATIO
N
	  W
ITH	  AN
D	  BASED	  O
N
	  THE	  PRO
VEN
	  SU
CCESS	  O
F	  
EXISTIN
G	  M
O
DELS	  AN
D	  STRU
CTU
RES.
18.04.05
O
scar	  Robles
N
IC-­‐M
exico
W
GIG	  critique
First	  of	  all,	  publishing	  a	  docum
ent	  three	  days	  before	  you	  close	  the	  period	  for	  public	  com
m
ents	  represents	  huge	  problem
	  to	  you	  ow
n	  process	  of	  openness	  and	  participation.	  Then,	  
m
odify	  that	  papers	  just	  tw
o	  days	  before	  your	  deadline,	  is	  definitely	  not	  serious.
454
18.04.05
O
scar	  Robles
N
IC-­‐M
exico
W
GIG	  critique
This	  docum
ent	  is	  not	  a	  neutral	  vision	  of	  the	  DN
S	  m
anagem
ent	  but	  a	  slanted	  one	  to	  the	  author	  w
ishes,	  show
ing	  only	  one	  'side	  of	  the	  coin',	  w
hy	  it	  doesn't	  say	  that	  there	  is	  another	  
em
erging	  view
,	  w
here	  no	  governm
ent	  involvem
ent?	  So,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  neutrality,	  you	  should	  refrain	  from
	  m
aking	  suggestions	  in	  factual	  docum
ents,	  otherw
ise	  w
e	  could	  
interpret	  it	  as	  som
eone	  already	  decided	  w
hat	  to	  do	  w
ith	  the	  DN
S	  governance,	  and	  you	  are	  just	  being	  the	  m
essengers.
18.04.05
O
scar	  Robles
N
IC-­‐M
exico
W
GIG	  critique
You	  just	  w
ere	  established	  as	  the	  'court	  of	  justice'	  for	  the	  Internet	  future	  and	  one	  of	  your	  m
ain	  pledges	  is	  openness	  and	  w
ider	  participation.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  w
ay	  you	  know
	  how
	  to	  
aim
	  it,	  I	  think	  w
e've	  seen	  enough	  and	  your	  endeavor	  is	  over.	  You	  are	  sending	  the	  w
rong	  m
essage.	  W
e	  look	  forw
ard	  to	  see	  real	  im
provem
ents	  on	  the	  w
ay	  you	  allow
	  not	  only	  
public	  com
m
ents	  to	  w
orking	  drafts,	  but	  actual	  participation	  of	  private	  sector,	  civil	  society	  and	  current	  players	  to	  your	  discussions	  and	  your	  decisions.
18.04.05
Syria
W
GIG	  critique
How
ever,	  Syria	  notes	  that	  the	  current	  papers	  do	  not	  fully	  reflect	  either	  the	  balance	  of	  view
s,	  or	  the	  w
ork	  currently	  done	  in	  the	  ITU
	  and	  w
ould	  expect	  this	  to	  be	  rectified	  in	  the	  
future
19.04.05
Peter	  Godw
in
ISO
C
Internet	  exceptionalism
In	  the	  spirit	  of	  m
eeting	  the	  international	  developm
ent	  goals	  highlighted	  by	  W
SIS,	  any	  review
	  of	  today's	  Internet	  m
odel	  or	  structures	  m
ust	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  context	  of	  how
	  
w
ell	  they	  have	  w
orked	  in	  the	  past,	  how
	  w
ell	  they	  m
eet	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  people	  w
ho	  depend	  upon	  them
	  today,	  and	  how
	  w
ell	  they	  w
ill	  adapt	  to	  changing	  requirem
ents	  in	  the	  
future:	  and	  not	  sim
ply	  focus	  on	  a	  com
parison	  to	  other	  historical	  telecom
m
unications	  or	  governance	  m
odels.	  These	  historical	  m
odels	  have	  not	  been	  dem
onstrated	  to	  be	  w
ell	  
suited	  to	  the	  Internet.
19.04.05
Peter	  Godw
in
ISO
C
separation	  technical/political
How
ever,	  m
uch	  of	  W
GIG's	  focus	  has	  been	  on	  Internet	  infrastructure,	  thereby	  m
issing	  an	  opportunity	  to	  focus	  on	  those	  aspects	  of	  the	  Internet's	  developm
ent	  that	  are	  less	  
developed	  and	  that	  could	  benefit	  from
	  im
proved,	  lightw
eight	  m
echanism
s	  facilitating	  an	  exchange	  of	  inform
ation	  betw
een	  policym
akers	  and	  the	  Internet	  com
m
unity.	  Exam
ples	  
here	  are	  issues	  concerning	  inappropriate	  usage	  of	  the	  Internet	  -­‐	  cybercrim
e	  and	  spam
	  being	  just	  tw
o	  exam
ples.
19.04.05
Peter	  Godw
in
ISO
C
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
The	  Internet	  Society	  believes	  that	  the	  best	  w
ay	  to	  extend	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  Internet	  is	  to	  build	  on	  those	  aspects	  that	  have	  w
orked	  w
ell	  -­‐	  e.g.	  the	  long	  established	  open,	  
distributed,	  consensus-­‐	  based	  processes	  and	  m
any	  regional	  forum
s	  for	  the	  developm
ent	  and	  adm
inistration	  of	  the	  Internet	  infrastructure.
19.04.05
Peter	  Godw
in
ISO
C
W
GIG	  critique
The	  Internet	  has	  a	  huge	  potential	  as	  an	  enabler	  bringing	  these	  benefits	  to	  people	  everyw
here	  and	  w
e	  rem
ain	  excited	  about	  the	  W
SIS	  m
ission.	  How
ever,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how
	  
W
GIG's	  actions	  to	  date	  have	  helped	  support	  achieving	  such	  goals.
19.04.05
Peter	  Godw
in
ISO
C
W
GIG	  critique
Also,	  m
any	  of	  W
GIG's	  prem
ises	  seem
	  to	  start	  w
ith	  an	  assum
ption	  that	  the	  Internet	  needs	  a	  hierarchical	  top-­‐dow
n	  governance	  m
odel,	  thereby	  ignoring	  the	  decentralised,	  
distributed	  structure	  on	  w
hich	  the	  Internet	  w
as	  so	  successfully	  built.	  N
ot	  only	  does	  this	  "governance	  hierarchy"	  m
odel	  prevent	  an	  accurate	  understanding	  of	  the	  Internet's	  
infrastructure	  and	  developm
ent	  (forcing	  key	  organisations	  to	  be	  classed	  in	  prescribed	  categories	  that	  do	  not	  fit	  w
ith	  the	  reality	  of	  their	  actions	  or	  their	  role	  in	  developing	  and	  
supporting	  the	  Internet)	  but	  it	  also	  w
ill	  very	  likely	  lead	  to	  conclusions	  that	  w
ill	  harm
	  the	  Internet's	  developm
ent	  and	  grow
th.
21.04.05
Jordan	  Carter
APTLD
n/a
his	  response	  paper	  is	  an	  effort	  to	  provide	  the	  W
GIG	  w
ith	  APTLD's	  perspective	  of	  the	  ccTLD-­‐related	  issues	  being	  discussed	  in	  this	  forum
.
22.04.05
U
N
ESCO
	  -­‐	  IFPAP
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
Participants	  to	  the	  round	  table	  recognize	  that	  alongside	  the	  obvious	  benefits	  of	  w
ider	  access	  to	  cyberspace	  only	  in	  the	  com
petence	  of	  the	  States	  the	  opportunity	  to	  create	  a	  legal	  
basis	  for	  protection	  of	  the	  population	  against	  the	  harm
ful	  contents	  lies	  by	  granting	  public	  access	  to	  the	  Internet.
22.04.05
U
N
ESCO
	  -­‐	  IFPAP
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
Participants	  of	  the	  round	  table	  note	  that	  the	  existing	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  the	  field	  of	  an	  infrastructural	  issues	  and	  the	  m
anagem
ent	  of	  critical	  Internet	  resources	  as	  a	  w
hole	  does	  not	  
cause	  any	  essential	  fears	  or	  problem
s.	  In	  this	  regard,	  participants	  to	  the	  round	  table	  believe	  it	  reasonable	  to	  m
aintain	  the	  status	  quo	  in	  the	  given	  area.
24.04.05
CEntr
expand	  participation
CEN
TR	  believes	  that	  transparency	  and	  dem
ocracy	  should	  be	  the	  m
ilestones	  of	  any	  coordination	  process	  at	  the	  Internet	  Governance	  level.	  W
e	  w
ould	  like	  to	  see	  an	  increased	  
dialogue	  am
ongst	  all	  Internet	  stakeholders	  and	  organisations	  such	  as	  ICAN
N
.
24.04.05
CEntr
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
The	  continued	  grow
th	  of	  the	  Internet	  can	  only	  be	  supported	  by	  em
phasising	  know
ledge	  and	  innovation,	  by	  im
proving	  synergies	  betw
een	  the	  relevant	  econom
ic,	  political	  and	  
social	  dim
ensions,	  and	  by	  rem
aining	  true	  to	  the	  "free	  spirit"	  of	  the	  Internet	  w
hich	  nurtured	  its	  grow
th	  to	  today.
28.04.05
Divina	  Frau-­‐M
eigs
CS	  Education	  TF
Internet	  users	  are	  stakeholders
Every	  citizen	  is	  a	  potential	  netizen	  and	  he/she	  should	  rightly	  understand	  how
	  the	  Internet	  w
orks	  since	  it	  is	  generating	  our	  know
ledge	  environm
ent.
28.04.05
M
ary	  Rundle
N
etDialogue
narrow
	  definition	  of	  IG
A	  decision	  for	  a	  consultative	  process	  should	  encourage	  a	  narrow
	  definition	  of	  the	  Internet.	  If	  the	  process	  is	  to	  treat	  other	  topics	  as	  w
ell	  (e.g.,	  intellectual	  property	  rights),	  its	  
m
andate	  should	  set	  this	  scope	  out	  clearly	  (e.g.,	  indicating	  that	  the	  scope	  includes	  uses	  of	  the	  Internet,	  etc.).	  In	  other	  w
ords,	  the	  m
andate	  should	  be	  clear	  in	  its	  term
inology,	  
distinguishing	  betw
een	  uses	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  "the	  Internet"	  per	  se.
13.05.05
Australia
Im
prove	  GAC
That	  does	  not	  m
ean	  governm
ents	  m
ay	  not	  w
ant	  a	  m
echanism
	  by	  w
hich	  ICAN
N
	  w
as	  further	  required	  to	  take	  account	  of	  countries'	  view
s	  (eg.	  the	  GAC	  or	  som
ething	  else).
13.05.05
Em
ily	  Taylor
N
om
inet	  U
K
M
Sim
	  excludes	  intergovernm
entalism
W
hilst	  w
e	  w
elcom
e	  this	  assurance,	  w
e	  recall	  M
r	  Allen	  M
iller's	  analysis	  that	  on	  a	  strict	  interpretation	  "m
ultilateral"	  and	  "m
ultistakeholder"	  are	  m
utually	  exclusive9.	  W
e	  
understand	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  intergovernm
ental	  organization	  a	  "m
ultilateral	  agreem
ent"	  m
eans	  an	  agreem
ent	  by	  governm
ents.	  How
ever,	  in	  the	  W
SIS	  declaration,	  w
e	  
take	  "m
ultilateralâ€¦	  m
anagem
ent"	  of	  the	  Internet10	  to	  m
ean	  "participated	  in	  by	  three	  or	  m
ore	  parties".	  W
e	  understand	  the	  W
SIS	  w
ording	  to	  be	  w
ide	  enough	  to	  encom
pass	  
m
odels	  such	  as	  ICAN
N
	  or	  the	  IETF.
13.05.05
Em
ily	  Taylor
N
om
inet	  U
K
Private	  sector	  leadership
W
e	  w
elcom
e	  the	  com
m
ent	  that	  "the	  overw
helm
ing	  m
ajority	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  actors	  have	  dem
onstrated	  their	  capability	  to	  fulfill	  their	  tasks	  and	  to	  m
ake	  their	  contribution	  to	  
the	  functioning	  of	  the	  Internet.	  W
ith	  regard	  to	  the	  practical	  m
anagem
ent	  there	  is	  no	  specific	  w
eakness	  in	  the	  system
"
13.05.05
Australia
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
In	  our	  view
,	  ICAN
N
,	  follow
ing	  reform
,	  should	  play	  an	  im
portant	  role	  in	  this	  regard.	  1	  This	  distinction	  is	  noted	  to	  accom
m
odate	  entities	  w
hich	  m
ay	  be	  fully	  or	  partially	  governm
ent-­‐
ow
ned	  but	  nevertheless	  operate	  on	  a	  com
m
ercial	  basis	  at	  arm
s	  length	  from
	  Governm
ent.
13.05.05
Em
ily	  Taylor
N
om
inet	  U
K
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
In	  our	  view
,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  strengths	  of	  the	  Internet	  to	  date	  is	  its	  distributed,	  decentralized	  nature.	  In	  this	  context,	  w
e	  believe	  that	  a	  "hierarchical	  top-­‐dow
n	  governance	  m
odel"2	  
w
ould	  be	  inappropriate,	  and	  in	  all	  probability,	  ineffective.
15.05.05
Francis	  M
uguet
W
GPCT
consider	  U
N
M
SP
e	  ask	  the	  W
GIG	  to	  assess	  the	  possibilities	  offered	  by	  the	  U
N
M
SP	  proposal	  to	  provide	  a	  w
ay	  to	  create	  suitable	  legal	  fram
ew
orks	  for	  Internet	  governance	  that	  w
ould	  be	  inclusive	  of	  
all	  stakeÂ-­‐holders,	  such	  as	  the	  Free	  Softw
are	  com
m
unity.
15.05.05
Francis	  M
uguet
W
GSI
consider	  U
N
M
SP
W
e	  w
ould	  like	  to	  bring	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  W
GIG,	  the	  U
N
M
SP	  proposal	  (	  see	  http://w
w
w
.unm
sp.org	  ),	  under	  the	  high	  patronage	  of	  H.E	  Adam
a	  Sam
assékou,	  that	  w
ould	  allow
	  
the	  flexible	  creation	  of	  M
ultiÂ-­‐Stakeholder	  partnerships	  that	  w
ould	  be	  equitable,	  transparent,	  inclusive	  and	  accountable	  before	  the	  U
nited	  N
ations.	  In	  particular,	  considering	  the	  
governance	  of	  the	  DO
I,	  and	  its	  relevance	  to	  Scientific	  Inform
ation,	  the	  funding	  institutions,	  the	  learned	  societies	  and	  the	  O
pen	  Access	  advocacy	  groups	  should	  be	  included	  as	  
stakeholders.
15.05.05
DEN
IC
Private	  sector	  leadership
he	  exceptionally	  successful	  developm
ent	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  particularly	  the	  Dom
ain	  N
am
e	  System
	  (DN
S)	  to	  date	  has	  been	  m
ade	  possible	  not	  by	  top	  dow
n	  (intergovernm
ental)	  
regulation	  but	  by	  bottom
	  up	  coordination	  and	  private	  initiative.	  I
455
15.05.05
DEN
IC
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
t	  is	  of	  param
ount	  im
portance	  to	  stay	  aw
are	  of	  this	  elem
entary	  insight	  as	  the	  considerations	  on	  Internet	  governance	  continue	  and	  focus	  shifts	  to	  details.	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  DEN
IC	  is	  
pleased	  w
ith	  and	  w
holeheartedly	  agrees	  to	  the	  W
GIG's	  statem
ents	  that	  Internet	  "governance"	  does	  not	  only	  and	  not	  necessarily	  at	  all	  m
eans	  "governm
ent	  activities"	  but	  im
plies	  
a	  new
	  kind	  of	  steerage	  by	  m
ultiple	  stakeholders,	  encom
passing	  both,	  the	  private	  and	  the	  public	  sector.
16.05.05
Daniel	  Dardailler
W
3C
separation	  technical/political
N
ational	  governm
ents	  and	  the	  U
nited	  N
ations	  should	  do	  w
hatever	  they	  can	  to	  help	  narrow
	  the	  gap	  betw
een	  the	  haves	  and	  the	  have-­‐nots	  for	  inform
ation	  access,	  just	  as	  for	  clean	  
w
ater	  and	  health	  care.	  Governm
ents	  should	  play	  an	  im
portant	  role	  as	  sponsors	  and	  users	  of	  the	  Internet	  technologies,	  but	  not	  as	  netw
ork	  architects.	  O
n	  the	  other	  hand,	  policy	  
m
akers	  w
orldw
ide	  should	  be	  aw
are	  of	  the	  ongoing	  evolution	  of	  open	  decentralized	  inform
ation	  netw
orks.
16.05.05
Daniel	  Dardailler
W
3C
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
N
ational	  and	  international	  regulatory	  structures	  supporting	  the	  use	  of	  Internet	  and	  W
eb	  technologies	  m
ust	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  potential	  im
pact	  of	  changes	  on	  the	  ongoing	  
evolution	  of	  open	  decentralized	  inform
ation	  netw
orks.	  If	  poorly	  im
plem
ented,	  such	  regulatory	  changes	  could	  stop	  or	  significantly	  slow
	  these	  unusually	  productive	  w
orldw
ide	  
technical	  innovations.	  Proposed	  Layer	  m
odel
26.05.05
ISrael
IPR	  critique
Another	  issue	  m
entioned	  in	  the	  paper,	  is	  that	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  can	  affect	  not	  only	  content,	  but	  the	  internet's	  infrastructure,	  both	  through	  the	  proliferation	  of	  
proprietary	  softw
are,	  and	  through	  private	  party's	  rights	  in	  various	  relevant	  standards.
26.05.05
ISrael
Private	  sector	  leadership
In	  fact,	  the	  Internet	  ow
es	  its	  robustness	  not	  to	  institutional	  governance,	  but	  the	  w
isdom
	  of	  those	  w
ith	  the	  pow
er	  to	  "govern"	  to	  allow
	  the	  Internet	  to	  develop	  w
ith	  a	  m
inim
um
	  of	  
outside	  intervention.
26.05.05
ISrael
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
For	  exam
ple,	  The	  Paper	  com
m
ents	  on	  ICAN
N
	  that	  "the	  very	  nature	  of	  this	  legal	  set	  up	  is	  the	  reason	  w
hy	  som
e	  hold	  the	  view
	  that	  ICAN
N
	  is	  in	  contradiction	  w
ith	  the	  W
SIS	  
criterion	  that	  recognizes	  policy	  authority	  for	  Internet-­‐related	  public	  policy	  issues	  as	  the	  sovereign	  right	  of	  States."	  Such	  a	  statem
ent	  can	  only	  be	  m
ade	  in	  disregard	  of	  an	  
assessm
ent	  of	  ICAN
N
	  in	  accordance	  w
ith	  the	  term
s	  of	  reference	  of	  the	  last	  sentence	  of	  Article	  48	  as	  w
ell	  as	  in	  disregard	  of	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  relevant	  Assessm
ent	  Report	  on	  
ICAN
N
.
31.05.05
AxelSal
Sociedad	  Inform
atica	  del	  N
orte
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
el	  GO
BIERN
O
	  DE	  IN
TERN
ET	  deberà¡	  sustentarse	  bà¡sicam
ente	  en	  un	  trabajo	  conjunto	  de	  la	  U
IT:	  que	  basa	  su	  trabajo	  en	  el	  principio	  de	  la	  cooperación	  entre	  gobiernos	  y	  sector	  
privado:
01.06.05
W
GIG
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
This	  forum
	  is	  envisaged	  as	  operating	  broadly	  according	  to	  the	  W
SIS	  criteria	  of	  transparency,	  dem
ocracy	  and	  w
ith	  the	  full	  participation	  of	  all	  stakeholders.	  The	  nature	  of	  this	  
forum
,	  as	  envisaged	  by	  different	  W
GIG	  m
em
bers,	  does	  not	  em
erge	  fully	  in	  answ
ers	  to	  this	  question	  alone	  so	  that	  this	  brief	  sum
m
ary	  also	  draw
s	  on	  the	  overall	  questionnaire	  
responses,	  in	  particular	  those	  in	  response	  to	  the	  questions	  relating	  to	  1	  of	  10	  the	  oversight	  function	  and	  the	  need	  to	  coordinate	  activities	  betw
een	  existing	  institutions.	  There	  is	  
no	  com
m
on	  view
	  of	  w
hat	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  proposed	  forum
	  should	  be	  and	  there	  is	  a	  w
ide	  spectrum
	  of	  opinions,	  ranging	  from
	  a	  very	  loosely	  structured	  discussion	  forum
	  to	  a	  
form
ally	  appointed	  'council'	  w
ith	  a	  very	  w
ide	  range	  of	  functions	  and	  oversight	  responsibilities,	  w
ith	  som
e	  preferring	  to	  see	  a	  'tw
o	  tier'	  com
bination	  of	  both.	  There	  is	  a	  range	  of	  
view
s	  concerning	  the	  possible	  functions	  of	  the	  forum
	  as	  follow
s.
01.06.05
W
GIG
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
a	  tw
o	  level	  structure	  w
ith	  an	  intergovernm
ental	  Council	  having	  executive	  authority	  and	  including	  representation	  from
	  other	  stakeholders	  and	  key	  organizations	  to	  provide	  policy	  
direction	  and	  oversight,	  and	  a	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  com
m
ittee	  to	  undertake	  coordination	  and	  m
ake	  recom
m
endations	  to	  the	  Council
01.06.05
W
GIG
Im
prove	  GAC
A	  num
ber	  of	  responses	  envisage	  oversight	  functions	  being	  carried	  out	  by	  a	  reform
ed	  or	  'evolved'	  Governm
ent	  Advisory	  Com
m
ittee	  of	  ICAN
N
	  (GAC),
01.06.05
W
GIG
non-­‐binding	  insitutions	  only
om
e	  see	  a	  possible	  role	  as	  being	  to	  provide	  non-­‐directive	  advice	  on	  best	  practice,	  sim
ilar	  to	  that	  played	  by	  the	  O
ECD	  for	  its	  m
em
bers.
01.06.05
W
GIG
U
N
	  oversight	  of	  the	  ICAN
N
Som
e	  responses	  envisage	  a	  m
ultilateral	  group	  w
hich	  w
ould	  take	  over	  the	  role	  of	  the	  U
S	  Departm
ent	  of	  Com
m
erce	  (DoC)	  in	  relation	  to	  ICAN
N
	  .
07.06.05
Ronda	  Hauben
ICAN
N
	  critique
he	  private	  organization	  that	  the	  U
.S.	  Governm
ent	  is	  asking	  to	  be	  form
ed	  is	  the	  opposite	  of	  protecting	  the	  Internet.	  It	  is	  encouraging	  the	  take	  over	  by	  a	  private,	  non	  accountable	  
corporate	  entity	  of	  the	  key	  Internet	  functions	  and	  of	  this	  International	  public	  resource.
08.06.05
African	  Group
creation	  of	  a	  policy-­‐m
aking	  institution
There	  w
as	  unanim
ity	  on	  the	  need	  for	  an	  additional	  body	  w
hich	  w
ould	  not	  only	  serve	  as	  a	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  discussion	  forum
,	  but	  w
ould	  also	  proffer	  policy	  advice	  albeit	  in	  a	  
participatory	  m
anner.	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  the	  participants	  the	  w
orld	  needed	  a	  m
ore	  dem
ocratic	  representativeness	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  Internet	  Governance.
08.06.05
Em
ily	  Taylor
N
om
inet	  U
K
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
If	  an	  additional	  body	  or	  arrangem
ent	  w
ere	  created,	  it	  should	  be	  a	  very	  loosely	  structured	  discussion	  forum
,	  w
ith	  an	  open	  and	  inclusive	  m
em
bership,	  in	  w
hich	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholders	  
can	  participate	  on	  an	  equal	  footing.
08.06.05
Em
ily	  Taylor
N
om
inet	  U
K
Im
prove	  GAC
N
o.	  How
ever,	  like	  the	  ICC,	  w
e	  w
ould	  encourage	  participation	  in	  the	  GAC	  by	  m
ore	  governm
ents,	  and	  w
ith	  higher-­‐level	  participation.
08.06.05
Harris	  M
iller
ITAA
Im
prove	  GAC
At	  the	  sam
e	  tim
e,	  the	  GAC	  today	  is	  in	  an	  evolutionary	  process.	  Given	  its	  relatively	  short	  period	  of	  existence,	  it	  m
ay	  not	  yet	  be	  operating	  at	  its	  full	  potential.	  Participation	  by	  
governm
ents	  m
ust	  continue	  to	  develop.	  It	  is	  not	  alw
ays	  the	  sam
e	  individuals	  participating	  from
	  m
eeting	  to	  m
eeting,	  yet	  it	  m
ust	  be	  recognized	  that	  the	  GAC	  continues	  to	  grow
.	  It	  
appears	  that	  the	  GAC	  w
ill	  further	  strengthen	  its	  role	  and	  involvem
ent	  in	  ICAN
N
	  through	  continued	  outreach	  and	  encouragem
ent	  for	  participation	  from
	  m
ore	  countries	  coupled	  
w
ith	  increasing	  attendance	  by	  m
ore	  senior	  governm
ent	  officials.	  ITAA	  supports	  these	  trends.
08.06.05
Em
ily	  Taylor
N
om
inet	  U
K
non-­‐binding	  insitutions	  only
If	  an	  additional	  body	  or	  arrangem
ent	  w
ere	  created,	  it	  should	  give	  non-­‐directive	  advice	  on	  best	  practice.
08.06.05
African	  Group
question	  the	  U
S	  oversight	  of	  ICAN
N
he	  general	  consensus	  w
as	  that	  the	  proposed	  new
	  body	  should	  not	  only	  take	  over	  the	  Governm
ental	  oversight	  functions	  of	  the	  DN
S	  and	  root	  server	  system
	  adm
inistration,	  but	  all	  
other	  areas	  of	  activity	  under	  the	  oversight	  of	  the	  U
SG.	  This	  oversight	  function	  through	  this	  new
	  body	  should	  not	  only	  be	  applicable	  to	  ICAN
N
,	  after	  the	  term
ination	  of	  the	  M
oU
	  in	  
2006,	  but	  also	  post	  2006.
08.06.05
Em
ily	  Taylor
N
om
inet	  U
K
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
N
o.	  W
e	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  such	  a	  body	  is	  necessary.	  The	  Internet	  is	  distributed	  and	  decentralized	  in	  nature,	  and	  is	  not	  am
enable	  to	  centralized	  control.	  M
oreover,	  w
e	  believe	  
that	  the	  existing	  institutions	  w
hich	  variously	  carry	  out	  Internet	  governance	  functions	  are	  sufficient,	  albeit	  that	  no	  institution	  is	  perfect,	  and	  all	  could	  benefit	  from
	  im
provem
ent.
08.06.05
Harris	  M
iller
ITAA
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
n	  sum
m
ary,	  ITAA	  opposes	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new
	  body.	  There	  has	  been	  no	  fact-­‐based	  case	  m
ade	  for	  its	  need,	  and	  considering	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  CTO
	  report,	  it	  w
ould	  likely	  fail	  
to	  achieve	  its	  objective.	  Instead,	  efforts	  should	  be	  m
ade	  to	  im
prove	  existing	  organizations.	  The	  resources	  that	  w
ould	  have	  been	  spent	  in	  participating	  in	  yet	  another	  organization	  
should	  be	  put	  to	  m
ore	  m
eaningful	  use	  im
plem
enting	  the	  recom
m
endations	  of	  the	  num
erous	  organizations	  already	  involved	  w
ith	  the	  Internet.
09.06.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
question	  the	  U
S	  oversight	  of	  ICAN
N
n	  an	  em
ergency	  situation,	  for	  exam
ple	  if	  ICAN
N
	  goes	  into	  bankruptcy,	  it	  should	  have	  the	  role	  of	  providing	  financial	  support.	  How
ever,	  governm
ental	  oversight	  should	  stand	  aside	  
ICAN
N
's	  daily	  operation.
09.06.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
N
o,	  in	  principle	  there	  isn't	  need	  for	  an	  additional	  arrangem
ent	  nor	  body.
14.06.05
Anthony	  Hill
South	  Centre
broad	  definition	  of	  IG
As	  recognised,	  governance	  of	  the	  DN
S	  (The	  Dom
ain	  N
am
e	  System
)	  is	  but	  one	  part	  of	  Internet	  Governance.	  It	  is	  not	  all-­‐em
bracing	  of	  Internet	  Governance.	  The	  question	  arises	  
w
hether	  ICAN
N
's	  role	  should	  then	  be	  m
ore	  narrow
ly	  defined	  to	  deal	  w
ith	  the	  N
am
es	  and	  N
am
ing	  System
	  and	  the	  navigation	  over	  the	  Internet	  through	  The	  DN
S	  Technical	  
System
?
456
14.06.05
Brazil
broad	  definition	  of	  IG
THE	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  ISSU
E	  IN
VO
LVES	  CHALLEN
GES	  THAT	  GO
	  BEYO
N
D	  ICAN
N
'S	  M
AN
DATE.	  SEVERAL	  TO
PICS	  ARE	  N
O
T	  TREATED	  BY	  IT,	  N
O
T	  CO
N
TEM
PLATED	  IN
	  AN
Y	  O
THER	  EXISTIN
G	  
FO
RU
M
.
14.06.05
Brazil
creation	  of	  a	  policy-­‐m
aking	  institution
This	  structure	  should	  include	  an	  exclusively	  governm
ental	  decision-­‐	  m
aking	  instance,
14.06.05
Brazil
creation	  of	  a	  policy-­‐m
aking	  institution
THIS	  STRU
CTU
RE	  SHO
U
LD	  IN
CLU
DE	  AN
	  EXCLU
SIVELY	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  DECISIO
N
-­‐M
AKIN
G	  IN
STAN
CE	  TO
	  DEAL	  W
ITH	  ISSU
ES	  PERTAIN
IN
G	  TO
	  THE	  N
ATIO
N
S'	  SO
VEREIGN
TY.
14.06.05
China
creation	  of	  a	  policy-­‐m
aking	  institution
HO
W
EVER,	  IN
	  DECISIO
N
-­‐M
AKIN
G,	  EACH	  STATE	  SHO
U
LD	  HAVE	  O
N
E	  VO
TE.	  PRIVATE	  SECTO
R	  AN
D	  THE	  CIVIL	  SO
CIETY	  AN
D	  O
THER
14.06.05
Ghana
creation	  of	  a	  policy-­‐m
aking	  institution
U
T	  N
U
M
BER	  O
N
E,	  REGARDIN
G	  FO
RU
M
	  FU
N
CTIO
N
,	  THERE	  W
AS	  U
N
AN
IM
ITY	  FO
R	  THE	  N
EED	  FO
R	  AN
	  ADDITIO
N
AL	  BO
DY	  W
HICH	  W
O
U
LD	  N
O
T	  O
N
LY	  SERVE	  AS	  A	  
M
U
LTISTAKEHO
LDER	  DISCU
SSIO
N
	  FO
RU
M
	  BU
T	  ALSO
	  PRO
FFER	  PO
LICY	  ADVICE	  IN
	  A	  PARTICIPATO
RY	  M
AN
N
ER.	  ACCO
RDIN
G	  TO
	  THE	  PARTICIPAN
TS,	  THE	  W
O
RLD	  N
EEDED	  A	  M
O
RE	  
DEM
O
CRATIC	  REPRESEN
TATIVEN
ESS	  AT	  THE	  LEVEL	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE.
14.06.05
India
creation	  of	  a	  policy-­‐m
aking	  institution
THIS	  N
EW
	  BO
DY	  CAN
	  BE	  CHARGED	  W
ITH	  THE	  M
AN
AGEM
EN
T	  O
F	  PU
BLIC	  PO
LICY	  ISSU
ES	  RELATED	  TO
	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE.	  M
AN
AGEM
EN
T	  O
F	  IN
TERN
ET	  ADDRESS	  SPACE	  IS	  
O
N
LY	  O
N
E	  SU
CH	  ISSU
E.	  W
HAT	  N
EEDS	  TO
	  BE	  EM
PHASIZED	  IS	  THAT	  THE	  DELIBERATIO
N
S	  O
F	  SU
CH	  A	  BO
DY	  ARE	  N
O
T	  O
N
LY	  TRAN
SPAREN
T,	  IN
CLU
SIVE,	  AN
D	  DEM
O
CRATIC,	  BU
T	  ARE	  
ALSO
	  SEEN
	  AN
D	  PERCEIVED	  AS	  SU
CH.	  AN
D	  THEY	  ARE	  BASED	  O
N
	  FU
LL	  IN
VO
LVEM
EN
T	  O
F	  THE	  GO
VERN
M
EN
T,	  PRIVATE	  SECTO
R,	  CIVIL	  SO
CIETY,	  AN
D	  IN
TERN
ATIO
N
AL	  
O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S.
14.06.05
Pakistan
creation	  of	  a	  policy-­‐m
aking	  institution
FO
U
R,	  HAVE	  A	  DECISIO
N
-­‐M
AKIN
G	  M
ECHAN
ISM
	  THAT	  CO
U
LD	  BE	  ACTIVATED	  W
HEN
	  N
ECESSARY.	  BASED	  O
N
	  THE	  M
ATERIAL	  PO
STED	  O
N
	  THE	  W
GIG	  W
EB	  SITE,	  W
E	  RECO
GN
IZE	  THE	  
EXISTEN
CE	  O
F	  A	  W
IDE	  RAN
GE	  O
F	  VIEW
S	  O
N
	  W
HETHER	  AN
D	  HO
W
	  THE	  N
EW
	  BO
DY	  FO
R	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  SET	  U
P.
14.06.05
El	  Salvador
creation	  of	  a	  policy-­‐m
aking	  institution
SO
	  M
Y	  DELEGATIO
N
	  BELIEVES	  THAT	  W
E	  SHO
U
LD	  W
O
RK	  TO
W
ARDS	  AGREEM
EN
TS	  W
HICH	  W
O
U
LD	  EN
ABLE	  EQ
U
ITABLE	  GEO
GRAPHICAL	  PARTICIPATIO
N
,	  BO
TH	  IN
	  THE	  GO
VERN
IN
G	  
BO
DY	  AN
D	  IN
	  A	  CO
M
M
ITTEE	  W
HICH	  W
O
U
LD	  U
N
DERTAKE	  M
O
N
ITO
RIN
G	  FU
N
CTIO
N
S	  FO
R	  ICAN
N
.
14.06.05
Art	  Reilly
ICC
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
onetheless,	  there	  m
ay,	  in	  som
e	  cases,	  be	  benefits	  from
	  a	  "forum
	  function"	  that	  could	  be	  offered	  by	  a	  discussion	  forum
	  w
here	  public	  policy	  issues	  and	  concerns	  of	  any	  
stakeholder	  could	  be	  heard	  and,	  discussed	  openly.
14.06.05
Brazil
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
A	  Global	  Internet	  Governance	  Coordination	  Forum
	  ought	  to	  be	  created.	  This	  Forum
	  should	  be	  autonom
ous	  independent	  and	  based	  on	  an	  international	  treaty	  that	  guarantees	  
the	  required	  legitim
acy,	  and	  established	  in	  conform
ity	  w
ith	  the	  principles	  of	  m
ultilateralism
,	  dem
ocracy,	  transparency,	  and	  m
ultistakeholder.
14.06.05
Paul	  Tw
om
ey
ICAN
N
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
View
	  s	  are	  different	  w
ithin	  and	  betw
een	  the	  various	  stakeholder	  groups.	  It	  seem
s	  therefore	  reasonable	  to	  us	  that	  a	  continued	  discussion	  platform
	  directed	  to	  th	  e	  full	  range	  of	  
issues	  is	  useful.
14.06.05
M
ary	  Rundle
N
etDialogue
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
In	  short,	  the	  W
orking	  Group	  could	  propel	  transparency	  and	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder	  input	  by	  creating	  a	  forum
	  through	  w
hich	  intergovernm
ental	  organizations	  w
ould	  consolidate	  
inform
ation	  and	  harness	  public	  input.
14.06.05
Brazil
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
A	  GLO
BAL	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  CO
O
RDIN
ATIO
N
	  FO
RU
M
	  O
U
GHT	  TO
	  BE	  CREATED.	  THIS	  FO
RU
M
	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  AU
TO
N
O
M
O
U
S,	  IN
DEPEN
DEN
T,	  AN
D	  BASED	  O
N
	  AN
	  
IN
TERN
ATIO
N
AL	  TREATY	  THAT	  GU
ARAN
TEES	  THE	  REQ
U
IRED	  LEGITIM
ACY	  AN
D	  ESTABLISHED	  IN
	  CO
N
FO
RM
AN
CE	  W
ITH	  THE	  PRIN
CIPLES	  O
F	  M
U
LTILATERALISM
,	  DEM
O
CRACY,	  
TRAN
SPAREN
CY,	  AN
D	  M
U
LTISTAKEHO
LDER.	  BASIC	  ASSU
M
PTIO
N
S	  FO
R	  THE	  CREATIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  FO
RU
M
.
14.06.05
Art	  Reilly
ICC
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
THERE	  M
AY	  BE,	  IN
	  SO
M
E	  CASES,	  BEN
EFITS	  FRO
M
	  A	  FO
RU
M
	  FU
N
CTIO
N
	  THAT	  CO
U
LD	  BE	  O
FFERED	  BY	  A	  DISCU
SSIO
N
	  FO
RU
M
	  W
HERE	  PU
BLIC-­‐PO
LICY	  ISSU
ES	  AN
D	  CO
N
CERN
S	  O
F	  
AN
Y	  STAKEHO
LDER	  CO
U
LD	  BE	  HEARD	  AN
D	  DISCU
SSED	  O
PEN
LY.	  THU
S,	  THE	  ICC	  M
EM
BERS	  HAVE	  RESPO
N
DED	  W
ITH	  A	  CO
N
DITIO
N
AL	  YES	  TO
	  THE	  N
EED	  FO
R	  A	  DISCU
SSIO
N
	  FO
RU
M
	  
FU
N
CTIO
N
.
14.06.05
M
arilyn	  Cade
N
etDialogue
creation	  of	  an	  IGF
IN
	  SHO
RT,	  THE	  W
O
RKIN
G	  GRO
U
P	  CO
U
LD	  PRO
PEL	  TRAN
SPAREN
CY	  AN
D	  M
U
LTISTAKEHO
LDER	  IN
PU
T	  BY	  CREATIN
G	  A	  FO
RU
M
	  THRO
U
GH	  W
HICH	  IN
TERGO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  
O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S	  W
O
U
LD	  CO
N
SO
LIDATE	  IN
FO
RM
ATIO
N
	  AN
D	  HARN
ESS	  PU
BLIC	  IN
PU
T.
14.06.05
China
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
O
N
E	  IS	  THAT	  IN
	  SU
CH	  PU
BLIC	  PO
LICY	  AREAS	  W
HERE	  THERE	  IS	  N
O
	  IN
TERGO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  M
AN
AGEM
EN
T	  -­‐-­‐	  IN
TERGO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  AGEN
CY	  M
AN
DATE	  -­‐-­‐	  FO
R	  IN
STAN
CE,	  SPAM
,	  
N
ETW
O
RK	  SECU
RITY,	  AN
D	  CYBERSPACE	  -­‐-­‐	  W
E	  SHO
U
LD	  LO
O
K	  FO
R	  AN
	  APPRO
PRIATE	  SPECIALIZED	  AGEN
CY	  O
F	  THE	  U
N
ITED	  N
ATIO
N
S	  AS	  A	  CO
M
PETEN
T	  BO
DY.
14.06.05
Syria
creation	  of	  an	  intergovernem
ental	  forum
IT	  BECAM
E	  Q
U
ITE	  CLEAR	  IN
	  THE	  FIRST	  PHASE	  THAT	  THERE	  IS	  AN
	  ABSO
LU
TE	  N
EED	  TO
	  SO
LVE	  SO
M
E	  PRO
BLEM
S	  AN
D	  DEAL	  W
ITH	  THEM
	  AT	  THE	  LEVEL	  O
F	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS,	  
W
ITHO
U
T	  HAM
PERIN
G	  FREEDO
M
	  O
F	  M
O
VEM
EN
T	  O
F	  IN
FO
RM
ATIO
N
	  AN
D	  W
ITHO
U
T	  PREJU
DICE	  TO
	  THE	  RIGHT	  O
F	  EVERY	  IN
DIVIDU
AL	  TO
	  HAVE	  ACCESS	  TO
	  IN
FO
RM
ATIO
N
	  AT	  THE	  
LEAST	  CO
ST.
14.06.05
China
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
THIS	  AGEN
CY	  CO
U
LD	  BE	  PRO
VIDED	  BY	  THE	  EXISTIN
G	  SU
BSIDIARY	  BO
DIES	  O
F	  THE	  U
N
ITED	  N
ATIO
N
S:	  FO
R	  IN
STAN
CE,	  ITU
.
14.06.05
U
N
ESCAP
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
THE	  CO
N
FEREN
CE	  FELT	  THE	  ITU
	  SHO
U
LD	  PLAY	  A	  GLO
BAL	  CO
O
RDIN
ATIN
G	  RO
LE	  IN
	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  ISSU
ES.
14.06.05
Syria
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
THAT	  IS	  130	  YEARS	  AGO
.	  W
E	  CAN
	  SEE	  THAT	  THE	  PRIVATE	  SECTO
R,	  W
ITH	  ALL	  ITS	  CO
M
PO
N
EN
TS,	  W
O
RKS	  AT	  THE	  ITO
	  PARTICIPATES,	  AT	  THE	  ITU
,	  AN
D	  HAS	  CLEAR	  RIGHTS.	  AN
D	  
THESE	  RIGHTS	  ARE	  CO
N
TAIN
ED	  IN
	  THE	  CO
N
STITU
TIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  ITU
.
14.06.05
Syria
enhance	  role	  of	  the	  ITU
	  in	  IG
W
E	  ALSO
	  APPRECIATE	  W
HAT	  W
AS	  SAID	  BY	  THE	  REPRESEN
TATIVE	  O
F	  GHAN
A	  O
N
	  BEHALF	  O
F	  THE	  AFRICAN
	  GRO
U
P	  W
HO
	  SAID	  THAT	  THE	  ITU
	  HAS	  A	  RO
LE	  TO
	  PLAY.	  W
E	  CO
N
SIDER	  
THAT	  THE	  CO
N
STITU
TIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  ITU
,	  THE	  CO
N
VEN
TIO
N
	  ALSO
	  O
F	  THE	  ITU
,	  IN
CLU
DE	  THE	  N
ECESSARY	  TEXT	  AN
D	  PRO
VISIO
N
S	  TO
	  ALLO
W
	  FO
R	  THE	  ITU
	  -­‐-­‐	  TO
	  ALLO
W
	  THE	  ITU
	  TO
	  
PLAY	  A	  M
AJO
R	  RO
LE	  THAT	  W
O
U
LD	  BE	  CO
M
PLEM
EN
TED	  BY	  THE	  U
N
ESCO
	  AS	  CO
N
CERN
S	  THE	  CO
N
TEN
T	  AN
D	  THE	  DEFEN
SE	  O
F	  CU
LTU
RAL	  RIGHTS	  AN
D	  LAN
GU
AGE	  RIGHTS	  AN
D	  
THE	  RIGHTS	  O
F	  ALL	  TO
	  ACCESS	  IN
FO
RM
ATIO
N
,	  AS	  W
ELL	  AS	  THE	  THIRD	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
,	  W
HICH	  IS	  W
IPO
,	  W
HICH	  W
O
U
LD	  RESO
LVE	  ALL	  PRO
BLEM
S	  RESU
LTIN
G	  FRO
M
	  THE	  U
SE	  O
F	  
THE	  IN
TERN
ET.
14.06.05
Lee	  How
ard
ICAN
N
-­‐ASO
expand	  participation
THAT	  IS	  THE	  CLARIFICATIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  RO
LE	  O
F	  N
ATIO
N
AL	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  IN
	  THE	  PO
LICIES	  FO
R	  THE	  ALLO
CATIO
N
	  O
F	  IP	  ADDRESSES.	  IT	  IS	  FAIR	  TO
	  SAY	  THAT	  SO
M
E	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  
AN
D	  CIVIL	  SO
CIETY	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S	  FEEL	  IN
SU
FFICIEN
TLY	  IN
VO
LVED	  IN
	  THE	  PRO
CESS	  O
F	  DEVELO
PIN
G	  PO
LICIES	  FO
R	  IN
TERN
ET	  ADDRESSIN
G,	  AN
D	  FO
R	  W
HATEVER	  REASO
N
,	  
GEN
ERALLY	  DO
N
'T	  PARTICIPATE	  IN
	  THE	  EXISTIN
G	  PRO
CESSES.
14.06.05
Lee	  How
ard
ICAN
N
-­‐ASO
expand	  participation
EACH	  O
F	  THE	  IN
DIVIDU
AL	  RIRS	  DO
	  ACCO
RDIN
G	  TO
	  THE	  PU
BLIC	  PO
LICIES.	  PERHAPS	  M
O
RE	  THAN
	  AN
Y	  O
THER	  STRU
CTU
RE	  THE	  RIRS	  EM
BO
DY	  DEM
O
CRATIC	  PRIN
CIPLES,	  
ALLO
W
IN
G	  PARTICIPATIO
N
	  BY	  AN
YO
N
E.
14.06.05
Paul	  Tw
om
ey
ICAN
N
expand	  participation
ADDITIO
N
ALLY,	  DEVELO
PIN
G	  CO
U
N
TRY	  PARTICIPATIO
N
	  FRO
M
	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  TO
	  PRIVATE	  SECTO
R	  AN
D	  CIVIL	  SO
CIETY	  IS	  O
F	  GREAT	  IM
PO
RTAN
CE.	  THE	  IM
PO
RTAN
CE	  O
F	  
PARTICIPATIO
N
	  BY	  ALL	  REGIO
N
S	  O
F	  THE	  W
O
RLD	  IS	  N
O
T	  O
N
LY	  AN
	  ISSU
E	  FO
R	  ICAN
N
	  BU
T	  FO
R	  AN
Y	  ISSU
E	  O
F	  IN
TERN
ATIO
N
AL	  IM
PO
RTAN
CE.
14.06.05
U
N
DP-­‐ADPIP
expand	  participation
Finally,	  m
eaningful	  participation	  from
	  developing	  countries	  in	  Internet	  Governance	  m
ust	  be	  developed.	  This	  is	  a	  com
plex	  challenge	  requiring	  both	  developm
ent	  of	  capacity	  to	  
participate	  in	  these	  countries,	  and	  a	  reform
	  of
457
14.06.05
Alejandro	  Pisanty
W
GIG
fragm
entation	  of	  governance
IS	  THAT	  M
O
RE	  THAN
	  A	  PRO
VEN
	  N
EED	  FO
R	  A	  SIN
GLE	  ALL-­‐EN
CO
M
PASSIN
G	  FO
RU
M
,	  W
HAT	  APPEARS	  IN
	  THE	  LAN
DSCAPE	  IN
	  THE	  FU
TU
RE	  IS	  THE	  N
EED	  FO
R	  SPECIFIC	  FO
RU
M
S	  FO
R	  
ISSU
E-­‐SPECIFIC	  DEVELO
PM
EN
T.	  I	  W
O
N
'T	  SAY	  EVEN
	  M
ECHAN
ISM
S	  O
R	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S	  BU
T	  W
AYS	  O
F	  DEALIN
G	  W
ITH	  SPAM
,	  W
AYS	  O
F	  DEALIN
G	  W
ITH	  CYBERCRIM
E,	  W
AYS	  O
F	  
DEALIN
G	  W
ITH	  THE	  M
AN
Y	  O
THER	  PU
BLIC	  PO
LICY	  RELATED	  ISSU
ES	  THAT	  W
E	  HAVE	  ALREADY	  LO
O
KED	  AT	  IN
	  THE	  GRO
U
P.
14.06.05
W
SIS	  Gender	  Caucus
gender	  issues	  m
ust	  be	  addressed
W
e	  further	  request	  that	  the	  W
GIG	  consider	  gender	  balance	  as	  a	  fundam
ental	  issue	  in	  its	  ongoing	  assessm
ent	  of	  Internet	  Governance	  m
echanism
s	  (current	  and	  future),	  w
ith	  the	  
aim
	  of	  equal	  representation	  of	  w
om
en	  and	  m
en	  at	  all	  levels	  in	  any	  and	  all	  governance	  m
echanism
s	  proposed	  by	  the	  W
GIG.
14.06.05
Brazil
ICAN
N
	  critique
W
HAT	  I'M
	  TRYIN
G	  TO
	  SAY,	  M
R.	  CHAIRM
AN
,	  IS	  THAT	  THERE	  IS	  A	  LACK	  O
F	  LEGITIM
ACY	  IN
	  THE	  SYSTEM
.
14.06.05
India
ICAN
N
	  critique
THE	  SECO
N
D	  ISSU
E,	  SIR,	  W
AS	  THE	  ISSU
E	  O
F	  LEGITIM
ACY.	  AS	  I	  M
EN
TIO
N
ED	  IN
	  THE	  M
O
RN
IN
G	  AN
D	  O
U
R	  CO
LLEAGU
E	  FRO
M
	  BRAZIL	  EXPLICITLY	  IN
DICATED,	  AN
Y	  M
ECHAN
ISM
,	  
HO
W
EVER	  GO
O
D,	  IF	  LACKIN
G	  LEGITIM
ACY,	  O
R	  I	  W
ILL	  SAY	  PO
SSIBLE	  LEGITIM
ACY,	  I	  W
ILL	  N
O
T	  EVEN
	  SAY	  LEGITIM
ACY	  PER	  SE,	  BECAU
SE	  THAT	  ALSO
	  IS	  A	  CO
N
CEPT	  DIFFEREN
T	  TO
	  
DIFFEREN
T	  PEO
PLE,	  PRO
BABLY	  IS	  -­‐-­‐	  CO
U
LD	  BE	  CO
N
SIDERED	  TO
	  BE	  SU
PPLAN
TED	  W
ITH	  THE	  CO
N
CEPT	  O
F	  A	  FO
RU
M
	  O
R	  A	  BO
DY	  O
R	  A	  M
ECHAN
ISM
	  W
HICH	  IS	  PRESU
M
ED	  TO
	  BE	  
LEGITIM
ATE.
14.06.05
Brazil
ICAN
N
	  critique
AN
D	  Q
U
O
TIN
G,	  O
N
	  JU
N
E	  THE	  1ST,	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  CO
RPO
RATIO
N
	  FO
R	  ASSIGN
ED	  N
AM
ES	  AN
D	  N
U
M
BERS,	  ICAN
N
,	  THE	  PRIVATE	  SECTO
R	  GRO
U
P	  THAT	  M
AN
AGES	  THE	  DO
M
AIN
	  
N
AM
E	  SYSTEM
	  APPRO
VED	  A	  TRIPLE	  X	  AS	  A	  W
EB	  SERVICE.	  AFTER	  ICAN
N
	  AGREES	  O
N
	  CO
N
TRACT	  TERM
S	  W
ITH	  ICM
	  REGISTRY,	  AN
	  AM
ERICAN
	  CO
M
PAN
Y,	  THAT	  W
E	  REN
DER	  THE	  
BACK-­‐EN
D	  REGISTRATIO
N
,	  TRIPLE	  X	  SITE	  W
ILL	  SPRO
U
T	  O
N
	  THE	  GLO
BAL	  IN
TERN
ET.	  THE	  IDEA	  IS	  CO
N
TRO
VERSIAL.	  IT	  W
AS	  M
ADE	  W
ITH	  LITTLE	  PU
BLIC	  DISCU
SSIO
N
,	  LEAVIN
G	  SO
M
E	  
TO
	  W
O
N
DER	  ABO
U
T	  THE	  W
AY	  ICAN
N
	  DO
LES	  O
U
T	  N
AM
ES.	  EN
D	  O
F	  Q
U
O
TE.
14.06.05
Carlos	  Afonso
W
GIG
ICAN
N
	  critique
THIS	  IS	  A	  PO
IN
T	  I	  M
U
ST	  KIN
DLY	  ASK	  THE	  ICAN
N
-­‐RELATED	  PEO
PLE	  TO
	  KEEP	  THIS	  IN
	  M
IN
D	  W
HEN
	  CO
N
FRO
N
TIN
G	  THEIR	  W
O
RKIN
G	  W
ELL,	  DO
N
'T	  FIX	  IT	  ARGU
M
EN
TS	  AGAIN
ST	  THE	  
O
VERW
HELM
IN
G,	  FAR	  BRO
ADER	  AN
D	  CO
M
PLEX	  REALITY	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  IN
	  THE	  CO
N
TEXT	  O
F	  REAL	  LIFE.	  THAN
K	  YO
U
,	  M
R.	  CHAIRM
AN
.
14.06.05
China
IGF	  not	  sufficient
AT	  PRESEN
T,	  W
GIG	  ASSU
M
ES	  SU
CH	  A	  RO
LE	  TO
	  A	  CERTAIN
	  EXTEN
T:	  HO
W
EVER,	  W
E	  VIEW
	  THAT	  M
ERELY	  A	  FO
RU
M
	  IS	  N
O
T	  SU
FFICIEN
T.
14.06.05
Paul	  Tw
om
ey
ICAN
N
Im
prove	  GAC
IT	  IS	  IM
PO
RTAN
T	  TO
	  N
O
TE	  THAT	  ICAN
N
	  BO
ARD	  DECISIO
N
S	  ARE	  M
ADE	  AFTER	  FU
LL	  CO
N
SU
LTATIO
N
	  PRO
CESSES	  W
ITH	  ALL	  ITS	  STAKEHO
LDERS,	  IN
CLU
DIN
G	  THE	  -­‐-­‐	  ESPECIALLY	  THE	  
GAC.	  SIGN
IFICAN
T	  PRO
CESSES	  O
FTEN
	  TAKE	  O
VER	  18	  M
O
N
THS	  FO
R	  FU
LLY	  TRAN
SPAREN
T	  CO
N
SU
LTATIO
N
S	  IN
	  W
HICH	  ALL	  PARTIES	  HAVE	  THE	  O
PPO
RTU
N
ITY	  TO
	  PARTICIPATE,	  
IN
CLU
DIN
G	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS.
14.06.05
Axel	  Paw
lik
N
RO
Im
prove	  GAC
TW
O
,	  PU
BLIC-­‐SECTO
R	  PARTICIPATIO
N
,	  ICAN
N
,	  PARTICU
LARLY,	  HAS	  EXPRESSED	  FO
R	  THE	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  ADVISO
RY	  CO
M
M
ITTEE	  HAS	  CLEARLY	  N
O
T	  O
PERATED	  TO
	  THE	  
SATISFACTIO
N
	  O
F	  ALL	  PARTIES.
14.06.05
U
N
ESCAP
Internet	  as	  a	  global	  public	  resource
THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  HAS	  BECO
M
E	  A	  PU
BLIC	  GO
O
D
14.06.05
O
xford	  Internet	  Institute
Internet	  exceptionalism
At	  the	  sam
e	  tim
e,	  any	  new
	  governance	  fr	  am
ew
ork	  has	  to	  take	  into	  account	  that	  the	  Internet	  itself	  is	  constantly	  changing.	  Flexibility	  is	  thus	  im
perative	  in	  both	  dim
ensions.	  It	  
w
ould	  be	  'un-­‐Internet-­‐	  like'	  if	  one	  w
ere	  to	  presum
e	  that	  the	  governance	  system
	  that	  w
orked	  w
ell	  fo	  r	  the	  netw
ork	  at	  one	  stage	  should	  rem
ain	  constant	  despite	  differences	  in	  
uses,	  num
ber	  of	  users	  and	  im
portance	  of	  the	  netw
ork.	  Likew
ise,	  any	  fram
ew
ork	  for	  Intern	  et	  governance	  m
ust	  not	  hinder	  experim
entation	  and	  innovation,	  so	  that	  the	  netw
ork	  
can	  evolve	  in	  the	  unpredictable	  w
ays	  that	  users	  w
ill	  ultim
ately	  take	  it.
14.06.05
Vittorio	  Bertola
W
GIG
Internet	  exceptionalism
AN
D	  SO
	  W
E	  BELIEVE	  THAT	  TO
	  TRY	  TO
	  DISTIN
GU
ISH	  TO
O
	  SHARPLY	  TECHN
ICAL	  FRO
M
	  PO
LICY	  W
O
U
LD	  DEN
U
DE	  THE	  DIRECTIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  AN
D	  THE	  IM
PO
RTAN
CE	  THAT	  IT	  
HAS	  FO
R	  PU
BLICS	  ACRO
SS	  THE	  W
O
RLD
14.06.05
Raul	  Echebarria
W
GIG
Internet	  exceptionalism
BU
T	  U
N
DER	  THE	  U
N
ITED	  N
ATIO
N
S	  FRAM
EW
O
RK,	  AN
D	  I	  THIN
K	  IT'S	  Q
U
ITE	  EXTRAO
RDIN
ARY	  THAT	  W
E'RE	  TO
GETHER	  W
ITH	  REPRESEN
TATIVES	  O
F	  ALL	  CO
U
N
TRIES	  TAKIN
G	  THE	  
FLO
O
R,	  REPLYIN
G,	  LISTEN
IN
G,	  SPEAKIN
G.	  W
E'RE	  HEARIN
G	  EACH	  O
THER'S	  O
PIN
IO
N
S.	  W
E	  HAVE	  SIM
U
LTAN
EO
U
S	  IN
TERPRETATIO
N
	  W
ITH	  THE	  SCRIPT	  O
N
	  THE	  SCREEN
	  AS	  W
ELL.	  
AN
D	  FO
R	  M
AN
Y	  O
F	  U
S	  W
O
RKIN
G	  O
N
	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET,	  THESE	  ARE	  N
O
RM
AL	  THIN
GS,	  Q
U
ITE	  CU
STO
M
ARY.	  THIS	  PU
BLIC	  CO
M
M
EN
TARY	  O
N
	  IN
TERN
ET	  IS	  -­‐-­‐	  THIS	  IS	  A	  FIN
AL	  
REFLECTIO
N
	  I'M
	  M
AKIN
G	  N
O
W
.	  THIS	  PRO
CESS	  IS	  TEACHIN
G	  U
S	  A	  LO
T,	  ALL	  O
F	  U
S,	  AN
D	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  SHO
U
LD	  ALSO
	  LEARN
	  THRO
U
GH	  THIS	  TO
	  M
O
VE	  FO
RW
ARD	  W
HILE	  
DEEPEN
IN
G	  THE	  M
U
LTI-­‐ACTO
R	  W
O
RK	  THAT	  THEY'RE	  CARRYIN
G	  O
U
T.
14.06.05
W
olfgang	  Kleinw
aechter
W
GIG
Internet	  exceptionalism
THE	  RESO
U
RCE	  FO
R	  THE	  IN
FO
RM
ATIO
N
	  AGE	  IS	  DIFFEREN
T.	  IF	  IT	  W
O
RKS	  FO
R	  YO
U
,	  IT	  W
O
RKS	  FO
R	  M
E.	  IF	  IT	  DO
ESN
'T	  W
O
RK	  FO
R	  YO
U
,	  IT	  DO
ESN
'T	  W
O
RK	  FO
R	  M
E.	  THAT	  M
EAN
S	  IF	  
I	  U
SE	  AN
	  I.P.	  ADDRESS,	  YO
U
	  CAN
	  U
SE	  AN
	  I.P.	  ADDRESS.	  IF	  I	  U
SE	  A	  DO
M
AIN
	  N
AM
E,	  YO
U
	  CAN
	  U
SE	  A	  DO
M
AIN
	  N
AM
E.	  THAT	  IT	  M
EAN
S	  THIS	  IS	  N
O
T	  A	  ZERO
	  SU
M
	  GAM
E.	  IT	  IS	  A	  W
IN
-­‐
W
IN
	  SITU
ATIO
N
.
14.06.05
W
olfgang	  Kleinw
aechter
W
GIG
Internet	  exceptionalism
N
D	  IF	  IT	  CO
M
ES	  DO
W
N
	  TO
	  A	  VERY	  CO
N
CRETE	  Q
U
ESTIO
N
S,	  FO
R	  IN
STAN
CE,	  THE	  SO
VEREIGN
TY	  O
F	  A	  N
ATIO
N
	  STATE,	  I	  THIN
K	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  HAVE	  TO
	  U
N
DERSTAN
D	  ALTHO
U
GH	  
THAT	  IN
	  THE	  CYBERSPACE,	  THEY	  HAVE	  TO
	  SHARE	  THE	  SO
VEREIGN
TY	  W
ITH	  O
THERS,	  W
HILE	  N
ATIO
N
AL	  SO
VEREIGN
TY	  W
ILL	  REM
AIN
	  A	  BASIC	  PRIN
CIPLE	  FO
R	  THE	  N
EXT	  100	  YEARS	  
IN
	  THE	  M
AJO
RITY	  O
F	  THE	  ISSU
ES	  O
F	  THE	  DAY-­‐TO
-­‐DAY	  PO
LICY,	  I	  THIN
K	  IN
	  CYBERSPACE,	  W
E	  HAVE	  TO
	  GO
	  BEYO
N
D	  THE	  TRADITIO
N
AL	  U
N
DERSTAN
DIN
G	  O
F	  N
ATIO
N
AL	  
SO
VEREIGN
TY,	  BECAU
SE	  THIS	  IS	  N
O
T	  A	  ZERO
-­‐SU
M
	  GAM
E.
14.06.05
Brazil
M
Sism
These	  points	  to	  the	  need	  to	  create	  an	  international	  structure	  for	  Internet's	  global	  governance	  that	  involves	  adequate	  representation	  from
	  governm
ents	  and	  other	  segm
ents	  of	  
civil	  society,	  such	  as	  the	  third	  sector	  [1],	  the	  private	  sector,	  and	  the	  academ
ic	  com
m
unity.
14.06.05
Isabelle	  Falque-­‐Pierrotin
Forum
	  des	  Droits	  sur	  Internet
M
Sism
In	  conclusion,	  a	  subject	  not	  yet	  tackled	  should	  be	  studied.	  W
e	  think	  that	  collaboration	  betw
een	  public	  and	  private	  international	  organizations	  w
orking	  on	  internet	  issues	  should	  
be	  encouraged.	  For	  this	  reason,	  w
e	  m
ake	  the	  follow
ing	  proposal.	  An	  office	  (a	  "liaison	  secretary")	  should	  be	  created	  at	  the	  international	  level	  that	  w
ould	  be	  a	  link	  betw
een	  all	  
these	  organizations	  (W
IPO
,	  ITU
,	  W
TO
,	  etc.)	  on	  the	  internet	  related	  issues.	  This	  Â«	  go-­‐betw
een	  Â»	  w
ould	  favour	  tw
o	  m
ain	  principles:	  coordination	  betw
een	  the	  num
erous	  
institutions	  and	  genuinely	  plural	  participation.
14.06.05
Brazil
M
Sism
THIS	  PO
IN
TS	  TO
	  THE	  N
EED	  TO
	  CREATE	  AN
	  IN
TERN
ATIO
N
AL	  STRU
CTU
RE	  FO
R	  IN
TERN
ET	  GLO
BAL	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  THAT	  IN
VO
LVES	  ADEQ
U
ATE	  REPRESEN
TATIO
N
	  FRO
M
	  
GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  AN
D	  O
THER	  SEGM
EN
TS	  O
F	  THE	  CIVIL	  SO
CIETY,	  SU
CH	  AS	  THE	  THIRD	  SECTO
R,	  THE	  PRIVATE	  SECTO
R,	  THE	  ACADEM
IC	  CO
M
M
U
N
ITY.
14.06.05
Raul	  Echebarria
W
GIG
M
Sism
W
HAT	  I	  W
O
U
LD	  LIKE	  TO
	  HIGHLIGHT	  IS	  W
HAT	  I	  SEE	  IS	  VERY	  STRO
N
G	  SU
PPO
RT	  BY	  THE	  LATIN
	  AM
ERICAN
	  AN
D	  CARIBBEAN
	  REGIO
N
	  TO
	  A	  SU
PPO
RT	  FO
R	  A	  M
U
LTISTAKEHO
LDER	  
SYSTEM
,
14.06.05
U
N
DP-­‐ADPIP
M
Sism
Third,	  Internet	  Governance	  m
echanism
s	  should	  include	  all	  affected	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  processes	  of	  decision-­‐m
aking	  as	  w
ell	  as	  im
plem
entation.	  W
hile	  the	  definition	  of	  w
ho	  is	  a	  
"stakeholder"	  varies,	  from
	  our	  report	  it	  m
ust	  at	  least	  include	  actors	  from
	  the	  private	  sector,	  governm
ent	  and	  civil	  society.
14.06.05
Alejandro	  Pisanty
W
GIG
no	  iGF
SO
	  THIS	  IS	  TO
	  EXPLAIN
	  THAT	  THERE	  IS	  N
O
T	  O
N
LY	  A	  VERY	  W
ELL-­‐EXPRESSED	  RESISTAN
CE	  TO
	  AN
	  ALL-­‐EN
CO
M
PASSIN
G	  N
EW
	  FO
RU
M
	  CO
M
IN
G	  FRO
M
	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S	  THAT	  W
AN
T	  
TO
	  CO
N
SERVE	  THEIR	  SPACE	  O
R	  CO
M
IN
G	  FRO
M
	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S	  THAT	  DO
N
'T	  W
AN
T	  TO
	  SEE	  M
O
RE	  CHAN
GE	  BECAU
SE	  THEY	  ARE	  AT	  THE	  FO
REFRO
N
T	  O
F	  CHAN
GE,	  BU
T	  O
F	  
THIN
KIN
G	  CLEARLY	  THAT	  THE	  ALL-­‐EN
CO
M
PASSIN
G	  FO
RU
M
	  IS	  N
O
T	  BO
U
N
D	  TO
	  BE	  AS	  U
SEFU
L	  AS	  M
O
RE	  FO
CU
SED	  SPECIFIC	  M
ECHAN
ISM
S.
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Brian	  Carpenter
IETF
no	  iGF
I	  FEEL	  STRO
N
GLY	  THAT	  W
GIG	  SHO
U
LD	  AVO
ID	  RECO
M
M
EN
DIN
G	  CREATIO
N
	  O
F	  N
EW
,	  IN
DEPEN
DEN
T	  GRO
U
PS	  W
HO
	  W
ILL	  JU
ST	  DISCU
SS	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET.
458
14.06.05
Anthony	  Hill
South	  Centre
no	  separation	  technical/political
he	  sharp	  distinction	  betw
een	  technical	  and	  Policy	  issues	  does	  not	  reflect	  w
hat	  the	  Q
uestionnaire	  considers	  to	  be	  -­‐Politically	  and	  financially	  realistic	  proposals.	  The	  technical	  
system
s,	  of	  w
hich	  the	  DN
S	  is	  one,	  and	  the	  Institutional	  Fram
ew
ork	  of	  O
rganisations,	  of	  w
hich	  ICAN
N
	  is	  one,	  w
orks	  together	  in	  com
plem
entary	  w
ays.	  The	  Institutional	  Fram
ew
ork	  
and	  policies	  are	  engaged	  continuously	  to	  enable	  the	  technical	  system
s	  to	  be	  constructed,	  operated,	  controlled,	  regulated,	  and	  im
proved	  and	  this	  is	  true	  for	  both	  the	  private	  and	  
public	  sectors.	  Thus	  w
e	  believe	  that	  to	  try	  to	  distinguish	  too	  sharply	  technical	  from
	  policy	  m
atters	  denudes	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  the	  im
portance	  that	  is	  has	  for	  Publics	  
across	  the	  w
orld.
14.06.05
Anthony	  Hill
South	  Centre
no	  separation	  technical/political
THE	  SHARP	  DISTIN
CTIO
N
	  BETW
EEN
	  TECHN
ICAL	  AN
D	  PO
LICY	  ISSU
ES	  DO
ES	  N
O
T	  REFLECT	  W
HAT	  THE	  Q
U
ESTIO
N
N
AIRE	  CO
N
SIDERS	  TO
	  BE	  -­‐-­‐	  AN
D	  I	  Q
U
O
TE	  -­‐-­‐	  PO
LITICALLY	  AN
D	  
FIN
AN
CIALLY	  REALISTIC	  PRO
PO
SALS,	  U
N
Q
U
O
TE
14.06.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
no	  special	  role	  for	  the	  state
I	  DO
	  REALLY	  RECO
GN
IZE	  THE	  IM
PO
RTAN
T	  RO
LE	  O
F	  THE	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS.	  BU
T	  W
HEN
	  IT	  CO
M
ES	  TO
	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE,	  W
E	  U
N
DERSTO
O
D	  IN
	  TEHERAN
	  THAT	  O
THER	  
STAKEHO
LDERS	  SHO
U
LD	  HAVE	  THEIR	  RO
LES,	  IF	  N
O
T,	  SAY,	  STRICTLY	  EQ
U
AL,	  BU
T	  ACCO
RDIN
G	  TO
	  THEIR	  RO
LES	  THAT	  W
E	  SHO
U
LD	  PLAY.
14.06.05
Heather	  Shaw
ICC
non-­‐binding	  insitutions	  only
SU
CH	  DISCU
SSIO
N
	  W
ILL	  N
ATU
RALLY	  AID	  IN
	  THE	  CO
O
RDIN
ATIO
N
	  O
F	  EXISTIN
G	  IN
STITU
TIO
N
S	  AN
D	  HELP	  TO
	  AVO
ID	  DU
PLICATIO
N
	  O
F	  EFFO
RTS.	  IN
	  THIS	  REGARD,	  ICC	  RESPO
N
DED	  
W
ITH	  A	  CO
N
DITIO
N
AL	  YES	  TO
	  THE	  N
EED	  FO
R	  DISCU
SSIO
N
	  FO
RU
M
.	  W
E	  BELIEVE	  THAT	  THIS	  N
EED	  IS	  DISTIN
CT	  FRO
M
	  THE	  N
EED	  FO
R	  O
VERSIGHT	  AN
D	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  CO
N
SIDERED	  
SEPARATELY	  BY	  THE	  W
O
RKIN
G	  GRO
U
P,	  AS	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  EACH	  O
F	  THE	  O
THER	  Q
U
ESTIO
N
S.
14.06.05
Lee	  How
ard
ICAN
N
-­‐ASO
non-­‐binding	  insitutions	  only
W
HERE	  THIS	  FO
RU
M
	  IS	  CO
N
CEIVED	  AS	  HAVIN
G	  O
VERSIGHT	  AU
THO
RITY	  IS	  TO
O
	  M
U
CH,	  HO
W
EVER.
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Anthony	  Hill
South	  Centre
O
ptim
ize	  connectivity	  and	  access
FO
R	  THESE	  REASO
N
S,	  THE	  RECO
M
M
EN
DATIO
N
S	  O
F	  W
GIG	  SHO
U
LD	  ADDRESS	  THESE	  KEY	  ISSU
ES.	  THE	  CO
N
SU
LTATIO
N
S	  TO
	  DATE	  IN
	  THE	  O
PEN
	  SESSIO
N
	  PERHAPS	  HAVE	  N
O
T	  
GIVEN
	  SU
FFICIEN
T	  ATTEN
TIO
N
	  TO
	  IN
TERCO
N
N
ECTIO
N
	  CHARGES	  AN
D	  BRO
ADBAN
D	  CO
N
N
ECTIVITY	  AN
D	  THE	  KEY	  RO
LES	  O
F	  IN
TERN
ET	  SERVICE	  PRO
VIDERS.
14.06.05
Lynn	  St.Am
our
ISO
C
Participation	  form
	  developing	  countries	  is	  satisfactory
Finally,	  it	  is	  w
orth	  restating	  here	  that	  the	  processes	  that	  support	  the	  developm
ent	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  Internet	  are	  truly	  open	  to	  all	  and	  are	  already	  m
ulti-­‐stakeholder.
14.06.05
N
om
inet	  U
K
Participation	  form
	  developing	  countries	  is	  satisfactory
AN
D	  I	  THIN
K	  IT'S	  ALSO
	  STRIKIN
G	  THAT	  PARTICIPAN
TS	  FRO
M
	  DEVELO
PIN
G	  N
ATIO
N
S	  ARE	  ABLE	  TO
	  SU
CCESSFU
LLY	  EN
GAGE	  IN
	  THO
SE	  PRO
CESSES	  AT	  PRESEN
T.
14.06.05
Japan
Private	  sector	  leadership
TAKIN
G	  IN
TO
	  ACCO
U
N
T	  THE	  M
ARKET	  CO
M
PETITIO
N
-­‐LED	  DEVELO
PM
EN
T	  W
HICH	  HAS	  BRO
U
GHT	  THE	  CU
RREN
T	  SU
CCESS.
14.06.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
question	  the	  U
S	  oversight	  of	  ICAN
N
W
E	  THIN
K	  IT	  IS	  VERY	  IM
PO
RTAN
T	  TO
	  REVIEW
	  THE	  EXISTIN
G	  O
VERSIGHT	  ARRAN
GEM
EN
TS	  W
HEN
	  W
E	  EVALU
ATE	  THE	  N
EED	  FO
R	  N
EW
	  O
VERSIGHT	  FU
N
CTIO
N
.	  AT	  PRESEN
T,	  THE	  
O
VERSIGHT	  IS	  DO
N
E	  BY	  THE	  U
.S.	  GO
VERN
M
EN
T	  O
N
	  THE	  ICAN
N
	  M
O
DELS.	  THE	  ARRAN
GEM
EN
TS	  ARE	  ESSEN
TIALLY	  O
N
E,	  TO
	  M
AN
DATE	  ICAN
N
	  TO
	  SU
BM
IT	  AN
N
U
AL	  REPO
RTS,	  AN
D,	  
TW
O
,	  TO
	  EXAM
IN
E	  AN
D	  APPRO
VE	  CHAN
GES	  TO
	  THE	  IAN
A	  DATABASE	  REQ
U
ESTED	  BY	  ICAN
N
.
14.06.05
Brian	  Carpenter
IETF
separation	  technical/political
BU
T	  IT'S	  IM
PO
RTAN
T	  THAT	  W
GIG	  FO
CU
S	  O
N
	  RESU
LTS	  AN
D	  SO
LVIN
G	  REAL	  PRO
BLEM
S.	  PERSO
N
ALLY,	  DU
RIN
G	  THE	  DEBATE	  O
VER	  IN
TERN
ET	  GO
VERN
AN
CE,	  I	  FEEL	  THERE'S	  BEEN
	  
TO
O
	  M
U
CH	  TIM
E	  SPEN
T	  O
N
	  DO
M
AIN
	  N
AM
ES,	  I.P.	  ADDRESSES,	  AN
D	  RO
O
T	  SERVERS.	  THESE	  ARE	  LARGELY	  TECHN
ICAL	  M
ATTERS	  FO
R	  THE	  TECHN
ICAL	  CO
M
M
U
N
ITY.
14.06.05
China
sovereignty
SECO
N
DLY,	  AS	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  RESO
U
RCE	  IS	  VERY	  SIGN
IFICAN
T	  TO
	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  DEVELO
PM
EN
T	  AN
D	  SECU
RITY,	  AN
D	  IT	  CO
N
CERN
S	  THE	  SO
VEREIGN
TY	  AN
D	  PU
BLIC	  IN
TEREST	  O
F	  
ALL	  STATES,	  W
HICH	  SO
LVED	  THE	  PRO
BLEM
	  O
F	  DEFICIEN
CY	  O
F	  A	  CO
M
PETEN
T	  BO
DY	  O
F	  IN
TERN
ET	  M
AN
AGEM
EN
T,	  W
HICH	  IS	  AU
THO
RITATIVE	  AN
D	  LEGITIM
ATE	  AN
D	  
RECO
GN
IZED	  BY	  THE	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS.
14.06.05
China
sovereignty
SU
CH	  STATE	  SO
VEREIGN
TY,	  IN
TERN
ET	  SECU
RITY,	  AN
D	  ISSU
ES	  THAT	  CO
N
CERN
	  PU
BLIC	  IN
TEREST	  AN
D	  THE	  PU
BLIC	  PO
LICIES	  O
F	  IN
TERN
ET	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  SO
LVED	  BY	  
IN
TERGO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  M
ECHAN
ISM
	  AN
D	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  M
AN
DATO
RY.
14.06.05
Brazil
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
o	  deal	  w
ith	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  the	  nations'	  sovereignty:
14.06.05
Brazil
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
IT	  SHO
U
LD	  IN
CLU
DE	  AN
	  IN
TERGO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  M
ECHAN
ISM
	  IN
	  W
HICH	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  EXERT	  THEIR	  RESPO
N
SIBILITIES	  THRO
U
GH	  A	  SPECIFIC	  SET	  O
F	  PU
BLIC-­‐PO
LICY	  ISSU
ES.
14.06.05
China
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
AT	  DIFFEREN
T	  LEVELS	  AT	  GO
VERN
AN
CE,	  STAKEHO
LDERS	  PLAY	  DIFFEREN
T	  RO
LES.	  AT	  SO
M
E	  DIM
EN
SIO
N
,	  THE	  GO
VERN
M
EN
T	  SHO
U
LD	  PLAY	  A	  LEADIN
G	  RO
LE.
14.06.05
U
N
ESCAP
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
AN
D	  THE	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  HAVE	  THE	  RESPO
N
SIBILITY	  TO
	  M
AKE	  IN
TERN
ET	  U
SEFU
L	  TO
	  THE	  DEVELO
PM
EN
T	  O
F	  THE	  N
ATIO
N
.
14.06.05
U
N
DP-­‐ADPIP
special	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  M
Sism
Second,	  governm
ents	  have	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  ensuring	  the	  sustainability	  of	  critical	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  region.	  Their	  capacity	  to	  enable	  the	  developm
ent	  of	  the	  Internet	  is	  probably	  
under-­‐utilised	  at	  present.
14.06.05
Art	  Reilly
ICC
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
The	  ICC	  w
ould	  concede	  that	  all	  institutions	  need	  to	  constantly	  seek	  to	  im
prove,	  and	  those	  associated	  w
ith	  the	  Internet	  are	  no	  exception.	  How
ever,	  each	  organization	  w
orking	  to	  
evolve	  the	  Internet	  has	  processes	  in	  place	  tow
ard	  this	  objective.	  Brian	  Carpenter	  spoke	  earlier	  on	  som
e	  of	  the	  outreach	  and	  other	  efforts	  of	  the	  IETF.	  Furtherm
ore,	  the	  Internet	  
w
as	  designed	  to	  be	  m
anaged/coordinated	  in	  a	  decentralized	  fashion	  w
ithout	  any	  need	  for	  "centralized"	  control.
14.06.05
Brian	  Carpenter
IETF
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
I	  feel	  strongly	  that	  the	  W
GIG	  should	  avoid	  recom
m
ending	  the	  creation	  of	  new
	  independent	  groups	  that	  w
ill	  m
erely	  discuss	  Internet.	  W
e	  already	  have	  enough	  of	  those.	  N
or	  
should	  W
GIG	  recom
m
end	  a	  new
	  group	  to	  duplicate	  the	  w
ork	  already	  being	  done	  elsew
here,	  or	  to	  look	  into	  technical	  m
atters	  such	  as	  the	  infeasibility	  of	  geographic	  addressing	  
w
ithout	  deep	  expertise	  on	  the	  technical	  issues	  involved.	  Your	  w
orking	  group	  w
ill	  not	  be	  a	  success	  if	  its	  m
ain	  recom
m
endation	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  another	  w
orking	  group.	  I	  hope	  
w
e	  can	  reduce	  the	  num
ber	  of	  m
eetings	  that	  w
e	  all	  have	  to	  attend.	  Let's	  instead	  find	  w
ays	  to	  build	  on	  the	  institutions	  that	  have	  served	  the	  Internet	  and	  the	  Internet	  com
m
unity	  
so	  w
ell.
14.06.05
Axel	  Paw
lik
N
RO
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
The	  N
RO
	  has	  also	  supported	  ICAN
N
	  in	  its	  efforts	  to	  em
brace	  these	  principles	  a	  nd	  characteristics,	  and	  has	  supported	  the	  continuing	  evolution	  of	  ICAN
N
's	  structure	  in	  order	  to	  
better	  fulfil	  its	  role.	  Further	  change	  is	  required	  for	  ICAN
N
	  to	  m
eet	  the	  evolving	  global	  agenda	  of	  the	  Internet,	  particularly	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  inform
ation	  
society.	  The	  N
RO
	  believes	  that	  the	  continui	  ng	  evolution	  of	  the	  Internet	  coordination	  function	  should	  include	  consideration	  of	  the	  follow
ing	  topics.
14.06.05
N
om
inet	  U
K
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
LIKE	  O
THERS	  W
HO
	  HAVE	  SPO
KEN
	  THIS	  M
O
RN
IN
G,	  W
E	  DO
	  N
O
T	  FEEL	  CO
N
VIN
CED	  O
F	  THE	  N
EED	  FO
R	  A	  N
EW
	  IN
STITU
TIO
N
.
14.06.05
N
om
inet	  U
K
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
EXISTIN
G	  IN
STITU
TIO
N
S	  SU
CH	  AS	  ICAN
N
	  O
R	  THE	  IETF	  ALLO
W
	  FO
R	  A	  M
U
LTISTAKEHO
LDER	  PARTICIPATIO
N
	  O
N
	  AN
	  EQ
U
AL	  FO
O
TIN
G.	  AN
D	  I	  THIN
K	  W
E	  ALL	  ACKN
O
W
LEDGE	  THAT	  
THAT	  IS	  VERY	  IM
PO
RTAN
T.
14.06.05
Alejandro	  Pisanty
W
GIG
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
FO
R	  EXAM
PLE,	  AN
D	  IN
	  THE	  PAPERS	  THAT	  ARE	  PU
BLISHED	  AS	  AN
	  ADVAN
CE	  O
F	  THE	  REPO
RT,	  O
F	  THE	  W
GIG,	  HO
W
	  DEEP	  THE	  SCRU
TIN
Y	  CAN
	  BE,	  FO
R	  EXAM
PLE,	  O
F	  ICAN
N
,	  W
HICH	  
CO
M
ES	  O
U
T	  IN
	  O
U
R	  VIEW
,	  IN
	  LARGE	  SCALE,	  A	  FU
LFILLM
EN
T	  O
F	  THESE	  VALU
ES.
14.06.05
Alejandro	  Pisanty
W
GIG
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
W
HAT	  IS	  CALLED	  IN
	  THESE	  DISCU
SSIO
N
S	  THE	  PRESEN
T	  ARRAN
GEM
EN
TS	  O
R	  EVEN
	  THE	  STATU
S	  Q
U
O
	  IS	  ACTU
ALLY	  O
N
E	  STEP	  IN
	  AN
	  EVO
LU
TIO
N
	  PRO
CESS	  IN
	  W
HICH	  N
EW
	  
GO
VERN
AN
CE	  ARRAN
GEM
EN
TS	  ARE	  BEIN
G	  M
ADE,	  EXPLO
RED,	  EXPERIM
EN
TED	  W
ITH,	  AN
D	  CO
N
TIN
U
O
U
SLY	  CO
RRECTED	  ACCO
RDIN
G	  TO
	  THE	  N
EEDS	  AN
D	  PRIN
CIPLES	  O
F	  THE	  
PARTICIPAN
TS.	  AM
O
N
G	  O
THER	  M
EM
BERS	  O
F	  THE	  W
O
RKIN
G	  GRO
U
P,	  PRO
FESSO
R	  KLEIN
W
ACHTER,	  HAS	  BEEN
	  VERY	  IN
SISTEN
T	  IN
	  AN
	  EXCELLEN
T	  AN
D	  BRIEF	  ARTICLE	  IN
	  GERM
AN
	  
O
N
	  THE	  FACT	  THAT	  THE	  EVO
LU
TIO
N
	  O
F	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  IN
	  THIS	  FO
RM
	  W
ILL	  BE	  A	  M
EASU
RE	  O
F	  HO
W
	  M
U
CH	  PEO
PLE	  AN
D	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S	  ARE	  REALLY	  ADAPTIN
G	  THEIR	  
GO
VERN
AN
CE	  TO
	  THE	  21ST	  CEN
TU
RY.
459
14.06.05
Raul	  Echebarria
W
GIG
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
SIM
PLY	  W
E	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  CO
M
M
ITTED	  TO
	  TECHN
O
LO
GY	  AN
D	  SCIEN
CE	  AN
D	  HAVE	  AN
	  IN
N
O
VATO
RY	  PRO
FILE,	  W
O
RKIN
G	  W
ITHIN
	  THE	  FRAM
EW
O
RK	  O
F	  GO
VERN
AN
CE	  IN
	  THAT	  
SPIRIT.	  BU
T	  CERTAIN
LY	  W
E	  SHO
U
LD	  N
O
T	  DESTRO
Y	  W
HAT	  EXISTS	  AN
D	  W
HAT	  IS	  SHO
W
N
	  AS	  BEN
EFITS	  ALREADY.	  SIM
PLY,	  I	  REPEAT,	  W
E	  SHO
U
LD	  IM
PRO
VE:	  W
E	  SHO
U
LD	  ADD	  
ASPECTS	  THAT	  PRO
VIDE	  ADDED	  VALU
E.	  BU
T	  IDEN
TIFYIN
G	  CLEARLY	  THE	  PRO
BLEM
S	  THAT	  N
EED	  TO
	  BE	  SO
LVED	  N
O
W
.
14.06.05
Brian	  Carpenter
IETF
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
LET'S,	  IN
STEAD,	  FIN
D	  W
AYS	  TO
	  BU
ILD	  O
N
	  THE	  IN
STITU
TIO
N
S	  THAT	  HAVE	  SERVED	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  CO
M
M
U
N
ITY	  SO
	  W
ELL.
14.06.05
Lee	  How
ard
ICAN
N
-­‐ASO
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
W
E	  IN
VITE	  AN
D	  W
ELCO
M
E	  PRO
PO
SALS	  AN
D	  SU
GGEST	  THAT	  U
N
LESS	  THE	  CU
RREN
T	  PRO
CESS	  IS	  BRO
KEN
,	  IT	  SHO
U
LD	  N
O
T	  BE	  FIXED.	  THE	  ASAO
C	  DO
ES	  N
O
T	  O
BJECT	  TO
	  THE	  
FO
RM
ATIO
N
	  O
F	  A	  FO
RU
M
	  O
F	  SO
M
E	  KIN
D	  W
ITH	  THE	  PU
RPO
SE	  O
F	  DISCU
SSIN
G	  PU
BLIC	  PO
LICY	  ISSU
ES	  AM
O
N
G	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS	  AN
D	  CIVIL	  SO
CIETY.
14.06.05
Art	  Reilly
ICC
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
BU
T	  LET	  M
E	  JU
ST	  M
AKE	  A	  GEN
ERAL	  STATEM
EN
T	  W
ITH	  REGARD	  TO
	  O
U
R	  PERSPECTIVES.	  THE	  ICC	  M
EM
BERS	  STRESS	  THE	  N
EED	  FO
R	  THE	  W
O
RKIN
G	  GRO
U
P	  O
N
	  IN
TERN
ET	  
GO
VERN
AN
CE	  IN
	  FIN
ALIZIN
G	  ITS	  REPO
RT	  TO
	  BE	  PRAGM
ATIC	  AN
D	  TO
	  REFLECT	  THE	  FACT	  THAT	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  HAS	  BEEN
	  FU
N
CTIO
N
IN
G	  W
ELL	  AN
D	  THIS	  SHO
U
LD	  N
O
T	  BE	  IN
	  AN
Y	  
W
AY	  IN
TERRU
PTED.
14.06.05
Paul	  Tw
om
ey
ICAN
N
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
ICAN
N
	  IS	  A	  TRU
LY	  M
U
LTISTAKEHO
LDER	  M
O
DEL	  W
HICH	  CO
N
TIN
U
ES	  TO
	  EVO
LVE.	  IN
DEED,	  A	  STRIKIN
G	  ASPECT	  O
F	  ITS	  BYLAW
S	  IS	  THAT	  THEY	  REQ
U
IRE	  VERY	  REGU
LAR	  REVIEW
	  O
F	  
ITS	  IN
TERN
AL	  STRU
CTU
RES	  TO
	  EN
SU
RE	  THAT	  THEY	  CO
N
TIN
U
E	  TO
	  BE	  RELEVAN
T	  TO
	  THE	  N
EEDS	  O
F	  AN
	  EVO
LVIN
G	  IN
TERN
ET	  CO
M
M
U
N
ITY.	  THE	  W
SIS	  PRO
CESS	  AN
D	  THE	  W
O
RK	  O
F	  
THE	  W
O
RKIN
G	  GRO
U
P	  HAS	  PRO
VIDED	  U
S	  W
ITH	  AN
	  O
PPO
RTU
N
ITY	  TO
	  SHARE	  O
U
R	  EXPERIEN
CES	  AS	  W
ELL	  AS	  TO
	  LISTEN
	  TO
	  W
HERE	  ICAN
N
,	  AS	  O
N
E	  O
F	  THE	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S	  
ACTIVE	  IN
	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET,	  CO
U
LD	  IM
PRO
VE.
14.06.05
ISO
C
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
W
E	  STRO
N
GLY	  U
RGE	  THE	  W
GIG	  TO
	  BU
ILD	  U
PO
N
	  THESE	  M
O
DELS	  AN
D	  W
O
RK	  W
ITH	  THESE	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S	  RATHER	  THAN
	  CREATIN
G	  A	  N
EW
	  BO
DY.
14.06.05
ISO
C
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
HO
SE	  O
F	  YO
U
	  THAT	  HAVE	  TAKEN
	  THE	  TIM
E	  TO
	  STU
DY	  HO
W
	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET'S	  CU
RREN
T	  PRO
CESSES	  AN
D	  GRO
U
PS	  FU
N
CTIO
N
	  W
ILL	  HAVE	  FO
U
N
D	  AN
	  EXCELLEN
T	  EXAM
PLE	  O
F	  
SU
CH	  CO
O
PERATIO
N
	  IN
	  THE	  W
AY	  GRO
U
PS	  SU
CH	  AS	  THE	  IETF,	  THE	  REGIO
N
AL	  IN
TERN
ET	  REGISTRIES,	  AN
D	  ICAN
N
,	  ET	  CETERA,	  ALL	  W
O
RK	  TO
GETHER.
14.06.05
Axel	  Paw
lik
N
RO
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
THE	  N
RO
	  HAS	  BEEN
	  SU
PPO
RTIVE	  O
F	  THE	  ICAN
N
	  M
O
DEL	  AS	  THE	  M
O
ST	  APPRO
PRIATE	  O
N
E	  TO
	  SU
PPO
RT	  THE	  FU
RTHER	  GRO
W
TH	  AN
D	  EVO
LU
TIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET.
14.06.05
Japan
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
W
E,	  HO
W
EVER,	  ARGU
E	  W
HETHER	  IT	  IS	  N
ECESSARY	  TO
	  FO
RM
	  A	  N
EW
	  AGEN
CY	  IN
	  DEALIN
G	  W
ITH	  IN
TERN
ET-­‐RELATED	  PO
LICY	  ISSU
ES	  AN
D	  CO
O
RDIN
ATIO
N
	  O
F	  PU
BLIC	  PO
LICIES.	  
THERE	  ARE	  ALREADY	  A	  N
U
M
BER	  O
F	  RESPO
N
SIBLE	  IN
TERN
ATIO
N
AL	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S	  FU
N
CTIO
N
IN
G	  W
ELL,	  AN
D	  THERE	  IS	  A	  RISK	  THAT	  THE	  ADDITIO
N
AL	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
	  CO
U
LD	  
CO
N
STITU
TE	  A	  GREATER	  CO
ST	  THAN
	  M
AKIN
G	  THE	  W
HO
LE	  PRO
CESS	  M
O
RE	  EFFICIEN
T.
14.06.05
ITAA
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
W
E	  BELIEVE	  THAT	  IN
	  THE	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
	  THAT	  IS	  N
EW
	  AN
D	  ADDITIVE,	  REGARDLESS	  O
F	  HO
W
	  LEAN
	  ITS	  SECRETARIAT	  O
R	  ITS	  ACTIVITIES,	  W
O
U
LD	  EN
TAIL	  EXPEN
SES	  AN
D	  
CO
M
M
ITM
EN
TS	  O
F	  TIM
E	  AN
D	  EN
ERGY	  THAT	  W
E	  BELIEVE	  CO
U
LD	  BE	  PU
T	  TO
	  BETTER	  U
SE.
14.06.05
ITAA
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
SO
	  N
EW
	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S	  W
ILL	  DU
PLICATE	  W
O
RK	  O
R	  PERHAPS	  CO
M
PETE	  W
ITH	  W
O
RK	  THAT	  M
U
ST	  BE	  DO
N
E.	  W
E	  BELIEVE	  THERE	  IS	  A	  M
O
RE	  RESPO
N
SIBLE	  APPRO
ACH,	  AN
D	  
THAT	  IS	  TO
	  STREN
GTHEN
	  THE	  EXISTIN
G	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S	  TO
	  IM
PRO
VE	  THEIR	  PERFO
RM
AN
CE,	  PRO
VIDE	  FO
R	  BETTER	  AN
D	  BRO
ADER	  TRAN
SPAREN
CY,	  PRO
VIDE	  FO
R	  GREATER	  
AN
D	  M
O
RE	  O
PEN
	  M
U
LTISTAKEHO
LDER	  PARTICIPATIO
N
	  IN
	  CO
N
SU
LTATIO
N
:	  STRIVE	  TO
	  IM
PRO
VE	  AN
D	  IN
CREASED	  PARTICIPATIO
N
	  AN
D	  IM
PRO
VE	  THE	  O
PPO
RTU
N
ITY	  FO
R	  
PARTICIPATIO
N
	  BY	  DEVELO
PIN
G	  CO
M
M
U
N
ITY	  REPRESEN
TATIVES	  IN
	  THE	  EXISTIN
G	  BO
DIES.	  SO
	  IN
	  SU
M
M
ARY	  W
E	  O
PPO
SE	  THE	  CREATIO
N
	  O
F	  A	  N
EW
	  BO
DY
14.06.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
support	  of	  the	  status	  quo
FO
R	  THE	  FIRST	  Q
U
ESTIO
N
,	  THE	  N
EED	  FO
R	  ADDITIO
N
AL	  ARRAN
GEM
EN
T	  O
F	  BO
DY,	  W
E	  DO
	  N
O
T	  THIN
K	  THERE	  IS	  N
EED	  FO
R	  AN
	  ADDITIO
N
AL	  ARRAN
GEM
EN
T	  O
F	  BO
DY.	  W
HEN
EVER	  
W
E	  HAD	  ISSU
ES	  REGARDIN
G	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET,	  IN
DIVIDU
ALS	  O
R	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S	  THAT	  THIN
K	  IT	  N
ECESSARY	  TO
	  ADDRESS	  THO
SE	  ISSU
ES	  HAVE	  BEEN
	  ABLE	  TO
	  DO
	  SO
	  VO
LU
N
TARILY	  
AN
D	  CO
O
PERATIVELY.	  TO
	  DATE,	  CO
LLECTIVELY	  W
E	  HAVE	  BEEN
	  ABLE	  TO
	  SO
LVE	  THO
SE	  ISSU
ES.
14.06.05
Paul	  Tw
om
ey
ICAN
N
support	  of	  the	  U
S	  oversight
First,	  one	  cannot	  change	  histor	  y:	  the	  Internet	  research	  star	  ted	  and	  w
as	  developed	  largely	  in	  the	  U
nited	  States.
14.06.05
Paul	  Tw
om
ey
ICAN
N
support	  of	  the	  U
S	  oversight
AS	  TO
	  W
HAT	  W
ILL	  BE	  THE	  RELATIO
N
SHIP	  BETW
EEN
	  THE	  U
.S.	  DEPARTM
EN
T	  O
F	  CO
M
M
ERCE	  AN
D	  ICAN
N
	  AFTER	  THE	  CO
M
PLETIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  M
O
U
,	  LET	  M
E	  BE	  CLEAR	  THAT	  ICAN
N
	  
DO
ES	  N
O
T	  SPEAK	  O
N
	  BEHALF	  O
F	  THE	  U
N
ITED	  STATES	  GO
VERN
M
EN
T.	  THAT	  SAID,	  THE	  RO
LES	  O
F	  ALL	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TS,	  IN
CLU
DIN
G	  THAT	  O
F	  THE	  U
.S.	  GO
VERN
M
EN
T,	  ARE	  
IM
PO
RTAN
T	  AS	  THEY	  SHARE	  THE	  SAM
E	  IN
TEREST	  AS	  ALL	  ICAN
N
	  STAKEHO
LDERS,	  N
AM
ELY,	  A	  STABLE	  AN
D	  SECU
RE	  IN
TERN
ET.
14.06.05
Paul	  Tw
om
ey
ICAN
N
support	  of	  the	  U
S	  oversight
I	  AM
	  N
O
T	  AW
ARE	  O
F	  O
N
E	  IN
STAN
CE	  W
HERE	  THE	  U
N
ITED	  STATES	  GO
VERN
M
EN
T	  CAN
	  BE	  SEEN
	  TO
	  HAVE	  ABU
SED	  ITS	  RO
LE	  AN
D	  REJECTED	  A	  CHAN
GE	  TO
	  THE	  ZO
N
E	  FILE	  FO
R	  
PO
LITICAL	  REASO
N
S.
14.06.05
Vittorio	  Bertola
W
GIG
technological	  determ
inism
.	  I	  THIN
K	  THAT	  THIS	  IS	  REALLY	  AN
	  HISTO
RICAL	  O
PPO
RTU
N
ITY	  O
F	  BREAKIN
G	  N
EW
	  GRO
U
N
DS	  IN
	  TERM
S	  O
F	  GLO
BAL	  GO
VERN
AN
CE.	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  IS	  -­‐-­‐	  W
ELL,	  IT	  IS	  AM
AZIN
G.	  I	  
GU
ESS	  EVERYO
N
E	  BY	  N
O
W
	  HAS	  GO
T	  TO
	  KN
O
W
	  ALL	  THE	  CHAN
GES	  THAT	  THE	  IN
TERN
ET	  HAS	  BRO
U
GHT	  IN
	  O
U
R	  LIVES.	  AN
D	  IT'S	  REALLY	  M
AKIN
G	  THE	  W
O
RLD	  U
N
ITED	  IN
	  PEACE.	  I	  
THIN
K	  THIS	  IS	  AN
	  HISTO
RICAL	  ADVAN
CEM
EN
T	  IN
	  THE	  HISTO
RY	  O
F	  M
AN
KIN
D,	  M
AYBE.
14.06.05
Brazil
U
N
	  oversight	  of	  the	  ICAN
N
T	  SHO
U
LD	  CO
O
RDIN
ATE	  THE	  DIVERSE	  EXISTIN
G	  O
RGAN
IZATIO
N
S,	  IN
STEAD	  O
F	  REPLACIN
G	  THEM
.
14.06.05
China
U
N
	  oversight	  of	  the	  ICAN
N
SECO
N
DLY,	  THE	  SU
PERVISIO
N
	  AN
D	  AU
THO
RIZATIO
N
	  BY	  ICAN
N
	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  TRAN
SFERRED	  TO
	  THIS	  AGEN
CY.	  THE	  SPECIFIC	  O
PERATIO
N
	  O
F	  IN
TERN
ET	  RESO
U
RCES,	  IN
	  PRIN
CIPLE,	  
CO
U
LD	  BE	  M
AN
DATED	  TO
	  ICAN
N
:	  HO
W
EVER,	  ICAN
N
	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  SU
PERVISED	  AN
D	  M
AN
AGED	  BY	  THE	  AGEN
CY	  U
N
DER	  THE	  U
N
ITED	  N
ATIO
N
S.	  THE	  RELEVAN
T	  PU
BLIC	  PO
LICY	  
ISSU
ES	  SHO
U
LD	  BE	  APPRO
VED	  BY	  THIS	  AGEN
CY.
14.06.05
Ghana
U
N
	  oversight	  of	  the	  ICAN
N
THE	  O
VERSIGHT	  FU
N
CTIO
N
	  CO
U
LD	  IN
CLU
DE	  ISSU
ES	  SU
CH	  AS	  PO
LICY	  ADVICE,	  ARBITRATIO
N
,	  M
O
N
ITO
RIN
G,	  AU
DIT	  AN
D	  CO
M
M
U
N
ICATIO
N
.	  THE	  GEN
ERAL	  CO
N
SEN
SU
S	  W
AS	  
THAT	  THE	  PRO
PO
SED	  N
EW
	  BO
DY	  SHO
U
LD	  N
O
T	  O
N
LY	  TAKE	  O
VER	  THE	  GO
VERN
M
EN
TAL	  O
VERSIGHT	  FU
N
CTIO
N
S	  O
F	  THE	  DN
S	  AN
D	  RO
O
T	  SERVER	  SYSTEM
	  ADM
IN
ISTRATIO
N
	  BU
T	  
ALSO
	  O
THER	  AREAS	  O
F	  ACTIVITY	  U
N
DER	  THE	  O
VERSIGHT	  O
F	  THE	  U
SG.	  THIS	  O
VERSIGHT	  FU
N
CTIO
N
	  THRO
U
GH	  THIS	  N
EW
	  BO
DY	  SHO
U
LD	  N
O
T	  O
N
LY	  BE	  APPLICABLE	  TO
	  ICAN
N
	  
AFTER	  THE	  TERM
IN
ATIO
N
	  O
F	  THE	  M
O
U
	  IN
	  2006	  BU
T	  ALSO
	  PO
ST	  2006.
14.06.05
Abdullah	  Al-­‐Darrab
W
GIG
W
GIG	  critique
W
HEN
	  HE	  SPO
KE,	  TRU
LY,	  SIR,	  I	  W
AS	  N
O
T	  AW
ARE	  W
HETHER	  HE	  W
AS	  SPEAKIN
G	  IN
	  HIS	  PERSO
N
AL	  CAPACITY	  AS	  A	  M
EM
BER	  O
F	  THE	  GRO
U
P	  O
R	  W
AS	  HE	  SPEAKIN
G	  AS	  O
N
E	  O
F	  THE	  
M
EM
BERS	  O
F	  THE	  BO
ARD	  O
F	  DIRECTO
RS	  O
F	  THE	  ICAN
N
	  O
R	  HIS	  VICE-­‐CHAIRM
AN
	  O
R	  O
N
	  BEHALF	  O
F	  M
EXICO
.	  I	  W
AS	  A	  LITTLE	  BIT	  CO
N
FU
SED	  IN
	  THIS	  RESPECT.	  AN
D,	  THEREFO
RE,	  
SIR,	  I	  W
O
U
LD	  LIKE	  TO
	  REITERATE	  TO
	  EVERYBO
DY	  O
N
CE	  AGAIN
	  HERE	  THAT	  THE	  W
O
RKIN
G	  GRO
U
P	  DO
ES	  N
O
T	  HAVE	  FO
R	  A	  M
ISSIO
N
	  TO
	  DEFEN
D	  O
N
E	  CIRCLE	  O
R	  O
N
E	  O
RGAN
	  O
R	  
THE	  O
THER.
14.06.05
Syria
W
GIG	  critique
THAN
K	  YO
U
,	  CHAIRM
AN
,	  FO
R	  GIVIN
G	  M
E	  THE	  FLO
O
R	  AGAIN
.	  CHAIRM
AN
,	  I	  W
AS	  ABO
U
T	  TO
	  STATE	  SO
M
ETHIN
G	  IN
	  GEN
ERAL	  W
HEN
	  I	  HEARD	  THE	  LAST	  SPEAKER	  SPEAKIN
G	  ABO
U
T	  
W
IN
-­‐W
IN
	  SITU
ATIO
N
.
14.06.05
Izum
i	  Aizu
IGTF
W
GIG	  critique
SIM
ILARLY,	  W
E	  W
ERE	  DISCU
SSIN
G	  YESTERDAY	  AM
O
N
GST	  THE	  CIVIL	  SO
CIETY	  CAU
CU
S	  M
EM
BERS	  AN
D	  O
THERS	  THAT	  IT	  M
IGHT	  BE	  VERY	  HELPFU
L	  IF	  THE	  W
GIG	  BEIN
G	  THE	  
M
EM
BER	  AN
D	  THE	  SECRETARIAT	  CO
U
LD	  KIN
DLY	  M
AKE	  SO
M
E	  EXTRA	  EFFO
RTS	  TO
	  IN
CLU
DE	  CERTAIN
,	  SAY,	  DESCRIPTIO
N
	  O
R	  CO
M
M
EN
TARIES	  TO
	  THE	  8,000	  E-­‐M
AILS	  O
R	  10,000-­‐
PAGE	  IN
PU
TS	  HO
W
	  YO
U
	  RECEIVED	  THESE	  AN
D	  HO
W
	  YO
U
	  SO
RT	  O
F	  IN
CO
RPO
RATED	  O
R	  N
O
T	  IN
CLU
DED	  W
ITH	  SO
M
E,	  YO
U
	  KN
O
W
,	  VERY	  CO
N
CISE	  LAN
GU
AGE	  THAT	  M
IGHT	  BE	  
VERY	  HELPFU
L	  SO
	  THAT	  W
E	  CAN
	  DIGEST	  THEM
	  IN
	  A	  BETTER	  SO
RT	  O
F	  PRO
DU
CTIVE,	  O
PEN
,	  TRAN
SPAREN
T	  M
AN
N
ER.
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14.06.05
W
SIS	  Gender	  Caucus
W
GIG	  critique
The	  silence	  of	  the	  W
GIG	  on	  this	  m
ost	  fundam
ental	  issue	  of	  gender	  rights	  is	  astounding,	  given	  that	  the	  W
GIG	  has	  som
e	  very	  strong	  w
om
en	  in	  the	  group,	  som
e	  of	  w
hom
	  are	  w
ell-­‐
know
n	  in	  their	  dedication	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  gender	  balance	  and	  representation	  in	  the	  Inform
ation	  Society.
20.06.05
Francoise	  M
assit-­‐Follea
Vox	  Internet
question	  the	  U
S	  oversight	  of	  ICAN
N
The	  m
anagem
ent	  of	  technical	  resources	  cannot	  rem
ain	  as	  it	  has	  been	  passed	  dow
n	  through	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Internet:	  the	  end	  of	  the	  exclusive	  M
oU
	  betw
een	  ICAN
N
	  and	  the	  
U
.S.	  Governm
ent,	  planned	  for	  M
ay	  2006,	  is	  the	  real	  deadline.
20.06.05
Paschal	  Preston
Dublin	  U
niversity
question	  the	  U
S	  oversight	  of	  ICAN
N
ICAN
N
	  increasingly	  criticised	  and/or	  perceived	  as	  'flaw
ed	  entity'	  in	  term
s	  of	  its	  processes,	  structures	  and	  international	  legitim
acy	  ICAN
N
	  has	  been	  m
uch	  criticised	  for	  failing	  to	  
deliver	  on	  its	  original	  prom
ises	  and	  expectations.	  As	  the	  Internet	  has	  diffused	  internationally,	  ICAN
N
's	  legitim
acy,	  and	  its	  status	  as	  an	  organisation	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  oversight	  and	  
control	  of	  a	  single	  governm
ent,	  has	  been	  increasingly	  called	  into	  question.
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